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1 - 4 of 4 (0.51 seconds)Section 2 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 33 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Jai Narayan Meena And Anr vs Raj University Of Health&Anr on 27 January, 2010
By this writ petition, a challenge is made to the order of termination. It is stated that petitioner was engaged as a Driver initially vide order dated 1.6.1991. It was under Special Assistance Programme receiving financial aid from the University Grants Commission so as the State Government. He continued thereupon and worked efficiently which has been testified by the Professors under whom petitioner had worked. The respondents subsequently appointed the petitioner on the post of Vehicle Cleaner vide order dated 15.2.1996 in regular pay scale of Rs.750-940. Petitioner however asked to work as driver only. The post was changed superficially while passing the order dated 15.2.1996. The petitioner got sick and remained on leave for five days and when he returned to join the duties, it was informed that his name has been struck out from the rolls and, now, pursuant to the reply to the writ petition, an order of termination dated 9.6.1997 has been placed on record. The aforesaid order has been passed in reference to the judgment of this court in the case of Jai Narain Meena versus University of Rajasthan & ors, SB Civil Writ Petition No. 6378/1993, decided on 6.1.1994. Aforesaid judgment was upheld by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 30.1.2004 in DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.424/1994. However, no direction was there to discontinue persons already working, that too, without observing the provisions of law. The petitioner has continuously worked for more than six years. Even if last post is taken note of, he has worked for more than a year yet his services have been terminated without following provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( for short 'the Act of 1947'). In view of above, order of termination deserves to be set aside on the aforesaid grounds alone. It is apart from the fact that petitioner's services were terminated in reference of the judgment of this court, whereas, many persons appointed in the similar manner were regularised. Names of those persons have been mentioned in para 2 of the rejoinder. Thus, termination of the petitioner becomes illegal and otherwise not in consonance to the judgment of this court.
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