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1 - 10 of 20 (0.23 seconds)State Of U.P vs Laxmi Brahman & Anr on 11 March, 1983
11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had then contended that no exhaustive or adequate reasons were given by the Bench in Rajoo alias Raj Kishore Singh's ease for arriving at the conclusion which, according to counsel, is more or less in the shape of a dictum. This is not wholly true. A reading of the judgment makes it plain that there was sizeable discussion of the matter and, in any case, it is undisputed that the issue was directly under consideration. I have already held that the ratio of this judgment cannot be blown away as if by a side-wind from any passing observation in State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman and Anr. (supra). Its line of reasoning is now well buttressed by subsequent judgments taking the same view. In the Said judgments reliance has been placed on Section 9 of the General Clauses Act which gives statutory recognition to the well established principle that in computing time the rule observed is to exclude the first and to include the last day. Similarly Section 12 of the Limitation Act provides that in calculating the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded.
Jagdish Prasad Soni And Ors. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. on 31 January, 1985
In Jagdish and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), the learned single Judge had concluded as follows:
L.R. Chawla vs Murari, Etc. on 14 August, 1975
6. Inevitably the basic reliance of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was on the last observations in paragraph 6 of the report in 1983 Criminal Law Journal 1336. There is no gainsaying the fact that these undoubtedly aid the stand of the petitioner. But with profound respect, I am unable to subscribe to the said view for the detailed reasons that follow. At this stage, it may be noticed that the primary question before the Bench was whether the period was to be computed from the date of the arrest by the police and not from the date of the production before the Magistrate. Virtually the whole discussion was directed to this aspect and after reference to precedents the Bench took the view that the period commences from the date of arrest and not from the production of the accused before the Magistrate. However, in the following and the concluding brief paragraph it was observed that the said day of arrest must also be counted for one day and fraction of the day for which the accused was under detention is also a day for the purposes of the statute. This observation has been made as a dictum without any detailed discussion of either principle or precedent and it would appear that the reference to L. R. Chawla v. Murari (1976) Cri L. J. 212 Delhi., for the support of this proposition is not well founded on a closer perusal of the said judgment. With respect, on this aspect, I feel compelled to take a contrary view and dissent from this judgment.
The State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Hotel Sri Lakshmi Bhavan on 30 January, 1973
10. On closely perusing the judgment in State of U. P. v. Lakshmi Bharman and Anr. (supra), it becomes manifest that the specific point before us was not even remotely raised in the said case, far from being adjudicated upon. The basic and, indeed, the solitary question, which arose and was decided, was whether from the time the accused appears before the Magistrate with a police report under Section 170 and the Magistrate proceeds to inquire whether Section 207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Section 2(g) of the Code, Holding so, it was held that if the Magistrate is holding the inquiry obviously under Section 309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. If is thus plain that this Supreme Court case is in no way relevant to the issue.
The State Of Orissa vs Sudhansu Sekhar Misra And Ors on 7 November, 1967
Expressly approving the rule in Queen v. Lethem the Final Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhanau Sekhar Misra and Ors. ., has further observed that what is relevant in a judgment is its ratio and not every observation therein and that it is idle to pick upon a line or sentence in a judgment and to build thereon.
Section 2 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 120B in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Durgacharan Naik And Ors vs State Of Orissa on 23 February, 1966
L. J. 79., in preference to the observations of the Orissa High Court in Fakir a Naik and Ors. v. State of Orissa (1983) Cri.L.J. 1336. Consequently he took the view that the day of the surrender of the accused in court was to be excluded for the purposes of the computation of the period of 90 days.