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Andhra Industrial Works, A. P vs Chief Controller Of Imports And Ors on 26 April, 1974

14. The proposition in Manickchand was reiterated by a Constitution Bench in Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Exports . While observing that the Import Control Policy statement contained in what was known as "Red Book" was not statutory, the Court observed, "no person can merely on the basis of such a Statement claim a right to the grant of an import licence, enforceable at law. Moreover, such a Policy can be changed, rescinded, altered by mere administrative orders or executive instructions issued at any time". The Court held further:
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 55 - R S Sarkaria - Full Document

Deputy Asstt. Iron & Steel Controller & ... vs L. Manickchand, Proprietor, Katrella ... on 5 January, 1972

In Deputy Assistant Iron and Still Controller v. L. Manickchand, Proprietor, Katrella Metal Corporation, Madras , the respondent applied for an import licence in December, 1968 for importing stainless steel for the licensing period 1968-69. His registration certificate showed that he was engaged in the manufacture of hospital and surgical instruments and household utensils of stainless steel. In view of the large number of applications for import licences for stainless steel, instructions were issued in January, 1969 that applications should be scrutinised carefully after asking for relevant information from the applicants as to the details of end products to be manufactured by them, the respondent supplied information in May, 1969 that the hospital requisites proposed to be manufactured by him were surgical bowls, spittoons and trays. The Chief Controller, Exports and Imports, however, issued instructions that only "medical and surgical equipment and appliances" should have priority and not other types of hospital equipment, such as bowls, trays, jugs, etc. In April 1970, the Chief Controller issued instructions to consider the respondent's application in terms of the Licencing Policy of 1970-71. The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court contending that his application having been filed when the 1968-69 Import Policy was in vogue should be considered in accordance with that Import Policy alone and not in the light of or under the Import Licensing Policy in vogue in 1970-71. The High Court allowed the writ petition but was reversed by this Court on appeal. This Court held, "no case has been made out on the present record for a mandamus to the department to consider the respondent's application for import licence in terms of 1968-69 policy. It is not possible on the existing material to conclude that the department is guilty of any undue laches or delay in dealing with the respondent's application which would justify the Court in granting the mandamus prayed for. " It was also held that keeping the respondent's application pending until completion of its examination in the light of policy in vogue cannot be said to be unreasonable nor can the time taken in that behalf be characterised as undue delay. Above all, it was held, while emphasising the necessity of disposing of such applications with due expedition, that "an applicant has not absolute vested right to an import licence in terms of the policy in force at the time of his application because from the very nature of things at the time of granting the licence the authority concerned may often be in a better position to have a clearer over-all picture of the various factors having an important impact on the final decision of the allotment of import quota to the various applicant". This decision rendered by a Bench of four learned Judges of this Court clearly negatives the contention of a vested right urged by Sri Kapoor.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 29 - I D Dua - Full Document

J. Fernandes & Co vs The Deputy Chief Controller Of Imports & ... on 7 March, 1975

The third and the last submission is that the sudden and sharp increase of duty steeply puts up the petitioner's liability from No. 1,84,341 to No. 6,42,065 on these consignments and constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. A tax, in particular, in the nature of duties of customs is not per se violative of Article 19(1)(g), Mere excessiveness of a tax is not, by itself, violative of Article 19(1)(g). This question cannot be divorced from the nature of the right to import. There is no absolute right much less a fundamental right to import. (See : Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Controller v. L. Manickchand, Proprietor, Katrella Metal Corpn., Madras and Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports ; J. Femandes & Co. v. Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports . That apart, no factual foundations are laid to demonstrate how this impost has had the effect of destroying the petitioner's right to carry on a trade or business. This contention also has no merit.
Supreme Court of India Cites 34 - Cited by 25 - A N Ray - Full Document

Kasinka Trading And Another, Etc. Etc. vs Union Of India And Another on 18 October, 1994

S.C.C. 306 and Kasinka Trading v. Union of India . On the basis of these decisions, the learned Counsel submitted that any change in policy or rate of duty between the date of placing the order for import and the actual import applies to the imported goods and that the theory of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in such a situation. We do not think it necessary to dilate upon these decisions in view of our holding that in the light of the Scheme concerned herein, there is no room for any such plea.
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 256 - M N Venkatachaliah - Full Document

M/S Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. ... vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors on 12 December, 1978

11. So far as the argument of promissory estoppel is concerned, it is equally unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Having regard to the nature of the advance licence - import first and export later there is no room for this argument. The discretion inhering in the authority to take into consideration the exports effected after the date of filing of the application for advance licence does not detract from its essential character, as explained hereinabove. We may also mention that no precise data has been furnished by the appellant in support of the said plea. In the absence of such data, the plea of promissory estoppel is misconceived. The appellant has to establish the various ingredients of this rule, as enumerated by this Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and other subsequent decisions. It is not a pure question of law.
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 1143 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document
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