Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 24 (0.45 seconds)Section 482 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 90 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 376 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 21 August, 2019
"23. This Court also examined the interplay between Section
375 IPC and Section 90 IPC in the context of consent in the case
of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9
SCC 608, and held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC
involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions
and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes
a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative
actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible
consequences flowing from such action (or inaction), consents to
such action. After deliberating upon the various case laws, this
Court summed up the legal position as under:
Section 417 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 506 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Maheshwar Tigga vs The State Of Jharkhand on 28 September, 2020
8. As far as the judgments relied on by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner are concerned, in Maheshwar Tigga v. State
of Jharkhand reported in (2020) 10 SCC 108, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in para 14 held as follows:-
Section 155 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Sonu @ Subhash Kumar vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 1 March, 2021
"10. Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in the
above decision, we are of the view that even assuming that all the
allegations in the FIR are correct for the purposes of considering
the application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C., no
offence has been established. There is no allegation to the effect
that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was
false at the inception. On the contrary, it would appear from the
contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the
part of the appellant to marry the second respondent which gave
rise to the registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the
view that the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the basis that it was only
the evidence at trial which would lead to a determination as to
whether an offence was established".