Gauhati High Court
Hafiz Ali vs Sri Afroz Ahmed And 3 Ors on 17 June, 2022
Author: Devashis Baruah
Bench: Devashis Baruah
Page No.# 1/13
GAHC010174762019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : FAO/40/2019
HAFIZ ALI
S/O- JABED ALI FAKIR, R/O- FRIENDS PATH, HATIGAON, BHETAPARA
ROAD, P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON, GUWAHATI, DIST.- KAMRUP(M), ASSAM,
PIN- 781038.
VERSUS
SRI AFROZ AHMED AND 3 ORS.
S/O- ZAMIRUL HAQUE, R/O- H/NO. 12, MOTHER TERESA PATH, HATIGAON,
BHETAPARA ROAD, P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON, GUWAHATI-38, DIST.-
KAMRUP(M), ASSAM, PIN- 781038.
2:MUMTAZ ALAM
S/O- ZAMIRUL HAQUE
R/O- H/NO. 12
MOTHER TERESA PATH
HATIGAON
BHETAPARA ROAD
P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON
GUWAHATI-38
DIST.- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM
PIN- 781038.
3:NIAZ AHMED
S/O- LATE SAMSUDDIN AHMED
R/O- VILL.- BORSOJAI
FRIENDS PATH
H/NO. 12
HATIGAON BHETAPARA ROAD
P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON
GUWAHATI-38
DIST.- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
Page No.# 2/13
4:RELIANCE HOME FINANCE LTD.
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
COMPANIES ACT
1956
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT RELIANCE CENTRE
SOUGHT WING
6TH FLOOR
OFF WESTERN HIGHWAY
SANTA CRUZ EAST
MUMBAI-55 AND REP. BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY AND ALSO
HAVING ONE OF ITS BRANCHES AT ULUBARI
OPPOSITE TO KFC
GUWAHATI-7
DIST.- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM
PIN- 781007
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K GHOSH
Advocate for the Respondent : MR. N ALAM
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
JUDGMENT
Date : 17-06-2022 Heard Mr. SK Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. N Alam, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff.
2. This is an appeal under order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC challenging the order dated 07.06.2019 passed in Misc (J) Case No.38/2019 arising out of Title Suit No.14/2019. Vide the impugned order dated 07.06.2019, the status quo order dated 17.01.2019 was made absolute by the Court of the Civil Judge, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati. Further to that, the petitioner as well as the opposite party No.1, 2 and 3 in the said injunction application were directed to Page No.# 3/13 maintain status quo and they were also directed not to do anything over the suit land till the disposal of the suit.
3. Mr. SK Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the name of the Proforma Respondent Nos.3 & 4 may be struck off as the appellants have no claim against them in the instant proceedings. Accordingly, the names of the Proforma Respondent Nos.3 & 4 are struck off.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record.
5. From a perusal of the materials on record, it reveals that the respondent herein as plaintiff had filed a suit seeking declaration that in view of the existence of a prior agreement for sale dated 12.07.2018 and the execution of the registered agreement for sale dated 29.12.2018 and in view of the existing loan liability before the defendant No.3, the defendant No.1 had no vested legal and lawful right to execute and register the sale deed No.12409/2018 dated 03.11.2018 in favour of the defendant No.2; for specific performance of the contract of agreement for sale dated 12.07.2018 and 21.12.2018 executed between the plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 in respect to the Schedule A plot of land and for cancellation of the deed of sale bearing deed No.12409/2018 dated 03.11.2018 in respect to the Schedule A plot of land; for confirmation of possession over the Schedule A plot of land and structure thereon delivered by the defendant on 31.12.2018; for permanent injunction etc. Page No.# 4/13
6. Along with the said suit, an injunction application was filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 CPC praying for an ad interim temporary injunction restraining the principal OP's/defendants their men, agents, servants, employees and workman, associates and representatives from changing the nature, character, feature and from alienating the Schedule A plot of land and structures standing thereon in any manner and further restraining them from disturbing the peaceful possession of the petitioners/plaintiffs over the same. The said injunction application was registered and numbered as Misc (J) Case No.38/2019.
7. Upon the said suit along with the injunction application filed, the Court of the Civil Judge No.1, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati (for short "the trial Court") vide an order dated 17.01.2019 passed an ex-parte order of injunction directing the parties to maintain status quo in respect to the suit land till the next date.
8. The appellant herein who was the defendant No.2 filed his written statement as well as his written objection to the injunction application. It is relevant to mention herein that in the written objection it was the specific stand taken that the appellant/defendant No.2 had entered into a registered agreement for sale of the Schedule A land with the defendant No.1 vide a registered agreement dated 05.04.2018 and thereafter, after obtaining the sale permission, the defendant No.1 and 2 executed the deed of sale on 03.11.2018. It was further stated that the GMDA permission from the appropriate authority was also taken. Further to that, it has been mentioned that Page No.# 5/13 the possession of the suit property was handed over to the appellant/defendant No.2 and the defendant No.2 have been residing upon the suit land.
9. The learned trial court vide the order dated 07.06.2019 although had taken into consideration that the agreement entered into between the defendant Nos.1 and 2 was prior in time and was dated 05.04.2018 and the agreement for sale entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 was on 28.06.2018 but on the ground that the OP No.1 have committed cheating for which the plaintiff had to suffer for no fault of him made the ad interim ex-parte order dated 17.01.2019 absolute; thereby directing that the plaintiff, defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 to maintain status quo and not to do anything over the suit land till the disposal of the suit. It is against the said order that the instant appeal has been filed.
10. Along with the instant appeal, an application was filed under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC for stay of the impugned order dated 07.06.2019. This Court vide an order dated 19.08.2019 admitted the instant appeal and stayed the impugned order dated 07.06.2019.
11. For the purpose of grant of an injunction, the requirement is the satisfaction of the three golden principles i.e, the prima-facie case for going for trial; balance of convenience in favour of grant of an injunction; and irreparable loss harm and injury. The said principles have been from time and again reiterated by the Supreme Court in various judicial pronouncements. This Court finds it apt to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dalpat Kr. Vs. Page No.# 6/13 Pralhad Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719, wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 laid down the concept of the three ingredients for grant of an injunction and the parameters to be followed while granting the injunction. The said paragraphs 5 and 6 are quoted herein below:
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial.
Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non- interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of Page No.# 7/13 substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.
6. Undoubtedly, in a suit seeking to set aside the decree, the subject matter in the earlier suit, though became final, the Court would in an appropriate case grant ad interim injunction when the party seeks to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud pleaded in the suit or for want of jurisdiction in the Court which passed the decree. But the Court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused. This case demonstrates (we are not expressing any opinion on the plea of fraud or their relative merits in the case or the validity of the decree impugned), suffice to state that the conduct of the respondent militates against the bona fides. At present there is a sale deed executed by the Court in favour of the first appellant. If ultimately the respondent succeeds at the trial, they can be adequately compensated by awarding damages for use and occupation from the date of dispossession till date of restitution. Repeatedly the civil court and the High Court refused injunction pending proceedings. For any acts of Page No.# 8/13 damage, if attempted to be made, to the property, or done, appropriate direction could be taken in the suit. If any alienation is made it would be subject to doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The High Court without adverting to any of these material circumstances held that balance of convenience lies in favour of granting injunction with the following observations, "keeping in mind the history, various facts which have been brought to my notice, and looking to the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, I think it will be in the interests of justice to allow these appeals and grant temporary injunction that the appellants may not be dispossessed from the suit property". The phrases "prima facie case", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by men's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success.
12. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court takes into consideration as to whether the trial Court was justified in passing the impugned order dated 07.06.2019 and as to whether the three principles were taken into consideration while passing the said order. This Court cannot also be unmindful of the scope of the jurisdiction of the present appeal in question as it is an appeal in principle against an Page No.# 9/13 order passed in exercise of the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction.
13. The interference by the Appellate Court can only be done if the order so passed is arbitrary, capricious, irrational as well as in violation to the well settled principles for grant of an injunction. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take into consideration as regards the legality and validity of the order impugned in the instant proceedings.
14. A perusal of the plaint shows that the suit so filed is a suit filed for declaration; for specific performance of the agreements for sale dated 12.07.2018 and 29.12.2018; for cancellation of the registered deed of sale executed in favour of the defendant No.2 by the defendant No.1; for confirmation of possession and for permanent injunction. The agreement for sale admittedly entered into between the defendant No.1 and 2 is a registered document which was executed on 05.04.2018 which was prior in time to the execution of the agreement dated 28.06.2018 between the plaintiff and the Defendant No.1. It would also be seen that the suit in question was filed on 17.01.2019 much after the execution of the registered deed of sale bearing deed No.12409 dated 03.11.2018. It is also relevant to mention that the registered agreement for sale dated 29.12.2018 was executed between the Defendant No.1 and the Plaintiff after the transfer of the Schedule A Land in favour of the defendant No.2 vide the registered Deed of sale bearing No.12409 dated 03.11.2018. Under such circumstances, till the Deed of sale dated 03.11.2018 is in existence, the question of specific performance of the contract on the Page No.# 10/13 basis of registered Agreement for sale dated 29.12.2018 or even the unregistered agreement for sale dated 25.06.2018 does not arise. The entire case of the plaintiff therefore hinges upon the setting aside of the registered deed of sale dated 03.11.2018. Now therefore the question arises is, as to whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case for grant of an injunction. As held by the Supreme court in Dalpat Kumar (supra), prima facie case is not required to be confused with prima facie title, which has to be established on evidence at trial. Prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bonafide, which needs investigation and a decision on merit. The question herein is that there is a prior registered agreement for sale dated 05.04.2018 between the defendant No.1 and 2. Thereafter there is an agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 for sale of the Schedule A land on 28.06.2018. The agreement dated 28.06.2018 during the existence of the registered agreement for sale dated 05.04.2018 prima facie would not vest any right upon the plaintiff to seek specific performance of the contract. More so, when by a registered Deed of sale dated 03.11.2018, the Schedule A Land was transferred in favour of the Defendant No.2. Upon transfer effected on 03.11.2018, the Defendant No.1 did not have a prima facie right to execute the Registered agreement for sale on 29.12.2018. As already stated herein above, the right on the basis of which the suit was instituted was one agreement for sale which admittedly was executed after the registered agreement for sale dated 05.04.2018 and the second agreement for sale was executed when the Defendant No.1 did not have a saleable right. Under such circumstances, this Court is Page No.# 11/13 of the opinion that the plaintiff did not have a prima facie case for grant of an injunction in his favour.
15. Now coming to the question of balance of convenience, there is an agreement dated 05.04.2018 executed and registered prior to entering into the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1; a sale deed was executed in favour of the defendant No.2 by the defendant No.1 and the defendant No.2 claims to be enjoying the rights over the suit land on the basis of the said registered deed of sale. Till the registered deed of sale is not set aside in accordance with law, the defendant No.2 is entitled to enjoy the benefits over the said suit land purchased on the basis of the registered deed of sale. The injunction so passed of directing to maintain status quo in respect to the suit land deprives the appellant/defendant No.2 to enjoy the benefits of the suit land pending disposal of the suit which in the opinion of this Court cannot be justified and as such, the balance of convenience is in favour of not granting an injunction in the instant case.
16. Now coming to the third ingredient as to whether the plaintiff would suffer any irreparable loss, harm and injury if the injunction sought for is not granted taking into consideration that the right of the plaintiff seeking declaration as well as specific performance on the basis of a documents which had come into existence after the registered agreement for sale dated 05.04.2018. At this stage, this Court finds it appropriate to rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Best Sellers Retail (India) Private Ltd.
Page No.# 12/13 Vs. Aditya Birla Navo Limited and Ors reported in (2012) 6 SCC 792 wherein at paragraph No.36, the Supreme Court quoted the words of Anderson B, in Attorney General Vs. Hallet reported in (1857) 16 M&W
569. The said paragraph 36 is quoted herein below:
36. To quote the words of Alderson, B. in Attorney General v.
Hallett (ER p. 1321) "... I take the meaning of irreparable injury to be that which, if not prevented by injunction, cannot be afterwards compensated by any decree which the court can pronounce in the result of the cause."
17. From the above quoted paragraph it would be seen that irreparable injury is that if not prevented by way of injunction cannot be afterwards compensated by any decree which the Court can pronounce in the result of the cause. If this court takes into consideration the facts of the instant case, it would be seen that only after the registered deed of agreement for sale dated 05.04.2018 and the respondent deed of sale dated 03.11.2018 are set aside and cancelled in accordance with law, the plaintiff can very well be entitled to the relief claimed for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 28.06.2018 and 29.12.2018. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 duly affords protection in respect to alienation made during the pendency of the suit and as such sale/transfer shall be subject to the suit. Under such circumstances, the question of irreparable loss, harm and injury is also not there for grant of an injunction.
Page No.# 13/13
18. Apart from the above, it is also be very pertinent to note that the Court below had granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff thereby directing to maintain status quo as regards the property on the ground that the defendant No.1 ought not to have committed cheating against the plaintiff by entering into a subsequent agreement during the existence of the agreement for sale dated 05.04.2018. The said aspect of the matter in the opinion of this Court cannot be a relevant consideration for grant of an injunction.
19. Consequently, in view of the above, the order passed by the Court below suffers from illegality and violates the well established principles of law for grant of an injunction for which the injunction order dated 07.06.2019 is set aside and quashed.
20. In view of the above, the instant appeal stands allowed.
21. It is made clear that the observations made herein above are only in respect to the adjudication of the injunction application and under no circumstances shall effect the adjudication of the suit pending before the Court below.
22. Send down the LCR.
JUDGE Comparing Assistant