Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 11 (0.21 seconds)Section 139 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 118 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 313 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 251 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Rangappa vs Sri Mohan on 7 May, 2010
21. Regarding the strength and nature of presumption raised under
section 139 NI Act, it is worthwhile to peruse the ruling of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Rangappa vs Sri Mohan (2011 (1) SCC (CRI) 184) wherein it ruled,
"As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable
presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.
However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which
favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
CT Cases 469005/2016 Page No.8 of 16
SAKUNTALA CHOUDHARY VS CAPTAIN (Retd.) DILAWAR SINGH SANGWAN
legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the
course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence
made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in
commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality
should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications,
reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a
persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when
an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard
of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'.
Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates
doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce evidence of his/her own."