Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Tamil Nadu
Karnataka Minerals And Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs C.C.E. And Cus. on 19 June, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1998(101)ELT627(TRI-CHENNAI)
ORDER T.P. Nambiar, Member (J)
1. The present application is filed for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The order in question was passed on 25-10-1991.
2. Shri Lakshmi Narayanan, learned Counsel for the applicant stated that this order was received on 27-10-1991 by the applicant/appellant. Therefore, the last date for filing the appeal was 27-1-1992. The learned Counsel stated that the appellant had filed writ petition with respect to some notification before the High Court on 18-10-1990 and the same came to be disposed of on 21-1-1991. He pleaded a Writ appeal was filed against the order of the learned Single Judge and the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka has passed an order granting interim stay by their order dated 9-8-1991 directing the appellant to deposit 50% of the amount of duty demanded on or before 31-10-1991 making it clear that in case of the deposit, there will be a stay. The learned Counsel admitted that no deposit was made by the appellant. The learned Counsel admitted that the appellant did not comply with the order in regard to 50% of the duty being pre-deposited. Thereafter the writ appeal was dismissed on 5-9-1995. It is the case of the appellant that against this dismissal order the appellant filed a SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was finally dismissed on 18-3-1995. The learned Counsel stated that the present appeal is filed on 15-4-1996 and is within 90 days from the dismissal of the SLP. He stated that apparently the appellant was prosecuting their case before the High Court and the Supreme Court. He stated that after the SLP was dismissed, the present appeal has been filed. He therefore, prayed for condonation of the delay in the presentation of the appeal before the Tribunal.
3. Shri Murugandi, the learned DR for the Department stated that the appellant was not prosecuting the appeal before the right forum and sufficient cause has not been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay.
4. We have considered the submissions made by both the sides. The cause of action for filing the appeal arose when the appellant received the copy of the impugned order dated 27-10-1991. The mere fact that a writ petition with respect to the notification in question was pending before the High Court was not sufficient reason for the appellant to sit quiet in this regard. When an order is passed and the appellant is intimated in regard to the same and when that cause of action is not challenged it cannot be said that the appellant was apparently prosecuting the proceedings. The benefit of Section 14 also cannot be given to the appellant as the writ appeal was finally dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court on 5-9-1995. The learned Counsel also stated that no permission was taken from the High Court for filing SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The conduct of the appellant shows that the appellant was not diligent and was negligent in prosecuting the appeal. The law helps the diligent and not the negligent. It is clearly stated in the order of the Collector that appeal has to be filed before the Tribunal. Therefore, order of the Collector should have been challenged before the High Court or in the alternative the appellant should have taken recourse to the statutory remedy of filing appeal before the Tribunal. It is further noted that the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka has passed an order directing the appellant to deposit 50% of the duty demanded and only in case the deposit was made, there would have been a stay. It is conceded before us that even that order of the Division Bench was not complied with. Therefore there was no stay of the order of the lower authority and the appellant should have taken recourse to the statutory remedy of filing the appeal before the Tribunal. Since the appellant has not taken care and caution by challenging the impugned order before the Tribunal, it cannot be said that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay. We, therefore, dismiss the application for condonation of delay. In this view of the matter, the stay petition and the appeal also stands dismissed.