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1 - 10 of 15 (0.26 seconds)Section 139 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 118 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 420 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 20 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 200 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 313 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde on 11 January, 2008
14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the
respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated
by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To
that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna
Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However,
this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness
of the decision in that case since it was based on the
specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in
the citations, this is of course in the nature of a
rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to
raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However,
there can be no doubt that there is an initial
presumption which favours the complainant. Section
139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause
that has been included in furtherance of the legislative
objective of improving the credibility of negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a
strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of
cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section
139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of
litigation. However, it must be remembered that the
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offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better
described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of
a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose
impact is usually confined to the private parties involved
in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test
of proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an
unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of
compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually
impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive
burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that
when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is
that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the
accused is able to raise a probable defence which
creates doubts about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As
clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise
such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases
the accused may not need to adduce evidence of
his/her own.