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1 - 10 of 23 (0.70 seconds)Section 320 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 307 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 376 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
M.P.State Tourism Dev.Corpn. vs Laxmi Narayan &Ors.; on 27 April, 2015
In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, again held that the power to
quash the criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Shimbhu & Anr vs State Of Haryana on 27 August, 2013
In Shimbhu Vs. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 318, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that rape is a non compoundable
offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter
to be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court
cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in
compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance
that she might have been pressurized by the convicts or the trauma
undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for
a compromise. Infact, accepting this proposition will put an
additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his
influence to pressurize her for compromise. So, in the interest of
justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the
victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived
at between the parties in rape cases to be a ground for the court to
exercise the discretionary power under proviso to Section 376(2)
IPC.
Gian Singh vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012
15.4) Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences
and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society
and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the
criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC
and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the
society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under
Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have
resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However,
the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR
Signing time: 2/11/2026
6:34:15 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5467
15 MCRC-35646-2024
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the
High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution
has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used
etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be
permissible only after the evidence is collected after
investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when
the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate
conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this
Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai ... vs The State Of Gujarat on 4 October, 2017
In Parbatbhai Aahir (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that the High Court was justified in declining to entertain the
application for quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction, as the case involved extortion, forgery, conspiracy,
fabrication of documents, utilization of fabricated documents to
effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and
deprivation of the complainant therein of his interest in land on the
basis of a fabricated power of attorney, and consequently it was
not in the interest of the society to quash the FIR on the ground
that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. Such
offences could not be construed to be merely private or civil
disputes but implicated the societal interest in prosecuting serious
crime.