Allahabad High Court
Ganeshi Lal vs Nand Kishore on 6 May, 1912
Equivalent citations: 15IND. CAS.319
ORDER Karamat Husain, J.
1. In this case, Nand Kishore lodged a complaint against Ganeshi Lal. The substance of the complaint is as follows: The head office of the complainant is at Cawnpore. A branch of the firm was opened at Gauriganj, District Sultanpur, in Sambat 1964. The accused was appointed a gumashta and his share was fixed at four annas in the rupee. He worked till Sambat 1966 and was asked to come to Cawnpore. The accused seemed to have been guilty of criminal breach of contract. The complainant directed him to arose the shop at Gauriganj and not to reopen it until the complainant had gone there and had checked the account. The complainant went to his home at Bhiwani in the Hissar District. When he returned in 1907, it came to his knowledge that the accused had opened the shop and misappropriated the money realized by him which he had to send to Cawnpore. A sum of about Rs. 1,583-14 6; has been misappropriated by him. When the complainant was examined, he distinctly stated that the accused misappropriated the money belonging to the branch of the Firm at Gauriganj. The Magistrate to whom the complaint was made came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction inasmuch as the offence appeared to have been committed in Gauriganj. In revision, the learned Judge was of opinion that the Court at Cawnpore had jurisdiction. In his order, he says: The facts alleged constitute an even stronger case for jurisdiction in the Cownpore Courts than did the facts in a previous case, Queen Empress v. O'Brien 19 A. 111 or in Colville v. Kristo Kishore Bose 26 C. 748 : 3 C.W.N. 598. Having regard to Section 179 and to the above rulings in explanation thereof, I find that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to proceed with the case." An application in revision is made to this Court and it is urged on behalf of the applicant that the order of the Joint Magistrate is right. Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: "When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done or any such consequence has ensued." The word "consequence" in this section, in my opinion, means a consequence which form's a part and parcel of the offence. It does not mean a consequence which is not such a direct result of the act of the offender as to form no part of that offence. In Babu Lal v. Ghansham Dass 5 A.L.J. 333 : A.W.N. (1908) 115 : 7 Cr.L.J. 394, it is remarked: "It is contended that Section 179 by reason of the words contained in it, 'and of any consequence which has ensued, 'gives the Magistrate at Aligarh in this case jurisdiction. But the only reasonable interpretation which can be put upon these words is that they are intended to embrace only such consequences as modify or complete the act alleged to be an offence." The above remarks support the view I take. The loss to the principal firm at Cawnpore is, therefore, not a consequence of the act of the accused committed at the branch of the firm within the meaning of Section 179, Criminal Procedure Code. In the case of Colville v. Kristo Kishore Bose 26 C. 748 : 3 C.W.N. 598, I find the following passage: "He seems to have thrown out in the course of his judgment, that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint, because the offence, if any, was committed at Shalimar within the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate of Howrah. But it appears to us that the monies having been received from the complainant's firm at Calcutta and false accounts, as stated by the complainants, having been rendered in Calcutta, the Presidency Magistrate has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint in question." The above facts are very different from the facts of the case before me and the case is no authority for the proposition that if an offence under Section 403 is committed in a branch of a firm, the Courts at the head office of the firm will have jurisdiction. In the case of Queen-Empress v. O'Brien 19 A. 111 the facts were also different, and the loss to a branch of the firm was not held to be a loss to the principal firm at another place. For the above reasons, I hold that the Courts at Cawnpore have no jurisdiction to proceed with the case, and set aside the order of the learned Sessions judge. Let the record be returned.