Telangana High Court
M. Rajendar vs Registrar Vig, High Court Of Judicate, ... on 26 March, 2025
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA:
HYDERABAD
***
WRIT PETITION No.23905 of 2017
Between:
M. Rajendar.
Petitioner
VERSUS
The High for the State of Judicature at Hyderabad
for the State of Telangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh
Rep. by its Registrar (Vigilance). Respondent
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 26.03.2025
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
_______________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Page 2 of 17
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
+ WRIT PETITION No.23905 of 2017
% 26.03.2025
# Between:
M. Rajendar.
Petitioner
VERSUS
The High for the State of Judicature at Hyderabad
for the State of Telangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh
Rep. by its Registrar (Vigilance). Respondent
! Counsel for Petitioner : Mr. Deepak Bhattacharya, learned
Senior Counsel, representing
Mr. S. Lakshmi Kanth.
^Counsel for Respondent : Ms. V. Uma Devi, learned
Standing Counsel for the
respondent.
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1) (1995) 6 SCC 749
2) (2008) 3 SCC 484
3) (2008) 7 SCC 580
4) (2011) 4 SCC 584
5) (2015) 2 SCC 610
6) (2020) 3 SCC 423
7) (2022) 13 SCC 329
8) (2023) 11 SCC 159
9) (2024) SCC OnLine Jhar 177
Page 3 of 17
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT PETITION No.23905 of 2017
ORDER:(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy) The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by the order of punishment passed by the respondent vide ROC.No.1159/2010- VIGILANCE CELL, dated 23.02.2016.
2. Heard Mr. Deepak Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel, representing Mr. S. Lakshmi Kanth, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Ms. V. Uma Devi, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent.
3. Vide the impugned order, the petitioner who is a Judicial Officer under the combined A.P. State Judicial Services as it then was, and now by allocation, a Judicial Officer of the Telangana State Judiciary has been inflicted with a minor punishment of "reduction to a lower stage in his time scale of pay, by two stages, for two years without cumulative effect". The said punishment has been imposed after conducting a detailed departmental enquiry wherein Page 4 of 17 the petitioner had participated and availed all the opportunities of hearing that was granted.
4. The petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 28.02.2012, which subjected him to disciplinary proceedings, with three charges being leveled against him. The three charges which were leveled against the petitioner are as follows:
"ARTICLES OF CHARGE No.1:
That you Sri M.Rajender, Additional Junior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda district, while working as such, granted bails to the accused in the following three criminal miscellaneous petitions, immediately after the filing of the said petitions in non- bailable offences, though the concerned Assistant Public Prosecutor opposed for the same and you granted release orders, despite the fact that the accused did not furnish sureties on the said dated and thus acted in a biased manner, for extraneous consideration, which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer withinthe meaning of the Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
ARCILES OF CHARGE No.2:
That you Sri M.Rajender, Additional Junior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda district, while working as such, dismissed the Crl.M.P.No.6182/2010(Crl.No.194/2010 of PS Halla) under Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act, filed by Sri K. Venkanna accused in a bailable offence, on 02-09-2010, on the ground that the offence is grave in nature and investigation is still pending but surprisingly on the next day i.e., 03-09-2010, allowed the second bail petition (Crl.M.P.No.6192/2010) of the same accused recording that investigation is almost completed except laying charge sheet that you acted in a biased attitude which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer within the meaning of the Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.Page 5 of 17
ARCILES OF CHARGE No.3:
That you Sri M.Rajender, Additional Junior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda district, while working as such, adjourned the Crl.M.P.No.6234/2010 (Cr.No.194/2010 of PS Halla) filed by Sri K. Ramesh, accused on 07-09-2010 to 09-09-2010 and allowed the petition on 09-09-2010, keeping the accused in custody for two days i.e., on 08-09-2010 and 09-09-2010, though it is a bailable offence registered under Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act, detriment to the interest of the accused which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer within the meaning of the Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
5. The enquiry was conducted keeping in view the principles of natural justice and by giving the petitioner all opportunity of defence. After the enquiry was concluded, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report on 29.10.2015. In the said enquiry report, the Enquiry Officer found charge No.1 to have been proved. Whereas, the other two charges are concerned, Enquiry Officer found the same as not proved. After the enquiry report was submitted, the disciplinary authority agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer inflicted the petitioner with a minor punishment under Rule 9(v)(b)of the A.P. Civil Services (CC&A) Rules, 1991. It is this order of punishment which is under challenge in the instant writ petition.
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that, it is a case where the petitioner was subjected to charge-sheet Page 6 of 17 in a short period of being inducted into judicial service. As such, being a raw junior in the service, there appears to be some order which have been passed by the petitioner which was sheer lack of experience, but was without any mala fide intention or any extraneous considerations. It was also the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the orders so passed by the petitioner was on the judicial side which are always revisable and appealable, and the act on the part of the petitioner therefore cannot be said to be a misconduct under the service law and even the Public Prosecutor appearing in the said case had not objected the passing of the order which has been considered as a misconduct by the petitioner.
7. It was also contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on a compliant received by post and in the course of the departmental enquiry, it was found that the complaint was sent in a fictitious name and upon verification, there was no such person in the said name practicing as an Advocate and the departmental enquiry therefore ought to had been dropped at that stage itself.
8. It was further contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the order which has been passed by the petitioner Page 7 of 17 and which is said to be a misconduct, was not a misconduct, but was only an act of procedural lapse or a minor irregularity which does not warrant disciplinary proceeding.
9. Lastly, it was contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the Court may take a liberal view considering the order having been passed on account of lack of experience being a raw junior and the petitioner may be discharged of charge No.1 and the impugned punishment may be set aside which has caused a permanent dent to the petitioner as his promotions have been delayed for a considerable period of time, because of the effect of said punishment, and his batch mates have got promotions much ahead of him which is giving rise to too much strain and pressure upon the petitioner.
10. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent contended that a bare perusal of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer would clearly give an indication of the fact that charge No.1 leveled against the petitioner has been conclusively proved. The order which was passed by the petitioner was not one which could be expected by any Judicial Officer, at any level, howsoever young or howsoever senior in the service. Page 8 of 17
11. Learned Standing Counsel for the respondent further contended that the enquiry report itself clearly indicates that the order passed by the petitioner was one which was not within the powers vested with the Magistrate under the provisions of Cr.P.C., and therefore, it was per se an illegal act on the part of the petitioner.
12. It was further contended that the punishment of "reduction to a lower stage in his time scale of pay, by two stages, for two years"
without cumulative effect is only a minor punishment, which according to the learned Standing Counsel is an indication that the respondent has taken a lenient view towards the petitioner for his act and also considering the length of service that he had put in and the fact that he was a junior level Officer. Nonetheless, the learned Standing Counsel brought to the notice of the Court that it also cannot be presumed that the petitioner is not young or raw in the service, as his appointment is that of 2008 and the charge-sheet is one which was issued on 28.02.2012 i.e. almost after four years, by which time there is sufficient training and experience which a Judicial Officer gets. Therefore, the petitioner does not get an Page 9 of 17 advantage, nor can be argue that he was a raw junior at that point of time.
13. It was also the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent that having inflicted the petitioner with a minor punishment by taking a lenient view and the charges having been proved, there is hardly any scope left for this Court to interfere with considering the factual matrix of the case.
14. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in case of a disciplinary proceeding, the scope of interference is not on the decision that the employer / disciplinary authority has taken, but the process in which the decision has been arrived at. However, according to the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent, neither is the case of the petitioner of the impugned order being passed without jurisdiction, nor had he raised a ground of the proceedings being in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the findings in the enquiry report or the findings given by the disciplinary authority to be in any manner perverse findings. In the absence of all these, the scope of interference for the High Court under Article 226 of the Page 10 of 17 Constitution of India is not available and the writ petition therefore deserves to be rejected.
15. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent so far as the scope of interference in a disciplinary proceeding, particularly in cases involving imposition of only a minor punishment, and the scope of interference in a proceeding where the impugned order of punishment has been passed after a detailed departmental enquiry where the delinquent has been afforded all the opportunity of defence.
16. Before we delve into the judicial precedents, it is also trite at this juncture to hold that the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent seems to be an admitted factual matrix so far as (a) the order not being without jurisdiction,
(b) there is also no ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, and (c) there is also no contention of the impugned order and the enquiry report being on a perverse finding contrary to the evidence on record.
Page 11 of 17
17. The decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India 1 is considered as a landmark judgment which established fundamental principles regarding the scope of judicial interference in departmental inquiries. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Courts should not interfere with disciplinary proceedings unless the findings of the inquiry are based on no evidence, there is a violation of statutory provisions, the findings are so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached to such conclusion and the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. The role of the Court / Tribunal is only to ensure that the decision-making process is fair, lawful, and is arrived at by following the principles of natural justice. In paragraph Nos.12 and 13, it has been held as under:
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of 1 (1995) 6 SCC 749 Page 12 of 17 Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment.
In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.........................................."
18. A similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Moni Shankar v. Union of India 2 wherein in paragraph No.17, it has been held as under:
"17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles........."2
(2008) 3 SCC 484 Page 13 of 17
19. Again in the case of State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak 3, in paragraph No.14 it was held as under:
"14......It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice."
20. The aforesaid principles have been reiterated in a catena of decisions, such as:
a) State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya 4 (see paragraph No.7);
b) Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran 5 (see paragraph Nos.13 and 14);
c) State of Karnataka vs. N. Gaganraj 6 (see paragraph No.11); and
d) Union of India vs. Biswanath Bhattacharjee 7 (see paragraph No.17 to 22) 3 (2008) 7 SCC 580 4 (2011) 4 SCC 584 5 (2015) 2 SCC 610 6 (2020) 3 SCC 423 7 (2022) 13 SCC 329 Page 14 of 17
21. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion of dealing with a similar question of law in the case of Ex- Const/Mukesh Kumar Raigar vs. Union of India 8 wherein in paragraph Nos.13, 14 and 15 it has been held as under:
13. The Constitution Bench, in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 106 : AIR 1963 SC 779] had observed way back in 1963 that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. A three-Judge Bench in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] had also held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of misconduct by a public servant, the court or tribunal would be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with.
14. In Om Kumar v. Union of India [Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] this Court had also after considering the Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] Principles and the doctrine of proportionality held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or the other of the well-known principles known as Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses 8 (2023) 11 SCC 159 Page 15 of 17 Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] Principles, namely, whether the order was contrary to law, or whether relevant factors were not considered, or whether irrelevant factors were considered or whether the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken.
15. Again, a three-Judge Bench in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava [SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 :
(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457] circumscribing the power of judicial review by the constitutional courts held as under : (SCC pp. 626-
27, paras 24 & 28) "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25.xxxxxx
26.xxxxxx Page 16 of 17
27.xxxxxx
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
22. In light of the legal principles established in a series of decisions by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the aforementioned judgment, and further reaffirmed in a recent decision of the High Court of Jharkhand in the case of Ajay Kumar vs. Union of India 9. The High Court of Jharkhand held that judicial intervention in departmental proceedings, especially when minor penalties are involved, should be limited. It further emphasized that such intervention is justified only in specific circumstances where there is a clear violation of statutory provisions, where the findings of the inquiry are unsupported by evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse.
9 (2024) SCC OnLine Jhar 177 Page 17 of 17
23. Keeping in view all the aforesaid judicial precedents of the recent past, by which the law now stands settled, we find no strong case has been made out by the petitioner in the instant case calling for an interference to the impugned order of minor punishment passed by the respondent in the factual circumstances of the case.
24. Hence, the writ petition deserves to be and is accordingly rejected.
25. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
_____________ P.SAM KOSHY, J _________________________ NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J Date: 26.03.2025 Note: LR Copy to be marked.
(B/o)GSD