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1 - 10 of 15 (2.97 seconds)Section 1 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 1 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 4 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 4 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 49 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 25 June, 1982
There was before him evidence both pro and con which he was entitled to sift and weigh and which he purported to do and in the exercise of his authority, he reached that conclusion. How can we, exercising only limited jurisdiction, venture to interfere with that finding of fact ? Our clear answer in this regard is that it is beyond our competence or domain or jurisdiction to enter that forbidden field. If we make any attempt to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence, we shall be transgressing the limits of law laid down around us. We are not oblivious of the fact that in certain contingencies even a finding of fact can be gone behind by this Court, but those cases are a few and far between, we shall reproduce them from one judgment of the Calcutta High Court produced by the petitioner himself in the case of Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani v. Union of India 1983 Labour Law Journal at page 122. Extracting the principles from various judicial pronouncements, including those of the Supreme Court, the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows, while reproducing the arguments of the advocate of the appellant there:
The Companies Act, 1956
R.C.Sharma vs Union Of India & Ors on 6 May, 1976
17. It is well said that the principles of natural justice are not empty or idle formalities, but at the same time, the Supreme Court has very clearly observed in the case of R. C. Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. that "the question whether a civil servant in a departmental enquiry against him was given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard or not is largely a question of fact and it is only when opportunity denided is of such a nature that the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial. The Supreme Court concluded this observation by stating that "prejudice to the Government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved", (emphasis supplied). In the course of our discussion hereinabove, we have already observed with reference to the material on the record that the petitioner had approached the disciplinary authority with a request to furnish him with the statements of various witnesses recorded by Mr. Parshuraman. It is to be noted with pertinence that the disciplinary authority under some misconception of law directed him to move the Enquiry Officer. He neither acceded to the request, nor rejected the same, throwing the ball back in the Court of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer on 19-5-79 categorically told the petitioner, as we have already noted above, that it was perfectly open to him to seek production of additional documents not listed in Annexure III, subject of course to his satisfying the said authority about the relevance of those documents. The petitioner, who from the first stage of the enquiry appears to have taken a trenched position indicating his good deal of acquaintance with the procedural aspect of departmental enquiries, if not the detailed law in that regard, could not have been oblivious of the fact that disciplinary authority had asked him to approach the Enquiry Officer, who also had reminded him on 19-5-79 of his right. The learned single Judge, again with respects we say, observed that all the documents were despatched to the Enquiry Officer, There is no reference to all documents. The proceedings of the Enquiry Officer at page 286 of our file dated 25-4-79 only mentioned "also received the documents" and not all documents, as our learned Brother has been pleased to find. Even if the documents were with the Enquiry Officer, it was all the more congenial for the petitioner. If the documents were there with the Enquiry Officer, all that was required to be done by the petitioner at the time of the trial was to request the Enquiry Officer to make those earlier statements available to him for the purpose of further cross-examination or closer and more effective cross-examination. If the documents were not with the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner could have well requested the Enquiry Officer to get the same for him and had the Enquiry Officer refused to extend that opportunity, there was an occasion for the petitioner to make grievance in that regard. We reiterate that even in his elaborate so-called summary of arguments running into 19 closely typed pages, he does not make grievance of this alleged, nonavailability of those statements and thereby his being deprived of a valuable right of effectively cross-examining the witnesses examined at the departmental proceedings. So, with respects, we find ourselves unable to agree with our Brother Mehta, J. that a very valuable right was denied to the petitioner from the. solitary fact that the disciplinary authority had simply directed the petitioner to go to the Enquiry Officer. We do not think that the petitioner was entertaining any serious thought of availing himself of those statements for any purpose whatsoever, much less for the purpose of effectively cross-examining the witnesses. Alternatively if the documents were with the Presenting Officer, then also it was easy for the petitioner to renew his request before the Enquiry Officer. He did nothing of the sort. It is only at the belated stage that he has raised this bogey and tried to exploit the sound principles of natural justice to his personal ends without any justification.