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Dilip Singh Parocha And Ors. vs Mahalaxmi Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd. ... on 16 August, 2002 cites

Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Ganesh Razak & Anr. on 26 November, 1993

5. In my opinion, the impugned judgment and order of the Labour Court cannot be sustained. The Labour Court has misunderstood the scope and jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act to be extremely narrow, without any scope for deciding the issue such as whether the applicants are or are not the workmen or the employer is or is not an industry. All such questions or issues or contentions raised by the other side have to be decided by the Labour Court at the threshold and such applications cannot be dismissed merely at the whisper of the employer that the applicants are not the workmen or that the employer is not an industry. The Labour Court must decide the issue as to on what basis, the applicants could be held to be workmen or under what circumstances the employer cannot be termed as industry to be covered by the provisions of the I.D. Act. If finally, the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the applicants do not fall within the definition of the workman or the employer is not an industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act, in that case, the Labour Court can take appropriate decision to proceed further with the application or to reject the application if both or either of the points are decided against the applicants. In the present case, the Labour Court has adopted a curious approach and has accepted the contention of the respondent society that the application was not maintainable and that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction because the respondent was not an industry. The Labour Court ought to have further probed into the matter to find out why the respondent society could not be called an industry in accordance with law. If the Labour Court had decided that question that the respondent society was not an industry on the basis of its activities and, thereafter, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the application. But the Labour Court could not deny itself the jurisdiction which is legitimately vested under the provisions to determine and compute the money due from the employer. There is no doubt about the scope and parameters of the aforesaid provisions which is known as executing jurisdiction. The applicant has to establish that he has an existing right to invoke the said jurisdiction to claim money due from the employer. In the present case, the applicants have claimed difference in the wages actually paid and which they are alleging that they are entitled to get under the Minimum Wages Act. The aforesaid and all other claims are made on the basis of the averments made by the applicants that they have an existing right. Whether they have or they do not have the existing right will have to be gone into by the Labour Court on the basis of evidence and material adduced by both the parties. The applicants, however, could not be thrown on the threshold merely because the respondents raised a plea that it was not an industry. The Labour Court ought to have further decided it as an incidental question whether the respondent society was an industry or was not an industry.
Delhi High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 713 - A Kumar - Full Document

Ramakrishna Ramnath vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, ... on 27 February, 1970

"..........The decision, therefore, is clearly an authority for the proposition that where the claim is founded on the statutory provisions such claim is contested on the ground that there was no retrenchment or that there was no closure, then merely on such a plea the jurisdiction of the Labour Court cannot be ousted and the Labour Court was competent to go into the question firstly, whether there was a retrenchment or not or closure or not; and in case finding was in favour of the employee, then to proceed further to compute the benefit in terms of rights given in Chapter V-A of the Act. The present case falls squarely within the dictum of the Supreme Court in R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mitts Co., 1972 Lab.I.C. 285. The whole case of the employee is that there had been a closure and it is the benefit to which she is entitled under the provisions of Section 25FFF that she wants to be computed. The Labour Court in such circumstances would clearly have jurisdiction to go into the question of the closure the factum of which does not now seem to be disputed. The question whether there was closure or not, therefore, does not arise. The claim which then survives is merely one for computation, if the employee proves her entitlement or title to the benefit, for which she relies on the statutory provisions. We may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, Nagpur, (1970) 2 Lab.LJ. 306 = 1973 Lab.I.C. 57, where the employees had made a claim for retrenchment compensation for some period and those claims were contested on the ground that the claimants were not employees but independent contractors and that there was closure to attract the provisions of Section 25FFF of the Act and that the dispute could not be referred to the Labour Court. It does not appear that the challenge which is now made, viz., that the claimant was not a workman was raised in that case. The Labour Court allowed the claims of all the applicants barring three and held that they were entitled to compensation under the provision to Section 25FFF and pay in lieu of notice as per schedule attached to the order. The points agitated before the Supreme Court were (1) the disputes which were referred to the Labour Court fell within the jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal. The jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) was a limited one and could not embrace a dispute of the nature in the case which could only fall under Section 10 of the Act; (2) the issue raised in each case was a fundamental one not limited to mere computation of a benefit in respect of a right envisaged by Section 33-C (2), (3) There was really no closure of the appellant's business but only a lock out or a temporary stoppage of work not attracting the operation of Section 25FFF. The fourth question which was raised before the Supreme Court was that in order to entitle the applicant to the benefit of Section 25F it was obligatory on her to show that she had worked for 240 days in each year of service for which the claim was made. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make a preliminary enquiry as to whether there had been a closure of the business and the text of the notice made the determination of the question quite a simple affair. It was pointed out that the examination of the claim under Section 33-C(2) may in some cases have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and a mere denial of the fact of retrenchment would not be enough to take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. On facts it was found that the employer had failed to show that the undertaking was closed down on account of the unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer and as such he was liable to pay the compensation under the principal part of the Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF of the Act. We are now informed that the petitioner had applied for the review of the finding that the closure was not covered by the provisions of Section 25F and the Supreme Court, has reviewed its finding and the operative finding in that case was that the closure fell within the provisions of Section 25FFF of the Act. That, however, was relevant only for the purposes of quantum of compensation and it would not change the basic finding that an application made for computation of the benefit under Section 25FFF could be enquired into by the Labour Court."
Supreme Court of India Cites 16 - Cited by 31 - G K Mitter - Full Document
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