Kerala High Court
Kallara N. Sukumaran vs T.M. Jacob And Ors. on 12 November, 1985
Equivalent citations: 1986CRILJ1696
JUDGMENT P.C. Balakrishna Menon, J.
1. By this original petition, the petitioner brings to the notice of this Court a publication in an evening daily 'Deergaveekshanam', commenting on the proceedings in O.P. No. 5538 of 1985, pending judgment, after a learned Judge of this Court had heard arguments, for taking action against the respondents under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
2. A Division Bench of this Court on 11-7-1985 issued notice to respondents 3 and 4, the Editor and the Publisher of the aforesaid daily. The Division Bench even at that stage found that there was no case against respondents 1 and 2 to initiate contempt action against them. A copy of the evening daily 'Deergaveekshanam' dt. 11-6-1985 wherein the publication appears is produced as Ext. P1. The publication is captioned as a news item that the case against the ministers is likely to be dismissed by the High Court. The news item relates to a writ of quo warranto against three ministers of the Kerala Congress Party, its Chief Whip and a former minister and M.L.A., that came up for admission before a learned Judge of this Court, the previous day. It is stated that the accusations against the Ministers and Leaders of the Kerala Congress Party are based on newspaper reports, devoid of merit and the Party Secretariat had on various occasions denied the alleged call for an agitation against the Central Government at the State Conference of the Party held at Cochin. The Court according to this news item appears to be convinced about the falsity of the accusation and the writ petition is likely to be dismissed.
3. The respondents have filed two counter-affidavits denying that the news item in Ext. P1 amounts to contempt of court within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. It is further stated that the publication was not intended to interfere with the due course of justice and was only a report of the proceedings before this Court in the case against the Ministers and certain other leaders of the Kerala Congress Party. The respondents have also raised a contention against the jurisdiction of a Division Bench of this Court to initiate suo motu proceedings for contempt of court.
4. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, both Article 215 of the Constitution and Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act would indicate that the suo motu action to be taken by the High Court for contempt of Court should be initiated by the Full Court consisting of all the Judges of the High Court. As per Article 215 of the Constitution, "every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act provides for the cognizance of criminal contempt. The relevant provision in the Section is extracted below:
In the case of a criminal contempt... the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion....
The argument is that the "High Court" means the Chief Justice and all other Judges constituting the High Court under Article 216 of the Constitution, and a Division Bench is not empowered to take suo motu action for contempt either under Article 215 of the Constitution or under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In support of this proposition the learned Counsel draws analogy on the wording of Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 233 of the Constitution relating to appointment of District Judges by the Governor of the State "in consultation with the High Court", and in cases of fresh recruitment of candidates as "recommended by the High Court for appointment". It is pointed out that the consultation or recommendation as the case may be is not merely of the Chief Justice, but of the High Court consisting of all the Judges, and their views and opinions are sought for and obtained before a District Judge is appointed under Article 233 of the Constitution.
5. We do not see any substance in this contention. Section 3 of the Kerala High Court Act (Act 5 of 1959) enumerates the powers of the High Court that can be exercised by a single Judge. The powers of the High Court to be exercised by a Division Bench are mentioned in Section 4 and all powers not expressly enumerated are to be exercised by a Division Bench, as provided for in Sub-section (7) extracted below:
All matters not expressly provided for in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force.
The Act as its preamble states is "to make provision regulating the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Kerala". How the powers of the High Court are to be exercised is thus regulated by Statute. Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act enacts that "every case of criminal contempt under Section 15 shall be heard and determined by a bench of not less than two Judges." There is thus express provision in the Contempt of Courts Act empowering a bench of two Judges to take action for Contempt of Court. There cannot be any doubt that the action to be taken for contempt under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act is a judicial act, the powers in respect of which are to be exercised in accordance with the statutory provisions contained in Section 4 of the Kerala High Court Act and Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act. These statutory provisions are not in conflict with Article 215 of the Constitution inasmuch as Article 215 does not prescribe the mode of exercising the power vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself. There is no statutory provision regulating the consultation or recommendation referred to in Article 233 of the Constitution, and such consultation or recommendation can only be of the High Court consisting of all the Judges of the High Court, The analogy sought to be drawn is therefore without substance and we overrule the objection to jurisdiction raised by the respondents.
6. Ext. P1 publication as we have already noticed is a comment on the proceedings in court and an expression of opinion as to the possible results. Even though such comments relating to pending proceedings should have been avoided, we are of the view that the publication Ext. P1 does not amount to criminal contempt within the meaning of its definition in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. There is nothing in Ext. P1 that would scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of this Court. Nor is there anything that would prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of the judicial proceeding pending before this Court. It cannot also be said that the publication would interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner. The Supreme Court in the decision in Amrit Nahata v. Union of India :
There is a marked difference between a complaint made by an individual for wrong done to him and a petition moved before this Court inviting the Court to take notice of the fact that its contempt has been committed. The contempt is of the Court and not of the individual. Therefore, Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 confers power on this Court as well as on the High Court to take suo motu action or on a motion made by amongst others, the Solicitor-General. It is for the Court to determine whether the act complained of tending to scandalise the Court if viewed with certain severity with a view to punishing the person would in the larger interest of the society enhance respect for the judicial process, or too sensitive attitude in such matter may even become counterproductive. The power to commit for contempt of court has to be exercised with the greatest caution. Neither too sensitive attitude nor an easy escape from performing the harsh duty would help in maintaining respect and decorum for the judicial process which is essential for establishing a society based on rule of law.
Bearing these principles in mind, we are of the view that no further action is called for in this original petition. We therefore drop the proceedings and discharge the rule issued by this Court.