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1 - 10 of 13 (0.27 seconds)Pandit Suraj Narain vs Pandit Ratan Lal on 30 January, 1917
The learned Judges themselves felt the difficulty on account of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Suraj Narain v. Ratan Lal A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 12, already referred to, and felt that in that case "apparently a contrary view was taken." They however remarked that that case was decided under the old Section 317, Civil P.C., the wording of which differed materially from that of Section 66. The difference in the wording which would be relevant was however not quoted. As far as can be seen the alteration in the language of the new section would make no difference so far as the point under consideration was concerned. One of the learned Judges remarked:
Achhaibar Dube vs Tapasi Dube And Ors. on 23 April, 1907
The learned Chief Justice after quoting the remarks of Richards, J. in Achhaibar Dube's case Achhaibar Dube v. Tapasi Dube (1907) 29 All. 557 remarked:
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882
Iswar Chandra Pal And Ors. vs Kabiruddin Ahmed And Ors. on 8 January, 1934
In Iswar Chandra v. Kabiruddin Ahmed A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 322, already quoted, the claim was in regard to only a part of the property purchased and the learned Judges did not consider that that saved the claim from the bar of Section 66.
Vishvanath Dhondiraj Gayadhani vs Pandharinath Ganesh on 16 February, 1925
The Bombay case in Vishwanath Dhondiraj v. Pandharinath Ganesh A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 525 was distinguished because the learned Counsel for the respondent unnecessarily conceded that Section 66 would be no bar to a case of partnership. In view of these authorities it must be held that Section 66 is a bar to the present claim.
Section 90 in The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Hari Govind Joshi vs Ramchandra Narayan on 17 September, 1906
Again in Hari Govind v. Ramchandra Narayan (1907) 31 Bom. 61, although the point was not expressly considered and decided, the claim related to only a half-share in the property purchased.
Baijnath Das vs Bishan Devi And Anr. on 14 June, 1921
In Baijnath Das v. Bishan Devi A.I.R. 1921 All. 185 certain property was purchased at auction in execution of, a decree by a father in a joint Hindu family benami in the name of his wife.
Babu Deonandan Prasad Singh vs Janki Singh And Ors. on 30 March, 1920
7. It is urged before us that their Lordships intended to lay down that the rights of persons who are otherwise beneficially interested in the purchase can never be affected by the provisions of the section. We think that their Lordships intended to protect the interest of persons beneficially interested in the property purchased, other than those who claim to have made auction-purchases, who are not entitled to maintain the suit contrary to the provisions of Section 66. Further, the title of persons otherwise beneficially interested would not be affected; and if by some means they obtain possession of the property and are sued as defendants, Section 68 would not stand in their way as their title has in no way been destroyed. The next case relied upon on behalf of the appellant is the case in Deonandan Prashad v. Janki Singh A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 227. That was a special case not arising under the Civil Procedure Code. There, under the terms of his mortgage, a usufructuary mortgagee was liable to pay a certain amount of Government revenue. He had on a previous occasion paid an excess amount which however was somehow absorbed. Later he made a deposit which was short by Rs. 2-10-0. Their Lordships agreed with the Courts in India that the Government revenue had been deliberately allowed to fall into arrear with a view to the property being put up for sale and bought by the mortgagee. Although the mortgagee himself being a minor could not be considered to have been a party to the fraud, it was found that his agents had deliberately committed default in. breach of the terms of the mortgage. When the property was sold and purchased in the name of the mortgagee, their Lordships held that the mortgagee could not be allowed to hold for himself the advantage gained by the default for which his agents were responsible and that the advantage gained by the scheme must be held for the benefit of the co-owners who were not shown to have been aware of the default or sale, or to have disentitled themselves to the equitable relief. The sale had not taken place in execution of any decree, but for recovery of revenue under the provisions of Act 11 of 1859, and the case was really governed by Section 90, Trusts Act. Illus. (c) to that section was directly in point: