Madras High Court
Managing Director, Steel Authority Of ... vs S. Chellathurai on 27 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: III(2002)ACC643
JUDGMENT K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order of the Deputy Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Trichy in W.C. No. 198 of 1997. The opposite party, namely, the Managing Director of The Steel Authority of India, Salem is the appellant before this Court.
2. The parents of deceased Vijayakumar contended that Vijayakumar was appointed as a Senior Operator-Trainee on 1.11.1993 in the concern of the opposite party and subsequently he was promoted as Chief Chemist. The deceased was a very hale and healthy person while he was discharging his duties in the respondent's concern. He went to duty as usual on 2.8.1995 - night shift. He died on 3.8.1995 at the age of 25 years while he was working in the laboratory in the Steel Plant during the course of his employment. Police has registered a case and the investigation is pending. The complaint given by the appellant/employer was that it was an attempt to commit suicide. The claimants stated that there was no necessity for the deceased to commit suicide. The deceased was covered tinder the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and claimants were entitled to claim the compensation. The deceased was drawing salary of Rs. 3,401/- per month.
3. In counter filed by the appellant, the various claims made in the petition were denied. According to the appellant, the deceased committed suicide and the death of the deceased was not a natural death. Even after he was admitted in the hospital, the deceased was shouting to others that he should be allowed to die. Inspite of having been given all medical treatment in the hospital, he died. He appears to have consumed Mercuric Chloride. Post-mortem report also shows that he died due to chemical poisoning. The Sub-Inspector has also made it clear that the deceased had committed suicide.
4. On consideration of the said contentions and evidence, the Deputy Commissioner held that the death had occurred only in the course of discharging the duties by the deceased and, therefore, the appellant was liable to compensate the death as per the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hence the present appeal.
5. Learned Counsel for the appellant/management contends that a perusal of the post-mortem report as well as the oral evidence and the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police would clearly establish that the death was purely an unnatural death by suicide. There was evidence to show that prior to his death, for a period of two months the deceased was in a depressed condition and was taking treatment from a Psychiatric doctor. It was not a part of the duty of the deceased to consume any chemical and, therefore, the death cannot be stated to be in the course of his official duties.
6. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa , wherein it has been held that there should be a causal connection between the employment and the accident. He also relied on the observation that there should be a causal connection between the employment and the accident which should have occurred in the course of the employment. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant the finding of the Deputy Commissioner was liable to be set aside.
7. However, the learned Counsel for the respondent/claimant submitted the following issues:
(1) The management has not established that the death was only due to suicide or that it was only due to chemical poisoning.
(2) The cause of death is a question of fact and evidence and cannot be interfered with by this Court under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and no substantial question of law arises for consideration.
(3) There was a delay in giving FIR to the police by more than 3 hours, which would suggest that the management was manipulating the records in order to suit their case.
8. I have considered the submissions of both the learned Counsel. In this case, the communication sent by the Sub-Inspector of Police to the Revenue Divisional Officer has been marked in evidence as Exh. R-5. It has been pointed out that the deceased was not normal for the past two months and as per the advice of the doctor of the Steel Plant he was also getting treatment from a Psychiatric doctor and due to dejection he had committed suicide. The said report also reveals that the claimants have been enquired by the police, and they have positively stated that the deceased was depressed for the last two months. The evidence of the R.W. 2 also clearly establishes that at the time of treatment, the deceased refused to take treatment and did not cooperate. He had shouted to others that he should be allowed to die. It is pertinent to note that in respect of all the above aspects there is no cross-examination by the claimant.
9. Therefore, there are prima facie and sufficient materials to establish that the death was due to suicide. It cannot also be disputed that the death, as found in the post-mortem report, was that the deceased would appear to have died due to "orgono phosphorous compound poisoning". Learned Counsel for the respondent appears to take advantage of certain minor contradictions in the evidence and as regards the statement that deceased had died only after consuming the mercuric chloride on the one hand and the ultimate finding in the post-mortem report which shows that the death was due to "orgono phosphorous compound poisoning". Assuming that the said finding does not confirm consuming of mercuric chloride, the fact is that the death was due to consumption of a poisonous chemical which is definitely not due to discharge of his official duty. The learned Counsel for the respondent fairly agreed that oral consumption of any chemical in the factory was not a part of his official duty. Therefore, once it is established that the cause of death is due to consumption of poison and it is not shown that such consumption is a part of the official duty of the deceased, the burden is very heavy on the claimants to establish that the death was only due to and in the course of the official duty.
10. The learned Counsel for the respondent stated various observations from several judgments in support of his contention that under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act that this Court cannot interfere in the absence of any substantial question of law. There is no dispute over the fact that under Section 30, the interference of the Court is limited. It is well settled proposition of law that perverted appreciation of evidence or finding based on no evidence would be the grounds for interference. Omission to consider vital evidence would also justify interference. The Deputy Commissioner has not dealt with the implications arising out of Exh. R-5, which is the communication sent by the Sub-Inspector to the Revenue Divisional Officer. Moreover, in the impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner has not given any reason as to how the consumption of the poison was possible or warranted by the deceased, in the course of his normal duties. There is absolutely no finding as regards how oral consumption of orgono phosphorous compound poison was possible in the course of the deceased discharging his official duties. The deceased was Chief Chemist who is fully aware of the difference in appearance of various chemicals and liquids and the adverse consequences of consuming a chemical orally.
11. Reference was made to the judgment of N. Arumugham, J. in support of his contention by the learned Counsel for the respondent in Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sexverage Board v. Karmal , wherein it is stated that an accident by itself implies that it may happen at any point of time with or without the knowledge of the person who suffers by it and it cannot be proved always by direct evidence. This decision does not imply that the claimant need not allege or prove the so-called 'accident', without any relevance or connection between the accident and the official duties of an individual. Learned Counsel referred also to certain decisions which arose out of cases under Indian Penal Code such as in Bru Bhukhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh , and Piara Singh v. State of Punjab . Those decisions dealt with the cases of criminal prosecution where the burden of proof is entirely on the prosecution. Further in Bru Bhukhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the scope of enquiry was also as regards the applicability of Article 136 of the Constitution of India and it was held that it is for the Courts of fact to deal with the evidence and in an appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court, the Court will not ordinarily interfere with appreciation of the evidence.
12. Reference has also been made to the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Pradesh Mining Corporation v. Munde Kol . In that case, the employer contended that workman was absent on the date of accident and that his services were terminated. I fail to understand as to how the facts of the present case could be compared with that particular case, having regard of the circumstance that in that case the employer did not produce the register, nor any officer was examined on the side of the management.
13. In Parasurama Oil Mills v. S. Kantian , K.M. Natarajan, J. held that medical evidence to the effect that percentage loss of earning capacity cannot be a subject-matter of appeal and will not amount to a substantial question of law. In N.L. Lalan v. V.A. John 1972 ACJ 248 (Kerala), the Kerala High Court held that in order that a question may be classified as a substantial question of law, it should be of great public importance and it should arise so frequently as to affect a large class of public or it should be basic to the operation of the Act. But where the question is covered already by precedents or law on that aspect is well settled, the mere difficulty of applying the facts to that law cannot make it a substantial question of law. The said observations came to be made while dealing with a well settled proposition of law. I am unable to appreciate that as to how the said decisions would apply to the present case. As already stated, the Deputy Commissioner has not given proper consideration to Exh. R-5 and had relied on only the interested testimony of the claimant alone. He has ignored that no evidence is let in on the side of the claimant to show that the death was only in the course of his official duty. It is needless to point out that even the Apex Court had interfered on a palpably erroneous appreciation of evidence in cases arising out of Workmen's Compensation Act and E.S.I. Act where appeals are restricted to substantial question of law, vide Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa (supra).
14. Therefore, I am inclined to come to the conclusion that consuming of poisonous chemical is not a part of duty and the same is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondent and, therefore, the claim cannot be sustained. However, in the interest of justice, I am inclined to give one more opportunity to the claimant to substantiate his case before the Deputy Commissioner and also having regard to the fact that the Deputy Commissioner has not properly considered the evidence. It would be proper to remit the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for re-appraisal of the evidence in accordance with law.
15. With the result, the present appeal is allowed and the matter is remanded to the Deputy Commissioner for proper consideration of the evidence on record and for appropriate decision in accordance with law.
16. The claim petition being of the year 1997, the Deputy Commissioner is directed to dispose of the claim petition within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.