Madras High Court
Pool Pandi vs State on 21 December, 2012
Author: M.Jaichandren
Bench: M.Jaichandren
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 21/12/2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE M.JAICHANDREN and THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU Criminal Appeal (MD) No.89 of 2005 1.Pool Pandi, S/o.Masanathevar. 2.Murugan, S/o.Venkatasalathevar. 3.Raju, S/o.Somasundaram. ... Appellants/ Accused 1 to 3 vs State, through The Inspector of Police, Nanguneri, Tirunelveli District. (Cr.No.359/97) ... Respondent/ Complainant Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 30.09.2004, in S.C.No.78 of 1999 on the file of learned Special District and Sessions Judge, Communal Clash Cases Court, Southern Districts at Madurai. !For Appellants ... Mr.S.Kumaresan ^For Respondent ... Mr.A.Ramar, Addl.Public prosecutor. :JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.NAGAMUTHU,J) The appellants are the accused in S.C.No.78/1999 on the file of the learned Special District and Sessions Judge for Communal Clash Cases, Southern Districts at Madurai. Originally, in this case, there were five accused, including these appellants. Initially, the case was on the file of the II-Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, in S.C.No.364/98 and charges were framed by the same court as against all the five accused, as under:
Accused No. Charge 1 U/s.148, 449, 324 and 302 IPC 2 U/s.147, 449, 302 r/w 149 and 323 IPC 3 U/s.148, 449 and 302 IPC 4 U/s.147, 449, 302 r/w 149 and 323 (3 counts) IPC 5 U/s.148 and 302 r/w 149 IPC
Later, since it was found to be a case on communal clash, it was transferred to the file learned Special District and Sessions Judge for Communal Clash Cases, Southern Districts at Madurai and taken on file as S.C.No.78/1999.
2.As per the array of parties, as stood originally, the appellants were accused Nos.1, 2, and 4. The 3rd accused was one Murugesan and the 5th accused was one Ramiah. But, during the course of trial, the 3rd accused Murugesan absconded and thus the case against him was split-up and numbered separately as S.C.No.8/2003. Thereafter, the array of appellants was rearranged and accordingly they were accused Nos.1, 2 and 3. The 4th accused was one Mr.Ramiah. By judgment, dated 30.09.2004, the trial court acquitted the 4th accused Ramiah from all the charges framed against him. However, the trial court convicted these appellants and sentenced them as detailed hereunder:
Accused Finding Sentence 1st accused- (a) For the offence under Section 148 IPC, Pool Pandi Guilty u/s.148, 449, to undergo 3 years R.I. and to pay 302 and 324 IPC a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to undergo 6 months R.I. (b) For the offence under Section 449 IPC, to undergo 10 years R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/-, in default to undergo one year R.I. (c) For the offence under Section 302 IPC, to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. (d) For the offence under Section 324 IPC, to undergo R.I. for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default to undergo 6 months R.I. 2nd accused- (a) For the offence under Section 147 IPC, Murugan Guilty under Sections to undergo 2 years R.I. and to pay 147, 449, 323 and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default 302 r/w 149 IPC to undergo 6 months R.I. (b) For the offence under Section 449 IPC, to undergo 10 years R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/-, in default to undergo one year R.I. (c) For the offence under Section 302 r/w 149 IPC, to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- . (d) For the offence under Section 323 IPC, to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo 3 months R.I. 3rd accused- Raju Guilty under Sections (a) For the offence under Section 147 IPC, 147, 449, 323 and to undergo 2 years R.I. and to pay 302 r/w 149 IPC a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to undergo 6 months R.I. (b) For the offence under Section 449 IPC, to undergo 10 years R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/-, in default to undergo one year R.I. (c) For the offence under Section 323 IPC, to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo 3 months R.I. (d) For the offence under Section 302 r/w 149 IPC, to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- .
The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, the appellants are before this Court, with this appeal.
3.The case of the prosecution is briefly as follows:
(a)The accused and the prosecution party belong to Paanangulam Village in Tirunelveli District. There is a temple in the said village, known as "Muppidari Amman Koil". The villagers use to organize annual festival in the temple, known as "Kodai" festival, during summer season. On 12.08.1997, such festival was celebrated. The deceased, in this case, was one Mr.Kanthan. The deceased Kanthan, one Ramamoorthy Reddiar and P.W.14 were the leaders of the village, who organized the said festival. On 12.08.1997, these accused came to the temple and wanted the deceased and others to play songs, through speakers, relating to their communal leader. The deceased and others declined. This resulted in a wordy quarrel. While leaving the said place, it is alleged that the accused threw a challenge to the deceased and others. This occurrence is projected to be the motive.
(b)P.W.1 is the wife and P.Ws.2 and 3 are the daughters of the deceased. P.W.20 is the mother of the deceased. On 20.08.1997, at about 10.30 p.m., P.Ws.1 to 3 and P.W.20 and the deceased were in their house at Paanangulam Village, Singikulam Main Road. At that time, suddenly, all the five accused, including the absconding accused Murugesan, came to the house and knocked at the door. P.W.20 opened the door. All the five accused trespassed into the house of the deceased. At that time, the 1st accused/1st appellant - Pool Pandi and the absconding accused Murugesan and the 4th accused Ramiah, were all armed with aruvals. The 2nd accused/2nd appellant - Murugan and the 3rd accused/3rd appellant - Raju did not possess any weapon. On entering into the house, the 1st accused/1st appellant shouted as to where the deceased was. P.W.1 attempted to intervene. Immediately, the 1st accused/1st appellant cut her with aruval, on her right hand and caused simple hurt. The deceased was sleeping in the room. All the accused went near him. The 1st accused/1st appellant attacked him with aruval on his hip, left forehand and on the head below the left ear, repeatedly. The absconding accused Murugesan cut him on his chest and right shoulder. P.W.20 tried to intervene. But, the 2nd accused/2nd appellant pushed her down and stamped her on her chest, causing simple hurt. The 3d accused/3rd appellant attacked the daughters of the deceased with hand and caused simple hurt. The deceased died instantaneously. All the accused, thereafter, fled-
away from the scene of occurrence.
(c)P.W.6 is the brother of the deceased. At the time of occurrence, he was at his home. On hearing the alarm raised, he rushed to the house of the deceased and came to know about the occurrence. Then P.W.1 narrated to him the entire occurrence. P.W.6 reduced the same into writing, as a complaint. Then taking the complaint, P.W.1 and P.W.6 went to Nanguneri Police Station.
(d)At 3.00 a.m., on 21.08.1997, when P.W.17, the then Sub- Inspector of Police, attached to Nanguneri Police Station, was on duty, P.W.1 presented the complaint to him. On the said complaint, P.W.17 registered a case in Crime No.359/1997 under Sections 324, 302 IPC. Ex.P-1 is the complaint and Ex.P-23 is the FIR. Then, P.W.17 forwarded Exs.P-1 and P-23 to the court, through P.W.18, a Constable attached to the said police Station. P.W.18, in turn, handed over the said documents to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Nanguneri, at his residence, at 5.00 a.m. on 21.08.1997. Then he handed over copy of the FIR to P.W.21, the then Inspector of Police, attached to Nanguneri Police Station.
(e)Taking-up the case for investigation, P.W.21 proceeded to the place of occurrence at 4.30 a.m. on 21.08.1997 and prepared Ex.P-3 Observation mahazar, in the presence of P.Ws.7 and 8. He also prepared Ex.P-29 Rough sketch, showing the place of occurrence. Then, he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased between 5.00 a.m. and 8.00 a.m. and prepared Ex.P-28 Inquest Report. During inquest, P.W.21 examined P.Ws.1 to 5 and P.W.20 and recorded their statements. Then, he recovered bloodstained brick piece (M.O.3) and sample brick piece (M.O.4), from the place of occurrence, under Ex.P-4 Mahazar, in the presence of witnesses. Thereafter, he forwarded the body for postmortem.
(f)P.W.15 Dr.Christopher Dass, was the Civil Surgeon, attached to Nanguneri Government Hospital, at the relevant point of time. On 21.08.1997, at about 1.00 p.m., he conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. He noticed the following external injuries.
"(1)Incised wound over upper part of chest obliquely placed, 4 cm below the upper end of sternum, measuring 27 x 12 x 31/2 cms. On the right side of sternum, it measured 18 cm. Part of right lung has come out through the lower part of the wound.
(2)Incised wound 18 x 10 x 6 cm on the right side of right upper arm exposing muscles and fractured end of upper part of humerus. (3)Incised wound 4 cms distal to left wrist and muscle was hanging loosely from skin, from the lateral aspect. Cut ends of metacarpal bones and tendons seen.
(4)Incised wound 12 x 6 x 2 cm over posterior aspect of left fore arm exposing muscles.
(5)Incised wound 20 x 4 cm over left side of abdomen, maximum depth 3cm on the upper part, wound present transversely.
(6)Incised wound 3 x 11/2 x 1/2 cm over left side of fore head."
P.W.15 opined that the deceased would appear to have died of injury to lungs, shock and haemorrhage. Ex.P-22 is the postmortem certificate. According to him, these injuries could have been caused by weapon like aruval.
(g)As soon as P.W.1 made the complaint under Ex.P-1, she was sent with a police memo to the Government Hospital at Nanguneri, for treatment. P.W.15 examined her at 6.30 a.m. on 21.08.1997 and found an incised wound 6 x 1 x/12 cm, over medial aspect of right palm. Ex.P-18 is the Accident Register Copy pertaining to P.W.1. P.W.15 opined that the injury sustained by P.W.1 is simple in nature.
(h)P.W.20 was also sent for treatment, with a police memo. At 08.15 p.m., on 21.08.1997, P.W.20 appeared before P.W.15, for treatment. On examination, P.W.15 found a brownish contusion 6 x 3 cm over upper part of chest. P.W.15 opined that the said injury is simple in nature. Ex.P-19 is the Accident Register Copy pertaining to P.W.20.
(i)Continuing the investigation, P.W.21 forwarded the material objects, collected from the scene of occurrence, to Court. On 28.08.1997, the accused 1, 2 and 4 and the absconding accused Murugesan surrendered before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tuticorin. On 04.09.1997, P.W.21 took police custody of the said accused on the orders of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Nanguneri. When they were brought to the police station, at 2.30 p.m., on 04.09.1997, the 1st accused/1st appellant gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place where he had hidden an aruval and on the same date, at 3.30 p.m., the absconding accused Murugesan gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place where he had hidden another aruval. At 4.15 p.m., the 4th accused Ramiah gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place where he had hidden another aruval. In pursuance of the confessions, the respective accused took the police and witnesses to the respective places and produced the weapons (M.Os. 1, 2 and 5 Aruvals) and P.W.21 recovered the same in the presence of P.Ws.12 and 13 and returned to the police station. (P.Ws.12 and 13 have turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution, in any manner). P.W.21 forwarded the accused to the court for judicial remand and handed over the material objects to the Court. Then he made a request to the Court for forwarding the material objects for chemical examination, including M.O.5 bloodstained Lungi recovered from the body of the deceased, in the presence of P.W.9. On such examination, the Chemical Analyst submitted a report under Ex.P-26. Ex.P-27 is the Serological Report. As per the Chemical Analyst Report, bloodstains were found on two aruvals and no bloodstain was found on the 3rd aruval. As per the Serological Report Ex.P-27, bloodstains are of human origin but, result of grouping test remained inconclusive. P.W.21 collected medical records, examined the doctor and finally laid charge sheet against all the five accused, on 08.09.1997, under Sections 147, 148, 449, 352, 323, 324, 109 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
4.Based on the above materials, the learned II-Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, framed charges against all the five accused, as detailed in the 1st paragraph of the judgment. All the accused pleaded innocence. Therefore, they were put on trial. Before the examination of witnesses commenced, as we have already pointed out, the accused Murugesan (the 3rd accused, as per the original array of parties) absconded. The trial Court, therefore, split-up the case against him as S.C.No.8/2003 and made rearrangement of the parties and proceeded with the trial. During trial, to establish the charges against the accused, on the side of prosecution 21 witnesses were examined and 37 Exhibits were marked, besides 6 M.Os.
5.Out of the said witnesses, P.Ws.1 and 20 are injured eye- witnesses. P.Ws.2 and 3 are eye-witnesses to the occurrence. These witnesses have spoken to about the participation of all the five accused in the crime. P.W.4, has spoken to about the motive occurrence, which took place on 12.08.1997. P.Ws.14 has also spoken to about the motive occurrence. P.W.5 is the son-in-law of the deceased. He has stated that he saw the accused 1 and 2 somewhere near the place of occurrence with weapons. P.W.6, the brother of the deceased, has spoken to the fact that he drafted Ex.P-1, as dictated by P.W.1. P.W.15 has spoken to about the postmortem conducted by him on the body of the deceased and his opinion regarding the cause of death. He has also spoken to about the treatment given to P.Ws.1 and 20. The other witnesses are official witnesses.
6.When the above incriminating materials in evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, they denied the same as false. However, they did not choose to examine any witnesses or mark any documents. Considering the above materials, the trial court acquitted the 4th accused Mr.Ramiah, holding that his presence in the occurrence place itself had not been proved. However, the trial court found the appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 guilty on various offences and accordingly punished them as detailed in the 2nd paragraph of the judgment. That is how the appellants are before this Court with this appeal.
7.We have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and we have also perused the records, carefully.
8.As we have pointed out, P.Ws.1 to 3 and 20 are the eye-
witnesses and they are inmates of the house. The foremost contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the occurrence would not have happened in the house of the deceased at all. According to him, the deceased, besides being a drunkard, had a number of enemies in the village and while he was fully drunk elsewhere, he was done to death by unidentifiable persons. Later on, according to the defence, the dead body was brought to the house of the deceased and then the prosecution story has been built-up. In our considered opinion, this defence taken has not even been probabilized by the accused. Except making a vague suggestion to the witnesses, nothing more have been brought on record to doubt the fact that the occurrence had taken place inside the house of the deceased. Apart from that, P.Ws.1 to 3 and P.W.20 have categorically stated about the occurrence. The bloodstained brick piece recovered from the place of occurrence would also go to prove that the occurrence had taken place only inside the house of the accused. Thus, in our considered opinion, the prosecution has clearly proved that the occurrence was only inside the house of the deceased. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, in this regard, is rejected.
9.The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the FIR in this case is a doubtful document and, therefore, the entire case of the prosecution has to be rejected as the FIR has collapsed. In order to substantiate this contention, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that P.W.1 has admitted, during cross-examination, that after the occurrence, she was at the place of occurrence continuously, as she was full of grief and she has further stated that from a local telephone booth, message was passed on to the police, immediately after the occurrence and thus police came to the place of occurrence, in a short while. After the arrival of the police, according to the learned counsel, the FIR could have been concocted and, therefore, no importance could be attached to the same. The learned counsel would further submit that there is inordinate delay in preferring the complaint as well as in forwarding the same to the Court.
10.As we have pointed out earlier, it is the case of the prosecution that FIR was registered at 3.00 a.m. on 21.08.1997 and the same had reached at the hands of the Magistrate at 5.00 a.m. So far as the delay aspect is concerned, we do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel at all. But, the main contention of the learned counsel that police would have arrived at the scene of occurrence, immediately on receiving the telephone message, needs serious consideration. We have perused the evidence of P.W.1, on this aspect. Of course, P.W.1 has stated so. But, this answer had been elicited from P.W.1 by raising a very vague question. Nothing has been elicited from her as to whether she meant the arrival of the police after the complaint given by her at the police station or before. From the records, we could see that P.W.1 is an illiterate woman, knowing only to sign. Such a rustic village woman cannot be expected to be meticulous to speak about the time of arrival of the police. From the evidence of P.W.15, it could be seen that P.W.1 went to the doctor on 21.08.1997 at 8.30 a.m. Had it been true that the police arrived at the scene of occurrence, immediately after the occurrence, as suggested by the defence, in all probabilities, P.W.1 would have been sent to the hospital forthwith. Having regard to the fact that P.W.1 is an illiterate woman and the way in which answer has been elicited from her in respect of the arrival of police and the fact that nothing was elicited from her as to whether the arrival of police was at the time of conducting inquest or before, we are not able to attach any importance to this inadvertent answer elicited from P.W.1. As we have pointed out, there is no delay either in preferring the complaint or in forwarding the same to the Court. Prompt lodging of the FIR, in this case, guarantees, to some extent, the truth of the contents in the FIR. Having regard to the over all evidence available, we hold that Ex.P-1 is not a doubtful document, as suggested by the defence.
11.Next, the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that there are certain contradictions between the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and P.W.20. According to the learned counsel, P.W.1, during cross-examination, has admitted that police sniffer dog was brought to the place of occurrence. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that services of police sniffer dog would have been requisitioned only to identify the assailants. In other words, according to him, had it been known that these appellants and the absconding accused were assailants, the Investigation Officer would not have requisitioned the services of sniffer dog. This, according to the learned counsel, creates enormous doubt in the case of the prosecution. In this regard, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would refer to the evidence of P.W.21. When a specific question was made to P.W.21, on this aspect, P.W.1 has stated that police sniffer dog was never brought to the place of occurrence. The defence had not taken any further steps even to probabilise that police sniffer dog was brought to the place of occurrence. In our considered opinion, P.W.1 has, by inadvertence, stated as though police sniffer dog was brought to the place of occurrence. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel is also rejected.
12.The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there is contradiction in respect of place of occurrence.
According to him, P.W.1 has stated, at one place, that the deceased was sleeping in the room; whereas, during cross-examination, she has stated that he was sleeping at the verandah. This is sought to be blown out of proportion, as though it is a major contradiction touching upon the truthfulness of the case of the prosecution. In our considered view, this is a very minor contradiction, which will not cause any harm to the prosecution at all.
13.The learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that at 10.30 p.m. in the night, due to darkness, these witnesses would not have been in a position to identify the assailants. But, it is in evidence that when the door was knocked at, P.W.20 opened the door, after putting on the light. P.W.11 Mr.Perumal Konar, has stated about the availability of electricity. He is a man from Electricity Board. Thus, in our considered view, there would have been enough light available for the witnesses to identify the accused.
14.Next, turning to the recovery of material objects, learned counsel would submit that P.Ws.12 and 13 have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution in respect of the alleged recovery of weapons from the possession of accused Nos.1, 4 and the absconding accused Murugesan. Of course, it is true that P.Ws.12 and 13 have turned hostile. But, the evidence of P.W.21 is available to prove the recovery of material objects, namely aruvals (M.Os.1, 2 and 6). The Chemical Analyst has found bloodstains on the aruvals, which connects the weapons with the crime. Though recovery of these material objects is a weak piece of evidence, in this particular case, it only adds strength to the case of the prosecution.
15.The learned counsel would next contend that the medical evidence does not corroborate the eye-witnesses account. So far as P.W.20 is concerned, she went to the hospital for treatment only at 8.15 p.m. on 21.08.2012. P.W.15 had seen only a small contusion measuring 6 cm x 3 cms., on P.W.20. P.W.20 herself has stated, in chief examination, that she could not identify the assailants. In our considered opinion, due to old age, she would not have been in a position to notice the assailants. The injury sustained by her is also a minor injury and there is absolutely no explanation as to why she was sent to the hospital only at 8.15 p.m., on the next day. As it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, this creates doubt. It is the case of the prosecution that the 2nd accused attacked P.W.20 and caused injury. But, in evidence, she has stated that the 4th accused Ramiah also attacked her. In any view of the matter, we are doubtful as to whether accused No.2 would have been present at all at the time of occurrence and attacked P.W.20.
16.Nextl the learned counsel would contend that the 3rd accused is alleg,d to have attacked the daughters of the deceased. The daughters were not sent to hospital for treatment. There is no medical evidence in support of the same. Thus, in respect of the alleged attack made by the 3rd appellant (Raju) on the daughters of the deceased, in our considered opinion, there is no reliable evidence available on record. Thus, the presence of and participation of the 3rd accused/3rd appellant is also doubtful.
17.The trial Court has acquitted the 4th accused Ramiah, though all the witnesses have spoken to about his presence and participation. The lower Court was not prepared to accept the evidence of all these witnesses, as against the 4th accused. This is because of the absence of medical evidence. If the same standard of test is applied to accused Nos.2 and 3, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove their presence and participation in the occurrence. Even according to the positive case of the prosecution, these two accused did not cause any injury at all either on the deceased or on P.w.1. As per the medical evidence, P.W.1 had a single cut injury, which, according to her evidence, was caused by accused No.1. Similarly, all injuries found on the deceased were cut injuries, which were caused by the 1st accused and the absconding accused Murugesan. Thus, an over all assessment of the entire evidence available on record would lead to the conclusion that it is highly doubtful as to whether the appellants 2 and 3 would have participated in the occurrence at all.
18.The learned counsel would nextly contend that P.W.5, the son-in-law of the deceased, has deposed that he found the accused 1 and 2 somewhere near the place of occurrence, at or about the time of the occurrence. But, during cross-examination, he has stated that he could not identify the person whom he saw, as it was dark. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.5 is, in no way, incriminating any of the accused.
19.Turning to the judgment of the trial court, as we have already stated, out of five accused, only four accused faced trial. Out of them, one accused was acquitted on the ground that his presence and participation in the crime itself was not established. If that be so, even according to the finding of the lower court, the number of accused, who participated in the crime, was reduced to four. Having given such a finding, it is strange that the lower court still proceeded to convict the accused under Sections 147, 148 IPC and by invoking 149 IPC also. This shows that the lower court has not bestowed proper attention while recording conviction of the accused.
20.In this judgment, now, as we are holding that the case against the appellants 2 and 3 has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, we are inclined to acquit them from all the charges levelled against them. So far as the 1st accused is concerned, in our considered view, the prosecution has succeeded in proving his participation in the crime. It has been established that he trespassed into the house, caused murder of the deceased and caused, voluntarily, simple hurt on P.W.1, with dangerous weapon. Therefore, the 1st accused alone is liable to be punished under Sections 302, 324 and 449 IPC. Now turning to the quantum of punishment, for the offence under Section 302 IPC, we are inclined to impose the punishment of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default rigorous imprisonment for one month. For the offence under 324 IPC, we are inclined to impose the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs.3000/-, in default rigorous imprisonment for two weeks and for the offence under Section 449 IPC, we are inclined to impose a punishment of rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default two weeks rigorous imprisonment.
21.We make it clear that any of the observations, in respect of the alleged involvement of the absconding accused Murugesan, made in this judgment, shall not be used against him or shall not be treated as a finding regarding his involvement, when Mr.Murugesan is tried in the split up case, namely S.C.No.8/3003.
22.In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, in the following terms.
(i)The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants 2 and 3, namely Murugan and Raju, are set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. Fine amount, if any, paid by them shall be refunded to them. The bail bonds executed by them shall stand discharged.
(ii)The conviction of the 1st appellant/1st accused (Pool Pandi) under Section 148 IPC and the sentence imposed thereunder are set aside and he is acquitted of the said charge.
(iii)The conviction of the 1st appellant/1st accused (Pool Pandi) under Sections 302, 324 and 449 IPC is hereby confirmed. However, the punishments imposed thereunder shall stand modified, as under:
(a)For the offence under Section 302 IPC, he is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.
(b)For the offence under 324 IPC, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and shall pay a fine of Rs.3000/-, in default shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks.
(c)For the offence under Section 449 IPC, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and shall pay a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default shall undergo two weeks rigorous imprisonment. The sentences are ordered to run concurrently.
(d)The fine amounts, if any, already paid by him as per the sentence imposed by the trial court shall be adjusted towards the fine amounts now imposed. Excess fine amount, if any, paid shall be refunded to him.
(iv)It is stated that the 1st appellant/1st accused (Pool Pandi) is on bail. The bail bonds executed by him shall stand cancelled. The trial court is directed to take necessary steps to secure his presence and commit him to jail to undergo the sentences imposed on him.
gb To
1.The District and Sessions Judge, Special Court for Communal Clash Cases for Souther District at Madurai.
2.The Principal Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli District.
3.The II-Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli.
4.The Judicial Magistrate, Nanguneri.
5.The Inspector of Police, Nanguneri Police Station, Tirunelveli District.
6.The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.