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1 - 10 of 19 (0.38 seconds)Section 9 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Section 405 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
K. Muthukaruppa Pillai vs Sellathammal Alias Kanakammal And Anr. on 23 November, 1914
In support of that conclusion,
footnote No.6 cites several decisions including Venkata Rama
v. Venkata Suriya [(1880) 2 Mad 333] and Muthukaruppa v.
Sellathammal [(1916) 39 Mad 298] etc. It is stated
thereafter that her husband can neither control her in her
dealings with it, nor use it himself. But he may take it in
case of extreme distress, as in a famine, or for some
indispensable duty, or during illness, or while a creditor
keeps him in prison. Even then he would appear to be under
at least a moral obligation to restore the value of the
property when able to do so. What he has taken without
necessity, he is bound to repay with interest. This right to
take the wife's property is purely a personal one in the
husband. If he does not choose to avail himself of it, his
creditors cannot proceed against her properties. The word
`take' in the text of Yajanavalkya means `taking' and
`using'. Hence if the husband taking his wife's property in
the exceptional circumstances mentioned in the text does not
actually use it, the wife still remains its owner and the
husband's creditors have no claim against the property.
State Of Bihar vs Sri Rajendra Agrawalla on 18 January, 1996
The learned Judge was not right in
jumping to the conclusion that the averments made by the
respondent in the counter-affidavit disclosed that no
entrustment was made of the jewellery, cash and household
goods and other movables enumerated in Annexures I and II
details of which are not material for our purpose. In the
light of the above, we are of the view that a prima facie
case of entrustment had been made out by the appellant as
the stridhana properties were not returned to her by the
husband. Obviously, therefore, the learned Magistrate,
having taken cognizance of the offence, had issued process
for appearance of the respondent. It is fairly settled legal
position that at the time of taking cognisance of the
offence, the Court has to consider only the averments made
in the complaint or in the charge-sheet filed under Section
173, as the case may be. It was held in State of Bihar v.
Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164] that it is not open
for the Court to sift or appreciate the evidence at that
stage with reference to the material and come to the
conclusion that no prima facie case is made out for
proceeding further in the matter. It is equally settled law
that it is open to the Court, before issuing the process, to
record the evidence and on consideration of the averments
made in the complaint and the evidence thus adduced, it is
required to find out whether an offence has been made out.
On finding that such an offence has been made out and after
taking cognizance thereof, process would be issued to the
respondent to take further steps in the matters. If it is a
charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code, the facts
stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis
of the evidence collected during investigation, would
disclose the offence for which cognisance would be taken by
the court to proceed further in the matter. Thus it is not
the province of the court at that stage to embark upon and
sift the evidence to come to the conclusion whether offence
has been made out or not. The learned Judge, therefore, was
clearly in error in attempting to sift the evidence with
reference to the averments made by the respondent in the
counter-affidavit to find out whether or not offence
punishable under Section 406, IPC had been made out.
Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt) vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors. on 20 April, 1993
The question, therefore, whether it is a continuing
offence and limitation began to run everyday loses its
relevance, in view of the above finding. The decisions cited
in support thereof, viz., Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v.
Vanka Venkata Reddy & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4] and Balram Singh
vs. Sukhwant Kaur [(1992) Crl. L.J. 792 F.B. (P&H)] hence
need not be considered. It is well settled legal position
that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise
the power under Section 482 of the Code to prevent
miscarriage of justice.
Balram Singh vs Sukhwant Kaur And Anr. on 9 January, 1991
The question, therefore, whether it is a continuing
offence and limitation began to run everyday loses its
relevance, in view of the above finding. The decisions cited
in support thereof, viz., Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v.
Vanka Venkata Reddy & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4] and Balram Singh
vs. Sukhwant Kaur [(1992) Crl. L.J. 792 F.B. (P&H)] hence
need not be considered. It is well settled legal position
that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise
the power under Section 482 of the Code to prevent
miscarriage of justice.
State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Shri Pirthi Chand And Anr on 30 November, 1995
In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri
Pirthi Chand & Anr. [JT 1995 (9) 411] two of us [K.
Ramaswamy and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.]
State Of U.P vs O.P. Sharma on 6 February, 1996
composing the Bench and in
State of U.P. Vs. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 70], a three-
Judge Bench of this Court, reviewed the entire care law on
the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the complaint or the charge-sheet or the
First Information Report and held that the High Court would
be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power
under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise
of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would
tantamount to abuse of the process of the Court. Social
stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding
against the offender as it is an offence against the society
as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in
mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent
power vested in the Court.
State Of Haryana And Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors on 21 November, 1990
Same view was taken in State of
Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan lal & Ors. [(1992) Supp.