Chattisgarh High Court
Jag Mohan Dhruw vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 23 June, 2025
1
Digitally
REKHA signed by
2025:CGHC:26808
SINGH REKHA
SINGH
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 4980 of 2018
1 - Vijay Kumar Lanjewar S/o Shri Amrit Rao Lanjewar Aged About 61
Years Presently Post As Revenue Sub - Inspector At Municipal
Corporation Raipur Chhattisgarh. R/o Chandrashekhar Nagar, Ashwani
Nagar, In Front Of Goyal General Store, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Urban
Administration And Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya
Raipur, Po And P.S. Rakhi, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Municipal Corporation, Through Commissioner, Municipal Corporation
Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Pramod Rao Jadhav, S/o Shri Bhupat Rao, Aged About 44 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Mankuram Dhiwar, S/o Shri Bagas Ram Dhiwar Aged About 48 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Amar Nath Sahu S/o Shri Bise Lal Sahu, Aged About 47 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
6 - Vijay Kumar Sharma, S/o Keju Ram Sharma, Aged About 45 Years
Presently Working At Municipal Corporation, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
Along with WPS No. 4994 of 2018 -2- 1 - Jag Mohan Dhruw S/o Late Shri Sehdev Dhruw Aged About 58 Years Presently Post As Revenue Sub Inspector At Municipal Corporation Raipur Chhattisgarh, R/o Dudhdhari Temple Premises, Math Para, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
---Petitioner Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary , Department Of Urban Administration And Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Raipur, Post Office And Police Station Rakhi, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Municipal Corporation Through Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Pramod Rao Jadhav S/o Shri Bhupat Rao , Aged About 44 Years Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Mankuram Dhiwar S/o Shri Bagas Ram Dhiwar Aged About 48 Years Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Amar Nath Sahu S/o Shri Bise Lal Sahu Aged About 47 Years Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Vijay Kumar Sharma S/o Keju Ram Sharma Aged About 45 Years Presently Working At Municipal Corporation , Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
---- Respondents For Petitioners : Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate For respective Respondents : Mr. Shubham Bajpayee, Panel Lawyer and Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate along with Ms. Swati Agrawal, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 23.06.2025 Heard.
1. The petitioners, who are retired Assistant Revenue Inspectors, have filed these petitions claiming therein promotion to the post of Revenue Inspector with effect from 29.06.2018, when their juniors 3 were promoted to the said post.
2. Mr. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners were appointed to the post of Muharrir/Tax Collector way back in the year 1975-77. They were promoted to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors on 22.05.2008 and 21.04.2008, respectively. He would contend that a policy decision was taken by the State Government to absorb the services of the Panchayat Department with the Municipal Department and consequently, the services of the Secretaries of the Gram Panchayats were absorbed with the Municipal Department and they were offered posting to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector. He would further contend that in the year 2018, a Departmental Promotion Committee was convened and the private respondents, who were juniors to the petitioners were promoted to the post of Revenue Inspectors vide order dated 29.06.2018. He would also submit that the Department has assigned reasons for non-consideration of the names of the petitioners to promotion to the post of Revenue Inspector that at the relevant time, the petitioners did not have the requisite qualification i.e. degree or diploma in computer application. He would further argue that vide Notification dated 30.04.2014 issued by the State Government, the requirement of degree or diploma in computer application was relaxed for promotion. He would also argue that there was no need for the petitioners to acquire such a qualification. He would also contend that according to the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Appointment and Terms and -4- Conditions of Service of Officers and Employees) Rules, 2018 (for short 'the Rules of 2018'), there is no requirement to acquire expertise in computer application, therefore, the respondent authorities committed an error of law in not considering the names of the petitioners for promotion to the next higher post. It is also contended by Mr. Verma though in the letter dated 03.10.2012, the petitioners as well as other employees of the Corporation were directed to acquire such a qualification but there was no such condition in the promotion order. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Kerala and others Vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai, 2007 (6) SCC 524, Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board Vs. C. Muddaiah, 2007 (7) SCC 689 and Union of India and others Vs. Krishna Kumar and others, 2019 (4) SCC 319.
3. On the other hand, learned Advocates appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Verma. Mr. Agrawal would submit that the petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors in the year 2008. He would further submit that a notice dated 03.10.2012 was issued to all the employees of the Municipal Corporation including the petitioners to acquire a degree or diploma in computer application. Mr. Agrawal would also submit that the petitioners and other employees were granted two years period to acquire such a qualification but the petitioners failed to acquire such qualification, therefore, their names were not considered for promotion to the post of Revenue 5 Inspectors though their names were at serial Nos.1 & 3 in the seniority list.
4. Mr. Bajpayee, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would submit that the promotion order annexed along with WPS No.4994 of 2018 contains a condition to acquire a degree or diploma in computer application.
5. It is also contended by Mr. Agrawal that with regard to extending the relaxation to the petitioner, a recommendation was made by the Municipal Corporation to the State Government and it was turned down vide order dated 08.11.2017 on the ground that the relaxation came into force in the year 2014 whereas the petitioners were promoted in the year 2008 and at that time, the circular of relaxation was not in existence. He would submit that the petitioners have already got retired from services therefore they cannot claim promotion from retrospective date. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government of West Bengal and others Vs. Dr. Aman Satpathi and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 3512.
6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record.
7. Initially, the petitioners were appointed to the post of Muharrir/Tax Collector under the Municipal Corporation. The petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors in the year 2008. One of the promotion orders would make it clear that a degree or diploma in computer application was an essential -6- qualification. Pursuant to the condition mentioned in the promotion order, a notice was issued by the Municipal Corporation to its employees to acquire such a qualification. It is not in dispute that the petitioners could not acquire such a qualification till their retirement.
8. The private respondents were absorbed according to the Government Policy and undisputedly, they were employees of the Panchayat Department.
9. With regard to the relaxation, a Notification was issued by the State Government dated 30.04.2014 whereby the requirement of computer qualification was relaxed. The petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors in the months of April and May of 2008 and in the promotion order, one of the conditions was to acquire a degree or diploma in computer application and in this regard, a notice was issued to all the employees of Corporation. The petitioners could not acquire such a qualification and the recommendation made by the Corporation for relaxation pursuant to the Notification dated 30.04.2014 was turned down by the State Government, thus, the knowledge of computer or degree or diploma in computer application was an essential qualification for the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector and the petitioners could not acquire it.
10.A DPC was convened in the year 2018 and the names of the private respondents and other deserving candidates were considered by the Committee for promotion to the post of Revenue Inspectors but the names of the petitioners were not considered as 7 they did not have the requisite qualification.
11.The contention made by Mr. Verma that in the year 2018, the essential qualification for the post of Revenue Inspector was modified by the State Government vide Notification dated 16.01.2018 but it cannot be accepted because the petitioners did not have the requisite qualification i.e. a degree or diploma in the computer application for the post of Assistant Revenue Inspectors, therefore, they have no right to claim promotion to the next higher post. Admittedly, the petitioners have already retired from services.
12. In the matter of E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 4 & 5 held as under:-
"4. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that grant of retrospective benefit on promotional post cannot be given to the incumbent when he has not worked on the said post. Therefore, he is not entitled to any benefit on the promotional post from 15.6.1972. In support thereof, the learned counsel invited our attention to the decisions of this Court in Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. [(1989) 2 SCC 541], Virender Kumar, G.M., Northern Railways Vs. Avinash Chandra Chadha & Ors.[ (1990) 3 SCC 472] , State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. O.P. Gupta & Ors. [ (1996) 7 SCC 533], A.K. Soumini Vs. State Bank of Travancore & Anr.[ (2003) 7 SCC 238] and Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Lal & Ors. [ (2006) 10 SCC 145]. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the decisions given by this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. K.V. Jankiraman & Ors.[ (1991) 4 SCC 109], State of A.P. Vs. K.V.L. Narasimha Rao & Ors.[ (1999) 4 SCC 181], Vasant Rao Roman Vs. Union of India & Ors. [1993 Supp. (2) SCC 324] and State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Vinod Kumar Srivastava [(2006) 9 SCC 621]. We have considered the decisions cited on behalf of both the sides. So far as the situation with regard to monetary benefits with retrospective promotion is concerned, that depends upon case to case. There are various facets which have to be considered.-8-
Sometimes in a case of departmental enquiry or in criminal case it depends on the authorities to grant full back wages or 50 per cent of back wages looking to the nature of delinquency involved in the matter or in criminal cases where the incumbent has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt or full acquittal. Sometimes in the matter when the person is superseded and he has challenged the same before Court or Tribunal and he succeeds in that and direction is given for reconsideration of his case from the date persons junior to him were appointed, in that case the Court may grant sometime full benefits with retrospective effect and sometimes it may not. Particularly when the administration has wrongly denied his due then in that case he should be given full benefits including monetary benefit subject to there being any change in law or some other supervening factors. However, it is very difficult to set down any hard and fast rule. The principle 'no work no pay' cannot be accepted as a rule of thumb. There are exceptions where courts have granted monetary benefits also.
5. However, so far as present case is concerned, as per directions given by the Court, petitioner's case was considered and it was found that persons junior to him were appointed and he was wrongly denied. Therefore, the petitioner was promoted from retrospective effect i.e. 15.9.1961 but he was not paid the benefit of promotion in terms of arrears of salary. Therefore, he approached the Court and learned Single Judge did not give him the monetary benefit of the promotional post from retrospective effect in terms of arrears of salary. In the review application, the benefit was given from the date he filed O.P. No. 585 of 1975 i.e. 15.6.1972. This appears to be reasonable. The petitioner did not approach the Court for the back wages from 15.9.1961 but he filed a petition dated 15.6.1972 and the Court granted the benefit from the date of filing of the petition before the Court i.e. 15.6.1972. The incumbent in the meanwhile has retired on 31.7.1980. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the view taken by the High Court appears to be justified and there is no ground to interfere in it."
13. In the matter of C. Muddaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 34 held as under:-
"34.We are conscious and mindful that even in absence 9 of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected."
14. The petitioners could not establish the fact that they were eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector and they acquired the eligibility requirement. The DPC in the year 2018 was convened according to old service Rules. The petitioners failed to establish that they have requisite qualification according to the service Rules on the date of consideration.
15. In the matter of Krishna Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 11,12 & 13 held as under:-
"11. In Deepak Agarwal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011 (6) SCC 725, this Court observed thus:
"26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the `rules in force' on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. 3 (2011) 6 SCC 725 Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah's case (supra) lays down any particular time frame, -10- within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants have been taken away by the amendment.
27. The judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellants namely B.L. Gupta Vs. MCD (supra), P. Ganeshwar Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and N.T. Devin Katti & Ors. Vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission & Ors (supra) are reiterations of a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah's case (supra)."
12. Recently, in State of Tripura Vs. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty, 2017 (3) SCC 646, another two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus:
"9. The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, "rules in force on the date" the consideration takes place and that there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably be filled by the law 4 (2017) 3 SCC 646 existing on the date when they arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24.11.2011."
13. In view of this statement of the law, it is evident that once the structure of Assam Rifles underwent a change following the creation of the intermediate post of Warrant Officer, persons holding the post of Havildar would be considered for promotion to the post of Warrant Officer. The intermediate post of Warrant Officer was created as a 11 result of the restructuring exercise. The High Court was, in our view, in error in postulating that vacancies which arose prior to the amendment of the Recruitment Rules would necessarily be governed by the Rules which existed at the time of the occurrence of the vacancies. As the decided cases noted earlier indicate, there is no such rule of absolute or universal application. The entire basis of the decision of the High Court was that those who were recruited prior to the restructuring exercise and were holding the post of Havildars had acquired a vested right of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar. This does not reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion."
16.It is a well settled principle of law that a government servant has a right to be considered for promotion strictly in accordance with the existing rules. The petitioners were not having requisite qualification of computer education for promotion to the post of Assistant Revenue Inspector, therefore they have no right to claim promotion to the next higher post.
17. In the matter of Dr. Amal Satpathi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the claim of the Government Servant with regard to promotion cannot be considered after retirement, in paragraphs 15 & 19, as under:-
"15. The primary question that arises for our consideration in the present appeal is whether respondent No.1, who was recommended for the promotion before his retirement but did not receive actual promotion to the higher post due to administrative delays, is entitled to notional financial benefits of the promotional post after his retirement?
19. It is a well settled principle that promotion becomes effective from the date it is granted, rather than from the date a vacancy arises or the post is created. While the Courts have recognized the right to be considered for promotion as not only a statutory right but also a fundamental right, there is no fundamental right to the promotion itself. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to a recent decision of this Court in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board and Others v. Dharamdeo Das, 2024 SCC Online SC 1768, wherein it was observed as follows:-
"18. It is no longer res integra that a promotion is -12- effective from the date it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself. In this context, we may profitably cite a recent decision in Ajay Kumar Shukla v. Arvind Rai, (2022) 12 SCC 579 where, citing earlier precedents in Director, Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty, (1991) 2 SCC 295 and Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 scc 209, a three-Judge Bench observed thus:
41. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis on right to be considered for promotion to be a fundamental right, as was held by K. Ramaswamy, J., in Director, Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty in para 4 of the report which is reproduced below:
'4....... There is no fundamental right to promotion, but an employee has only right to be considered for promotion, when it arises, in accordance with relevant rules. From this perspective in our view the conclusion of the High Court that the gradation list prepared by the corporation is in violation of the right of respondent-writ petitioner to equality enshrined under Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution, and the respondent-writ petitioner was unjustly denied of the same is obviously unjustified.'
42. A Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, laying emphasis on Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India held that if a person who satisfies the eligibility and the criteria for promotion but still is not considered for promotion, then there will be clear violation of his/her's fundamental right. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for himself and Anand, C.J., Venkataswami, Pattanaik, Kurdukar, JJ., observed the same as follows in paras 22 and 27:
'Articles 14 and 16(1) : is right to be considered for promotion a fundamental right
22. Article 14 and Article 16(1) are closely connected. They deal with individual rights of the person. Article 14 demands that the 'State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws'. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that:
'there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or 13 appointment to any office under the State'.
18. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 and that it takes its roots from Article 14. The said clause particularises the generality in Article 14 and identifies, in a constitutional sense "equality of opportunity" in matters of employment and appointment to any office under the State. The word "employment" being wider, there is no dispute that it takes within its fold, the aspect of promotions to posts above the stage of initial level of recruitment.
Article 16 (1) provides to every employee otherwise eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone of consideration, a fundamental right to be "considered" for promotion. Equal opportunity here means the right to be "considered" for promotion. If a person satisfies the eligibility and zone criteria but is not considered for promotion, then there will be a clear infraction of his fundamental right to be "considered" for promotion, which is his personal right. "Promotion" based on equal opportunity and seniority attached to such promotion are facets of fundamental right under Article 16(1).
19. * * *
27. In our opinion, the above view expressed in Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., (1997) 5 SCC 201, and followed in Jagdish Lal [Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538, and other cases, if it is intended to lay down that the right guaranteed to employees for being "considered" for promotion according to relevant rules of recruitment by promotion (i.e. whether on the basis of seniority or merit) is only a statutory right and not a fundamental right, we cannot accept the proposition. We have already stated earlier that the right to equal opportunity in the matter of promotion in the sense of a right to be "considered" for promotion is indeed a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) and this has never been doubted in any other case before Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.], right from 1950.' "20. In State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334, it was held that retrospective seniority cannot be given to an employee from a date when he was not even borne in the cadre, nor can seniority be given with retrospective effect as that might adversely affect others. The same view was reiterated in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, reported 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272, where it was held that when a -14- quota is provided for, then the seniority of the employee would be reckoned from the date when the vacancy arises in the quota and not from any anterior date of promotion or subsequent date of confirmation. The said view was restated in Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P, (2006) 10 SCC 346, in the following words:
37. We are also of the view that no retrospective promotion or seniority can be granted from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre so as to adversely affect the direct recruits appointed validly in the meantime, as decided by this Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India held that when promotion is outside the quota, seniority would be reckoned from the date of the vacancy within the quota rendering the previous service fortuitous. The previous promotion would be regular only from the date of the vacancy within the quota and seniority shall be counted from that date and not from the date of his earlier promotion or subsequent confirmation. In order to do justice to the promotes, it would not be proper to do injustice to the direct recruits......
38. This Court has consistently held that no retrospective promotion can be granted nor can any seniority be given on retrospective basis from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre particularly when this would adversely affect the direct recruits who have been appointed validity in the meantime." (emphasis supplied)"
20.Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Amal Sathpathi (supra), in my opinion, no case is made out for interference.
21.Thus, both petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. No cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha