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Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax U. P., C. P., ... on 4 September, 1946 cites

Kesho Prasad Singh vs Sheo Pargash Ojha on 29 July, 1924

The learned Judges were dealing with the expression "agricultural land" in the Constitution Act, and after pointing out that it had not been defined there said at page 61 : "It must accordingly be understood in the sense which it ordinarily bears in the English language", and again at page 62 : "As regards the connotation of the word agricultural, it may be pointed out that agriculture has been variously defined in several English and Indian status for the purposes of these statutes and it is neither useful nor legitimate to attempt to draw any inference from these statutory definitions for the purpose of determining the ordinary connotation of the word in the English language." They then referred to decisions in which the Court has placed a restricted meaning on the terms "in view of the indication afforded by the particular Act which had to be considered by the Court," and to others which construed the term in a more general sense. The sum and substance of it all is that it is of little avail to consider these decisions because of course, it is open to the legislature to widen or to restrict the ordinary meaning of a word, and because, if it chooses to do so for the purposes of a particular Act, it does not follow that the same result is intended in another Act framed for a different purpose, having different provisions and using other language. In the face of that we do not think it will be either profitable or proper to consider in detail the various decisions which construe the term or analogous expressions, for the purpose of some particular Act. Some of them have been referred to in the Federal Courts judgment at pages 62-65, and others will be found in decisions like Province of Bihar v. Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo and Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu It will suffice to say that the following cases related to special Act, and at least part of the decisions in each is based upon matters special to those Acts : Venkayya v. Ramasomi Murugesa Chetti v. Chinna Thambi Goundan, Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Hiralal Ravchand v. Parbhulal Sakhidas, Kaju Mal v. Salig Ram and Imam Ali v. Priyawati Devi. The other cases in this class, though dealing with special Acts, base the decision on general grounds and to that extent are more in point. But all they serve to show is that difference of opinion is possible, the meaning being extended in some cases and restricted in others.
Bombay High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 31 - Full Document

Province Of Bihar vs Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo Of ... on 17 April, 1941

The learned Judges were dealing with the expression "agricultural land" in the Constitution Act, and after pointing out that it had not been defined there said at page 61 : "It must accordingly be understood in the sense which it ordinarily bears in the English language", and again at page 62 : "As regards the connotation of the word agricultural, it may be pointed out that agriculture has been variously defined in several English and Indian status for the purposes of these statutes and it is neither useful nor legitimate to attempt to draw any inference from these statutory definitions for the purpose of determining the ordinary connotation of the word in the English language." They then referred to decisions in which the Court has placed a restricted meaning on the terms "in view of the indication afforded by the particular Act which had to be considered by the Court," and to others which construed the term in a more general sense. The sum and substance of it all is that it is of little avail to consider these decisions because of course, it is open to the legislature to widen or to restrict the ordinary meaning of a word, and because, if it chooses to do so for the purposes of a particular Act, it does not follow that the same result is intended in another Act framed for a different purpose, having different provisions and using other language. In the face of that we do not think it will be either profitable or proper to consider in detail the various decisions which construe the term or analogous expressions, for the purpose of some particular Act. Some of them have been referred to in the Federal Courts judgment at pages 62-65, and others will be found in decisions like Province of Bihar v. Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo and Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu It will suffice to say that the following cases related to special Act, and at least part of the decisions in each is based upon matters special to those Acts : Venkayya v. Ramasomi Murugesa Chetti v. Chinna Thambi Goundan, Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Hiralal Ravchand v. Parbhulal Sakhidas, Kaju Mal v. Salig Ram and Imam Ali v. Priyawati Devi. The other cases in this class, though dealing with special Acts, base the decision on general grounds and to that extent are more in point. But all they serve to show is that difference of opinion is possible, the meaning being extended in some cases and restricted in others.
Patna High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 41 - Full Document

Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bihar & ... on 27 August, 1946

The other cases cited to us are not in point and do not help because they deal with other matters, such as dairy farming, Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Kokine Dairy, Rangoon, allowances from a zemindari to a Rani, Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces v. Rani Saltanat Begam, a money-lender who cultivates a field in lieu of a debt due to him, Chellappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, and royalties from a coal mine, Kamakshya Narayan Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax Bihar & Orissa. All we need say with respect to them, excluding of course the judgment of the Privy Council, is that in so far as their more general observations agree with the distinction we make, they support us, and in so far as they do not, then, with great respect, we differ from them. Their Lordships held that royalties from local mines were not agricultural income and nothing that their Lordships said detracts from our view.
Patna High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 70 - Full Document

Srimath Jagathguru Sringeri Sri ... vs C.P. Duraiswami Naidu (Dead) And Ors. on 6 January, 1931

The learned Judges were dealing with the expression "agricultural land" in the Constitution Act, and after pointing out that it had not been defined there said at page 61 : "It must accordingly be understood in the sense which it ordinarily bears in the English language", and again at page 62 : "As regards the connotation of the word agricultural, it may be pointed out that agriculture has been variously defined in several English and Indian status for the purposes of these statutes and it is neither useful nor legitimate to attempt to draw any inference from these statutory definitions for the purpose of determining the ordinary connotation of the word in the English language." They then referred to decisions in which the Court has placed a restricted meaning on the terms "in view of the indication afforded by the particular Act which had to be considered by the Court," and to others which construed the term in a more general sense. The sum and substance of it all is that it is of little avail to consider these decisions because of course, it is open to the legislature to widen or to restrict the ordinary meaning of a word, and because, if it chooses to do so for the purposes of a particular Act, it does not follow that the same result is intended in another Act framed for a different purpose, having different provisions and using other language. In the face of that we do not think it will be either profitable or proper to consider in detail the various decisions which construe the term or analogous expressions, for the purpose of some particular Act. Some of them have been referred to in the Federal Courts judgment at pages 62-65, and others will be found in decisions like Province of Bihar v. Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo and Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu It will suffice to say that the following cases related to special Act, and at least part of the decisions in each is based upon matters special to those Acts : Venkayya v. Ramasomi Murugesa Chetti v. Chinna Thambi Goundan, Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Hiralal Ravchand v. Parbhulal Sakhidas, Kaju Mal v. Salig Ram and Imam Ali v. Priyawati Devi. The other cases in this class, though dealing with special Acts, base the decision on general grounds and to that extent are more in point. But all they serve to show is that difference of opinion is possible, the meaning being extended in some cases and restricted in others.
Madras High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 18 - Full Document

The Chief Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Zamindar Of Singampatti on 21 February, 1922

From here we proceed to consider cases under the Income-tax Act. A large number were cited but those dealing with forests are not many. Of them Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zamindar of Singampatti. thought, without deciding the point, that "forestry" might be regarded as agriculture. We stress, however, the use of the word "forestry" as opposed to "forest".
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Hiralal Ravchand Shah vs Parbhulal Sakhidas Shah on 8 April, 1921

The learned Judges were dealing with the expression "agricultural land" in the Constitution Act, and after pointing out that it had not been defined there said at page 61 : "It must accordingly be understood in the sense which it ordinarily bears in the English language", and again at page 62 : "As regards the connotation of the word agricultural, it may be pointed out that agriculture has been variously defined in several English and Indian status for the purposes of these statutes and it is neither useful nor legitimate to attempt to draw any inference from these statutory definitions for the purpose of determining the ordinary connotation of the word in the English language." They then referred to decisions in which the Court has placed a restricted meaning on the terms "in view of the indication afforded by the particular Act which had to be considered by the Court," and to others which construed the term in a more general sense. The sum and substance of it all is that it is of little avail to consider these decisions because of course, it is open to the legislature to widen or to restrict the ordinary meaning of a word, and because, if it chooses to do so for the purposes of a particular Act, it does not follow that the same result is intended in another Act framed for a different purpose, having different provisions and using other language. In the face of that we do not think it will be either profitable or proper to consider in detail the various decisions which construe the term or analogous expressions, for the purpose of some particular Act. Some of them have been referred to in the Federal Courts judgment at pages 62-65, and others will be found in decisions like Province of Bihar v. Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo and Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu It will suffice to say that the following cases related to special Act, and at least part of the decisions in each is based upon matters special to those Acts : Venkayya v. Ramasomi Murugesa Chetti v. Chinna Thambi Goundan, Chandrasekhara Bharathi v. Duraisami Naidu, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Kesho Prasad v. Sheo Pargash Ojha, Hiralal Ravchand v. Parbhulal Sakhidas, Kaju Mal v. Salig Ram and Imam Ali v. Priyawati Devi. The other cases in this class, though dealing with special Acts, base the decision on general grounds and to that extent are more in point. But all they serve to show is that difference of opinion is possible, the meaning being extended in some cases and restricted in others.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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