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1 - 10 of 29 (0.29 seconds)Section 5 in The Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 [Entire Act]
Section 527 in The Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 [Entire Act]
Section 213 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
The State Of West Bengal & Anr vs Kailash Chandra Kapur & Ors on 29 November, 1996
26. The aforementioned cases indicate that in general tenancies are to be
regulated by the governing legislation, which favour that tenancy be
transferred only to family members of the deceased original tenant.
However, in light of the majority decision of the Constitution Bench in
Gian Devi vs. Jeevan Kumar (supra), the position which emerges is that
in absence of any specific provisions, general laws of succession to
apply, this position is further cemented by the decision of this Court
in State of West Bengal vs. Kailash Chandra Kapur (supra) which has
allowed the disposal of tenancy rights of Government owned land in
favour of a stranger by means of a Will in the absence of any specific
clause or provisions.
Sri Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi (Dead) ... vs Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi And Ors on 15 September, 1998
In Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi vs. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi & Ors.[7] a
dispute pertaining to the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 this Court held
as under:
H.C. Pandey vs G.C. Paul on 28 April, 1989
“Transfer connotes, normally, between two living persons during life;
Will takes effect after demise of the testator and transfer in that
perspective becomes incongruous. Though, as indicated earlier, the
assignment may be prohibited and the Government intended to be so, a
bequest in favour of a stranger by way of testamentary disposition
does not appear to be intended, in view of the permissive language
used in clause (12) of the covenants. We find no express prohibition
as at present under the terms of the lease. Unless the Government
amends the rules or imposes appropriate restrictive covenants
prohibiting the bequest in favour of the strangers or by enacting
appropriate law, there would be no statutory power to impose such
restrictions prohibiting such bequest in favour of the strangers. It
is seen that the object of assignment of the government land in favour
of the lessee is to provide him right to residence. If any such
transfer is made contrary to the policy, obviously, it would be
defeating the public purpose. But it would be open to the Government
to regulate by appropriate covenants in the lease deed or appropriate
statutory orders as per law or to make a law in this behalf. But so
long as that is not done and in the light of the permissive language
used in clause (12) of the lease deed, it cannot be said that the
bequest in favour of strangers inducting a stranger into the demised
premises or the building erected thereon is not governed by the
provisions of the regulation or that prior permission should be
required in that behalf. However, the stranger legatee should be bound
by all the covenants or any new covenants or statutory base so as to
bind all the existing lessees.”
In H.C. Pandey vs. G.C. Paul[9], this Court held that:
Parvinder Singh vs Renu Gautam & Ors on 22 April, 2004
“It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant,
subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting
the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the
deceased tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those
enjoyed by the original tenant.”
Furthermore in Parvinder Singh vs. Renu Gautam & Ors.[10], it has been held
by this Court that:
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs The Motor & General Traders on 18 March, 1975
“…If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that
the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor
institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that
procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial
process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding
it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot
blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the
decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure,
where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to
promote substantial justice — subject, of course, to the absence of
other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we
contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power
exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that
course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as
situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We
affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by
the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord
with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must,
take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the
institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both
sides are scrupulously obeyed.”
The abovementioned principle has been recognized in a catena of decisions.
This Court by placing reliance on the Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Case
(supra), held in Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram[14] that:
Ramesh Kumar vs Kesho Ram on 30 September, 1991
“…If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that
the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor
institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that
procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial
process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding
it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot
blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the
decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure,
where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to
promote substantial justice — subject, of course, to the absence of
other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we
contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power
exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that
course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as
situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We
affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by
the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord
with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must,
take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the
institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both
sides are scrupulously obeyed.”
The abovementioned principle has been recognized in a catena of decisions.
This Court by placing reliance on the Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Case
(supra), held in Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram[14] that: