"48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for
publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could
not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision
would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle
of law that where a statute functionary is asked to perform
a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the
same would be directory and not mandatory. (See
Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate of Monghyr,
Nomina Chowdhury v. State of W.B. and Garbari Union
Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar
Jana)."
"7. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces
clarity in an order and without the same it becomes lifeless.
(See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar [(2003) 11 SCC 519 :
12. The fact that the proceedings are initiated under
MDG is not in dispute. A detailed procedure is prescribed
under the MDG, for initiation of appropriate actions against
the distributers. The initiating authority has to prima facie
satisfy himself as to the requirement for taking steps under
the relevant chapter of the MDG. This Court has already
taken the view that decisions being arrived at by the
respondent Corporation are institutional, in the judgment
reported as Baby Girija v. Indian Oil Corporation [2024
KHC OnLine 7136]. Therefore, the provisions of Clause 4.2
cannot be taken to be mandatory in nature, since for arriving
at a decision to proceed in accordance with Clause 4.2(viii),
the procedure prescribed thereunder has to be complied with.
Therefore, the stipulation of the period of 30 days for
initiation of the notice can only be reckoned as "directory" in
nature. Furthermore, I notice that the Delhi High Court, in
the judgment referred to earlier, had found that the MDG has
legal backing, especially when the intention behind the
24W.P(C) No.9331 of 2020
and con.cases 2024:KER:93537
introduction of the MDG was laudable. Therefore, the
provisions of Clause 4.2(viii) can only be directory in nature.