Karnataka High Court
Sri Ajit S/O Ganpatrao Chavan vs Sarvajaneek Shri Ganesh Mandir on 30 January, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 23.01.2026
Pronounced on : 30.01.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.108803 OF 2025 (GM - RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI AJIT
S/O GANPATRAO CHAVAN
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS
OCC.: EX-SERVICEMAN
R/O VISHNU GALLI, H.NO.127
VADGAON, BELAGAVI - 590 005.
... PETITIONER
(BY SMT.VAIBHAVI INAMDAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SARVAJANEEK SHRI GANESH MANDIR
AND SANSKRUTIK TRUST
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
SAMBHAJI NAGAR
VADGAON, BELAGAVI
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN
SRI PARASHURAM
S/O KALLAPPA NAVGEKAR
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
OCC.: CHAIRMAN OF SARVAJANEEK
SHRI GANESH MANDIR AND
2
SANSKRUTIK TRUST
R/O H.NO.218 SAMBHAJI NAGAR
VADGAON TALUK AND
DISTRICT BELAGAVI - 590 005.
2. SRI MARUTI
S/O BUDHAJI JAYANNACHE
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
OCC.: VICE CHAIRMAN OF
SARVAJANEEK SHRI GANESH MANDIR AND
SANSKRUTIK TRUST
R/O PLOT NO.18, S.Y. NO. 102
SAMBHAJI NAGAR, VADGAON TALUK AND
DISTRICT BELAGAVI - 590 005.
3. SRI PRADEEP APPAJI SHATTIBACHE
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
OCC.: SECRETARY OF SARVAJANEEK
SHRI GANESH MANDIR AND
SANSKRUTIK TRUST
R/O H.NO.233/D, SAMBHAJI NAGAR
VADGAON TALUK AND
DISTRICT BELAGAVI - 590 005.
4. SRI BHAURAO
S/O JAYAWANT PATIL
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
OCC.: AGRICULTURE
R/O H.NO.355/4
SAMBHAJI NAGAR
VADGAON TALUK AND
DISTRICT BELAGAVI - 590 005.
5. SRI PRASAD
S/O VINOD YELLURKAR
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
OCC.: BUSINESS
R/O: H.NO.195, PLOT NO.17
3
SAMBHAJI NAGAR
VADGAON TALUK AND
DISTRICT BELAGAVI - 590 005.
... RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) ISSUE A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND
DECREE PASSED BY DISTRICT LEGAL SERVICE AUTHORITY,
BELAGAVI, BEFORE LOK ADALAT BY ITS ORDER DATED. 07-04-
2018 IN PLC NO. 185/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-C; B) ISSUE ANY
OTHER INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEF AS DEEMED FIT,
IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN AID OF
THE MAIN RELIEF SOUGHT FOR, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
AND EQUITY.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 23.01.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question the
judgment and decree dated 07-04-2018 passed by the Lok Adalat,
Belagavi in P.L.C.No.185 of 2018.
4
2. Heard Smt. Vaibhavi Inamdar, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
The father of the petitioner one Sri Ganpatrao Chavan is said
to have purchased the property measuring 7 acres and 34 guntas in
Sy.No.102/1, out of which, CTS No.673, Plot No.19A measuring
296.10 sq. mtrs. situated at Sambhaji Nagar, Vadgaon, Belgavi is
the subject property. After the death of his father, the petitioner
and his siblings are said to be in possession and peaceful
enjoyment of the said property and that petitioner is the owner of
the property by virtue of inheritance. At a later point in time, in the
year 2025, when petitioner got the records verified, he comes to
know about the compromise decree entered into between two
individuals without the petitioner being a party to the compromise
decree, while the property of the petitioner being its subject matter.
On coming to know of the said compromise decree without the
knowledge of the petitioner, the petitioner is before this Court in
the subject petition.
5
4. The learned counsel Smt. Vaibhavi Inamdar appearing for
the petitioner would vehemently contend that all the documents
and statutory records stand in the name of the petitioner in respect
of the subject property. The compromise decree is entered on a
property belonging to the petitioner, without the petitioner being
made a party and extract from the property card that becomes the
subject matter of compromise decree shows nil transaction. With
all these, the learned counsel would submit that the petitioner who
has served the Army for more than 30 years has now been at the
mercy of some miscreants who have taken over his property,
without him being made a party to the proceedings. The learned
counsel would submit that the judgment and decree of the Lok
Adalat be quashed and the petitioner be left with peaceful
possession of the property.
5. The respondents though served have remained
unrepresented throughout. Several opportunities for appearance
were granted but they did not appear and on 09-01-2026 this Court
passed the following order:
6
"Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
Smt Vaibhavi Inamdar.
All the respondents are now served by way of hand
summons and an acknowledgment of such service is also placed
before the Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Therefore, I deem it appropriate to grant one opportunity to the
respondents to get themselves represented or appear before the
Court. In the event they would not appear, appropriate orders
would be passed on hearing the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner.
List the matter on 23.01.2026.
Interim order, granted earlier, is extended till the next
date of hearing."
Even on the next date there was no appearance of the respondents.
Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner was heard.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused
the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The
petitioner being the owner of the property is not in dispute, as
plethora of documents are produced along with the petition itself to
show that the petitioner is the owner of the property. A compromise
7
petition is filed before the Lok Adalat in P.L.C.No.185 of 2018. The
compromise petition reads as follows:
".... ..... ....
III] DESCRIPTION OF SUIT PROPERTY :
All that piece and parcel of property bearing CTS No. 673,
old Plot No.19 A out of R S No.102/1, measuring 296.10 Sq
Mtrs., and two old AC sheet rooms measuring 300 sq fts each
situated at Sambhaji Nagar Vadgaon, Belagavi.
The suit property is well identifiable by its separate CTS extract
hence boundaries are not mentioned.
1] The petitioner is a public trust which is registered under No.
A4862/BGM with Assistant Charity Commissioner Belagavi, and
trust was registered in order to achieve the aims and objects of
the Trust Pooja functions. Utsav, Cultural activities etc.... That
the petitioner trust is in possession and enjoyment of the suit
property since more than 30 years. The name of the petitioner
is duly mutated to CTS records as Holder and absolute owner of
the suit property. The petitioner trust is having two rooms of ac
sheet measuring 300 sq fts each and running Anganwadi school
at the premises. And also the petitioner regularly carrying and
performing all cultural and social and devotional activities time
being.
2] The Plaintiff/petitioner submits the Respondents without
having any right interest over the suit property claiming
ownership right over the suit property. It is submitted by the
petitioner that since from more than 30 years the petitioner
trust in possession and carrying all devotional and cultural
activities and no one have objected the possession of the trust
petitioner and ownership of the petitioner over the suit property
was admitted ed by the citizens of locality.
3] Further Petitioner submits that the Respondents started
objecting the ownership of the petitioner over suit property
hence in this regard the elders of the locality conducted the
meeting and in that meeting the respondents agreed not to
8
object the ownership of trust over suit property. But after long
period now the respondents started disturbing the possession of
the petitioner. It is submitted that the respondents are having
no right and have not produced single documents regarding
their rights and title.
4] Further Plaintiff/petitioner submits that now it is become
necessary to declare the Plaintiff as absolute owner of suit
property and hence Plaintiff having no other alternative
approached this Hon'ble Court to declare its as absolute owner.
Hence Plaintiff/petitioner constrained present petition for
Declaration.
5] The cause of action arose for filling this petition when the
defendants are trying to disturbing the possession of the
petitioner trust in the month of January 2018 and same is
continued till today.
PRAYER:
Therefore the Plaintiff most humbly prays that:
a) To Declare the Plaintiff/petitioner absolute owner and
holder of the suit property.
b) Any other relief which deems fit and proper be given in
favor of the Plaintiff.
c) Permission to amend the petition as and when deem
necessary may kindly be granted.
Sd/-
अ य
Sarvajanik Shri Ganesh Mandir &
Sanskritik Trust, Dharmer Sambhaji Nagar
Vadgeon-Belgaum
Sd/-
(Vice President)
Sarvajanik Shri Ganesh Mandir &
Sanskritik Trust, Dharmaveer Sambhaji Nagar
Vadgeon-Belgaum
9
Sd/-
सं टर
Shri Ganesh Mandir &
Sanskritik Trust, Dharmaveer Sambhaj
Vadgaon-Belgaum
Belagavi.
Date: 06/04/2018
Herein we 1] Shri. Parasharam Kallappa Navgekar,
chairman, 2] Shri. Marauti Budhaji Jayannache, Vice-Chairman,
3] Shri. Pradeep Appaji Shattibache, Secretary of the petitioner
trust all R/o Sambhaji Nagar Vadgaon, Belagavi do hereby state
on solemn affirmation that the above contents read by us and
the same are true and correct to the best of our knowledge,
belief and information.
Sd/-
अ य
Sarvajanik Shri Ganesh Mandir &
Sanskritik Trust, Dharmer Sambhaji Nagar
Vadgeon-Belgaum
Sd/-
(Vice President)
Sarvajanik Shri Ganesh Mandir &
Sanskritik Trust, Dharmaveer Sambhaji Nagar
Vadgeon-Belgaum
Sd/-
सं टर
Shri Ganesh Mandir &
Sanskritik Trust, Dharmaveer Sambhaj
Vadgaon-Belgaum
Belagavi.
Date: 06/04/2018"
The description of the property shown is old Plot No.19A in
R.S.No.102/1 measuring 296.10 sq. mtrs. If the said description is
10
juxtaposed with the documents produced by the petitioner to
demonstrate ownership, there is only Plot No.19 and no Plot No.19A
which is the subject matter of compromise petition. The extract of
the property record is as follows:
"PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ
Govt. of Karnataka
¥Áæ¥Ànð gÀf¸ÀÖgÀ PÁrð£À £ÀPÀ®Ä
EXTRACT FROM THE PROPERTY REGISTRER CARD
The encumbrances are completely free from transfer. There is
nothing from the compromise petition that is filed. Based upon the
aforesaid compromise petition, the compromise decree is obtained
by two persons describing the property to be Plot No 19A.
Admittedly all other indications are clear that the property is of the
petitioner and the petitioner is not a party to the proceedings in
which compromise is recorded.
11
8. Whether the writ would be maintainable against the said
ex-parte decree of a property belonging to a person need not detain
this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. This Court in
GURAMMA v. SMT.NAGAMMA NAGALAPURA1, has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
ISSUE NO.1:
Whether the drawing up of a decree on the award
of the Lok Adalat, can be challenged in a writ petition?
9. The Apex Court has time and again held that an award
of the Lok Adalat can only be challenged by filing a writ petition
under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India on limited
grounds of fraud.
9.1 In the case of STATE OF PUNJAB v. JALOUR SINGH [(2008) 2
SCC 660] , the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
"7. A reference to relevant provisions will be of some
assistance, before examination of the issues involved.
Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 ("the
LSA Act", for short) provides for organisation of the Lok
Adalats. Section 19(5)(i) of the LSA Act provides that a Lok
Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a
compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute
in respect of any case pending before any court for which
the Lok Adalat is organised. Section 20 relates to
cognizance of cases by the Lok Adalats. Sub-section (1)
refers to the Lok Adalats taking cognizance of cases referred
to by courts and sub-section (2) refers to the Lok Adalats
taking cognizance of matters at pre-litigation stage. The
1
W.P.No.101962 of 2025 decided on 15-12-2025
12
relevant portions of other sub-sections of Section 20,
relating to cases referred by courts, are extracted below:
"20. (3) Where any case is referred to a Lok
Adalat under sub-section (1) ... the Lok Adalat shall
proceed to dispose of the case ... and arrive at a
compromise or settlement between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining
any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost
expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement
between the parties and shall be guided by the
principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal
principles.
(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat
on the ground that no compromise or settlement could
be arrived at between the parties, the record of the
case shall be returned by it to the court, from which
the reference has been received under sub-section (1)
for disposal in accordance with law.
***
(7) Where the record of the case is returned
under sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall
proceed to deal with such case from the stage which
was reached before such reference under sub-section
(1)."
(emphasis supplied)
8. It is evident from the said provisions that the
Lok Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial
functions. Their functions relate purely to conciliation.
A Lok Adalat determines a reference on the basis of a
compromise or settlement between the parties at its
instance, and puts its seal of confirmation by making
an award in terms of the compromise or settlement.
When the Lok Adalat is not able to arrive at a settlement or
compromise, no award is made and the case record is
returned to the court from which the reference was
received, for disposal in accordance with law. No Lok
Adalat has the power to "hear" parties to adjudicate
cases as a court does. It discusses the subject-matter
with the parties and persuades them to arrive at a just
settlement. In their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are
guided by the principles of justice, equity and fair play.
13
When the LSA Act refers to "determination" by the Lok
Adalat and "award" by the Lok Adalat, the said Act does not
contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial
determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination based
on a compromise or settlement, arrived at by the parties,
with guidance and assistance from the Lok Adalat. The
"award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent
verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision-making
process. The making of the award is merely an
administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement
or compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok
Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the
signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.
.... .... ....
12. It is true that where an award is made by
the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at
between the parties (which is duly signed by parties
and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it
becomes final and binding on the parties to the
settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree
of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any
court. If any party wants to challenge such an award
based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a
petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the
Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. But
where no compromise or settlement is signed by the
parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer
to any settlement, but directs the respondent to
either make payment if it agrees to the order, or
approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on
merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok
Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a
petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already
noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to
have heard and disposed of the appeal on merits."
(Emphasis supplied)
9.2 The Apex Court following JALOUR SINGH supra, in
the case of BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS V. KOTHAKAPU
MUTHYAM REDDY [(2018) 13 SCC 480], has held as follows:
14
"10. The defendants, on being served with the notice
of the suit, filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Code") and prayed for rejection of the plaint. According
to the defendants, since the suit seeks to challenge the award
of Lok Adalat, it is not maintainable being barred by virtue of
rigour contained in Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code. It was
contended that the remedy of the plaintiff was in filing
writ petition under Article 226 or/and Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to challenge the award dated 22-
8-2007 as held by this Court in State of
Punjab v. Jalour Singh [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh,
(2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1
SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] .
11. The trial court, by order dated 24-7-2013
allowed the application filed by the defendants and
rejected the plaint by invoking powers under clause (d)
of Rule 11. It was held that the filing of the civil suit to
challenge the award of Lok Adalat is impliedly barred
and the remedy of the plaintiffs is to challenge the
award by filing writ petition under Articles 226 or/and
227 of the Constitution in the High Court as held by this
Court in State of Punjab [State of Punjab v. Jalour
Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] .
.... .... ....
22. The question arose before this Court (three-
Judge Bench) in State of Punjab [State of
Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1
SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC
(L&S) 535] as to what is the remedy available to the
person aggrieved of the award passed by the Lok
Adalat under Section 20 of the Act. In that case, the
award was passed by the Lok Adalat which had
resulted in disposal of the appeal pending before the
High Court relating to a claim case arising out of the
Motor Vehicles Act. One party to the appeal felt
aggrieved of the award and, therefore, questioned its
legality and correctness by filing a writ petition under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition holding it to be not
maintainable. The aggrieved party, therefore, filed an
appeal by way of special leave before this Court. This
15
Court, after examining the scheme of the Act allowed
the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court.
This Court held that the High Court was not right in
dismissing the writ petition as not maintainable. It was
held that the only remedy available with the aggrieved
person was to challenge the award of the Lok Adalat by
filing a writ petition under Article 226 or/and Article
227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and
that too on very limited grounds. The case was
accordingly remanded to the High Court for deciding
the writ petition filed by the aggrieved person on its
merits in accordance with law.
23. This is what their Lordships held in para 12 :
(Jalour Singh case [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2
SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] , SCC p. 666, para 12)
"12. It is true that where an award is made by
the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at
between the parties (which is duly signed by parties
and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it
becomes final and binding on the parties to the
settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree
of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any
court. If any party wants to challenge such an
award based on settlement, it can be done only
by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or
Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very
limited grounds. But where no compromise or
settlement is signed by the parties and the order
of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any
settlement, but directs the respondent to either
make payment if it agrees to the order, or
approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on
merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the
Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an
order in a petition under Article 227 does not
arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the
High Court ought to have heard and disposed of
the appeal on merits."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in
JALOUR SINGH and BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS (supra),
and the facts obtaining in the case at hand, the decree so drawn
16
on the basis of the award of the Lok Adalat can only be
challenged by filing a writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of
the Constitution of India on the grounds set out by the Apex
Court in the afore-quoted two judgments. The issue is
answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.2:
Whether a writ petition filed by a third party
challenging the award of the Lok Adalat is maintainable
and entertainable ?
10. To consider the said issue, it is necessary to consider
the facts that has lead the petitioners before this Court, though
at the periphery. It is not in dispute that the suit is for partition
and separate possession, in which the distinction of a plaintiff
and defendant is illusory, as all of them are entitled to a share
in the property. The contention of the petitioners is that, the
genealogical tree produced before the concerned Court is said to
be in error, as it has left out the petitioners from the family. The
genealogical tree upon which the present petition is preferred is
as follows:
17
On the strength of the said genealogical tree, the
petitioners have built their submissions. The submission is,
tracing the history to 17.02.1968, when the partition deed was
entered into by the family. The partition recognized certain
rights of the petitioners and certain shares in the suit properties.
The submission now is that, the share that is allotted to the
petitioners in the partition deed in the year 1968 is further
partitioned without providing the respective shares to these
petitioners. Further, the petitioners' father, way back in the year
1970 had acquired by purchasing the properties from
Bharamaiah, who is the only son of Lakshmaiah, who inherited
his share of the properties in the partition deed dated
17.02.1968. Therefore, the petitioners ought to have been made
as parties - defendants before the concerned Court, especially
when the petitioners have a higher share in the suit properties.
The respondents instead, without impleading the petitioners in
the suit for partition, have fraudulently entered into a
compromise decree on the entirety of the suit properties,
without having any right to the same. Therefore, the issue now
would be, whether a person who is not arrayed as a party to the
suit can challenge the decree or award of compromise passed by
the Lok Adalat, arising from the said suit.
11. Jurisprudence is replete as to whether a person who
is not a party / third party can file a writ petition challenging an
award of the Lok Adalat. I deem it appropriate to quote a few
judgments on this issue.
11.1. A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, in the case of BATCHU SUBBA LAKSHMI V.
SANNIDHI SRINIVASULU[2009 SCC OnLine AP 795], has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
Who can file writ petition challenging the Lok
Adalat Award
8. The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third
party cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even
18
if such award causes prejudice. The remedy of such party
would be to institute a separate suit or proceeding for
necessary redressal and seek appropriate decree of
declaration by filing a suit within the period of limitation
prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character or
any right as to any property, may file a suit for
declaration. Under this provision, any person can even
institute a suit for declaration that the decree passed by
Civil Court in an earlier suit is not binding on him. When
a civil Court can even declare that an earlier decree of
the Court is not binding on the party before it, we do not
see any objection for a third party to institute a suit in a
civil Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok
Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the law of
limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution.
What are grounds of challenge
9. Insofar as legal position that the Lok Adalat cannot
pass award unless and until there is a compromise and
settlement under Section 20(3) and (5) of the Act between the
parties, is well settled. In State of Punjab v. Ganpat Raj, (2006)
8 SCC 364, respondent moved Punjab and Haryana High Court
by filing writ petition seeking writ of Mandamus to the State to
pay interest at 18% per annum on the delayed payment of
pension arrears and other retiral benefits. The case was sent to
Lok Adalat, which passed award without any settlement or
compromise between the pensioner and the State. The writ
petition filed by the State was dismissed as misconceived. In
the Supreme Court, it was submitted that the matter could not
have been disposed of by Lok Adalat in view of the specific
provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act. While allowing
19
the appeal, the matter was remitted to High Court for de novo
consideration. The purport of Section 20(3) and (5) of the Act is
explained by Supreme Court in the following words.
The specific language used in sub-section (3) of Section 20
makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter by way
of a compromise or settlement between the parties. Two crucial
terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are "compromise"
and "settlement". The former expression means settlement of
differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reached by
adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal
modification of demands. As per Termes de la Ley, "compromise is
a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy".
As per Bouvier it is "an agreement between two or more persons,
who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such
terms as they can agree upon". The word "compromise" implies
some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to
describe total surrender. (See NFU Development Trust Ltd., Re,
(1973) 1 All ER 135 : (1972) 1 WLR 1548 (Ch D)). A compromise
is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. "Settlement" is
termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent.
10. In State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 3 SCC
660, the wife and son of Amarjit Kaur, who died in a motor
accident, filed petition before the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal (MACT) claiming Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation. An
award was passed by MACT on 1.12.1998 for Rs. 1,44,000/-.
The claimants filed appeal before High Court, which was
referred to High Court Lok Adalat for settlement. On 3.8.2001,
Lok Adalat passed an order awarding Rs. 1,70,200/- observing
that if the parties have any objection to the order proposed,
they may move the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits.
Aggrieved by the same, Punjab Roadways filed application
before the High Court to set aside the Lok Adalat award. A
learned Single Judge rejected the same placing reliance on
earlier judgment of another learned Single Judge wherein it had
been held that an order passed by Lok Adalat can be challenged
by filing a petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India.
Therefore, another petition was moved under Article 227 of
Constitution challenging the order of Lok Adalat. The same was
rejected by learned Single Judge on the ground that such a
petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of Constitution.
The Supreme Court while reversing the award and remanding
the matter to High Court laid down as under.
It is true that where an award is made by the Lok
Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the
parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the
award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on
20
the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if
it is a decree of a civil Court, and no appeal lies against it to
any Court. If any party wants to challenge such an award
based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition
under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution,
that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise
or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the
Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the
respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order,
or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits,
if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The
question of challenging such an order in a petition under
Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a
situation, the High Court ought to have heard and disposed
of the appeal on merits.
11. Dealing with the provisions of the Act
especially Sections 19 and 20, their Lordships observed
as under:
It is evident from the said provisions that the Lok
Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their
functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat
determines a reference on the basis of a compromise or
settlement between the parties at its instance, and puts its
seal of confirmation by making an award in terms of the
compromise or settlement. When the Lok Adalat is not able
to arrive at a settlement or compromise, no award is made
and the case record is returned to the Court from which the
reference was received, for disposal in accordance with law.
No Lok Adalat has the power to "hear" parties to adjudicate
cases as a Court does. It discusses the subject-matter with
the parties and persuades them to arrive at a just
settlement. In their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are
guided by the principles of justice, equity and fair play.
When the LSA Act refers to "determination" by the Lok
Adalat and "award" by the Lok Adalat, the said Act does not
contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial
determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination based
on a compromise or settlement, arrived at by the parties,
with guidance and assistance from the Lok Adalat. The
"award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent
verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision-making
process. The making of the award is merely an
administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement
or compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok
Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the
signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.
(emphasis supplied)
21
12. From the above judgments, it may be
taken as well settled that the award of Lok Adalat
is administrative act of incorporating the terms of
compromise or settlement agreed by the parties in
the presence of Lok Adalat and Lok Adalat does
not sit in adjudication of the dispute. When an
award is passed in terms of the settlement arrived
between the parties, which is duly signed by the
parties annexed to the award of Lok Adalat, it
becomes binding on the parties to the settlement
and becomes executable as if it is a decree of Civil
Court. No appeal would lie against the award of
Lok Adalat and if any party wants to challenge
such an award, it can be by way of petition under
Article 226 or 227 of Constitution. If there is no
compromise or settlement between the parties before
the Lok Adalat, it cannot pass any award nor such award
can bind the parties. The challenge to the award of Lok
Adalat under Article 226 of Constitution can be
entertained on very limited grounds raised only by
parties to the settlement/compromise before Lok Adalat
and not by anybody else."
(Emphasis supplied)
11.2 The High Court of Bombay, in the case of
KUSUMBAI v. BHAUSAHEB [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 585], has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
2. The issue raised in this petition is as to
whether, the third party can challenge the award
of the Lok Adalath before the High Court on the
ground that the litigating sides had excluded the
third party from the litigation?
.... .... ....
6. I find from Bhargavi Constructions
(supra) that the Honourable Supreme Court was
not dealing with the issue as to whether, a third
party could also have the same remedy of
challenging the Lok Adalat award in the High Court
contending that such third party is aggrieved by
the Lok Adalat Award. The Honourable Supreme
22
Court, therefore, concluded that an "aggrieved
party" can challenge the Lok Adalat award before
the High Court.
7. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court, in the matter of Batchu Subba Lakshmi
v. Sannidhi Srinivasulu, 2010 (1) ALT 483 : 2010
(1) ALD 277, dealt with the issue of a third party
challenging the award of the Lok Adalat. The
observations made by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court as to who can challenge the Lok Adalat
award are found in paragraph 8 of the judgment,
which read as under:--
"Who can file writ petition challenging the Lok
Adalat Award.
8. The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third
party cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even
if such award causes prejudice. The remedy of such
party would be to institute a separate suit or proceeding
for necessary redressal and seek appropriate decree of
declaration by filing a suit within the period of limitation
prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character
or any right as to any property, may file a suit for
declaration. Under this provision, any person can even
institute a suit for declaration that the decree passed by
Civil Court in an earlier suit is not binding on him. When
a civil Court can even declare that an earlier decree of
the Court is not binding on the party before it, we do not
see any objection for a third party to institute a suit in a
civil Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok
Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the law of
limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
23
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution."
8. While dealing with such challenge, the
Andhra Pradesh High Court also concluded in
Batchu Subba Lakshmi (supra) that such a
challenge can be posed on certain grounds. The
grounds for challenge are recorded in paragraph 9
of the said judgment, which read as under:--
"What are grounds of challenge.
9. Insofar as legal position that the Lok Adalat
cannot pass award unless and until there is a
compromise and settlement under Section 20(3) and (5)
of the Act between the parties, is well settled. In State
of Punjab v. Ganpat Raj : (2006) 8 SCC 364 : 2006 (7)
SCJ 364 : 2007 (1) ALT 283 (DNSC), respondent moved
Punjab and Haryana High Court by filing writ petition
seeking writ of Mandamus to the State to pay interest at
18% per annum on the delayed payment of pension
arrears and other retiral benefits. The case was sent to
Lok Adalat, which passed award without any settlement
or compromise between the pensioner and the State.
The writ petition filed by the State was dismissed as
misconceived. In the Supreme Court, it was submitted
that the matter could not have been disposed of by Lok
Adalat in view of the specific provisions contained in
Section 20 of the Act. While allowing the appeal, the
matter was remitted to High Court for de novo
consideration. The purport of Section 20(3) and (5) of
the Act is explained by Supreme Court in the following
words.
The specific language used in Sub-section (3) of
Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can
dispose of a matter by way of a compromise or
settlement between the parties. Two crucial terms in
Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are 'compromise'
and 'settlement'. The former expression means
settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an
agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or
opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands.
As per Tertnes de la Ley, 'compromise is a mutual
promise of two or more parties that are at controversy'.
As per Bouvier it is 'an agreement between two or more
persons, who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their
differences, on such terms as they can agree upon'. The
word 'compromise' implies some element of
accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe
24
total surrender. (See NFU Development Trust Ltd., Re
(2) (1973) 1 All ER 135 : (1972) 1 WLR 1548 (Ch D)). A
compromise is always bilateral and means mutual
adjustment. 'Settlement' is termination of legal
proceedings by mutual consent."
9. In the instant case, RCS No. 730/2017 was
filed on 30.06.2017 and the Defendants appeared suo
moto in the said matter. It was immediately placed in
the list of matters, which could be taken up in the Lok
Adalat after 08 days, scheduled on 08.07.2017. On the
said date, the suit was compromised with reference to
the properties mentioned above. Prima facie, a fraud
is played by the Plaintiff and the Defendants on
these Petitioners. All of them were parties to the
earlier RCS No. 447/2000. The entire family as
appearing in the family tree was before the Civil
Court. The said first suit was compromised on
02.09.2002 and the shares of the parties were
demarcated. The property at Survey No. 104 in
Vadjai sector was mentioned in the suit properties
in the 2000 suit as well as in the 2017 suit as
noted above. The Plaintiff in the 2017 suit,
therefore, had no reason to exclude these
Petitioners.
10. The learned counsel for the Petitioners
submits that this mischief is played because the
husband of Petitioner No. 1 (deceased Ramesh), who is
the brother of the Plaintiff Bhausaheb in the 2017 suit,
had passed away in 2000 and Bhusaheb along with
other relatives desired to deprive the widow of Ramesh
with that share of the property to which Ramesh would
have a right. This prima facie appears to be the
fraud played upon these Petitioners as well as the
court when the 2017 suit was settled in the Lok
Adalat within 08 days of it's institution and when
the Defendants had appeared suo moto without
any notice. All had declared that there are no
other family members.
11. These set of facts are not found in the
judgments delivered by the Honourable Supreme Court
in Bhargavi Construction (supra) and in State of Punjab
v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 and in the matter
decided by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the
25
case of Shalu v. Vineet, 2014 (174) (2) PLR 602 : 2013
TLP & H 4103.
12. It is true that a party aggrieved by the
Lok Adalat award can approach the High Court if it
discovers any fraud post the Lok Adalat award. It
is equally true that the third party, which is not a
litigant in a suit which has suffered a compromise
decree, can also file a separate suit for seeking a
declaration that such decree which affects the
rights of the third party, would not be binding
upon the said party as the said decree was
delivered in the matter in which, such third party
was never arrayed. It, therefore, appears that an
option to either prefer a separate suit or file a writ
petition in the High Court would be available to
such third party. At times, the issue of limitation
would crop up and the suit to be preferred by such
third party might be barred, of course, subject to
the date of the knowledge of such decree.
13. Both the learned Advocates submit that
despite their best efforts, they could not locate
any judgment, directly on this law point, delivered
by this Court or by the Honourable Supreme Court.
It is conceded that the judgment delivered by the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the matter of
Batchu Subba Lakshmi (supra) is the only judicial
pronouncement available dealing with a third
party being aggrieved by the Lok Adalat award on
the ground of fraud and his/her exclusion from
such proceedings, which culminated into the Lok
Adalat award.
14. The learned Advocate for the
Petitioners, who are the third parties, relies upon
the judgments delivered by the Honourable
Supreme Court in Bhargavi Constructions (supra)
and State of Punjab (supra) to contend that when
any aggrieved party can approach the High Court
for challenging the Lok Adalat award, such
"aggrieved party" would also include a "third
party" as like the Petitioners herein.
15. While hearing the learned Advocates for the
respective sides, notwithstanding that prima facie the
26
contention of fraud is sustainable, I have perused the
record and have found that the property situated in
Survey No. 104 which is known as Vadjai area, was the
suit property in the 2000 suit for partition and separate
possession and the same survey number involving a
larger area of land in Vadjai area was the suit property
in the 2017 suit, in which these Petitioners were
excluded. As such, if at all there is any fraud played by
the Plaintiff (Bhausaheb) or the Defendants (Kondabai
and Lahanabai) in the 2017 suit, it relates to the
property Survey No. 104 in Vadjai area and which,
therefore, fortifies the contention of the Petitioners that
the property admeasuring 3 Acres 35 Gunthas, which
was subject matter of the 2000 suit is the suit property
in the 2017 suit, which is shown to be admeasuring 7
Acres 19 Gunthas.
16. In view of the above, I conclude, in the
light of the law laid down by the Honourable
Supreme Court in Bhargavi Constructions (supra)
and State of Punjab (supra), that the third party
would be covered by the meaning "aggrieved
person" and as is held by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in the matter of Batchu Subba Lakshmi
(supra), such a third party can challenge the Lok
Adalat award provided the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation is, prima facie, made out."
(Emphasis supplied)
The view taken by the High Court of Bombay in the afore-
quoted case was subsequently followed by the same High Court
of again in the case of LATA v. SHANKAR reported in 2021
SCC ONLINE BOM 6358.
11.3 The High Court of Madras, in the case of M.
ANTONYSAMY v. S. MUMTAJ [2018 SCC OnLine Mad 12537],
has held as follows:
".... .... ....
21. When the entire facts leading to the
registration of the award obtained before the Lok Adalat
is established to have been obtained by playing a fraud
27
and the parties colluding among themselves, the award
itself would be a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law.
22. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner
relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath reported in
(1994) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1994 SC 853 on these proposition
and the relevant observation reads as follows:--
"1."Fraud avoids all judicial acts,
ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice
Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago.
It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment
or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is
a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a
judgment/decree by the first court or by the
highest court has to be treated as a nullity by
every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court even in collateral
proceedings.
8. The facts of the present case leave no
manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the
preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A
fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the
design of securing something by taking unfair
advantage of another. It is a deception in order to
gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to
get an advantage...."
23. Insofar as what constitutes a fraud or collusion has
been discussed by this Court in a decision reported in 1998 (1)
CTC 66 [Ranipet Municipality v. M. Shamsheerkhan] and this
Court made the following observations:
"9. It is this conduct of the respondent that is attacked
by the petitioner as abuse of process of Court. What is 'abuse
of the process of the Court'? Of course, for the term 'abuse of
the process of the Court' the Code of Civil Procedure has not
given any definition. A party to a litigation is said to be guilty
of abuse of process of the Court, in any of the following
cases:--
(1) Gaining an unfair advantage by the use of a rule of
procedure.
(2) Contempt of the authority of the Court by a party or
stranger.
(3) Fraud or collusion in Court proceedings as between
parties.
28
(4) Retention of a benefit wrongly received.
(5) Resorting to and encouraging multiplicity of
proceedings.
(6) Circumventing of the law by indirect means.
(7) Presence of witness during examination of previous
witness.
(8) Institution vexatious, obstructive or dilatory actions.
(9) Introduction of Scandalous or objectionable matter in
proceedings.
(10) Executing a decree manifestly at variance with its
purpose and intent.
(11) Institution of a suit by a puppet plaintiff.
(12) Institution of a suit in the name of the firm by one
partner against the majority opinion of other partners
etc. (See The Code of Civil Procedure - A.I.R.
Commentary to Section 151, C.P.C.) The above are
only some of the instances, where a party may be said
to be guilty of committing abuse of the process of
Court."
24. The issue as to whether the revision
petitioner, who was not a party to the suit, can
seek for setting aside an award obtained by fraud
or misrepresentation is also no more res-integra in
view of the following decisions:
1) 1998 (1) CTC 470 [J. Sivasubramanian v. N.
Govindarajan],
"1. A person who is not a party to the suit, but who is
aggrieved by the decree, has come to this Court, under Art. 227
of the Constitution of India, alleging fraud and collusion in
obtaining the decree.
13. I feel that all these decisions will show that a duty is
cast on the litigant to plead, pray and get relief by placing all
materials before Court. By suppressing facts and without
impleading the necessary parties, a collusive decree is
obtained. In the case on hand, the collusion is apparent. A
person who has no right in the property concedes the right of
the plaintiff to get a decree, and that too within 49 hours of
filing of the suit. The result of this is getting unfair advantage
over the rights of the petitioners and to deprive them of their
properties. Both the respondents were aware that the
petitioners are in possession on the basis of documents. They
themselves (i, e. parties to the suit) admit the possession of
the petitioners. But, without disclosing any of these
documents, the power of attorney (agent) filed the suit against
the principal and gets a decree, by consent. I have already
stated as to what is the legal effect, i.e., the second respondent
29
(defendant) himself is the plaintiff and defendant. It will be
unjust to accept the contention of the respondents. Such a
collusive decree also cannot be allowed to stand. After coming
to know of these facts, if any Court shuts its eyes to realities, it
will cease to be a Court of Justice. By invoking the judicial
supervisory jurisdiction, I declare that the decree in O.S. No.
7631 of 1997, on the file of XV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court
at Madras is a nullity and on the basis of the said decree,
possession of the petitioners shall not be disturbed. I further
find that since the suit is filed fraudulently, the same is liable to
be quashed, and I do so. O.S. No. 7631 of 1997 is struck off
from the file of the lower Court. The Civil Revision Petition is
allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees Two
thousand five hundred). CMP. No. 17556 of 1997 for stay is
closed."
2) 2009 SCC OnLine AP 795 [Batchu Subba Lakshmi v.
Sannidhi Srinivasualu]
"7. Under Section 21(1) of the Act an award of Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be decree of a Civil Court and under
Section 21(2) of the Act every award made by Lok Adalat shall
be final and binding on all the parties. No appeal shall lie to any
Court against the award, and therefore, ordinarily a writ
petition challenging award is also barred. But there may be
situations where there being no compromise or settlement as
envisaged under Section 20(3) and (5) of the Act, Lok Adalat
may have passed an award. In other words, what would be the
position if Lok Adalat passes an order even without parties
arriving at a compromise or settlement among themselves. In
such a situation, it cannot be said that there is an award of Lok
Adalat, which can be enforced by a Civil Court as a decree.
There may be yet another situation where in the absence of the
parties to the lis or in the absence of one of the parties to the
lis, award of Lok Adalat may have been obtained by
impersonation, misrepresentation or fraud. Even in such cases,
there being no valid award, Section 21(1) of the Act is not
attracted. Having regard to the language of Article 226(1) of
Constitution of India, which empowers the High Court of a
State to issue writs, orders or directions against any public
authority or against authorities discharging public functions,
the High Court can entertain a writ petition against an award of
Lok Adalat. The phrase 'for any other purpose' appearing in
Article 226(1) of Constitution, in our opinion, is broad enough
to take within its purview the situations where a statute
contains 'no Certiorari clause'. It is well settled that 'no
Certiorari clause' in a statute does not bar the Constitutional
Court from entertaining a petition for redressal of grievance
and issue an appropriate order ex debito justitiae. Therefore, in
either of the situations or any such other situations, a writ
petition would lie.
30
Who can file writ petition challenging the Lok Adalat
Award
8. The parties to the compromise or settlement, which is
the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt entitled to
challenge the award on any of the grounds referred to herein
above grounds. Ordinarily, a third party cannot challenge the
award in a writ petition even if such award causes prejudice.
The remedy of such party would be to institute a separate suit
or proceeding for necessary redressal and seek appropriate
decree of declaration by filing a suit within the period of
limitation prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character
or any right as to any property, may file a suit for declaration.
Under this provision, any person can even institute a suit for
declaration that the decree passed by Civil Court in an earlier
suit is not binding on him. When a civil Court can even declare
that an earlier decree of the Court is not binding on the party
before it, we do not see any objection for a third party to
institute a suit in a civil Court seeking a declaration that the
award of Lok Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the
law of limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with injustice
at the behest of two or more conniving and colluding parties,
who may have obtained an award of Lok Adalat by fraud or
misrepresentation only to defeat the rights of such third party.
In such cases within a reasonable period such third party may
maintain a writ petition. But in such cases, there should be
prima facie evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion
in obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such allegations
are made and the question involves complicated questions of
fact requiring voluminous evidence, third party should be left
to seek remedy in a civil Court rather than preferring
extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of Constitution.
13. Reverting to the facts of this case, there is no
dispute that respondents 1, 2 and 4 are partners in 3rd
respondent firm. There is also no dispute that respondents 1
and 2 filed O.S. No. 1 of 2004 against third respondent and its
Managing Partner, the fourth respondent, for dissolution of
firm and rendition of accounts. On 07.2.2004, plaintiffs and
defendants therein signed memorandum of compromise and
settlement whereunder they agreed to withdraw from the firm
and fourth respondent was permitted to continue the business
till 31.3.2008, failing which it shall be open to first respondent
to execute the decree and recover possession of vacant site
used as stockyard for the business of third respondent. The
award passed by Lok Adalat on 07.2.2004 was signed by
respondents 1 and 2. Fourth respondent signed on his behalf
and also on behalf of third respondent firm. Either on the date
of award of Lok Adalat or during pendency of suit before
District Court, Nandyal, allegation of reconstitution of third
31
respondent firm with petitioners and fourth respondent as new
partners was not revealed. There is also no dispute nor it can
be denied that partnership deed dated 01.4.2003 was executed
by petitioners and fourth respondent on the stamp papers
which had been produced (sic. purchased) by third respondent
firm on 27.3.2001 long prior to disputes arose among
respondents 1 to 4. This creates any amount of doubt on the
case put up by petitioners. This doubt becomes strong when we
realised that the petitioners 1 to 3 are stepmother, wife and
grandfather respectively of fourth respondent and they are all
living under the same roof. The allegation made by respondents
1 and 2 in their counter affidavit remains uncontroverted.
These lend support to the submissions made on behalf of
respondents 1 and 2 and we do not see strong reasons to
discredit those submissions."
3) 2013 (6) CTC 166 [P. Subramani v. A. Periyasamy]
"21. In the present case, the entire proceedings relating
to delivery of possession are vitiated by fraud. When an order
is obtained by resorting to fraud, all the subsequent
proceedings thereto will also render it vitiated. In this context,
I am fortified by the decision of this Court reported in (J.
Sivasubramanian v. N. Govindarajan) 1998 1 CTC 470 relied on
by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. In that case,
this Court took note of the fact that the suit was filed by
suppressing material facts and by not impleading the proper
and necessary parties. This Court held that fraud and collusion
are palpable and that the decree was obtained by power of
attorney agent as against his own principal thereby depriving
his right over the property, which was purchased by him from
the original owner. As the power agent filed the suit by
suppressing the material facts, this Court held that "....in such
cases, it is the duty of the Court to see that the suit itself is
wiped off from the file." It was also held by this Court that in
such circumstances the revision petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India is very much maintainable. In that
case, this Court, relying on the decision of the Honourable
Supreme Court reported in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by
Lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs., (1994) 1 SCC 1 culled out the
legal propositions as follows:
"12. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v.
Jagannath (dead) by LRs., their Lordships have decided as to
what is meant by 'fraud'. In paragraph 6, Their Lordships have
held thus:--
"... A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the
design of securing something by taking unfair advantage 14 of
another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It
is a cheating intended to get an advantage..." Their Lordships
have further said thus:-- "A litigant who approaches the Court,
is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which
32
are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document
in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be
guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite
party." In the earlier portion of that Judgment, their Lordships
have held thus:-- "... We have no hesitation to say that a
person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to
approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any
stage of the litigation." The effect of such a decree obtained in
such cases is also stated in that judgment thus:-- "... The
principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the
extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud
in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant
for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to
the Court, must come with clean hands.... A judgment or decree
obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est
in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first Court
or by the highest Court has to be treated as a nullity by every
Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any
court even in collateral proceedings." In Mahboob Sahab v.
Syed Ismail, of the judgment, Their Lordships declared thus:--
"... The reason is that fraud is and extrinsic collateral act,
which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice.
If a party obtains a decree from the Court by practicing fraud
or collusion, he cannot be allowed to say that the matter is res
judicata and cannot be reopened. There can also be no question
of res judicata in a case where signs of fraud or collusion are
transparently pregnant or apparent from the facts on record."
In paragraph 10, Their Lordships further declared thus:--
"... Section 44 of the Evidence Act envisages
that any party to a suit or proceeding may show that
any judgment, order or decree, which is relevant
under Sections 40, 41 or 42 has been obtained by
fraud or collusion. Under Section 40, the existence of
the judgment, order or decree which by law prevents
any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding
a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether
such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to
hold such trial." In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres
(India) Pvt. Ltd., it was declared thus:--
"The authorities, be they constitutional, statutory or
administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a
lis) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if
they are obtained by fraud as fraud and justice never dwell
together (Fraud et jus nunquam cohabitant). Fraud and deceit
defend or excuse no man (Fraud et dolus nemini patrocinari
debent). The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power,
specially under Section 151, CPC., to recall its judgment or
order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on
a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the
affected parly to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree
obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are
resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These
powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the
constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to
enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its
process and rule, protect its officers from indignity and wrong
and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for
the orderly administration of the Court's business. Since fraud
affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the
proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the
process of court, the courts have been held to have inherent
33
power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon
that Court."
25. On a overall appreciation of the observations in the
aforesaid decisions, I am of the view that the award before the
Lok Adalat was obtained by fraud and collusion exercised by
the parties to the suit and as such, the award itself has no
validity and deemed to be non-est. It is a settled law that fraud
vitiates all solemn acts and an award obtained by playing fraud
is nullity. Hence, this Court would be justified in setting aside
the award by exercising its power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India."
(Emphasis supplied)
11.4 A Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana, in
the case of DASARI LOKESH CHANDRA v. LOK ADALAT
[W.P.18369/2021 decided on 20.12.2021] has held as follows:
".... .... .....
6. Point No.1:-
Arguing at length in respect of the merits of the
case, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended
that the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser of Plot
Nos.379 and 452 admeasuring 400 square yards in
Survey No.175 of Patancheru Mandal, Sangareddy
District and he purchased the said property on
30.01.2021 through a registered sale deed for valuable
consideration, but subsequently he came to know that
an Award was passed by the Lok Adalat in respect of the
said property and other property in a suit between the
sons and the daughters of late Lakkaraju Laxmana Rao
and the said Award is based on the terms of compromise
entered into between the parties i.e., the sons and the
daughters of late Lakkaraju Laxmana Rao and indeed,
the said deed of compromise is a collusive one and
therefore, the Award passed basing on the said deed of
compromise is unsustainable. He further submitted that
as there is no other remedy for the petitioner who is a
third party to the proceedings to question the Award of
the Lok Adalat, he filed the present Writ Petition
challenging the same.
34
7. Undoubtedly, challenge to an Award of
the Lok Adalat can be done only by filing a Writ
Petition under Article 226 or 227 of the
Constitution of India, as observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Bhargavi Constructions and
another Vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and others
- (2018) 13 SCC 480.
8. Under Section 21(1) of the Legal Services
Authority Act, 1987, an Award of the Lok Adalat
shall be deemed to be a decree of the civil Court.
Also, as per Section 21(2) of the said Act, the
Award made is final and binding on the parties.
Law does not provide any appeal to any Court
against the said Award. Thus, only, Writ Petitions
can be filed challenging the Award passed by the
Lok Adalat. However, the grounds of challenge are
very limited.
9. Observing that there may be extra-
ordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving
and colluding parties, who may have obtained the
Award of the Lok Adalat by fraud or
misrepresentation, the Courts in a series of
decisions held that even a third party may
maintain a Writ Petition challenging the Award of
the Lok Adalat. One of such cases where the said
observation is made is Batchu Subba Lakshmi and
others Vs. Sannidhi Srinivasulu and others -
2010(1) ALD 277 DB, wherein a Division Bench of
this Court at para 8 held as follows:-
"The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third
party cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even
if such award causes prejudice. The remedy of such
party would be to institute a separate suit or proceeding
for necessary redressal and seek appropriate decree of
declaration by filing a suit within the period of limitation
prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character
or any right as to any property, may file a suit for
declaration. Under this provision, any person can even
institute a suit for declaration that the decree passed by
Civil Court in an earlier suit is not binding on him. When
35
a civil Court can even declare that an earlier decree of
the Court is not binding on the party before it, we do not
see any objection for a third party to institute a suit in a
civil Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok
Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the law of
limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution."
(Emphasis supplied)
The views taken in the cases of BATCHU
SUBBALAKSHMI supra and DASARI VENKATESH supra were
subsequently affirmed by another Division Bench of the High
Court of Telangana in the case of SMT. B. LAVANYA v. THE
STATE OF TELANGANA in Writ Petition No.2906 of 2021,
decided on 16.12.2023."
The aforesaid judgment clearly lays down that a writ challenging
the award of the Lok Adalat is maintainable and entertainable and
the person who was not a party to the proceedings is also entitled
to challenge the award of the Lok Adalat. The petitioner fits in to
both these principles as laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
judgment. The award challenged is that of the Lok Adalat and
before the Lok Adalat the petitioner is not a party.
36
9. Now with regard to the fraud played by all those persons
who are beneficiaries of the compromise decree should be
permitted to enjoy the fruits of the said decree, notwithstanding the
principle that fraud unravels everything, again need not detain this
Court for long or delve deep into the matter. A coordinate Bench of
this Court in SHAH HARILAL BHIKHABHAI AND COMPANY v.
B.MANI2, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
having perused the petition papers, this Court is inclined to
grant indulgence in the matter because:
(a) Petitioner apparently has been in the possession and
enjoyment of the subject property by virtue of two registered
lease deeds both dated 23.01.1954; his assertion as to this is
strengthened by the tax paid receipts for decades, the latest
being of the year 2019-2020; the contesting respondents
despite service of notice having remained unrepresented, the
version of the petitioner which is supported by an affidavit and
the accompanying documents remains unrebutted.
(b) In respect of subject property the suit in
S.C.No.678/2018 was filed by 1st respondent-Mr.B.Mani
represented by 3rd respondent-GPA Holder Mr.Sendil Kumar
against the 2nd respondent-Mr.Arun on 26.04.2018; strangely a
compromise decree has been obtained on 31.05.2018,
absolutely without any explanation for this rocket speed, even
when the ink on the pleadings had not yet dried up; what
intrigues the mind of this court is that the learned Judge of the
Court below has not given a thought to this doubtful swiftness
with which the parties to the suit have acted.
2
W.P.No.7714 of 2020 decided on 04-11-2020
37
(c) Apparently, petitioner a registered partnership firm is
a huge stakeholder in the matter and that he has not been
impleaded as one of the defendants to the suit, obviously
because it would have resisted the suit being decreed on the
basis of a fraudulent compromise; as already mentioned above
the allegations of fraud and duplication have remained
unrebutted, there being no contra pleadings nor controvertion
thereof; in fact, the parties to the suit as also the 3rd
respondent GPA Holder have chosen to remain unrepresented
and this conduct itself shows prima facie fraud that has
victimized the petitioner.
(d) Learned counsel for the petitioner is more than
justified in banking upon decision of the Apex Court in
S.P.CHANGALVARAYA NAIDU vs. JAGANNATH, AIR 1994
SC 853 in support of his contention that fraud vitiates
everything; his reliance on MEGHAMALA & OTHERS vs.
G.NARASIMHA REDDY & OTHERS, JT (2010) 8 SC 658 also
aides the case of the petitioner; at para 33 the Apex Court
observed:
"Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an
egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn
proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of
deliberate deception with a design to secure something,
which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud"
involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person
deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage".
(e) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits and I think
it right that the possession of the suit premises needs to be
restored since it was thrown out from the same on the basis of
the impugned judgment & decree which are a nullity in the eye
of law, having been tainted by fraud and duplicity; he is also
justified in seeking a direction to the respondent-Registrar of
the Court below for initiating police proceedings in the matter of
fraud in a time bound way, inasmuch as several such fraudulent
decrees & orders are stated to have been obtained.
38
In the above circumstances, this writ petition succeeds:
(i) a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned
judgment & decree, and dismissing the subject suit with an
exemplary cost of Rs.1 lakh (rupees one lakh) payable by the
respondents 1 & 2 each, and Rs.50,000/- payable by respondent
no.3;
(ii) the learned Judge of the Court below shall take all
steps for restoring possession of the subject property in favour
of the petitioner-firm within an outer limit of eight weeks, if
necessary, by taking the aid of State Power.
... ... ...."
If the law as declared by the coordinate bench in the judgment
quoted supra is considered on the facts obtaining in the case at
hand, fraud is all over found. Two parties go before the permanent
Lok Adalath. No suit is pending. They file a compromise petition
before the said Lok Adalath, the next day it is compromised and a
decree is drawn. The property does not belong either to the plaintiff
or to the defendant, it belongs to the third party, the present
petitioner. Therefore, there is a clear fraud played by two parties
usurping the property belonging to the petitioner, without any
documentation and without any right whatsoever over the property.
What is held by the coordinate bench in the judgment quoted supra
would aptly become applicable to the facts obtaining in the case at
hand, as the entire transaction is marred by fraud, as
39
fraud unravels everything, it does unravel the compromise decree
entered into by the parties to the compromise. On the aforesaid
reasons the inevitable conclusion is, the success of the petition.
10. For the aforesaid discussions, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) The judgment and decree dated 07-04-2018 passed by the District Legal Services Authority, Belagavi, before Lok Adalat at Belagavi in P.L.C.No.185 of 2018 stands quashed.
(iii) Petitioner would become entitled to all consequential benefits that would flow from quashment of the order.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp/CT:MJ