Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Ahmed Mohiuddin vs State Bank Of Hyderabad And Ors. on 2 May, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(4)ALD738, 2003(4)ALT247
Author: Goda Raghuram
Bench: Goda Raghuram
ORDER Goda Raghuram, J.
1. The parties herein have pursued a long drawn and tortuous litigative saga in respect of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner's conduct while working as a Manager in Kamalanagar Branch (Karnataka State) of the respondent-Bank - the State Bank of Hyderabad.
2. The petitioner initially joined service in the respondent-bank as a clerk in 1963. He was promoted to the category of Officer Grade II and thereafter as Manager in the years 1973 and 1975, respectively. As Manager he was transferred to Kamalanagar Branch and joined duty in the Branch in July, 1975. He was relieved on 16-9-1976 to undergo training at Trivandrum. On the basis of a complaint dated 17-9-1976, from a customer of the Bank at Kamalanagar Branch, by the letter dated 5-10-1976 the petitioner was called upon to show-cause and submit his comments on the complaint dated 17-9-1976. He was also placed under suspension by the order dated 9-10-1976. A charge-sheet was issued to him by the proceedings dated 8-12-1976 enumerating 8 charges. The petitioner submitted his explanation dated 24-1-1977.
3. Without conducting any enquiry the Bank issued a notice dated 30-4-1977 proposing the petitioner's reversion to the post of a Clerk. The petitioner challenged the notice dated 30-4-1977 by way of W.P. No. 526 of 1978. This Court by the judgment dated 8-8-1978 allowed the writ petition partly, directing completion of enquiry within a period of two months. Not satisfied with the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court, the petitioner preferred W.A.No. 461/ 78. The writ appeal was disposed of by the judgment dated 11-7-1979 confirming the order in the writ petition and directing the respondent-bank to dispose of the show-cause notice dated 30-4-1977 on considering the defence urged by the petitioner in his reply, to be examined by the Board of Directors.
4. By an order dated 3-9-1982 the petitioner was communicated the decision of the Board of Directors of the Bank imposing on the petitioner the punishment of discharge from the bank service and treating the period he was under suspension as not on duty and without adjustment in subsistence allowance/ remuneration payable to him during the period of suspension. Challenging this order the petitioner filed W.P. No. 6754/82. This Court by the judgment dated 14-2-1983 allowed the writ petition. The order dated 3-9-1982 was quashed and the respondent-bank directed to conduct an enquiry by following the procedure ordained in the State Bank of Hyderabad (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 (for short 'the Regulations') and on the basis of the show-cause notice dated 30-4-1977.
5. As against the judgment in W.P. No. 6754/82, the petitioner preferred W.A. No. 331/83. By the judgment dated 14-6-1984 the appeal was dismissed. Consequently by proceedings dated 13-11-1985 the 3rd respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 22-6-1989. Based on the report, the 3rd respondent, by the order dated 13-2-1991 communicated to the petitioner the decision dated 7-12-1990 of the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank imposing on him the punishment of placing him at the "start of the basic pay applicable to officers of JMGS-I Cadre i.e., at Rs. 2100/-, thereby bringing down the basic pay of the official from Rs. 3,180/- by 9 stages" and debarring his promotional chances for a period of 5 years from the date of reporting back to duty and recovery of Rs. 550/- paid by the bank to Bandappa Kalappa Gandge. The period of suspension of the petitioner was treated as confined to the subsistence allowance already received by him.
6. Questioning the above order, the petitioner filed W.P. 3129/91. This writ petition was disposed of by the judgment dated 22-3-1994. The impugned order was set aside. This Court held that non-supply of the enquiry officer's report to the petitioner per se constituted prejudice and invalidated the proceedings. However as the petitioner had by then, been supplied with a copy of the enquiry officer's report but along with the order of the punishment, this Court directed that the disciplinary proceedings should continue from the stage of giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit his reply to the report of the enquiry officer, to the disciplinary authority. The 1st respondent was directed to proceed with the enquiry and complete the same in accordance with law and that status quo as on the date of the judgment be maintained for a period of four months and in case the enquiry is not completed within the aforesaid period, this Court directed, the petitioner should be paid the salary he was drawing prior to the order suspending him from service pending enquiry.
7. The petitioner submitted his explanation dated 16-4-1994. By the order dated 8/13-6-1994, the appointing authority imposed on the petitioner the same penalty as was imposed on him by the decision of the Board of Directors of the Bank dated 7-12-1990, communicated to the petitioner by the order of the Managing Director dated 13-2-1991. The petitioner preferred an appeal dated 27-7-1994 to the 2nd respondent.
8. The 3rd respondent by his communication dated 16-2-1995 informed the petitioner as under:
"Please refer to the appeal dated the 27th July, 1994, preferred by you to the Managing Director/Appellate Authority against the orders of the Appointing Authority dated the 9th June, 1994, holding you guilty of all the charges alleged against you vide charge-sheet No. 8/20, dated the 8th December, 1996.
The Appellate Authority/Managing Director has since remitted back to me the entire record of disciplinary proceedings initiated against you, together with the findings of the inquiry Authority (iA), your submissions thereto and directed me to furnish you to reasons for my holding the charges 5, 6 and 7 as established differing with the findings of the I.A. and seek your submissions, if any, thereon for taking an overall view in the matter. Accordingly, I furnish hereunder the reasons for my disagreement with the findings of the I.A. in respect of charges 5, 6 and 7 alleged against you."
9. In response thereto the petitioner addressed the 3rd respondent by his letter dated 7-4-1995 contending in substance, that in view of the observations of the appellate authority as conveyed to him, the earlier order of punishment imposed by the appointing authority ceased to subsist and a fresh order could be passed only after the petitioner furnishes his comments on the reasons of the disciplinary authority for differing with the conclusions of the enquiry authority in relation to charges 5, -6 and 7 and that in the circumstances the petitioner should be treated as in continuous service, from the date of his original suspension dated 9-10-1976 and is consequently entitled to all the benefits as per Regulation 69(8)(i) of the Regulations such as salary, allowances, promotions and the like. In his letter dated 7-4-1995 the petitioner stated that he would make his submissions on the reasons of the disagreement of the disciplinary authority with the findings of the enquiry authority as conveyed to him by the letter dated 16-2-1995, after the respondent-Bank settles the issues raised by him in his letter (regarding payment of the benefits, from the date of suspension, as claimed).
10. As the 3rd respondent's communication dated 16-2-1995 called upon the petitioner to submit his comments to the contents of the said letter within fifteen days and the petitioner failed to furnish his comments, the appellate authority by the order dated 10-5-1995 rejected the petitioner's appeal dated 27-7-1994, concurring with the findings and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. The order dated 10-5-1995 was a communication of the 1 st respondent appellate authority's order dated 29-4-1995 containing the detailed reasons for rejection of the appeal.
11. The petitioner thereupon preferred a review petition dated 3-7-1995 to the 2nd respondent - Board of Directors. The Board of Directors at its meeting on 11-12-1995 rejected the review petition, which was communicated by the letter of the 1st respondent dated 28-2-1996.
12. In this writ petition the decisions of the primary, appellate and review authorities are questioned seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari.
13. Sri S.V. Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the order of punishment including the orders of the appellate and review authorities are invalid for a plurality of reasons. The broad grounds of attack are:-
(a) that charges 1,2 and 8 set out in the charge memo dated 8-12-1976 are vague and even taken on their own terms do not constitute misconduct;
(b) that the conclusions in respect of charges 3 to 7 are invalid as based on no evidence or on perverse appreciation of the evidence; and
(c) that the conclusions in respect of charges 5 to 7 are invalid as the petitioner had been denied a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposal of the disciplinary authority to differ from the conclusions of the enquiry authority in respect of these charges and for the further reason that the appellate authority had rejected his appeal even without the petitioner being afforded a reasonable opportunity of submitting his objections (to the reasons of the disciplinary authority for differing with the conclusions of the enquiry authority, as communicated by the disciplinary authority's proceedings dated 16-2-1995).
14. As the inherited principles and law governing disciplinary proceedings posit a discrete analysis of the contentions of the petitioner regarding charges 1, 2 and 8, the validity of the disciplinary proceedings in respect of these charges is considered in the first instance.
Charge No. 1:
15. Charge No. 1 reads as under:
"I. You opened a Special Savings Bank Account in the name of Shri Mallikarjun s/o Bandappa Gandge on 2nd January, 1976 with a deposit of Rs. 9,900/-. No cheque book was issued by you on the date the account was opened."
16. Charge-1 arraigns the petitioner for his conduct of opening of a Special Savings Bank Account in the name of Mr. Mallikarjun on 2-1-1976 with a deposit of Rs. 9,900/- and in not issuing a cheque book on the date the account was opened. There is no complaint that the issue of the cheque book was declined by the petitioner despite a request in this behalf. Mr. M.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Counsel for the Bank has not been able to satisfy this Court as to the misconduct involved in an officer of the Bank opening a Special Savings Bank Account in the name of a customer. The charge is also vague in the sense that the charge per se neither expressly nor by an implication brings forth what is the misconduct involved by a Manager in opening a Savings Bank Account in the name of a customer and not issuing the cheque book on the very date of opening of an account and in the absence of a complaint or a charge, either that the account was opened without the customer's request or that the cheque book was denied despite entitlement and request for issuance of a cheque book. It is the admitted position that the petitioner was charged on the basis of a complaint dated 17-9-1976 of Mr. Bandappa Gandge, the father of Mr. Mallikarjun Gandge. There is not a whisper in the complaint either regarding the opening of the account without authorisation or regarding the failure to issue a cheque book on the date the account was opened despite either entitlement or request in that behalf. It is settled law apart from being a principle of common understanding that every assertion couched in the form of a charge even if proved will not tantamount to a misconduct actionable in disciplinary proceedings. Even if evidence led in the inquiry demonstrates that the petitioner opened the account in the name of Mr. Mallikarjun and did not issue a cheque book on 2-1-1976, the date on which the account was opened with a deposit of Rs. 9,900/-, that by itself would not constitute misconduct. Opening of an account in the name of a customer is the normal function of a Bank Official. There is no evidence led by the Bank management to permit an inference that issuance of a cheque book on the date of opening of Savings Bank Account is mandatory even without a request in this behalf by the customer concerned. There is no complaint by the customer Mallikarjun Gandge or even by his father, the complainant and the author of the complaint dated 17-9-1976, either that the petitioner opened the Special Savings Bank Account without a request from the customer or that a cheque book was declined despite a request for the same.
17. In his explanation to the charge memo dated 8-12-1976, the petitioner by his letter dated 24-1-1977 and in reply to charge-1 stated that an existing customer Bandappa Gandge a Sahukar of Dongaon Village, on 2-1-1976 'withdrew a sum of Rs. 10,000 from his account and in the first instance and opened an account in the single name of one Mallikarjun, whom he identified as his son, with an initial deposit of Rs. 9,900/- and that at the instance of Bandappa Gandga a cheque book was not issued as he stated that it would be collected later. At the enquiry neither Mallikarjun nor Bandappa were examined. There is therefore no evidence contradicting the explanation of the charged officer - the petitioner that the account was opened at request and that the cheque book was not issued on account of specific instructions that it would be collected later. In this state of the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered view that charge No. 1 is itself wholly misconceived and the allegation even if factually proved does not amount to any misconduct.
Charge No. 2 :
18. Charge-2 read as under:
"Subsequently, the account was converted into a joint account along with the father of Shri Mallikarjun. While converting it into a joint account, it would appear that the account opening forms were tampered with and substituted by a fresh one."
19. In his explanation dated 24-1-1977 to the charge memo, in respect of Charge-2 the petitioner stated that after the formalities of opening the account in the name of Mallikarjun were completed his father Bandappa approached the petitioner again and requested the petitioner that Mallikarjun should not be allowed to draw the monies from this newly opened account, without his knowledge. The petitioner thereupon advised him to have the account in "joint names" with "joint operations" as it was not possible to prevent the individual account holder Mallikarjun from drawing amounts so long as the account stood in his single name. Bandappa requested the petitioner to do the needful. Thereupon the Special Savings Bank Account, which was opened in the single name of Mallikarjun, was converted into a joint account by incorporating the name of Bandappa Gandge in the ledger and a fresh account opening form was obtained. The petitioner further explained that all this was done by him personally on the same day le., 2-1-1976 and that the complainant himself admitted in his complaint dated 17-9-1976 that he is maintaining the SSB Account in the joint names of Mallikarjun and himself.
20. The basis for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner is the complaint of Bandappa Gandge dated 17-9-1976. In Para-2 of the complaint the following is the statement made by the complainant:
"1, the undersigned, is maintaing a SSB A/c in the joint names of ourselves namely Sri Bandappa s/o Kallappa Ghandge (Father) and Sri Mattikarjun S/o Bandappa Gandge (major son) at your Kamalanagar Branch. The SSB A/c has been opened by us about 8 months back and we are maintaining an average of Rs. 10,000/- balance in our SSB A/c."
(emphasis)
21. The Enquiry Officer in his report dated 22-6-1999, in respect of charge-2 records that MW.2 at Typist-Clerk in Kamalangar Branch at the relevant time, had stated during inquiry that he had opened the SSB A/c 270 in the name of Mattikarjun Gandge and that the depositor had come to the branch and singed the account opening form and the credit voucher for Rs. 9,900/- in his presence. MW.2 also testified that "and Eandappa Gandge" was not written by the witness but by the charged officer and that the pass book was prepared in the single name of Mattikkarjun Gandge. MW1 [the Branch Manager, who succeeded the petitioner at Kamalanagar Branch with effect from 16-9-1976] stated at the inquiry that as per procedure only one declaration is required for opeining of a SSB Account. But in case of joint account of Mallikarjun Gandge and Bandappa Kallappa Gandge there were two declarations signed by the charged officer and that there was a difference in the colour of ink while writing the introductory reference and the second declaration, which are red in colour and the other particulars are in blue ink. MW-1 also stated that the pass book contained the single name of Mallikarjun and the hand writing in the pass book and that in SSB Ledger Account No. 270, are the same. M W-2 also deposed that it was not the same account opening form with which he opened the A/c No. 270 and this witness further identified the handwriting on the account opening form as that of the charged officer. On this evidence the inquiry officer concluded that charge No. 2 stood established.
22. While analysing the disciplinary proceedings in respect of charge-1, it was noticed, supra, that it is the statement in the complaint dated 8-12-1976 of Bandappa Gandge that the account was a joint account in the name of himself and his son. There is no complaint regarding any irregularity or that a single account of Mallikarjun was converted into joint account of Mallikarjun and Bandappa Gandge, without the consent of either Mallikarjun or Bandappa. What all the evidence reveals is that the words "and Bandappa Gandge" were not written by MW-2, who was the bank official who had opened the SSB A/c No. 270 in the name of Mallikarjun but these words were written by the charged officer. This fact brought out in the inquiry is consistent with the defence of the petitioner that at the request of Bandappa Gandge the single account in the name of Mattikarjun was converted into a joint account incorporating the name of Bandappa Gandge in the ledger and that a fresh account opening form was obtained and that all this was done personally by the petitioner on 2-1-1976 itself. As the conversion from a single account to a joint account is not the complaint nor is it the complaint that such conversion was without proper authorisation of either of the joint customers involved, this Court is at a loss to comprehend the misconduct involved. On this analysis I hold that Charge No. 2 is misconceived.
Charge No. 8:
23. It reads as under:
"You had resorted to private borrowings from the public of Kamalanagar to an extent of Rs. 7,650/- and issued a cheque in payment of these dues of to public on Syndicate Bank. This cheque was subsequently withdrawn and a cheque for the same amount was issued on our Kamalanagar Branch."
24. In the explanation dated 24-1-1977 to this charge, the petitioner denied the allegation of private borrowings enumerated in this charge. He pleaded that a postdated cheque for Rs. 7,650/- and also certain receipts were obtained from him by certain local leaders and businessmen in the Police Station, Kamalanagar, by coercion. The Enquiry Officer in his report, recorded in respect of this charge that MW-1 the successor Manager to the petitioner, at the Kamalanagar branch, testified at the inquiry that on 16-9-1976, the date on which MW-1 took charge from the charged officer, two persons came to the branch and discussed about the hand loans with the charged officer. Later they returned and showed the receipt signed by the charged officer for the borrowed amount. They also brought a post-dated cheque on Syndicate Bank. It was however torn and replaced by a cheque on the SBH, by the charged officer. MW-1 further stated that this cheque also, when presented, was not encashed as the charged officer stopped the payment of the cheque. MW.1 also stated that the Sarpanch also gave a written complaint in Hindi regarding the hand loans. The inquiry report further records that the recording in the trunk call register made by the charged officer corroborates the evidence of MWs.1 and 3 indicating his borrowings. The enquiry officer concluded that charge-8 stood proved in view of the deposition of M.W.1. The Disciplinary Authority and Appointing Authority in their reports dated 8-6-1994 and 9-6-1994 concurred with the enquiry officer and held charge-8 as proved.
25. Earlier in this report it is recorded that this Court by the judgment dated 14-2-1983 in W.P. No. 6754/82 - filed by the petitioner, directed the conduct of the Disciplinary Enquiry by following the procedure ordained in the 1979 Service Regulations and on the basis of the show-cause notice dated 30-4-1977. The charge (No. 8) against the petitioner is misconduct in resorting to private borrowings from the public of Kamafanagar to the extent of Rs. 7,650/-. The question is whether resorting to private borrowing per se constitutes misconduct. Chapter X of the 1979 Service Regulations enumerates the conduct to be adhered to by an Officer of the SBH. Regulation 59(1) reads as under:
"59.(1) No officer shall, in his individual capacity borrow money or permit any member of his family to borrow money or otherwise place himself or a member of his family under a pecuniary obligation to a broker or a money-lender or a subordinate employee of the Bank or any person, association of persons, firm, company or institution, whether incorporated or not, having dealings with the Bank:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to borrowing from the Bank, the Life Insurance Corporation of India, a Cooperative Credit Society or any financial institution including a bank subject to such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Bank. Provided further that an officer may accept a loan, subject to other provisions of these regulations, from a relative or personal friend or operate a credit account with a bonafide tradesman."
And Regulation 61(2) reads as follows:
"61(2) An officer shall so manage his private affairs as to avoid insolvency or habitual indebtedness. An officer against whom any legal proceedings are instituted for the recovery of any debts due from him or for adjudging him as an insolvent shall forthwith report the full facts of the legal proceedings to the Bank."
26. It is neither the charge nor is there led evidence in respect of the allegation, against the petitioner in respect of charge-8, that the persons from whom he has borrowed the amounts and placed himself under a pecuniary obligation were persons having dealings with the bank or that such borrowings constitute habitual indebtedness or have led to his insolvency. Occasional borrowings are an occurrence in the life of many an individual including those in public employment. Such borrowings do not per se constitute misconduct nor has such conduct been prohibited by the conduct regulations.
27. Mr. Ramachandra Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-bank when confronted with the contention on behalf of the petitioner that charge-8 even on its terms does not constitute misconduct either per se or under the governing conduct regulations of the bank, was at a loss to demonstrate before this Court that the borrowings by the petitioner charged as misconduct in charge-8, constituted misconduct under the Service Regulations of the respondent-bank.
28. On the above analysis charge-8 is seen to be misconceived.
Analysis of the domestic enquiry proceedings in respect of Charge No. 3:
Charge No. 3 reads as under:
"Though Sri M.V. Gandge did not call at the bank on 1-9-1976, a sum of Rs. 7,000-00 was drawn from his account. Since the signature of Shri M. V, Gandge on the cheque also materially differs from the one appearing on the pay-in-slip dated the 2nd January, 1976, it is presumed that the signature was forged."
29. The Enquiry Authority, in support of his conclusions that this charge stood proved, relied on the following:
(a) The testimony of M.W.I (The Branch Manager of Kamalanagar since 16-9-1976), who stated that the customer - Mr. Bandappa Gandge along with two others approached him and gave an application requesting stoppage of payment in respect of Cheque Nos. 599911, 599913 to 599920, as he has not received the cheque book M.W.I also testified that Cheque No. 599912 for Rs. 7,000-00 dated 1 -9-1976 was passed for payment by the Charged Officer.
(b) The debit entry in the Day Book for Rs. 7,000-00 on 1-9-1976 was made in the name of Mr. Mallikarjun Gandge and checked by the Charged Officer; and M.W.3 on verification, testified that this entry was made by the Charged Officer.
(c) Despite there being sufficient cash balance at Kamalanagar Branch, the Charged Officer, on the pretext that there was an expected cheque coming for payment, advised Head Cashier to proceed to Udgir Branch during business hours for remittance.
(d) The Handwriting Expert-M.W.6 during his deposition stated that the signature on M.E.4 (the cheque bearing No. 599912) was-iiot of the account holder Mr. Mallikarjun Gandge, but it is a forged one and the signature tallies with the handwriting of the Charged Officer.
30. The imputation under this charge is that the Charged Officer forged the signature of the customer, Mr. Mallikarjun Gandge, on cheque No. 599912 and unauthorisedly withdrew and misappropriated the amount of Rs. 7,000-00 from the Savings Bank Account of the customer. In his explanation, the petitioner denied the charge. According to him, on 1-9-1976 Mr. Bandappa Gandge came to him personally together with his son and asked for a loose cheque leaf whereupon a cheque book was issued to him under acknowledgment, as they had not obtained a cheque book since opening of the joint account on 2-1-1976, As per the petitioner's explanation, thereafter Mr. Bandappa Gandge presented a cheque for Rs. 7,000-00, which was honoured as it was found prima facie in order. After the petitioner passed the cheque for payment, the Cashier paid the cash on 1-9-1976 duly making the necessary entries in the Cash Payment Register.
31. The charge of misconduct of forging the cheque of a customer, is held established by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the Disciplinary and Appointing Authority on the basis of the evidence of M.W.6, the Handwriting Expert - Mr. A.K. Gupta, who was then working as Assistant Director (Documents) in the Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science, Government of India (Ministry of Home Affairs), New Delhi. This witness was first examined on 13-12-1986 and the substance of his testimony in the chief-examination, inter alia, is to the effect that the signature of Mr. Mallikarjun Gandge on the subject cheque tallies with that of the Charged Officer. After the end of his chief-examination, the defence representative was offered the opportunity of cross-examining the witness. The defence representative requested the Enquiry Officer that as the witness, M.W.6 is an expert, the defence experiences a handicap and requests permission of an advocate to conduct the cross-examination. The Prosecuting Officer objected to both the requests i.e., for time and for engaging an advocate, contending that in the list of witnesses, this witness was mentioned, he had come all the way from Delhi to tender evidence and the request on behalf of the Charged Officer, at this juncture, is intended to delay the proceedings. The Enquiry Officer recorded his ruling that the Charged Officer should be given enough opportunity to defend his case. The Charged Officer was advised to give a letter in mis regard duly recording that the final decision of the Enquiry Officer will be communicated in the due course. At this, the Prosecuting Officer informed the Enquiry Officer to note that if it becomes necessary to summon I M.W.6, it must be on account of the defence not coming up with the plea sufficiently in advance. On 13-12-1986, the petitioner gave a letter to the Enquiry Authority for permission to allow him the services of an expert or an advocate for cross-examination M.W.6. By his letter dated 2-1-1987, the Enquiry Authority informed the petitioner that he is permitted to engage an expert to cross-examine M.W.6 (the Assistant Government Examiner of questioned documents), but not an advocate. This letter further stated that since the petitioner had not come up with a request much in advance resulting in adjournment of the proceedings on 13-12-1986, the expenses for re-summoning the Government Examiner of questioned documents for the purpose of cross-examination by the defence through an expert, should be borne by the petitioner. The letter further states that they are ascertaining the approximate costs of re-summoning the Government Examiner of questioned documents and would advise the petitioner of the same in due course. Thereafter, by another letter dated 12-2-1987 the Enquiry Officer addressed the petitioner calling upon him to deposit an amount of Rs. 2,170-00 for calling M.W.6 for cross-examination; and by another letter dated 19-2-1987, the Enquiry Officer called upon the petitioner to deposit a further sum of Rs. 400-00. By his letter dated 20-2-1987, the petitioner addressed the Enquiry Officer putting forth his inability to remit the money for calling M.W.6. In response to this, by the letter dated 3-4-1987, the Enquiry Officer called upon the petitioner to remit a sum of Rs. 2,570-00 by 20-4-1987. The petitioner again replied by his letter dated 14-4-1987 stating his inability to remit the amount, since he had been under suspension from 1976.
32. An analysis of the chronology of events, on the aspect, establishes that the petitioner was denied a reasonable opportunity of putting forth his defence. It is a settled principle that a charged employee is entitled to a reasonable pportunity to cross-examine a witness introduced by the employer. The right of cross-examination is a very valuable right. It cannot be jettisoned for jejune reasons vide Union of India v. T.R. Varma, and State of M.P. v. Chintaman, AIR 1961 SC 1623.
33. In the case on hand, as per the record of enquiry, the Enquiring Authority was satisfied that the petitioner should be afforded opportunity to cross-examine M.W.6. The cross-examination of M.W.6 was also deferred to afford the petitioner such an opportunity. The Enquiry Officer was also satisfied that having regard to the expertise of M.W.6, the petitioner should be provided a fair opportunity for cross-examining this witness by permitting him to engage an expert, though not an advocate (vide Enquiry Officer's-letter dated 2-1-1987). The petitioner was under suspension since October, 1976 i.e., for over a decade up to the date M.W.6 was examined in chief i.e., 13-12-1986. The petitioner also expressed his inability to meet the expenses of summoning M.W.6 for cross-examination. Despite these circumstances, the Enquiry Officer denied the petitioner an opportunity of cross-examining M.W.6 without the petitioner having to meet the travelling expenses of M.W.6 from Delhi to the place of enquiry. This constitutes, in the considered view of this Court, gross denial of a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of pursuing his defence by cross-examining the expert witness, M.W.6. This denial has prejudiced the petitioner. On this analysis, the entirety of the evidence of M.W.6 requires to be discarded.
34. Without the evidence of M.W.6, there is no-evidence justifying the conclusion that the signature of Mr. Mallikarjun, on the cheque M.E.4, was forged by the petitioner. The conclusion of the Enquiry Officer on charge No. 3, therefore, warrants invalidation and is accordingly set aside. Resultantly, the findings of the disciplinary and appointing authority that charge No. 3 is proved are also invalid.
Analysis of the disciplinary proceedings in respect of Charge Nos. 4 to 7:
Charge Nos. 4 to 7 read as under:-
Charge No. 4:
"With a view to covering up the position, you obtained the signature of Shri Bandappa Gandge on the cheque dated the 1st September, 1976 for Rs. 7,000-00 as also in the cheque book register, account opening form and specimen signature card".
Charge No. 5:
"A sum of Rs. 7,000-00 purported to have drawn by you was kept in your personal custody till 6th September, 1976".
Charge No. 6;
"On 6-9-1976 after obtaining the signature of the father on the various forms/ documents mentioned in the charge No. 4, you took him to your residence and paid him Rs. 5,000-00 only."
Charge No. 7:
"Thereafter, when Shri Bandappa demanded the full amount, you paid him another Rs. 1,450-00 and the balance of Rs. 550-00 was not paid by you."
Charge No. 4:
35. In this charge, the petitioner is imputed the conduct of having obtained the signature of Mr. Bandappa Gandge on the cheque dated 1-9-1976 drawn for Rs. 7,000-00; as also in the cheque book register, account opening form and the specimen signature card.
36. The evidence marshalled by the management in support of this charge is as under:
(a) The complaint dated 17-9-1976 of Mr. Bandappa Gandge, which is inter alia as under:- "On 1-9-1976 he (Charged Officer) has withdraw the above amount through a cheque and cashed that cheque without obtaining our signature". And again at paras No. 3 and 4 in the said complaint, Mr. Bandappa Gandge states that on 6-9-1976 when he went to the bank, the petitioner told him to wait till 5-30 p.m., that he went back to bank at 5-30 p.m. At that time, the Manager told him that there was an enquiry in respect of his SSB Account by the Head Office regarding his keeping Rs. 10,000-00 in the account and that there was an enquiry as to where Mr. Bandappa Gandge got the money. The petitioner is further stated to have told the complainant, Mr. Bandappa Gandge, that he had informed the Head Office that Mr. Bandappa Gandge maintained a balance of only Rs. 3,000-00 and that the petitioner had withdrawn the remaining amount, which was with him. The complaint also states that the petitioner requested Mr. Bandappa Gandge to sign on some papers and that he would handover the money to Mr. Bandappa Gandge, if he came to his house; and that the petitioner obtained the signatures of Mr. Bandappa Gandge on three or four places, including the cheque, by which, he had unauthorisedly withdrawn Rs. 7,000-00 from their SSB Account.
(b) M.W.2 in his testimony stated that neither of the account holders of SSB A/c. 270 came to the bank on 1-9-1976 and that they did not come to the bank till the witness left the bank at 2-30 p.m., on the said day.
(c) M.W.5 was the Head Cashier, Kamalanagar Branch during the relevant period. He testified that the cancellation of the drawers signature on the cheque - the subject cheque (M.E.4) - was done by the witness in blue ink, but the blue pencil cutting appearing on M.E.4 was not done by him and he does not know who had done it. He also testified that the vernacular signature appearing on M.E.4 (of Mr. Bandappa Gandge) was not cancelled and it was also not there on that date (1-9-1976). He also testified that he did not translate that signature.
(d) It is also in the evidence of M.W.2 that the account opening form, the specimen signature card, brought on record during the enquiry proceedings were not the ones originally filled by the customer Mr. Mallikarjim in the presence of M.W.2 when he opened the account in the ledger and prepared the passbook. After perusing the ledger account, M.W.2 testified that the petitioner, under his own handwriting, added the name of Mr. Bandappa Gandge in the ledger account.
(e) There is also enough evidence on record to substantiate the fact that the petitioner sent the Head Cashier - M.W.5 accompanied by Mr.Kasturichand and Mr. T.M. Kaddam, watchman (M.W.4) for cash remittance on 1-9-1976 at 11-00 a.m. and that these persons returned to the branch at 3-00 p.m. and while they were away, the petitioner looked after the work of cash receipts and payments.
37. On the basis of the above evidence, the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry authority, as confirmed by the disciplinary and appointing authorities, that charge No. 4 against the petitioner has been established, is seen to be a conclusion that is rationally arrived at on the basis of evidence having a probate value to a prudent mind and acceptable by the standards of domestic enquiry. Within the jurisdictional constraints of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I find no warrant for inference with this conclusion.
Charge Nos. 5, 6 and 7 can be considered together:
The misconduct imputed under these charges is that the petitioner withdrew a sum of Rs. 7,000-00, kept it in his personal custody till 6-9-1976 and on the said date, after obtaining the signature of Mr. Bandappa Gandge, on various forms and documents mentioned in pharge No. 4, took him to the petitioner's residence and paid him Rs. 5,000-00. Thereafter, when Mr. Bandappa Gandge demanded the full amount, the petitioner paid him another sum of Rs. 1,450-00, but failed to pay Rs. 550-00.
38. The evidence led by the Bank in substantiation of these charges is as under:
(a) M.W.I, the Manager, who succeeded the petitioner in the Kamalanagar Branch on 16-9-1976 testified that the customer Mr. Bandappa Gandge came to the branch and informed him that the amount was withdrawn from his account without his knowledge and a sum of Rs. 550-00 is yet to be received from the petitioner. This witness also stated that Mr. Bandappa Gandge gave an application to him to stop the payment on the rest of the cheques, as Mr. Bandappa Gandge stated that he did not receive the cheques from which a cheque leaf was used for withdrawal of the amount from his account. M.W.I further testified that Mr. Bandappa Gandge informed him that the petitioner withdrew a sum of Rs. 7,000-00. M.W.I categorically testified that the amount was withdrawn by the petitioner from the account of Mr. Bandappa Gandge without his knowledge, that Mr. Bandappa orally informed him about this on 16-9-1976 and thereafter he received a complaint dated 17-9-1976. M.W.I also testified that the relevant cheque bearing No. 599912 for a sum of Rs. 7,000-00 was passed by the petitioner.
(b) M.W.2 in his testimony stated that neither of the account holders, of Account No. 270 (Mr. Mallikarjun Gandge or Mr. Bandappa Gandge), came to the Bank on 1-9-1976 till the witness left the Bank at 2-30 p.m. He also testified that Mr. Bandappa Gandge had told him about the withdrawal of amount from his son's account, during the 2nd week of September, 1976, when the witness and Mr. Bandappa Gandge were travelling together in a bus to Udgir. M.W.2 also testified that Mr. Bandappa Gandge asked him whether money could be withdrawn without the knowledge of the account holder, whereupon the witness informed Mr. Bandappa Gandge that withdrawal without the account holder's knowledge is not possible. Thereafter Mr. Bandappa Gandge informed the witness that the Charged Official had withdrawn an amount of Rs. 7,000-00 from his account and latter refunded the amount, except Rs. 550-00.
(c) M.W.3 was the Head Cashier of the Kamalanagar Branch during the relevant period. He testified that on 7-9-1976 Mr. Bandappa Gandge reported to him at 6-30 a.m., that an amount of Rs. 7,000-00 was withdrawn from his account fraudulently and that he wanted the witness to ascertain this. To this, the witness told Mr. Bandappa Gandge that such a thing cannot happen in a bank and that in any case he will be able to clariiy this matter only after the Bank opens at 10-30 a.m. The witness then went to the bank and saw that there was a withdrawal in Mr, Bandappa Gandge's account. This witness also testified that Mr. Bandappa Gandge went on telling everybody in the village that an amount of Rs. 7,000-00 was withdrawn from his account. He also testified that Mr. Bandappa Gandge told him that the petitioner had withdrawn the amount on 1-9-1976 and that he had received back a sum of Rs. 6,450-00 from the petitioner. He further testified that the entry of Rs. 7,000-00 dated 1-9-1976 was made in the ledger by the petitioner. This witness further testified that he and Mr. Arun Deshpande, a clerk spoke to the petitioner and informed him regarding the allegation of Mr. Bandappa Gandge and that the petitioner denied the allegation. The witness also testified that the amount of Rs. 7,000-00 was withdrawn by way of a cheque-M.E.4, that the 2nd signature on the cheque, in vernacular, was of Mr. Bandappa Gandge and that the signature was translated by the petitioner. M.W.3 has further testified that the petitioner called him and told him that though there was no substance in Mr. Bandappa Gandge's complaint, the petitioner would like to meet Mr. Bandappa Gandge outside the bank, to avoid further complications and that the petitioner had arranged a meeting at his residence in Kamalanagar. The petitioner requested the witness on a Saturday morning to attend the meeting in the afternoon. The witness went to the meeting and found Mr. Bandappa Gandge, one Mr. Revenappa Mahajan; Mr. Madhavarao Patil, Sarpanch, Kamalanagar and one Mr. Deshmukh of Dondgaon Village apart from the petitioner. At the meeting Mr. Bandappa Gandge stated that the petitioner had withdrawn Rs. 7,000-00 from his account, that his son had not come to the bank on that day nor did he sign; that the petitioner on 6th called Mr. Bandappa Gandge and returned Rs. 6,450-00 and while doing so, obtained his signature at six places and that the petitioner may please return the balance amount of Rs. 550-00. Thereafter the petitioner told Mr. Bandappa Gandge that he had committed a mistake and would return the amount of Rs. 550-00 shortly and requested not to pursue the matter any further. The other villagers present also requested Mr. Bandappa Gandge not to pursue the matter. After the other people left, the witness asked the petitioner what he had done. On this, the petitioner broke down and on watching the demeanour of the petitioner, the witness felt mat he should inform somebody. Accordingly, he came to Hyderabad and informed about the whole episode to the then Superintendent of the Karnataka region.
39. The above evidence on record clearly establishes charge Nos. 5 to 7, in all material aspects. The evidence is adequate by the accepted standards of proof required in a domestic enquiry. There is direct and clear evidence to substantiate the fact that a complaint was made by Mr. Bandappa Gandge, apart from his written complaint dated 17-9-1976, by way of an oral complaint to M.W.I and a statement to M.W.2, while travelling with the latter in a bus to Udgir. There is also the direct evidence of M.W.3 regarding the meeting at the residence of the petitioner wherein the customer Mr. Bandappa Gandge accosted the petitioner about the unauthorised withdrawal and about repayment by him of a part of the amount while retaining a sum of Rs. 550-00. M.W.3 categorically testified that the petitioner admitted to Mr. Bandappa Gandge in his presence that he had committed mistake and that he would return Rs. 550-00 shortly and further requested that the matter be not pursued any further. This is evidence of a confession by the petitioner to M.W.3. This evidence coupled with the inferences to be drawn from the other valid evidence on record is adequate to sustain the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appointing Authority that the imputations against the petitioner in respect of the charge Nos. 5, 6 and 7 are established and that the petitioner is guilty of these charges.
40. One of the grounds of challenge by the writ petitioner to the disciplinary proceedings is that the order of the appellate authority dated 10-5-1995 rejecting the petitioner's appeal dated 27-7-1994, while concurring with the findings of penalty imposed by the appointing authority, constitutes a ritualistic adherence to the requirements of a reasonable opportunity.
41. Mr. S.V. Shaft, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the appointing authority by the order dated 8/13-6-1994 imposed on the petitioner the penalty of placing him at the start of the basic pay applicable to the officers of J.M.G.S.-I cadre i.e., at Rs. 2,100-00 thereby bringing down his basic pay from Rs. 3,180-00 by nine (9) stages, while debarring his promotional chances for a period of five years from the date of reporting back to duty. This penalty was imposed by the appointing authority, while concurring with the enquiry authority. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the conclusions of the enquiry authority that charge Nos. 5,6 and 7 were not established. Before coming to this conclusion while differing with the contra conclusions of the enquiry authority, neither the disciplinary authority nor the appointing authority gave any opportunity to the petitioner to submit his objections to the reasons, for which, either the disciplinary authority or appointing authority differed with the conclusions of the enquiry authority. Against the order of the appointing authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal dated 27-7-1994, in which, he pointed out that it was incumbent that an opportunity should be afforded to a charged officer before a penalty is imposed on him in circumstances, where the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority disagree with a conclusion of the enquiry authority exonerating the charged officer, of a charge. Thereupon, the disciplinary authority, by his letter dated 16-2-1995 addressed the petitioner informing him that the appellate authority had remitted the disciplinary record to him directing him to furnish the petitioner with the reasons for his disagreement with the enquiring authority's conclusions regarding charge Nos. 5 to 7. The disciplinary authority, in this letter enumerated the reasons for his disagreement with the conclusions of the enquiry authority on charge Nos. 5 to 7.
42. Mr. S.V. Bhatt, learned Counsel contends that such an opportunity afforded by the disciplinary authority after his appeal was filed against the disciplinary order, amounts a post decisional opportunity and at the appellate stage, which is not consistent with the requirements of 'reasonable opportunity'. The opportunity should be afforded by the disciplinary authority and before he comes to a conclusion to differ with the enquiry authority, on the particular charges; and this not having been done, the imposition of penalty and it's confirmation by the appellate authority stand vitiated by a failure of natural justice, is the contention.
43. In Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, , the Supreme Court, after noticing the developments in the administrative law principles in this area and on a consideration of the relevant precedents, including Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, , Ram Kishan v. Union of India, , State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, , Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, , and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, , enunciated the law "whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority, on any article of charge, then before it records it's own findings on such charge, it must record it's tentative reasons-far such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records it's findings." The Supreme Court declared that the contrary view expressed by it in earlier decisions in State of Rajasthan v. M.C. Saxena, , State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 468, and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India, 1983 (3) SLR 319 (A.P.), did not lay down the correct law and overruled the principle enunciated in those cases.
44. In Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle enunciated in Kunj Behari Misra's case (supra) and held that the principle must be read into the relevant rule governing the conduct of disciplinary proceedings, even if such rule does not contain a provision for affording an opportunity to the charged officer, when the disciplinary authority seeks to differ from the conclusions of the enquiry officer and when the enquiry officer exonerates the charged officer in respect of a charge. In this case, a Judicial Officer was dismissed from service on charges of indulging in corrupt practices. The enquiry authority had concluded that the charges were not proved. The disciplinary committee of the High Court disagreed with the findings of the enquiry authority and held that the charges are proved and thereafter a show-cause notice proposing dismissal was issued to the officer accompanied by a copy of the report of the enquiry authority. After the penalty of dismissal was imposed, the petitioner challenged his dismissal before the Bombay High Court, which rejected the writ petition. That is how he came in appeal to the Supreme Court. Following the law declared in Kunj Behari Misra's case (supra), the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Before the Supreme Court, on behalf of the respondents, it was contended that not merely the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, but the reasons for which, the disciplinary committee has not agreed with those findings, were communicated to the appellant along with a notice to show-cause why he should not be dismissed from service, the appellant submitted his reply to the show-cause notice attacking the reasons recorded by the disciplinary committee for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer and, therefore, there is no failure of opportunity. The Supreme Court held that a post decisional opportunity of hearing, though available in certain cases, was of no avail atleast in the circumstances of the case. The reasons recorded by the Supreme Court are required to be reproduced.
Para-37 of the judgment in Yoginath D. Bagde's case (supra), reads as under:
"The contention apparently appears to be sound but a little attention would reveal that it sounds like the reverberations from an empty vessel. What is ignored by the learned Counsel is that a final decision with regard to the charges levelled against the appellant had already been taken by the Disciplinary Committee without providing any opportunity of hearing to him. After having taken that decision, the members of the Disciplinary Committee merely issued a notice to the appellant to show-cause against the major punishment of dismissal mentioned in Rule 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. This procedure was contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (supra), in which it had been categorically provided, following earlier decisions, that if the disciplinary authority does not agree with the findings of the enquiry officer that the charges are not proved, it has to provide, at that stage, an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent so that there may still be some room left for convincing the disciplinary authority that the findings already recorded by the enquiry officer were just and proper. Post-decisional opportunity of hearing, though available in certain cases, will be of no avail, at least, in the circumstances of the present case."
45. The Supreme Court further observed in the above case that the disciplinary committee consisting of five (5) senior most Judges of the High Court, including the Chief Justice, took a final decision that the charges against the appellant were established and recorded that decision in writing and then issued a notice requiring him to show-cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal. The findings were final; what was tentative was the proposal to inflict upon the appellant the punishment of dismissal from service.
46. In S.B.I. v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty, , the above concept again fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court. The principle enunciated in Kunj Behari Misra's case (supra) was reiterated. In the case, the respondent before the Court, a Manager Grade-1 of the S.B.I., was charged with misconduct on several counts. The enquiry officer in his report held that some of the charges were proved, some partly proved and some not proved. The disciplinary authority, while accepting the findings of the enquiry officer, on the charges proved and not proved, disagreed with the enquiry report as regards the findings with regard to the charges partly held proved and came to the conclusion that those charges were fully proved and recommended for dismissal of the respondent from service. Accepting the recommendation of the disciplinary authority, the competent authority passed the order of dismissal. Eventually, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition concluding that no opportunity was afforded to the respondent by the disciplinary authority in regard to the charges, which the enquiry officer held were partly proved, and the disciplinary and appointing authorities differed and held as fully proved. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge. The bank approached the Supreme Court in Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the principles enunciated in Kunj Behari Misra's case (supra) with regard to the opportunity to be afforded to the charged officer, would have to be read into the relevant disciplinary regulations. The Supreme Court further held that showing of a prejudice suffered by the charged officer on account of the failure to afford such an opportunity was not required.
47. On an analysis of the above decisions, in particular, the decision in Yoginath D. Bagde's case (supra), the conclusion is irresistible that in case where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer that the charges are not proved, he is obligated to provide at that stage an opportunity to the delinquent to enable him to convince the disciplinary authority in respect of the findings in his favour by the enquiry officer, that the findings were justified and proper, it must also to be taken as settled that a post decisional opportunity of hearing is of no avail (emphasis)
48. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, , the dialectic contours of the concept of 'post decisional opportunity' fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court. The validity of a decision of Government of India, in purported exercise of the power under Section 18 (AA) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 (for short 'the Act') authorising the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management of certain industrial undertakings of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court. The statutory provisions did not express or implicate the requirement of a hearing before an order of taking over of management is passed. The decision to take over the management was recorded as having been taken to meet the exigent situation. The questions that fell for consideration of the Supreme Court were whether:
(a) the natural justice principle of Audi Alterant Partem was implicated in Section 18(AA) of the Act; and
(b) Whether a post decisional opportunity would cure the failure to offer a pre-decisional opportunity.
On an incisive analysis of extant administrative law principles, (the majority per Sarkaria, J (for himself and D.A, Desai, J) (Chinnapa Reddy, J per minority) held that the principle of Audi Alteram Partem is a fundamental principle of fairness and must be held as implicated in Section 18 (AA) of the Act. Considering the question whether a post-decisional opportunity would suffice or cure the defect of failure to offer a pre-decisional opportunity, the Supreme Court held that prima facie, giving of an opportunity before passing the impugned order, constitutes a seminal aspect of fair play and reasonableness; and that it was an imperative requirement. The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the impugned order warranted invalidation. However, on the basis of oral and written undertakings given by the learned Solicitor General, that the Central Government under Section 18(F) of the Act would offer full and effective hearing On all aspects touching the validity and correctness of the order and action of taking over, the Supreme Court desisted from quashing the impugned order, but directed the Government to give a full and effective hearing to the aggrieved owner of the undertaking. The analysis and elucidation of the principles of law in this case shows that the Audi Alteram Partem principle is a fundamental principle of fairness. It is an emanation of the equality doctrine under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle is a grundnorm of a civilised society. Such an omnipotent and fundamental principle should not be jettisoned and discarded at the altar of expediency.
49. In the case on hand, the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were pending since 1976. In the circumstances, there was no urgency of any magnitude in 1994 nearly twenty (20) years after initiation of departmental enquiry, to jettison the requirement of a pre-decisional opportunity and seeking to cure that fatal defect by offering a post decisional opportunity at the appellate stage. The insecure feeling and apprehension of the petitioner, that ithe conclusion having already been arrived at by the disciplinary authority, would be merely reinforced after a formal and ritualistic compliance with the particular requirement, cannot be effaced, if this fatal flaw in the disciplinary proceedings is upheld.
50. On the above analysis, this Court is constrained to hold that the communication by the disciplinary authority of reasons for disagreeing with the enquiry officer's conclusions on charge Nos. 5 to 7 (exonerating the petitioner of these charges), by it's communication dated 16-2-1995 and after remission of the matter by the appellate authority, amounts to a post decisional opportunity. Such post decisional opportunity does not cure the fatal flaw in the failure to offer an opportunity before a decision is taken by the disciplinary authority to differ with the findings of the enquiry authority. As held in Yoginath D. Bagde 's case (supra) and for the reasons alike, I am of the considered view that the post decisional opportunity given in this case is of no avail and the penalty imposed on the petitioner, on the basis of the conclusions in respect of charge Nos. 5 to 7 are invalid.
51. On the above analysis, what remains is a valid conclusion of guilt only in respect of charge No. 4. Charge Nos. 3, 5 and 8 imputed serious misconduct and the conclusions in the disciplinary proceedings in respect of these charges have been found unsustainable, in this judgment. In comparison to those charges, charge No. 4 standing alone appears to impute a relatively smaller degree of misconduct.
52. It is an established principle in administrative law that where the decision of an authority, in particular, a quasi judicial authority is based on a plurality of reasons and some of those reasons are found unsustainable, then the conclusion could still be sustained, if the judicial branch is satisfied that such conclusion, would necessarily have followed for the reasons found valid vide State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan, 1963 SC 779 (V.50 C.117), State of Maharashtra v. B.K, Takkamore, and Union of India v. Farm Nanda, .
53. In the case on hand, however, this Court is unable to satisfy itself that the disciplinary authority and appointing authority would have inflicted the petitioner with the very same penalty as has been inflicted on him by the impugned order, only on the basis of a valid conclusion regarding the petitioner's guilt in respect of charge No. 4; and in the context of charge Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 to 8 being effaced on account of their invalidity, as held in this judgment
54. In the above circumstances, I consider it appropriate to remit the matter for the consideration of the 3rd respondent-disciplinary authority. The 3rd respondent shall, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment consider the appropriate penalty proportionate to the misconduct validly found against the petitioner in respect of charge No. 4 and take a decision in this regard, in accordance with law.
55. On the analysis above, the order of the 3rd respondent communicated by the proceedings dated 13-6-1994, the order of the appellate authority communicated by the proceedings dated 10-5-1995 and the order of the review authority, the 2nd respondent, communicated by the proceedings dated 23-2-1996 are set aside. The matter shall now be considered and a decision taken by the 3rd respondent as directed supra. The writ petition is allowed and to the extent recorded above. There shall, however, be no costs.