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1 - 10 of 10 (0.19 seconds)Section 18 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Chand Rani vs Kamal Rani on 18 December, 1992
" Even where time is not of the essence of the
contract, the plaintiffs must perform his part of the
contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should
be determined by looking at all the surrounding
circumstances including the express terms of the contract
and the nature of the property." (Para 14)
In our opinion, there has been a default on the part
of the respondents in performing their obligations under the
contract. The period lost between 25.7.1972 ( the date of
the agreement) and the years 1979 and 1980 when the
litigation commenced, cannot be termed a reasonable period
for which the appellant could have waited awaiting
performance by the respondents though there was not a
defined time limit for performance laid down by the
agreement. The agreement contemplated several sanctions and
clearances which were certainly not within the power of the
parties and both the parties knew it well that they were the
respondents who were being depended on for securing such
sanctions/clearances. Part of the land forming subject
matter of the agreement was an excess land within the
meaning of ULCRA and hence could not have been sold. Part
of the land has been acquired by the State and to that
extent the agreement has been rendered incapable of
performance. The feasibility of a multi-storeyed complex as
is proposed and planned by the respondents appears to be an
impracticality. If the respondents would not be able to
construct and deliver to the appellant some of the flats as
contemplated by the novated agreement how and in what manner
the remaining part of consideration shall be offered/paid by
the respondents to the appellant is a question that defies
answer on the material available on record. Added to all
this is the factum of astronomical rise in the value of the
land which none of the parties would have forecontemplated
at the time of entering into the agreement. We are not in
the least holding that the consideration agreed upon between
the parties was inadequate on the date of the agreement. We
are only noticing the subsequent event. Possession over a
meagre part of the property was delivered by the appellant
to the respondents, not simultaneously with the agreement
but subsequently at some point of time. To that extent, the
recital in the agreement and the averments made in the
plaint filed by the respondents are false. On a major part
of the property, the appellant has continued to remain in
possession. As opposed to this, the respondents have
neither pleaded nor brought material on record to hold that
they have acted in such a way as to render inequitable the
denial of specific performance and to hold that theirs would
be a case of greater hardship over the hardship of the
appellant. Upon an evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances, we are of the opinion that the performance of
the contract would involve such hardship on the appellant as
he did not foresee while the non performance would not
involve such hardship on the respondents. The contract
though valid at the time when it was entered, is engrossed
into such circumstances that the performance thereof cannot
be secured with precision. The present one is a case where
the discretionary jurisdiction to decree the specific
performance ought not to be exercised in favour of the
respondents. During the course of hearing the learned
senior counsel for the respondents time and again emphasized
and appealed to the court that respondents were builders of
repute and in the event of the specific performance being
denied, they run a grave risk of loosing their reputation as
their proposed building plan "Girnar" would not materialise
and they will not be able to show their face to their
prospective flat buyers. This is hardly a consideration
which can weigh against the several circumstances which we
have set out herein above. If a multi-storeyed complex
cannot come up on the suit property, the respondents' plans
are going to fail in any case.
The Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999
Section 56 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 20 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Lourdu Mari David And Ors vs Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy And Ors on 9 August, 1996
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides
that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is
discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such
relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion
of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable
guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a
court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some
hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while
non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff,
is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly
exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The
doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily
recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of
consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous
to the defendant or improvident in its nature , shall not
constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the
defendant or unforseeable hardship on the defendant. The
principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this
Court in Lourdu Mari David and others vs. Louis Chinnaya
Arogiaswamy and others. AIR 1996 SC 2814 by stating that
the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of
the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily;
the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of
law capable of correction by an appellate court.
Section 21 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
K.S. Vidyanadam And Ors vs Vairavan on 6 February, 1997
"Severe hardship may be a ground for refusing specific
performance even though it results from circumstances which
arise after the conclusion of the contract, which affect the
person of the defendant rather than the subject-matter of
the contract, and for which the plaintiff is in no way
responsible." Very recently in K.S. Vidyanadam & others vs.
Vairavan 1997 (3) SCC 1, this court has held :
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