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1 - 10 of 10 (0.26 seconds)Ajit Singh Thakur Singh And Anr. vs State Of Gujarat on 9 January, 1981
19. Thus, in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh (supra) the Supreme
Court has held that no event or circumstance arising after the
expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause, whereas in
the facts of the present case, the applicants seek to contend
that it is on account of an event that arose much after the
expiry of the period of limitation, namely the allocation of the
five candidates to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police
by an order dated 8th December, 2017, that cause of action
arose for them to challenge the impugned judgment and
order dated 21st April, 2017. In the light of the principle
enunciated in the above decision, the events that transpired
after the expiry of the period of limitation cannot constitute
sufficient cause.
Esha Bhattacharjee vs Mg.Commit.Of Raghunathpur Nafar ... on 13 September, 2013
Insofar as decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
(supra), on which reliance has been placed by the learned
counsel for the applicants, it may be noted that the said
decision also lays down that the concept of liberal approach
has to encapsulate conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed totally unfettered free play. In case of
inordinate delay, the same warrants strict approach. The
conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both the parties and the said principles cannot be
given total go by in the name of liberal approach. In the facts
of the present case, the original petitions were filed sometime
in the year 2012, challenging the non-appointment of the
original petitioners pursuant to the recruitment process. By
the impugned judgment and order dated 21.4.2017, relief has
been granted to the said petitioners. The judgment and order
dated 21.4.2017 has been sought to be implemented much
later, that is, after a period of almost eight months from the
date of the passing of the impugned judgment and order and
it is at this point of time that the applicants have sought to
challenge the impugned judgment and order. Under the
circumstances, the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the
applicants relating to their inaction and negligence are
relevant factors which cannot be given a go by in the name of
a liberal approach.
D.G. Dalal vs State Of Gujarat on 17 July, 2001
10. In rejoinder, Mr. Thakore submitted that it is not the case
of the applicants that they did not file the appeal because the
Government did not file the appeal. It was submitted that the
impugned judgment and order give certain directions which
are based on the decision of this court in the case of D.G.
Dalal v. State of Gujarat, 2002 (2) GLR, 1011 which itself
speaks of a wait list. These directions have been interpreted
by the State Government in a manner that the opponents
may get seniority over the applicants. It was submitted that
there was delay of 184 days from the time the Government
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accepted and implemented the impugned judgment and order
and that from 12th December onwards, the delay has been
properly explained in the application.
N. Balakrishnan vs M. Krishnamurthy on 3 September, 1998
21. Shri Mohta, learned senior counsel relying on the
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decision of this court in N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy submitted that length of delay is no
matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion.
It was submitted that if the explanation offered does not
smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of
dilatory tactics the court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor. The very said decision upon
which reliance has been placed holds that the law of
limitation fixes a life span for every legal remedy for the
redress of the legal injury suffered. Unending period for
launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty
and consequential anarchy. The law of Limitation is thus
founded on public policy. The decision does not lay
down that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his
own time in preferring appeal or application as the case
may be. On the other hand, in the said judgment it is
said that court should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It is observed :
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961
In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. this court held
that:
Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) By Lrs vs Exe.Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project & Anr on 3 November, 2008
In Pundlik Jalam Patil v.Executive
Engineer (supra) the Supreme Court has held that in
construing section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear
in mind two important considerations. The first consideration
is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for
making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-
holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and
the legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by
lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. As noted
earlier, in this case, the State Government has not
implemented the impugned judgment and order immediately
and has passed the order dated 8th December, 2017 much
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C/LPA/98/2018 ORDER
after the period of limitation had expired, thereby granting
sufficient time to any party aggrieved by the impugned
judgment and order to challenge the same. However, it is only
when the judgment and order is sought to be implemented,
that the applicants have thought it fit to challenge the same
and disturb the legal right that has accrued in favour of the
original petitioners.
Section 32 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors vs State Of Orissa & Ors on 12 November, 2009
5.4 The learned counsel also submitted that the applicants
were well aware of the fact that their appointments were
subject to the final decision on the special civil applications,
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C/LPA/98/2018 ORDER
nonetheless, at the relevant time they did not choose to be
impleaded as parties. The applicants were, therefore, fence-
sitters, who merely watched the proceedings but did not
participate in the same. Reliance was placed upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiba Shankar
Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 471, for the
proposition that it is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be
allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the
order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a
matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that
person approaching the court is guilty of delay and laches.
The court exercising public law jurisdiction does not
encourage agitation of stale claim where the right of the third
parties crystallises in the interregnum.
Syed Bashiruddin Ashraf vs Bihar Subai Sunni Majlis-E-Awqaf And ... on 23 November, 1964
6. Mr. S.N. Shelat, Senior Advocate, learned counsel
appearing for some of a proposed respondent, submitted that
the order of appointments of the applicants was passed on
6.5.2011, which was made subject to the final decision in the
writ petitions. Therefore, the moment the order deciding the
writ petitions was passed, the applicants were immediately
affected by such decision and, hence, were required to
challenge the same if they were aggrieved by it. To bolster
such submission the learned counsel placed reliance upon
the decision in the case of Bashiruddin Ashraf v. Bihar
Subai Sunni Majlis-Awaqf, AIR 1965 SC 1206, wherein the
court held thus,
"6. The two appeals were heard together. The High
Court by a common judgment delivered on December
21, 1960, dismissed the appeal of the appellant and
accepted that of Maulvi Md. Shoeb. In dealing with the
appeal of Maulvi Md. Shoeb the High Court pointed out
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that Section 32 of the Act was clear in conferring
jurisdiction on the Majlis to make temporary
appointment when there was a vacancy in the office of
the Mutwalli and that the words in that section "subject
to any order by the competent court" did not mean that
there had to be either prior permission or subsequent
assent before the appointment was complete. The High
Court rightly pointed out that those words denoted that
the appointment was to endure according to its tenor till
an order to the contrary was passed by a competent
court. This conclusion is so patently correct that we
need say nothing more than this."
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