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1 - 10 of 23 (0.36 seconds)Section 139 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
The Customs Tariff Act, 1975
THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972
Section 148 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 9B in The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 [Entire Act]
Salem Advocate Bar Association,Tamil ... vs Union Of India on 2 August, 2005
The said decision of the Constitution Bench was followed in Salem Advocate Bar vs. Union of India [2005 (6) SCC 344]. While doing so, the Supreme Court pointed out therein that our laws on procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decision should not be reached behind their back, that proceedings that affect their lives and properties should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.
Sharif-Ud-Din vs Abdul Gani Lone on 12 November, 1979
In Sharif-Ud-Din vs. Abdul Gani Lone [AIR 1980 SC 303], the Supreme Court indicated that the question whether a provision of law is mandatory or not depends upon its language, the context in which it is enacted and its object. The Court made an important observation, which will resolve the problem for us and hence it is extracted as follows:-
Commissioner Of Income Tax,Jullundur vs Ajanta Electricals, Punjab on 2 May, 1995
In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ajanta Electricals [(1995) 81 Taxman 166 (SC)], the Supreme Court was concerned with a case where notices under Section 139(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1969 were served on a partnership firm and its partners in respect of the assessment year 1966-67, calling upon them to furnish returns of their income within 30 days from the date of service of notice. All the partners submitted their returns. At the time of completing the assessment, the Income Tax Officer also initiated proceedings under Section 271(1)(a) for levy of penalty, on the ground that there was delay in filing the returns without reasonable cause. But, the assessees contended that they had made applications for extension of time. The Income Tax Officer rejected the contention on the ground that the application for extension of time ought to have been made before the expiry of the due date for the filing of returns. He also levied penalty. The Appellate Authority set aside the order of penalty, forcing the revenue to prefer appeals to the Tribunal. The Tribunal restored the orders of the Income Tax Officer and a reference was made to the High Court. Having regard to the proviso to Section 139(2), which did not contain any limitation to the effect that an application for extension should be filed within the stipulated time, the High Court held that an application for extension of time can be made even after the expiry of that period. The view taken by the High Court in the tax case reference was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ajanta Electricals. While doing so, the Supreme Court pointed out that there is no scope for interpreting the word "extend" appearing in the proviso to Section 139(2) to mean that at the time of making the application, the time originally allowed should not have expired. To come to the said conclusion in paragraph 10 of its decision, the Supreme Court drew analogy from Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is clear that where the word "extend" or "extension" is used in a statute, without any fetters being placed on the manner in which the power to extend is to be exercised, it cannot be contended that such extension ought to be granted before the expiry of the original term.