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1 - 10 of 32 (0.24 seconds)Section 100 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 96 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 103 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs Ganga Prosad Das Mushib And Ors on 14 September, 1966
In
Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prasad Das Mushib &
Ors., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 878, it has been observed that law
under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as to
undue influence is the same in case of a gift inter vivos as in case
of a contract. It has further been held that the court trying a case
of undue influence under Section 16 of the Contract Act, 1872
must consider two things to start with, namely, (1) are the
relations between the donor and the donee such that the donee is
in a position to dominate the will of the donor, and (2) has the
donee used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the
donor? Upon the determination of these issues a third point
emerges, which is that or the onus probandi. If the transaction
appears to be unconscionable, then the burden of proving that the
contract was not induced by undue influence is to lie upon the
person who was in a position to dominate the will of the other. The
judgment further proceeded to observe that merely because the
parties were nearly related to each other or merely because the
donor was old or of weak character, no presumption of undue
influence can arise. In this view of the matter, as noticed
hereinabove, the plaintiffs have miserably failed to establish that
the gift deed was executed by donor in favour of the donee under
undue influence or fraud......"
The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Gurvachan Kaur & Ors vs Salikram (Dead) Through Lrs on 18 March, 2009
In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para
10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532)
"10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section
100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot
interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first
appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the
same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it
r must be held that the High Court was not justified in
reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate
court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and
default committed by the latter in payment of rent."
Kulwant Kaur & Ors vs Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By Lrs & Ors on 21 March, 2001
In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262,
this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High
Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79)
"34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction
on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the
High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an
embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not
required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out,
but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a
finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed
but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test
and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly
there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court
in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue.
This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light
by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be
categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of
justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a
substantial question worth adjudication -- what is required is a
categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity.
In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code
which reads as below:
S.R.Tewari vs Union Of India & Anr on 28 May, 2013
In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602, after
referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder
Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635, it was
held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615)
"30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be
perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to
be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence
or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person
would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is
some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could
be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse
and the findings would not be interfered with.
Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs Delhi Administration Through ... on 27 September, 1984
In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602, after
referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder
Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635, it was
held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615)
"30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be
perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to
be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence
or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person
would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is
some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could
be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse
and the findings would not be interfered with.