Bombay High Court
Abdul Razak Shaikh vs State Of Maharashtra on 7 August, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1987(3)BOMCR467, (1987)89BOMLR408
ORDER Tated, J.
1. The appellant has been convicted for the offence of murder of his brother under S. 302 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, in Sessions Case No. 102 of 1983, decided on 19th August, 1983.
2. The prosecution case was that the deceased Shaikh Ibrahim Shaikh Ismail and the accused along with their mother and other relations previously resided in the same house at Ulhasnagar. Due to household difficulties Abdul Razak, the accused, started living separately in the same compound but in a different house. The deceased was working as a taxi driver. The accused was employed in a Burner factory at Ulhasnagar at a distance of about 2 Km. from the house. The prosecution alleged that there used to be quarrels between the accused and deceased and also between the deceased and the wife of the accused. On 25th October, 1982 at about 12 noon there was a quarrel between the deceased and the wife of the accused. The wife of the accused went to the Burnal factory where her husband was working and told him about the quarrel with the deceased. Thereupon the accused rushed to his house and stabbed the deceased with a sword-stick (Gupti). As the stab was on the abdomen, the deceased fell on the ground with a bleeding injury. P.W. 1 Ajgar Ali arrived on the scene and took the deceased in a rickshaw to the police station and narrated the incident to the police. His F.I.R. was recorded. Soon thereafter the accused appeared at the police station and he produced the sword-stick before the P.I. The P.I. found the blade of the sword-stick stained with blood. He also found that the clothes on the person of the accused were stained with human blood. The clothes from the person of the accused and the sword-stick produced by him were seized by the police after drawing up panchanama. The deceased was sent to the hospital where he succumbed to the injury. During investigation the sword-stick and the clothes of the accused, clothes of the deceased and other articles were sent to the Chemical Analyser. The Chemical Analyser found that the blade of the Gupti was stained with human blood of A, B group. The blood of the accused was also taken and was sent to the Chemical Analyser. It was found of 'A' group. The statements of various witnesses were recorded during the various witnesses were recorded during the investigation. The accused expressed his desire to make confession and, therefore, he was sent to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ulhasnagar. The learned Judicial Magistrate, F.C. questioned him as to whether he willingly wanted to make confessional statement and after recording his answers, he remanded him to the magisterial custody and gave him 48 hours' time for reflection. The accused was produced again before him after 48 hours. The learned Magistrate again inquired of him whether he voluntarily wanted to make confessional statement. He also warned him that in case he makes voluntary statement, it could be used at the trial against him. As the learned Magistrate found that the accused was ready to make confession voluntarily, he recorded his statement in Hindi, in the language in which the accused made the statement. The accused stated before the learned Magistrate that he stabbed his brother with Gupti and caused his death. After completing the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ulhasnagar for the offence punishable under S. 302 of the I.P.C. The learned Judicial Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions.
3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge charged the accused for the offence of murder punishable under section 302 I.P.C. for intentionally causing the death of his brother Shaikh Ibrahim Shaikh Ismail. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. His defence was of complete denial.
4. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, on considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, held that the prosecution proved the charge levelled against the accused satisfactorily and he convicted him of the offence punishable under S. 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life. Feeling aggrieved, the accused preferred this appeal through the Jail Superintendent.
5. The learned appointed Counsel Mr. A. Y. Sakhara took us through the evidence on record and contends that there is no evidence against the accused on the basis of which he could have been convicted for the offence charged against him. He submitted that the witnesses on whom the prosecution relied upon for proving the charge levelled against the accused, turned hostile and their evidence was not at all helpful for bringing home the charge to the accused. He submits that the learned Additional Sessions Judge based his conviction on the circumstances : (1) The accused produced Gupti before the P.I. soon after the incident and the said Gupti was found stained with human blood (2). The clothes of the accused were found stained with blood of A, B, group to which group the blood of the deceased belonged. (3) The confession made by the accused before the Judicial Magistrate, F.C. Ulhasnagar, Sudhakar Vyavahare, P.W. 10. According to the learned Counsel if the confession relied on by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is discarded being not recorded as per the mandatory provisions of S. 164, Cr.P.C., the other two circumstances relied on by the learned Magistrate are not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused and none else caused the injury found on the person of the deceased and to which he succumbed to death.
6. The confession is a very important piece of evidence in this case if the confession is found to be inadmissible, we agree with the learned Counsel that the other two circumstances referred to above are not sufficient to bring home the charge to the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the confession, recorded by the Judicial Magistrate Shri Vyavahare P.W. 10 is as per the provisions of S. 164, Cr.P.C. and could be admitted into evidence. The learned Counsel Mr. Sakhare contends that as per the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 164, Cr.P.C. It is mandatory for the Magistrate after recording the confession, to obtain the signature of the accused thereon and as in the present case the learned Judicial Magistrate failed to obtain the signature of the accused on the confession recorded by him, that confession could not be admitted in evidence and the defect could not be cured by invoking the provisions of S. 463, Cr.P.C. Sub-section (4) of S. 164 reads as follows :-
"164(4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner provided in S. 281 for recording the examination of an accused person and shall be signed by the person making the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect :-
"I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. (Signed) A. B. Magistrate".
S. 281, Cr.P.C. reads as follows :-
"281. (1) Whenever the accused is examined by a Metropolitan Magistrate, the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of the substance of the examination of the accused in the language of the Court and such memorandum shall be signed by the Magistrate and shall form part of the record.
(2) Whenever the accused is examined by any Magistrate other than a Metropolitan Magistrate, or by a Court of Session, the whole of such examination, including every question put to him and every answer given by him, shall be recorded in full by the presiding Judge or Magistrate himself or where he is unable to do so owing to a physical or other incapacity, under his direction and superintendence by an officer of the Court appointed by him in this behalf.
(3) The record shall, if practicable, be in the language in which the accused is examined or, if that is not practicable, in the language of the Court.
(4) The record shall be shown or read to the accused or, if he does not understand the language in which it is written, shall be incorporated to him in a language which he understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his answers.
(5) It shall thereafter be signed by the accused and by the Magistrate or presiding Judge, who shall certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and hearing and that the record contains a full and true account of the statement made by the accused.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to the examination of an accused person in the course of a summary trial.
Both the Sections 164 and 281, Cr.P.C. require that the record of confession made by the Magistrate shall be signed by the person making the confession. The learned Judicial Magistrate who recorded the confession has failed the signature of the accused who made the confession. According to the learned Public Prosecutor the irregularity in not obtaining the signature of the accused on the confession is not a irregularity and it could be cured as per the provisions of S. 463, Cr.P.C. reads as follows :-
"463(1) If any Court before which a confession or other statement of an accused person recorded, or purporting to be recorded under S. 164 or S. 281, is tendered, or has been recorded or has been received, in evidence finds finds that any of either of such sections have not been compiled with by the Magistrate recording the statement, it may, notwithstanding anything contained in S. 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, take evidence in regard to such non-compliance, and may, if satisfied that such non-compliance has not injured the accused in his defence on the merits and that he duly made the statement recorded admit such statement.
(2) The provision of this section apply to Courts of appeal reference and revision.
7. It is to be considered whether non-obtaining of signature of the accused on the confessional statement recorded by the Magistrate under S. 164, Cr.P.C. is an irregularity which can be cured by invoking the provisions of S. 463, Cr.P.C. reproduced above. The language used in sub-clause (4) of S. 164 and sub-section (5) of S. 281, Cr.P.C. reproduced above indicates that it is mandatory on the part of the Magistrate recording confession to obtain signature of the person whose confession he has recorded. The omission in that behalf cannot be cured by examining the Magistrate under S. 463, Cr.P.C. The Magistrate when examined touching the confession he has recorded, can only say that he has recorded the confession, but by such examination the omission to obtain his signature cannot be supplied. It appears to us that the provision that the Magistrate after recording confession should obtain the signature of the accused thereon is a salutary provision and has been specially provided for, for safeguarding the interest of the accused and, therefore, it is mandatory.
8. The Lordships of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor , considered the provisions of Sections 164 and 364 of the Cr.P.C. 1898, which correspond to Sections 164 and 281 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 and at page 257 (of AIR) : (at p. 901 of Cri LJ) of the report laid down the law thus :-
".... Whether a Magistrate records any confession is a matter of duty and discretion and not of obligation. The rule which applies is a different and not less well recognised rule, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This doctrine has often been applied to Courts, (1986) 1 Ch D 426 at p. 431, and although the Magistrate acting under this group of sections is not acting as a Court, yet he is a judicial officer and both as a matter construction and of good sense there are strong reasons for applying the rule in question to S. 164".
"On the matter of construction Sections 164 and 364 must be looked at and construed together, and it would be an unnatural construction to hold that any other procedure was permitted than that which is laid down with such minute particularity in the sections themselves. Upon the construction adopted by the Crown, the only effect of S. 164 is to allow evidence to be put in form in which it can prove itself under Ss. 74 and 80, Evidence Act. Their Lordships are satisfied that the scope and extent of the section is for other than this, and that it is a section conferring powers on Magistrates and delimiting them. It is also to be observed that, if the construction contended for by the Crown be correct, all the precautions and safeguards laid down by Sections 164 and 364 would be of such trifling value as to be almost idle ...."
9. In Neharoo Mangtu Satnami v. Emperor, AIR 1937 Nag 220 : (1937-38 Cri LJ 642), the confession recorded by the Magistrate which was not signed by the person who made the confession, was sought to be admitted in evidence. Their Lordships of the former Nagpur High Court relying on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad (1936-37 Cri LJ 897), held that the evidence of the Magistrate, who recorded the confession and did not obtain signature thereon of the accused, who made the confession, was inadmissible. In that case the Magistrate while recording the confession of the accused did not follow the provisions of Sections 164 and 364, Cr.P.C. and did not record the confession of the accused with the required care and formality. He did not record the certificate as required by S. 164 of the Code and also failed to obtain signature of the accused. The Magistrate subsequently went into the witness box for the prosecution and deposed that the confession was made by the accused voluntarily. Relying on the Privy Council decision in Nazir Ahmad's case (1936-37 Cri LJ 897). Their Lordships held that the evidence of the Magistrate was inadmissible and the confession recorded by him was ineffective.
10. The learned Public Prosecutor relying on the decision in Ba Yin v. Emperor, (1930) 31 Cri LJ 297 : (AIR 1930 Rang 53), contends that the omission to obtain signature of the accused who makes confession before a Magistrate is an irregularity and it can be cured, as it does not prejudice the accused. In view of the Privy Council decision in Nazir Ahmad's case (1936-37 Cri LJ 897) and the decision of the Nagpur High Court on the point in question, we are unable to accept the reasoning of the Rangoon High Court on the point in question. The provision for obtaining signature of the accused on the confession recorded by the Magistrate and that too in the presence of the very Magistrate who recorded the confession, under sub-section (4) of S. 164 and sub-section (5) of S. 281 is a salutary provision and it is meant to safeguard the interest of the accused making the confession. There are in built safeguards in the provisions of S. 164 and, therefore, it is necessary for the Magistrate to follow scrupulously the procedure laid down in that section. As provided in S. 463(1), Cr.P.C. certain omissions may be supplied by examining the Magistrate who recorded the confessional but there are certain omissions which cannot be supplied by recording evidence of the Magistrate. Failure to obtain signature of the accused on the confession recorded by the Magistrate is an omission which can never be supplied by examining the Magistrate on oath touching the confession recorded by him. As already stated, the provision that the Magistrate should obtain signature of the accused on the confession recorded by him is a salutary provision meant for safeguarding interests of the person who made the confession and as such in our opinion it is mandatory provision and in the present case that mandatory provision having not been complied with by the Magistrate Mr. Vyavahare, the confession recorded by him cannot be read into evidence. We, therefore, ignore that confession and exclude it from consideration in this case.
11. Having excluded the confession, there remains only the evidence of P.I. Mr. Patil, P.W. 15, who states that the accused came to the police station soon after Asgaralli, P.W. 1 brought the deceased to the police station and produced before him the sword-stick article 1 and that he noticed blood-stains on the clothes of the accused. The clothes seized from the person of the accused have been found to be stained with blood of A B group to which group the blood of the deceased belonged. The blade of the sword-stick was found stained with human blood but the group thereof could not be determined. The accused and the deceased are brothers. They formerly resided in the same house and at the time of the incident they resided in the same compound though in different houses. The age of the blood-stains found on the clothes of the accused is not known. From the mere finding of some blood-stains of the group to which the blood of his deceased brother belonged it would be hazardous to conclude that the accused must have committed the crime. It is true that the accused produced sword-stick article 1 before P.I. Mr. Patil but there is no evidence that the accused used that sword-stick in causing the stab injury found on the person of the deceased. As the group of the blood found on the blade of the sword-stick could not be ascertained, it cannot be positively said that the blood found on the sword-stick was that of the deceased. Therefore, this circumstance is also not very clinching. It is a settled rule of circumstantial evidence that each one of the circumstances have to be established beyond doubt and all the circumstances put together must lead to only one inference and that is of the guilt of the accused. Though the above circumstances create suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of the proof. Consequently, in our opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge under S. 302 of the I.P.C. cannot be sustained.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant under S. 302, I.P.C. and the sentence awarded to him by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, are hereby set aside. The accused is acquitted of the charge under S. 302, I.P.C. The accused shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.
12. Appeal allowed.