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1 - 10 of 14 (0.22 seconds)Section 50 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 65 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Firm Kaluram Sitaram vs The Dominion Of India on 18 March, 1953
The learned Chief Justice in his distinctive style of
writing observed as under in para 19: (Firm Kaluram case, SCC
OnLine Bom)
"19. ... we have often had occasion to say that when the State
deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities,
and if the State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just
one, even though legal defences may be open to it, it must act, as
has been said by eminent Judges, as an honest person."
We are in respectful agreement with the aforementioned
observations, as in our considered opinion these observations
apply fully to the case in hand against the State because except
the plea of limitation, the State has no case to defend their
action.
Urban Improvement Trust,Bikaner vs Mohan Lal on 30 October, 2009
32. Similar view was also taken in Urban Improvement Trust,
Bikaner vs. Mohan Lal6 . It declared:
Dilbagh Rai Jarry vs Union Of India And Others on 5 November, 1973
In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India7 this Court
extracted with approval the following statement [from an earlier
decision of the Kerala High Court (P.P. Abubacker case8):
Committee-Gfil vs Libra Buildtech P.Ltd.. on 30 September, 2015
In Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech (P) Ltd2., an auction
sale of immoveable properties of a Company (GFIL) by a Committee
constituted by the Supreme Court took place. Successful bidders
deposited with the Committee entire amount of sale consideration and
stamp duty in terms of auction conditions and directions of Court
monitoring the transaction. But despite full performance of
purchasers' part of the contract, the Committee ( seller) could
not deliver possession of the properties to the purchasers and the
transaction failed for reasons beyond the control of the parties. The
Supreme Court cancelled the transaction and directed the Committee
to refund the entire sale consideration with interest and permitted the
petitioners to approach the State Government to claim refund of stamp
duty. The Committee refunded the sale consideration, but the State
refused to refund the stamp duty spent for execution of sale deeds in
their favor in relation to the properties in question. The purchasers
then approached the Supreme Court. It held that they are entitled
under Sec.65 of the Contract Act,1872 to refund of the stamp duty as
well. It applied the above principle i.e., that no party shall be
prejudiced by an act of a Court and held that once the sale became
void as a result of cancellation of transaction by the Court, the
contract was rendered void. It held:
Bhag Singh & Ors vs Union Territory Of Chandigarh, Through ... on 14 August, 1985
In a three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh v. UT of
Chandigarh10 this Court held: (SCC p. 741, para 3)
9
1979 (4) SCC 176
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"3. ... The State Government must do what is fair and just to
the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases
where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or
where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be
prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and
just claim of the citizen."
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Another vs Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited ... on 19 February, 1997
In Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries
(P) Ltd11. the Supreme Court held that where an objection to
jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any
interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of
jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending
the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no
jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and
circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not
instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet
pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the
question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim
orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and
effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain
the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the
decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to
11
(1997) 3 SCC 443, at page 457
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modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the
suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such
orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case,
where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by
appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the Court should,
while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, put back
the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or
obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force,
these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished
even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff
provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court
on the question of jurisdiction.