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1 - 8 of 8 (1.40 seconds)State Of Punjab vs Sri Hardyal on 10 April, 1985
According to the said
objections, the umpire became functus-officio. It was con-
tended that the power to extend the period of passing the
award was vested in the court alone under section 28 of the
Arbitration Act and it was not permissible for the parties
to extend the time. We are unable to accept this position.
Mr. Markendeya drew our attention to certain observations of
this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sri Hardyal,
[1985] 3 S.C.R. 649. He relied on the observations of the
Court at page 656 and emphasised that law precludes parties
from extending time after the matter had been referred to
the arbitrator, it would be contradiction in terms to hold
that the same result could be brought about by the conduct
of the parties. These observations, in our opinion, are out
of the context. The policy of law is that the arbitration
proceedings should not be unduly prolonged. The arbitrator
therefore has to give the award within the time prescribed
or such extended time as the court concerned may in its
discretion extend and the court alone has been given the
power to extend time for giving the award. The court has got
the power to extend time even after the award has been given
or after the expiry of the period prescribed for the award.
But the court has to exercise its discretion in a judicial
manner. In that case this Court found that the High Court
was justified in taking the view that it did. This power,
however, could be exercised even by the appellate court. In
view of the policy of law that the arbitration proceedings
should not be unduly prolonged and in view of the fact that
the parties have been taking willing part in the proceedings
before the arbitrator without a demur and had all along been
willing to extend time, this will be a fit case, in our
opinion, for the extension of time. We accordingly extend
the time for giving the award and the award will be deemed
to have been given in time. In this case, it appears that
under section 28 and in the light of section 3 of the First
Schedule the parties are allowed to extend the time.
Section 3 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
The Arbitration Act, 1940
Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth And Others vs Chintamanrao Balaji And Others on 19 November, 1963
In the case of Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth and
others v. Chintamanrao Balaji and others, [1964] 5 S.C.R.
480, this Court observed that an award might be set aside by
the court on the ground of error on the face of the award,
but an award was not invalid merely because by a process of
inference and argument it might be demonstrated that the
arbitrator had committed some mistake in arriving at his
conclusion. The law on this point is well-settled.
Section 30 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Section 33 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Champsey Bhara And Company vs The Jivraj Balloo Spinning And C. Co. ... on 6 March, 1923
The
Judicial Committee in Chempsey Bhara and Company v. Jivraj
Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. L.R. 50 I.A. 324
clarified that an error of law on the face of the award
means, that one could find in the award or a document actu-
ally incorporated thereto, as for instance a note appended
by the "arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment,
some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and
which one could then say was erroneous. It did not mean that
if in narrating a reference was made to a contention of one
party, that opened the door to seeing first what that con-
tention was, and then going to the contract on which the
parties' rights depended to see if that contention was
sound". It has been further reiterated by this Court in the
aforesaid decision relying on Chempsey Bhara and Company's
case (supra) that in dealing with an application to set
aside an award the court had not to consider whether the
view of the arbitratorr on the evidence was justified. The
arbitrator's adjudication was generally considered binding
between the parties, for he was the tribunal selected by the
parties and the power of the Court to set aside the award
was restricted to cases set out in section 30 of the Arbi-
tration Act. It is not open to the court to speculate,
where no reasons are
658
given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator
to arrive at his conclusion. It is not open to the Court to
attempt to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator
had reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the
terms of his award. In this case this is not a speaking
award. The learned Umpire has not spoken his mind indicating
why he has done, what he has done, he has narrated only how
he came to make the award.
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