Punjab-Haryana High Court
Darshan Lal vs State Of Haryana And Ors. on 7 January, 1999
Author: Iqbal Singh
Bench: Iqbal Singh
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. The main prayer made in this petition is for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto declaring respondent No. 5 to be a usurper of the post of Assistant Project Officer, though, the petitioner has also sought issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to consider and promote him as Assistant Project Officer in District Rural Development Agency, Hisar (hereinafter described as DRDA, Hisar).
2. A perusal of the record shows that petitioner-Darshan Lal, who joined the service of the Haryana State Small Industries and Export Corporation Limited on 21.5.1981 as a Junior Accountant was absorbed in the service of DRDA, Hisar in view of the Government's decision to transfer the Training Production Centre of the Corporation to DRDA, Hisar, His plea for ouster of respondent No. 5 from the post of Assistant Project Officer is based on the premise that the appointment of the said respondent is violative of the Haryana State Rural Development Agency Employees Service Rules, 1991, (hereinafter referred to as the 1991 Rules') and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The grounds on which he has challenged the appointment of respondent No. 5 are :-
(i) Respondent No. 4 is not competent to make appointment on the post of Assistant Project Officer in the service of the District Rural Development Agency.
(ii) Respondent No. 5 is not qualified to be appointed on the post of Assistant Project Officer.
(iii) On the date of appointment i.e. 21.3.1994, respondent No. 5 was overage.
3. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 have opposed the petitioner's prayer to be considered for promotion as Assistant Project Officer by slating that the 1991 Rules do not provide for promotion of Accountant to the post of Assistant Project Officer. They have also averred that the petitioner can not be promoted to the higher post due to adverse entries contained in his ACRs of 1987-88 and 1993-94. As regards the appointment of respondent No. 5, the following statements have been made in paragraphs 12 and 16 (i) and (iii) of the written statement :-
"12. The contents of this para admitted to the extent that respondent No. 4 was not competent to appoint respondent No. 5.
xx xx xx xx xx 16. Sub-parawise reply is given below :
(i) Respondent No. 4 was not competent to make appointment to Class-11 posts.
xx xx xx xx xx
(iii) Respondent No. 5 does not strictly fulfil the qualifications and experience for the post of APO as per Service Rules, 1991.
In a separate written statement, respondent No. 5 has challenged the locus standi of the petitioner by staling that he is no eligible to be appointed as Assistant Project Officer under the 1991 Rules because there is no channel of promotion from the post of Accountant to that of Assistant Project Officer. He has also averred that the petitioner should be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches. Respondent No. 5 has contested the petitioner's challenge to his appointment by stating that DRDA, Hisar had delegated the power to make appointment and promotion against the sanctioned posts to the Chief Executive Officer. He has also relied on the resolution passed by the Governing Body of DRDA, Hisar on 13.1.1995 approving the appointments and promotion made by respondent No. 4. He has averred that respondent No. 4 issued the order dated 21.3.1994 on the basis of selection made by a committee comprising of Chief Executive Officer-Additional Deputy Commissioner (respondent No. 4). Accounts Officer and Superintendent from amongst the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange, Hisar. Respondent No. 5 has also defended his eligibility to be appointed as Assistant Project Officer by slating that being a member of Economically Backward Class, he is entitled to age relaxation up to 5 years in accordance with the instructions issued vide circular No. 43/88/11.3 (Annexure-R-5/4). He has also averred that the 1991 Rules cannot be treated as anything more than mere guide-lines because the same have neither been notified nor published in the gazette and violation of such guide-lines cannot be treated as sufficient to invalidate his appointment.
4. In the replication filed by him to the written statement of respondent Nos. I to 4, the petitioner has averred that he is entitled to be promoted as Assistant Project Officer in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court in SLP(C) No. 26/93 of 1995, Anand Kumar v. State of Haryana. He has accused respondent Nos. 1 to 4 of arbitrariness by staling that the so-called adverse remarks were communicated to him through the written statement, on receipt of which he made representation Annexure-P10, which is still pending. To the written statement of respondent No. 5 also, the petitioner has filed replication in which he has averred that respondent No. 5 cannot be considered as a member of Economically Backward Class because his father retired from service as Deputy Superintendent of Police and he himself worked as Assistant Manager in the service of Haryana State Federation of Consumers Cooperative Wholesale Stores Limited from 16.3.1981 to 12.1.1990 - He has also stated that the vacancy of Assistant Project Officer against which respondent No. 5 has been appointed is of general category and is not reserved for the candidates of Economically Backward Class. With regard to the status of the 1991 Rules, the petitioner has averred that these rules were approved by DRDA, Hisar in compliance of the communication sent by the Government to all the DRDAs (except DRDA, Karnal) vide memo No. 30(E) & EA-1-9 I/I 9194-208 dated 19.11.1991. The petitioner has further stated that after having adopted the 1991 Rules, Officers of DRDA, Hisar cannot act in breach thereof.
5. In the additional reply submitted by him, respondent No. 5 has reiterated his claim of deemed relaxation in the upper age limit by staling that he was registered with the Employment Exchange as a member of Economically Backward Class.
6. Before we deal with the contentions urged by the learned counsel, it will be useful to outline the nature of writ of quo warranto and the circumstances in which appropriate direction, order or writ in the nature of quo warranto can be issued by the superior courts.
7. The writ of quo warranto is the process by which persons, who claim to exercise public functions of an important and substantive character, by whomsoever appointed, can be called to account for if they are not legally authorised to do so. By this means the Court can and does exercise control on all persons who hold public offices. The process is enforced for the benefit of the community and is the only available remedy if the public office is either abused or usurped. Every citizen has an interest in ensuring that public duties shall be exercised only by those competent to exercise them.
8. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.) Vol. Ip. 165, it is said :
"An information in the nature of quo warranto lay only if the office was substantive in character, that is, an office independent in title, and if the holder of the office was an independent official, not one discharging the functions of a deputy or servant at the will and pleasure of others. An information in the nature of a quo warranto lay in respect of an office held at pleasure, provided that the office was one of a public and substantive character."
9. In the University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491, the Supreme Court quoted Halsbury's Laws of England with approval and said :-
"Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceedings afford a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office franchise or liberty : if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions : it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject u the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurper of public office : in some cases persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not."
10. In view of this, it must be treated as a settled proposition of law that the writ in the nature of quo warranto is issued to protect the public from usurper of public office and the Court can, in an appropriate case ask the holder of an office as to under what authority he/she supports his/her claim to the office.
11. The questions that arise for adjudication in this case are :-
(i) Whether the appointment of respondent No. 5 as Assistant Project Officer, DRDA is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of the 1991 Rules and also on the ground that he was not eligible to be appointed on that post, and
(ii) whether the petitioner is entitled to be considered for promotion as Assistel Project Officer in the service of DRDA, Hisar.
Re : Question No. 1 :
11 A. The issue involving challenge to the competence of respondent No. 4 to make appointment on the post of Assistant Project Officer does not require elaborate discussion in view of the admission made in paragraphs 12 and 16(i) of the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in which they have unequivocally admitted that respondent No. 4 was not competent to appoint respondent No. 5 as Assistant Project Officer. Respondent No. 5 has tried to contest this on two counts. In the first place, he has relied on Annexure-R-5/6 to show that the power to make appointment and promotion against sanctioned posts was delegated to the Chief Executive Officer i.e. respondent No. 4. In the second place, he has invoked the theory of ratification by stating that the promotion/appointments made by respondent No. 4 were approved by the Governing Body of DRDA, Hisar. Shri P. S. Patwalia made strenuous efforts to convince us that the petitioner cannot question the jurisdiction of respondent No. 4 to make appointment on the post of Assistant Project Officer because the power vested in the DRDA to make appointments on the various posts stood delegated to him (respondent No. 4). He also argued that the violation of the 1991 Rules cannot be made basis for quashing the appointment of respondent No. 5 because these rules can not be treated as anything more than mere administrative instructions issued by the Government for guidance of the officers.
12. In our opinion, neither of these submissions merit acceptance or our approval. Admittedly, DRDA, Hisar is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Its constitution does not envisage publication in the official gazette of the rules framed/adopted by it. Therefore, the mere factum of adoption of the 1991 Rules by DRDA, Hisar is sufficient to make them binding on its officers and any action taken in violation of these rules will have to be treated as nullity. The respondents cannot plead that even though the 1991 Rules have been adopted by DRDA, its officers have the liberty to act in violation thereof without the consequence of invalidation of their action/decision. In our considered opinion, DRDA, Hisar and its officers are duty-bound to act in consonance with the 1991 Rules and any act done in violation thereof affecting public interest will surely entail the consequence of invalidation of the same.
13. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1628, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an action done in violation of them. "Their Lordships approved the following ratio of the decision of Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 359 US 535 :
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to bejudged .... Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the require ments that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed .... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword."
14. In B. S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute and others, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 363, their Lordships examined challenge to the appointment of the Director of Indian Statistical Institute. One of the grounds on which the appointment was challenged was the violation of bye-law 2 framed by the respondent-institute. Bye-law 2 required that before appointment, the vacancy in the post of Director should be suitably publicised. It was urged on behalf of the institute that the violation of the bye-law 2 was inconsequential. The three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the contention and reiterated the principle of law laid down in Ramana Dayaram Shetty's case (supra). Their Lordships quashed the appointment of the Director on the ground of non-publication of the vacancy in accordance with byelaw 2.
15. In view of these decisions, it must be treated as a settled provision of law that every public authority must act in accordance with the rules, regulations and bye-laws framed or adopted by it for the purpose of regulating its business and actions, more so, when its actions and decisions affect the members of public or relate to public interest.
16. The argument of Shri Patwalia that the breach of the 1991 Rules should be equated with breach of administrative guide-lines and, therefore, the appointment of respondent No. 5 should not be invalidated on the ground that respondent No. 4 was not authorised to make appointment on the post of Assistant Project Officer, does not commend our acceptance. At the cost of repetition, we consider it appropriate to observe that respondent-DRDA, Hisar had adopted the draft rules framed by the Government and, therefore, it is bound to act in accordance with those rules and mere non-publication of the rules in the official gazette cannot entitle respondent No. 5 to plead that the flagrant breach of Rule 3.6 of the 1991 Rules should be treated as inconsequential.
17. The decision of the Full Bench in Parkash Singh Bawa v. Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board, 1977 (1) SLR 382, relied upon by Shri Patwalia cannot be treated as a precedent for holding that a public authority like DRDA, Hisar can act in violation of the rules which have been adopted by it. The facts borne out from the judgment of the Full Bench show that the petitioner Parkash Singh had challenged the termination of his service from the post of Secretary, Market Committee on various grounds, one of which was that after having adopted the Punjab Civil Service Rules, the Punjab Agricultural Marketing Board was bound to act in accordance with those rules. The Full Bench rejected his plea on the ground that the adoption of the rules regulating the service conditions of the Government employees cannot be equated with framing of bye-laws under Section 5 read with Section 3(12) and (14) of the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board. The Full Bench further held that in the absence of statutory bye-laws, the rules adopted by the Board can, at the best, be treated as broad guide-lines for determination of inter se relationship between the Board and its employees. The enunciation of law made by the Full Bench in the background of the facts of that case is sufficient to hold that the same does not have any bearing on the case in hand, more so, because learned counsel for respondent No. 5 could not show that the constitution of DRDA, Hisar prescribes any particular mode for framing the rules regulating recruitment to its service. He has also not been able to establish that the resolution passed by DRDA, Hisar for adoption of the 1991 Rules is contrary to its constitution. That apart, we are also of the opinion, that in view of later decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty 's case (supra) and B. S. Minhas's case (supra), the decision of the Full Bench will have to be treated as confined to the facts of that case.
18. The questions whether respondent No. 4 could make appointment on the post of Assistant Project Officer on the basis of the so-called delegation made by DRDA, Hisar and whether the approval of the appointment of respondent No. 5 by the Governing Body of DRDA, Hisar is sufficient to cure thej urisdictional defect in the appointment of respondent No. 5 deserve to be examined in the light of the provisions of the 1991 Rules. Rule 1.2, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7 and the relevant extract of Schedule-B which have bearing on this aspect of the case read as under :-
The 1991 Rules :-
"1.2. Extent of application :- Unless otherwise expressly provided, these Service Rules will apply to all the employees of the DRDAs in Haryana. The word Class-1, II, III and IV wherever used in these rules is just to differentiate their status in DRDAs but they shall be member of such service of Haryana Government as prescribed under Punjab Civil Services Rules, Vol. I Part-1 (applicable to Haryana State Employees). These rules shall not apply to :-
(i) Persons on deputation from Government of Haryana.
(ii) Persons of other State Governments, Government of India, or any other statutory body or Corporation, who will be governed by the rules applicable to them in their parent departments and the terms and conditions of deputation as may be agreed between such Departments and Corporations and their respective employees and the Agency.
(iii) Employees appointed on contract.
(iv) work charged employees :
(iv) Persons paid from contingencies.
1.3. Power to relax/amend : Any amendment, addition, deletion and relaxation to these rules shall be made by the State Government on the basis of recommenations of the State Level Sanctioning/Coordination Committee.
xx xx xx xx xx 3.1. Number and Character of posts : The service shall comprise the posts shown in Schedule A to those rules.
Provided that nothing in these rules shall effect the inherent right of competent authority to make addition to or reduction in the number of such posts or to create new posts with different designations and scales of pay either permanently or temporarily.
xx xx xx xx xx 3.3. Method of recruitment : Recruitment to the Service shall be made :- (i) by promotion; or (ii) by direct recruitment : or
(iii) by transfer or deputation of an officer/official already in the service of such State Government or the Government of India.
(iv) by absorption of such employees who have worked atleast for 3 years on deputation in Agency as on 1st January, 1991. Provided that persons appointed by absorption shall be the first charge on the posts vacant on the day these regulations are adopted by the District Rural Development Agency.
xx xx xx xx xx 3.6. Appointing Authority : Appointment to the sanctioned post in the service shall be made by authorities as under :-
(i) Class-1 and II posts by Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Haryana, Rural Development Department/Commissioner and Secretary to Govt. Haryana, Rural Development Department (State Government).
(ii) Class-111 posts by Director, Rural Development Haryana.
(iii) Class-IV posts by the Chairman of the Agency.
3.7. Qualifications :- No person shall be appointed to the service unless he is in possession of qualification and experience specified in column 3 of Schedule-B to these rules in the case of direct recruitment and those specified in column 4 of the aforesaid schedule in case of appointment otherwise than the direct recruitment.
RELEVANT EXTRACT OF SCHEDULE-B (See Rules 3.6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S. Name of Academic Qualification Academic Qualification No.
Post experience having, and experience,
any, for direct if any, for appointment
recruitment other than by direct
recruitment
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xx xx xx xx xx
2. Asstt. Project Officer Post Graduate with 3 years BDPO by transfer basis
experience in Development from Development
work. Department.
Or
Graduate with 5 years
experience.
xx xx xx xx xx
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19. An analysis of the rules extracted above shows that the power to make appointment on different classes/categories of posts vests in different authorities. The Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Haryana, Rural Development Department or the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Haryana, Rural Development Department are the only authorities empowered to make appointment on Class I and II posts. The power to make appointment on Class III posts vests in the Director, Rural Development Department, Haryana and for Class IV posts, the appointing authority is the Chairman of DRDA. These rules do not provide for delegation of the powers of appointment vested in the Financial Commissioner and Secretary or the Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Rural Development Department to any other authority. Rule 1.3 of the 1991 Rules does empower the Government to amend or to relax the rules but such power can be exercised only on the basis of recommendations of the State level sanctioning/coordination committee. Under the 1991 Rules, the Governing Body of DRDA does not have the power to delegate the powers of appointment to any authority. Therefore, the so-called delegation of powers made to the Chief Executive Officer (Annexure-R-5/6) must be treated as nullity and redundant and on the basis of such delegation, respondent No. 4 did not acquire the power to make appointment on the post of Assistant Project Officer which is a Class II post.
20. We also do not find any merit in the submission of Shri Patwalia that approval by the Governing Body of DRDA, Hisar of the action of respondent No. 4 appointing respondent No. 5 should be treated as sufficient to cure the defect in the appointment of respondent No. 5 because it was not a case of mere irregularity or technical violation of the rules. Rather, the action of respondent No. 4 to appoint respondent No. 5 amounted to an illegal usurpation of power which vests in the Financial Commissioner/Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Government of Haryana, Therefore, the theory of ratification cannot be pressed into service to sustain the patently illegal order passed by respondent No. 4.
21. The argument of Shri M. S. Sindhu that respondent No. 5 was not eligible to be considered for appointment as Assistant Project Officer because he was overage also merits - acceptance and the claim made by respondent No. 5 about the deemed relaxation in the upper age limit deserves to be negatived. Admittedly, the date of birth of respondent No. 5 is 5.12.1954. Therefore, as on the date of consideration, he was more than 39 years of age which was more than the maximum age of 35 years prescribed for recruitments on the post of Assistant Project Officer, The plea of deemed relaxation in the upper age limit raised by respondent No. 5 cannot be accepted because :-
(i) the circular Annexure-R-5/3 reiled upon by respondent No. 5 is not shown to have been issued by the Government or any other competent authority and in the absence of relaxation by the government in terms of Rule 1.3 of the 1991 Rules, respondent No. 5 cannot make claim for consideration for appointment on the basis of deemed relaxation of the upper age limit of 35 years; and
(ii) no evidence has been produced on the record of the case to prove that the competent authority had passed any order or taken a decision to relax the upper age limit in the case of respondent No. 5 on the ground that he is a member of Economically Backward Class.
22. We also find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 5 could not have been appointed as Assistant Project Officer because he did not possess the required experience of 3 years in development work. There is no dispute between the parties that the minimum qualifications required for the direct recruitment on the post of Assistant Project Officer are post-graduation with three years experience in development work or graduation with five years experience. The certificate Annexure-R-5/5 relied upon by respondent No. 5 to show that he had worked as Assistant Manager in the Haryana State Federation of Consumer Cooperative Wholesale Stores Limited cannot be treated as sufficient to hold that the petitioner had gained experience in development work because the certificate does not give any indication about the nature of work done by the petitioner in his capacity as Assistant Manager. However, we may mentioned that this is not the main ground on which we are inclined to invalidate the appointment of respondent No. 5 because after having held the post of Assistant Project Officer for 3 years as on the date of filing of the writ petition and more than 4 years as on the date of decision of this case, he will be deemed to have acquired the requisite experience.
23. The petitioner's plea for issuance of a writ directing respondent Nos. I to 4 to promote him as Assistant Project Officer cannot be accepted because the 1991 Rules do not prescribe recruitment to the post of Assistant Project Officer by promotion from amongst Accountants. The order passed by the Supreme Court in Anand Kumar's case (supra) cannot be made basis for directing the respondent DRDA to appoint the petitioner as Assistant Project Officer by promotion even though the 1991 Rules do not provide for recruitment to that post by promotion.
24. Before concluding, we deem it appropriate to deal with the objection raised by Shri Patwalia to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches and also on the ground that the petitioner does not have the locus standi to challenge the appointment of respondent No. 5 because he is not eligible to be appointed as Assistant Project Officer. The second objection of Shri Patwalia deserves summary rejection because the petitioner who himself is an employee of DRDA, Hisar has sufficient interest in the appointment of eligible and qualified persons in the service of his employer. That apart, notwithstanding our disinclination to accept his claim for promotion, the fact remains that a number of persons holding the posts of Accountants and other similar posts have been appointed by promotion on higher posts. Thus, the petitioner's interest is certainly greater than that of a mere by-stander in the street or a busy-body. Therefore, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of lack of locus stdndi.
25. We are also unable to uphold the objection of Shri Patwalia that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. It is true that there is a time-gap of 2 year's and about 11 months between the date of appointment of respondent No. 5 and the institution of this petition but in a writ of quo warranto this delay is not sufficient to non-suit the petitioner, particularly when he has made an emphatic assertion that before filing the writ petition, he made representations dated 31.10.1994, 6.3.1995 and 19.11.1996 to the authorities of DRDA, Hisar and the Government to cancel the appointment of respondent No. 5.
26. Now a few words about the decisions relied upon by Shri Patwalia.
27. Bhajan Das Swami v. State of Punjab and others, 1977 SDWR 289, is a case in which appointment of respondent No. 4 as Assistant Professor (Pathology) was challenged on the ground that he did not possess the qualifications prescribed in the Punjab Ayurvedic Department (Class-III) Technical Service Rules, 1963, inasmuch as, he did not possess the knowledge of Sanskrit of Shastri standard. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the petition by observing that :-
(i) the appellant did not object to the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Assistant Professor on the ground that the latter did not possess the prescribed qualifications :
(ii) respondent No. 4 fulfilled all the qualifications specified in the advertisement; and
(iii) there was an unexplained delay in the filing of the writ petition as on the date of decision, respondent No. 4 had served for 8 years.
28. In Roshan Lal and others v. International Airport Authority of India and others, 1980 (3) SLR 587, the Apex Court ruled that 4 years delay was sufficient to decline the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the seniority list.
29. In S. K. Dubey v. Union of India and others, 1983 (2) SLR 414, a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court refused to issue writ of quo warranto on the ground that the office of the Chief Engineer (Extension) is not a high public office and also on the ground that the writ was filed after long delay.
30. In Udai Singh v. Union of India and others, 1995 (1) SLR 588, the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Courtrefused to quash the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Principal, Delhi Public School on the ground that the petitioner knew about the so-called illegality in the constitution of the selection committee but he kept on sitting on the fence for a long time.
31. In A.S. Garg and another v. State of Haryana and others, 1995 (3) All Instant Judgments 364, a Division Bench of this Court refused to quash the appointment of respondent No. 3 on the ground that he was appointed to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service 11 years prior to the filing of the writ petition.
32. A careful reading of these decisions shows that the Apex Court and the High Courts examined the claim of the writ petitioners for issuance of writ of quo warranto in the background of the facts of the individual cases and the varied grounds on which relief was sought. In some of these decisions, delay has been considered as one of the factors for declining relief but no general proposition of law has been laid down by the Apex Court or by the High Courts which may justify dismissal of this petition in spite of the fact that respondent No. 5 was appointed by a person who did not have even a semblance of competence to make appointment and who completely disregarded the recruitment rules and usurped the power vested in the Financial Commissioner/Commissioner-cum-Secretary.
33. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. The appointment of respondent No. 5 as Assistant Project Officer is declared illegal and quashed. DRDA, Hisar is directed to remove him from the post of Assistant Project Officer and make fresh appointment on the vacant post in accordance with law.
34. Petition allowed.