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1 - 6 of 6 (0.28 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 36 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Kochira Krishnan vs Joseph Desouza on 12 April, 1985
Mr. George Varghese referred also to the judgment of this Court in Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza and submitted that violation of an injunction order or violation of an undertaking given to the court was a matter to be seriously and sternly dealt with since otherwise it will undermine the very basis of the rule of law and submitted further that the court in cases under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was concerned only with the question whether there was disobedience of an order while the order was in force. Counsel drew my attention to the facts of the case and submitted that Ext.P2 order itself will reveal that earlier the court had passed an interim order of injunction restraining the defendants from forcibly take away the vehicle from the plaintiff and that in violation of that order the defendants took away the vehicle. According to counsel, the order would further reveal that the court directed the defendants to deliver the vehicle back to the plaintiff and that the defendants did not obey that order. The application for initiation of action under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was enquired into and disposed of in accordance with law. The Writ Petitioner, according to counsel, had engaged counsel and the counsel cross-examined the plaintiff who was examined as a witness in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, submitted Mr. George Varghese. Ext.P2 was an appealable order against which the petitioner did not prefer any appeal. The period of detention presently fixed as "not exceeding two months" is a mistake resulting from an omission which could have been got corrected by the learned Munsiff himself. Article 227 of the Constitution was not for correcting such mistakes at the instance of a party who did not request the court below to make such corrections. Ext.Pl decree, according to counsel, was passed on the assumption that the court will ensure that the writ petitioner and the co-defendants in the suit will comply with the court's earlier direction, to deliver back the vehicle. Ext.Pl decree, according to counsel, will become executable at the instance of the defendants only after they have obeyed the court's direction to return the vehicle. Setting aside Ext.P2 will be unjust since the same will enable the petitioner and his codefendannts who are guilty of having violated the orders of the court to go scot-free. Learned counsel also submitted that he has no objection in this Court correcting the mistake in Ext.P2 and fixing a definite period of detention to be undergone by the petitioner and the co-defendants. Counsel justified the filing of execution petition since, according to him, Section 36 of the Code clearly provides that the provisions under Order XXI and Chapter III of the Code will apply to execution of executable orders also.
Section 74 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Choorakadan Alias Rayyappadan Sanku ... vs Antony on 29 June, 1990
Counsel referred to the judgment of K.G. Balakrishnan, J. in Choorakadan alias Rayyappadan Sanku v. Antony and submitted that the proceeding under Order XXXIX Rule 2A for breach of injunction is separate and independent from the main proceeding, the suit and therefore it was not good argument that Ext.P2 was beyond the scope of Ext.Pl decree.
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