Allahabad High Court
M/S. Rajhans Khandsari Udyog And ... vs Canara Bank, Kiratpur And Others on 13 August, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997ALL276, [1999]97COMPCAS261(ALL), AIR 1997 ALLAHABAD 276, 1997 ALL. L. J. 1446, 1996 (2) ALL RENTCAS 608, 1997 (1) CIV LJ 830, 1997 (3) LJR 274, 1996 ALL CJ 1267, 1999 (97) COM CAS 261, 1998 (35) BANKLJ 328, 1998 (1) BANKCLR 644, 1997 (1) CIVILCOURTC 718
Author: S.K. Phaujdar
Bench: S.K. Phaujdar
ORDER
1. Original Suit No. 65 of 1988 was filed by Canara Bank against M/s Rajhans Khandsari Udyog and others for realisation of a sum of Rs. Nine Lakhs and odd (Rs. 10 lakhs approximately) with interest etc. and in case of default in payment for sale of the, properties mortgaged for secured the loan.
2. On 3-4-1989 when the suit was called out the plaintiff was present. The defendant was absent and had not, till that date, filed any written statement although by an order dated 24-3-1989 they were directed to file the written statement on 3-4-1989 in terms of a prayer made by them. The Court, accordingly, decided/to proceed under Order 8 Rule 10CPC and it decreed the suit under the said provisions.
3. Subsequently, the defendants came up with an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree. Both the parties were heard on this application and by an order dated 29-9-1995 the learned trial Court allowed the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC on condition that within 15 days from the date of the order the defendants were to deposit 25 per cent of the sum under demand in the suit, amounting to Rs.2,45,250/-, and to file written statement within 16-10-1995. In case of failure of these conditions, the order setting aside the ex parte decree would be deemed automatically to have been vacated, Against this order this application was filed initially as a First Appeal from order which was registered as FAFO No. 971 of 1995 under Order 43, Rule 1 (d) of the CPC. It is worth mention at this place that the time for filing the written statement was upto 16-10-995, as indicated in the order dated 29-9-1995. The FAFO was also-filed on 16-10-1995. In terms of the valuation of the FAFO it was placed before the Division Bench. When the matter came up before the Division Bench for hearing, the Court expressed its views that the appeal under Order 43, Rule l(d) of the CPC was not maintainable as, by the impugned order, the appellants' prayer under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC was allowed. On the prayer of the appellants, they were permitted to convert the application as one under Section 115 CPC. They did so and the application was renumbered as Civil Revision No. 70 of 1996.
4. It was stated that imposition of the condition of payment of one-fourth of the sum under demand was an unreasonable one and that amounted to virtual refusal of the relief of restoration. The second aspect of this argument, that the prayer for restoration was denied in fact due to the imposition of the condition, may not be looked into because a Division Bench of this Court has already given an opinion that the application was allowed and so no appeal would lie. The learned counsel, however, insisted that in this revisional application the Court could always see if the condition was unreasonable one and hence suffered from material irregularity. It was further contended that the ex parte decree in question was recorded under Order 8, Rule 10 and there was no discussion of the merits of the claim of plaintiffs. I am afraid, this point would be beyond the scope of the present revision application. In this revision under Section 115 CPC this Court is supposed to see to the illegality or otherwise of the impugned order dated 29-9-95 and has further to see if the conditions for action under Section 115 CPC are there to require an interference by this Court in the impugned order.
5. The learned counsel relied on a decision reported in AIR 1994 All 193. This decision really touches the true import or Order 8, Rule 10 CPC and the revision was directed against an ex parte decree in a small cause Court suit. The ex parte decree was sought to be set aside in a-restoration application and that application was also rejected. Under Section 25 of the Small Causes Courts Act, both the orders were open to revision and the Court had held that even for an ex parte decree under Order 8, Rule 10 CPC the Court should have examined the plaintiff in support of his case. In the case at our hand, however, upon the ex parte decree (even under Order 3, Rule 10 CPC) the defendant had two reliefs - (1) one by way of appeal and (2) the other, by way of an application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC. The second course was preferred by the defendant and the impugned order dated 29-9-1995 was recorded. The course of appeal is still open to the defendant subject, however, to the laws of limitation and the merits of the ex parte decree, there-
fore, may not be touched in this revision. Reliance was further placed by the revisionist on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court as reported in AIR 1933 All 601. This was a first appeal in respect of a suit which was fixed for final hearing on 31st May, 1932. The mother of the defendant expired on 23-5-1932 and, accordingly, he made a prayer for adjournment of the case that was fixed on 31st May. The Court recorded an order that the heirs of the deceased-defendant be brought on record by 6-6-1932 as the applicant's mother was also a defendant in the suit. The plaintiff indicated that no substitution was necessary as the heirs of the deceased were already on record. Accordingly, the Court directed that the suit would proceed on 31-5-1932. The suit was decided ex parte on that date. On 20th June, 1932 the defendant made an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The Court, after hearing the objection of the plaintiff, directed that if the defendant would deposit one-third of the decretal amount together with a cost that was imposed, the case would be restored. It was held by the High Court that it was within the jurisdiction of the Court to pass an order for payment of the decretal amount or a portion thereof but the condition was unreasonable. The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree. The opposite party submitted that it was within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to impose a cost and to direct payment in Court and the conditional order was not beyond jurisdiction and not illegal. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court as reported in AIR 1972 All 166. It was a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and the suit was decreed ex parte. On an application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC the trial Court allowed restoration subject to payment of cost and subject to the condition of deposit of certain amount of rent within a specific time, failing which the application would stand automatically rejected. There was no payment in terms of that order, rather a prayer for extension of time was made and in the meantime the revision application was preferred. It was held that in passing an order for setting aside the ex parte decree the Court had a right to put any condition. Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Gokul Dairy Farm v. Canara Bank, in Civil Revision No. 116 of 1996 decided on 23rd July, 1996. Here was also a suit by Canara Bank against M/s. Gokul Dairy Farm and others for realisation of certain sum of money. The suit was decreed ex parte. An application under Order 9, Rule 13 was preferred and there was a direction for selling aside the ex parte decree subject to payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- within a particular period. A prayer for recall of that order was made and was disallowed. It was interpreted in this case that under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC the trial Court was empowered to set aside an ex parte decree "upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit". The application for recall that was filed by M/s. Gokul Dairy Farm was not in terms of Order 47 and no review was allowed. The Court found in this case that the direction to pay Rs. 2,50,000/- was not beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and should not be interfered with in revision. There were, however, other grounds also for the Court not to interfere.
6. The case relied upon by the revisionist, AIR 1933 All 601, also spoke that it was within the jurisdiction of the Court to pass an order for payment of the decretal amount a portion thereof in the circumstances of the case, but exercising powers of appeal the condition was thought unreasonable and was set aside. The law that stood then allowed an appeal against such order but now an appeal is not provided for under Order 43, Rule 1 in the present set of facts.
7. Under Section 115 CPC the Court would interfere in exercising its power of revision only if there had been a jurisdictional erroras indicated in the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). There was certainly a jurisdiction in the Court below to impose a condition of payment in the Court and it cannot be said that the Court had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law. Such exercise would be open to challenge if it was illegal or material irregularity was there. What is not provided under the law may be termed as illegality, and unreasonableness, as observed in the Allahabad decision, may not be equated with material irregularity. The appellate Court had every right, upon discussion of the facts, to differ from the judgment of the trial Court but a revisional Court is not empowered to impose its discretion to replace the discretion of the Court below unless there was a jurisdictional error committed by the Court below.
8. Under these circumstances, the present application under Section 115 CPC stands dismissed.
9. Petition dismissed.