Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 39 (0.54 seconds)Section 6 in The Cinematograph Act, 1952 [Entire Act]
Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 5B in The Cinematograph Act, 1952 [Entire Act]
Article 19 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
K. A. Abbas vs The Union Of India & Anr on 24 September, 1970
A similar question
came up before this Court in K.A. Abbas v. The Union of
India, [1971] 2 SCR 446 wherein Chief Justice Hidayatullah
exhaustively dealt with the question of prior restraint in the
context of the provisions of the Constitution and the Act. The
learned Chief Justice after setting out the various provisions
to which we have already adverted posed the questions;
`How far can these restrictions go and how are these to be
imposed'? The documentary film ` A tale of four cities' made
by K.A. Abbas portrayed the contrast between the luxuious
life of the rich and the squalor and poverty of the poor in the
four principal cities of the country and included therein shots
from the red light district of Bombay showing scantily
dressed women soliciting customers by standing near the
doors and windows. The Board of Film Censors granted `A'
certificate to the film and refused the `U' certificate sought
by Abbas. This was on the ground that the film dealt with
relations between sexes in such a manner as to depict
immoral traffic in women and because the film contained
incidents unsuitable for young persons. Abbas challenged the
Board's decision on the ground (i) that pre-censorship cannot
be tolerated as it was in violation of the freedom of speech
and expression and (ii) even if it is considered legitimate it
must be exercised on well-defined principles leaving no room
for arbitrary decisions. This Court held that censorship in
Indian had full justification in the field of exhibition of films
since it was in the interest of society and if the legitimate
power in abused it can be struck down. While dealing with
the grounds on which the `U' certificate was refused, the
learned Chief Justice observed: "The task of the censor is
extremely delicate and his duties cannot be the subject of an
exhaustive set of commands established by prior
ratiocination. But direction is necessary of him so that he
does not sweep within the terms of the directions vast areas
of thought, speech and expression of artistic quality and
social purpose and interest. Our standards must be so
framed that we are not reduced to a level where the
protection of the least capable and the most depraved
amongst us determines what the morally healthy cannot view
or read. The standards that we set for our censors must
make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus
leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and
society with some of its foibles along with what is good. We
CS(OS) No. 3010/2012 Page 36 of 66
must not look upon such human relationships as banned in
toto and for ever from human thought and must give scope
for talent to put them before society. The requirements of art
and literature include within themselves a comprehensive
view of social life and not only in its ideal from and the line is
to be drawn where the average man moral man begins to
feel embarrassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life
without the redeeming touch of art or genius or social value.
If the depraved begins to see in these things more than what
an average person would, in much the same way, as it is
wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in
everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of things
ideas having redeeming social or artistic value must also
have importance and protection for their growth."
Ram Jethmalani vs Subramaniam Swamy on 3 January, 2006
Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the modern mediums of
communication are undoubtedly vital for keeping the
public debate alive on various issues of national
importance, but at the same time the restrictions imposed
under Article 19(2) cannot be encroached. This court in
the celebrated judgment of in Ram Jethmalani vs
Subramaniam Swamy 126 (2006) DLT 535 defined
defamation as a public communication which tends to
injure the reputation of another. It dwelled upon the
balance between the right to reputation and held that law
of defamation, by making actionable certain utterances,
runs counter to another widely accepted legal tenet-the
right to freedom of expression, but the two have been
harmonised by judicial process so that an individuals right
of privacy and right to protect his honour and reputation is
CS(OS) No. 3010/2012 Page 28 of 66
preserved and at the same time his fundamental right to
free speech is also protected. The court also explained the
defenses of truth, fair comment and privilege available in a
suit for defamation as under:
Section 5A in The Cinematograph Act, 1952 [Entire Act]
K.V. Ramaniah vs Special Public Prosecutor on 18 April, 1960
In the case of K.V. Ramaniah vs Special Public
Prosecutor AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 190, cited in the
above judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court, the court
CS(OS) No. 3010/2012 Page 46 of 66
took a view that it is impossible to accept the argument
that freedom of speech in Article 19(1) must be taken to
mean absolute freedom to say or write whatever a person
chooses recklessly and without regard to any person‟s
honour and reputation. It would be relevant to reproduce
the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment as under:-
Binod Rao vs Minocher Rustom Masani on 10 February, 1976
29. At this stage, we wish to clarify that the reliance on the
above judgments is only to show that "prior restraint" per
se has not been rejected as constitutionally impermissible.
At this stage, we may point out that in the present IAs we
are dealing with the concept of "prior restraint" per se and
not with cases of misuse of powers of pre- censorship which
were corrected by the Courts [see Binod Rao v. Minocher
Rustom Masani reported in 78 Bom LR 125 and C. Vaidya v.
D'Penha decided by Gujarat High Court in Sp. CA 141 of
1976 on 22.03.1976 (unreported)]