Madhya Pradesh High Court
Usha Jain And Ors. vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. on 14 September, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1997ACJ1311
Author: D.M. Dharmadhikari
Bench: D.M. Dharmadhikari
JUDGMENT D.M. Dharmadhikari, J.
1. On 14.12.1988, as a result of a head-on collision between mini bus No. MPW 6541 and scooter No. CPW 1798, Devendra Kumar Gupta, the scooterist and Abhay Kumar Jain, pillion rider sitting behind him, died. Their heirs filed two claim cases, Nos. 13 of 1989 and 25 of 1989, which were consolidated for trial as they arose out of the same accident. A common award has been passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gwalior (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') on 21.8.1991. In these two appeals, M.A. No. 250 of 1991 and M.A. No. 168 of 1992, a common order is being passed as they arise out of same accident and a common award.
2. In both the appeals, preferred by the claimants, only two prayers have been made. The first is that the insurance company should have been directed to be jointly and severally liable with the owner of the vehicle and the driver and the liability of the insurance company should not have been held to be limited only to the extent of Rs. 60,000/- in case of each death. The second prayer is for the quantum of compensation. It is urged that the amount of compensation, determined by the Tribunal, is on the lower side and it should be enhanced.
3. The learned Counsel Mr. J.P. Gupta and Mr. N.P. Mittal for the claimants; Mr. B.N. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the insurance company and Mr. N.K. Modi, the learned Counsel for the owner of the vehicle, addressed the court at great length on the question of alleged limited liability of the insurance company and on interpretation of the provisions of Section 95 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, 'the Act'). We have also heard Mr. M.H. Haswani as amicus curiae in the case on the question of the interpretation of Section 95 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act.
4. On behalf of the claimants, the substance of all the contentions advanced by different counsel appearing for them is that Section 95 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) does not provide for any limited liability of the insurance company for death of or injury to a third party, i.e., a person who is not inside the vehicle. Reliance for the above purpose and interpretation of the said provision is made on New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Thakor Bhemaji Ganeshji 1993 ACJ 630 (Gujarat) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Martin Kanduna 1995 ACJ 522 (Orissa).
5. The learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company, on the other hand, submits that there is a limit of Rs. 50,000 prescribed for death and injury to third party including those who are inside the vehicle as passengers as they all are covered under Section 95 (2) (b) (i) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel for the insurance company, the legal question raised on behalf of the claimants is, in fact, squarely covered by the decisions of the Supreme Court in M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty 1987 ACJ 872 (SC); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore 1988 ACJ 270 (SC); New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Bai 1995 ACJ 470 (SC); Benny v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 1991 ACJ 182 (Kerala); and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alapati Venkata Subba Rao 1991 ACJ 206 (AP).
6. We shall take up for consideration firstly the contention advanced with regard to the interpretation of Section 95 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act. It is necessary to consider the provisions contained in Section 95, Sub-section (2) as a whole and the other provisions on the subject of insurance, contained in Chapter VIII of the Act. Section 95 (2) may be reproduced for ready reference:
95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-
(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Subject to the proviso to Sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely-
(a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of one lakh and fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle;
(b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment,-
(i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all;
(ii) in respect of passengers, a limit of fifteen thousand rupees for each individual passenger;
(c) save as provided in Clause (d), where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount of liability incurred;
(d) irrespective of the class of the vehicle, a limit of rupees six thousand in all in respect of damage to any property of a third party.
7. Chapter VIII has the heading: "Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third-Party Risks". The provisions contained in Chapter VIII provide a scheme for comprehensive insurance of vehicle against third-party risks. The words 'third-party' have nowhere been defined in the Act and under Chapter VIII, Section 93 (d) only states that " 'third party' includes the Government". In the context of the provisions contained in Chapter VIII and the scheme of insurance with regard to motor vehicles, it may well be understood by the words 'third party' that they include persons and Government other than the insurer and insured. Section 94 provides that no person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place without an insurance as provided in the Act. In the Sub-section (2) the only exception made is in respect of Government vehicles and vehicles of local authorities and State transport undertakings. The provision of Section 95 (1) (b) is also relevant which states:
In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in Sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place.
8. Lengthy arguments were advanced because Section 95 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) uses three expressions with regard to the compulsory insurance cover. The expressions used are 'person', 'third party' and 'passenger'.
9. On behalf of the claimants, it is argued that since Sub-section (2) (b) (i) uses the expression 'persons' and not 'third party', there is no limit of liability laid down by that provision for third party risks. The argument advanced is that reading Sub-clause (b) to Sub-section (2) of Section 95, the limit of coverage mentioned therein is in relation to only different types of passengers in the vehicle and it does not mention anything about the risk to the person or property of a third party who may be victim of an accident and was not inside the vehicle. In the considered opinion of this Court, the contention advanced on behalf of the claimants, on examination of the provisions in greater depth, has no merit. It is true that Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (2) in the opening part, includes only the 'passengers' for the purpose of laying down the limit of liability. It is, however, to be noticed that in the opening part of Sub-clause (b), the mention of passengers is for the purpose of categorisation of the vehicle and not for any other purpose. The limit sought to be laid down under Sub-clause (b) is for a passenger vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Only on the language of opening part of Sub-clause (b), it cannot be held that as a type of vehicle has been described therein, the liability against a third party on the road or outside the vehicle is not covered by it. Reading Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2), Mr. J.P. Gupta, assisted by Mr. N.M. Haswani, argued that they together, cover all kinds of passengers in a passenger vehicle. It is submitted that under Sub-clause (i) are covered passengers who are not carried for hire or reward and the use of expression 'persons' refers to only such types of passengers. It is contended that under Sub-clause (ii) are covered passengers who are carried for hire or reward. In this respect, it is submitted that the Kerala and Andhra Pradesh view (supra) that Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) covers all categories of passengers, is not a correct interpretation, if the entire Section 95 with the two Sub-clauses and opening part of Sub-section (2) (b) (i) are read together harmoniously.
10. We have given our careful consideration to the language employed in Sub-section (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the section in the light of the decisions cited before us by counsel on the either side. In our considered opinion, the interpretation placed on the provisions by Kerala and Andhra Pradesh High Courts (supra) appear acceptable as it fulfils the scheme and object of the Act requiring compulsory insurance for third party and we respectfully disagree with the view expressed by Gujarat High Court in the Full Bench decision cited before us (supra).
11. In our considered opinion, in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) the expression 'persons' has been deliberately used by the legislature to cover in it victims of the accidents who may be 'passengers not carried for hire or reward' or such third parties who are outside the vehicle on the road or any other place and victims of an accident. Harmoniously read together, Sub-clause (i) covers third parties and passengers not carried for hire or reward and Sub-clause (ii) covers all the remaining categories of 'passengers carried for hire or reward'. To hold that in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) the expression 'persons' would not include persons outside the vehicle on road and any other place would, in fact, frustrate the very purpose and aim of the Act to provide for compulsory insurance in favour of all third parties including passengers. We, therefore, reject the contention advanced on behalf of the claimants that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the Act does not provide for any limit of liability of the insurance company with regard to third party, i.e., such persons who suffer by accident although they are not in the vehicle and are either on road or any other place.
12. Having rejected the contention advanced by the claimants on the interpretation of Section 95 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act, the other contention advanced on their behalf needs much careful consideration. On behalf of the claimants, it is urged that although there may be a statutory limit of liability against third party risks on the insurance company, but there is no prohibition in law for the insurance company to take upon itself responsibility to cover higher risk. It is submitted that under the terms of the policy, the insurance company had taken upon itself unlimited liability towards third party claim. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company submits that contents of the policy, if properly read and understood, would show that the insurance company has not charged any extra premium for unlimited third party liability. Hence, no such liability beyond Rs. 50,000, as a statutory liability, can be placed on the insurance company.
13. To decide the alternative contention advanced on the question of liability of the insurance company, it is necessary to critically examine the contents of the policy conditions on record. The owner and driver of the vehicle in both the cases were ex parte. The claims were contested only by the insurance company. They filed on record an incomplete insurance policy which did not contain all the conditions attached to the policy. Document Exh. D/2 is the cover note, which was followed by the policy, Exh. D/1. Exh. D/4 is said to be the copy of the original policy issued to the insured. What we find is that the contents of the policy Exh. D/1 and Exh. D/4 which is a carbon copy, do not tally in all respects with regard to the various premia charged under several heads. It is necessary to reproduce the contents of policy, Exh. D/1 and the carbon copy of the policy Ex. D/4. In the policy, Exh. D/1, the limit of liability shown and the Schedule showing premium fixed is as under:
Limit of the amount of the company's liability under Section II-1 (i) in respect of any one accident:
Such amount as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Limits of the amount of the company's liability under Section II-1 (ii) in respect of any one claim or series of claims arising out of one event: Rs. 50,000/-.
Gwalior 29.2.1988
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insured's Non Electrical Total I.E.V.
estimated electrical & electronic
value of accessories accessories
vehicle
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Policy No. 081900/24/1/00030/88 SCHEDULE OF PREMIUM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Own damage Rs. B. Liability to public risk Rs.
T.P. T.P. only
Basic Premium
Basic Premium
Add: 3 % extra on-elec- Add: for L.L. to passengers
trical or electronic fittings as per END IMT 13
as per END IMT. 71 Limit per passenger Rs....240-00
Add per cent on total E.V. Limit per accident Rs.....
as per Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Less % for voluntary Add for L.L. to paid driver
excess of Rs. ... and/or cleaner as per
END MT 16
as per END IMT. 1
Add... Add for increased T.P. limits
Less: % No claim bonus ... Section II 1 (i) unlimited
Section II 1 (ii)
Less 10 per cent special 15 pass 180.00
Discount Add: for......
1 dr. + 1 cond. 16.00
----------
436.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The contents of Exh. D/4 with the Schedule read as under:
Limits of liability.
Limit of the amount of the company's liability under Section II-1 (i) in respect of any one accident:
Such amount as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Limits of the amount of the company's liability under Section II-1 (ii) in respect of any one claim or series of claims arising out of one event: Rs. 50,000/- AA 33
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Policy No: 081900/24/1/00030/88
Insured's Non- Electrical & Total
Estimated electrical electronic I.E.V.
value of accessories accessories
vehicle
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rs. T.P. Rs. Rs. Rs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCHEDULE OF PREMIUM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Own damage basic B. liability to public risk
as per END IMT 23 Rs.
Add: for L.L. to passengers
Add: 3 per cent on as per END IMT 13. Rs. 240/-
extra electrical or Rs.
electronic fitting as per
END IMT. 71 Limit per passenger Rs. ...
15 pass
Add for per cent on Total Rs. (Maximum Rs....as per Rs. 180/-
I.E.V. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Less: ... % Discount Add for L.L. to paid driver
for excess of and/or cleaner as per END
IMT 10
Rs. ...(Max. Rs. ...) ...
1 driver + 1 conductor Rs. 16/-
Rs.
Rs. Add for increased T.P. limits
Section II 1 (i) unlimited
Add for riot & strikes Section II 1 (ii) Rs... 0.25 % of total I.E.V.
Add for ....
as per END IMT 21 Rs. Rs. 436/-
Add......... Rs. Comprehensive premium
Add......... Rs. (A+B) Rs.
Less: 10 % Sp. Discount Rs.
----------------
Net premium Rs. 436/-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the above-quoted contents of Exh. D/l and D/4 which are produced by the insurance company itself, it appears that Rs. 180/- is charged as premium for the unlimited third party liability. In the contents of Schedule to the policy, Exh. D/1 premium of Rs. 240/- is charged for the liability towards passengers who are said to be 16 although as stated by the insurance company, the seating capacity of the passenger vehicle was 30. Rs. 16/- has been charged as premium for liability of one driver and one conductor. It is, thus, clear that Rs. 180/- as premium was charged for third party liability only which is unlimited. A similar question arose on the interpretation of the terms of the policy before a learned single Judge and a Division Bench of this Court. The learned single Judge, Justice G.C. Gupta (as he then was) in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanak Chand Ben 1989 ACJ 169 (MP), commented as under:
Reading of these clauses of the policy would indicate that the insurance company had undertaken to indemnify the insured to the extent of 'such amount' as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Apparently this clause is widely worded and covers the entire liability of the owners. Limits to this extensive liability are provided in the proviso to the aforesaid section and do not include a case like the present one. Under the circumstances, this provision would indicate that the insurance company under this policy has undertaken to indemnify the insured of his total liability under the Motor Vehicles Act. The words 'requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' cannot be read as the requirements of Section 95 only. Then it cannot be overlooked that Section 95 does not deal with the requirement of insured or the owner of vehicle, it only limits the liability of the insurance company. For this reason, Section 95 of the Act cannot be read into this clause of the policy.
14. The Division Bench consisting of S.K. Chawla and T.S. Doabia, JJ., in National Insurance Co. v. Ramswaroop, which decision has been reported in full in 1994 (II) MPWN 41, has placed similar construction on the contents of the similar insurance policy to hold as under:
A look at the policy in the present case (copy Exh. D-l-C) would show that the insurance company, inter alia, undertook to indemnify the insured against all sums including claimant's costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle to the extent of 'such sum as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' [See Section II-(i) and last but one column of the Schedule stating the limits of liability contained in the policy]. The expression 'such sum as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' in the policy cannot be read as requirements of Section 95 only but that expression would cover the entire liability of the owner, when incurred under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Had there been an intention to limit the liability of the insurance company to limits given in Section 95, there was nothing to prevent the use of the words 'section 95' or to mention of the sum of Rs. 15,000/- per passenger as liability, in the above term. The award for the entire sum of compensation having been given under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the above expression would mean that the insurance company agreed to indemnify for the entire sum, as the liability therefor was incurred by the owner under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Decisions in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanak Chand Ben 1989 ACJ 169 (MP), New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Kumar Tamarakar 1990 ACJ 958 (MP) and Anupama v. Laxmanrao 1988 ACJ 996 (MP), are in point.
The insurance company, in its written statement, has merely said that its liability under the insurance policy is limited without specifying the ground and reasons as to how it is limited with regard to third party. The insurance company examined Satish C. Bansal, employed as Assistant Regional Manager of the company, as NAW 3. In his deposition, he agrees that Exh. D/2 was the cover note issued, followed by Exh. D/1, the insurance policy and Exh. D/3 was a copy of the policy containing all the conditions. In his cross-examination, he is unable to explain why the above sum of Rs. 240/- as premium for passengers and Rs. 180/- were separately charged. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Natvarlal 1988 ACJ 956 (MP), the question of insurance and its limit of liability should not be decided on technicalities and abstract doctrine of burden of proof. The insurance company is, therefore, essentially expected to produce the entire insurance policy with all its conditions, to explain the different amounts of premia charged to cover different categories of risks of different passengers and parties. If the insurance company failed to do so, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the company to hold that its liability for third party under the conditions of policy was not limited.
15. Considering in the above manner the contents of the policy in the light of evidence on record and the legal provisions applicable, we have come to the conclusion that in the instant case, the insurance company cannot restrict its liability only to a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in the case of each death. Under the terms of policy, its liability extended to the amount determined by the Tribunal which was joint and several with the driver and owner of the vehicle.
16. Now remains the question of quantum of comptensation. Before dealing with the submissions made on behalf of the claimants for the enhancement of compensation, we may state how the learned Member of the Tribunal has determined the quantum of compensation in each case of death. Deceased Abhay Kumar Jain was employed as Chemical Analyst in Cimmco Steel Foundry, Gwalior. According to the Tribunal, his age was between 39 and 40 years and not 34 and 35 years, as was claimed. On the question of age, the Tribunal took the following facts into consideration: Abhay Kumar Jain entered service in 1974. He had taken education up to M.Sc. He had put in 18 years' service. He must have obtained the M.Sc. degree between 20 and 25 years of his age. There was no educational record produced to prove his age. His wife, Usha Jain, is shown as 34 years of age. For the aforesaid reasons, the Tribunal determined the age of the deceased as between 39-40 years which, according to us, is not liable to be disturbed. He was getting a salary of Rs. 1,448/- per month, exclusive of bonus and other benefits. The monthly dependency was worked out as Rs. 1,300/- and annual dependency of Rs. 15,600/-. The Tribunal adopted the multiplier of 15 and awarded a total sum of Rs. 2,34,000/-. The Tribunal rejected the claims for mental agony and loss of consortium.
17. The Tribunal totally rejected any claim for loss of income from grain shop. The Tribunal held that there was no reliable evidence to accept the case of the claimants that deceased Abhay Kumar Jain was also getting some income from grain shop business run by him along with his father.
18. With regard to the other claim as a result of death of Devendra Kumar Gupta, the Tribunal found that he was employed as Melter in Cimmco Steel Foundry. His age was between 43 to 44 years at the time of death. His salary was Rs. 2,318/- per month apart from other benefits such as bonus, L.T.C. and increments. The dependency was worked out as Rs. 1,400/- p.m., that is, Rs. 16,800/- per year. In proportion to his age, the Tribunal adopted a multiplier of 14 and worked out the figure of total compensation at Rs. 2,35,200/-. In the absence of any documentary proof, a sum of Rs. 500/- was awarded as damages for the scooter. Thus, a total award of Rs. 2,35,700/- was passed in favour of the claimants for the death of Devendra Kumar Gupta. The Tribunal rejected the claim for loss of income from tuitions which were said to have been done by deceased Devendra Kumar Gupta. It was held by the Tribunal that there was no reliable evidence in proof of the fact that Devendra Kumar Gupta was also getting some income from tuitions to school children. No amount was awarded for mental agony and loss of consortium or on any other head.
19. In both the claim cases, the learned Counsel appearing for the claimants made strenuous efforts in this appeal to persuade us to enhance the amount of compensation by considering the loss of income due to grain shop business of Abhay Kumar Jain and the tuition work done from home by Devendra Kumar Gupta. We have read along with the learned Counsel the relevant evidence on the point on record. We find no error in the conclusions reached by the learned Member of the Tribunal in rejecting the above claims. In the case of death of Abhay Kumar Jain, no grain shop licence was produced. No bills/vouchers were produced and no accounts were available. Even the servant examined was unable to correctly give the nature and extent of the business. The Tribunal rightly held that running of grain shop business by deceased Abhay Kumar was not proved.
20. Similarly, the claim for loss of income due to tuition work done by the deceased Devendra Kumar Gupta was also rightly rejected. His widow, in the witness-box, was unable to give any detail of any such tuition work done by her husband. She was unable to name even one single student who was taught at home. In both cases, therefore, additional claim raised for extra income in grain shop business and tuitions was rightly rejected by the Tribunal.
21. It is then urged on behalf of the claimants that the multiplier, 15 and 14, taken in both cases is low. Some cases are cited at the Bar. We need not go into the correctness of those decisions. It is enough for us to rely on the latest decision of the Apex Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Trans. Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), in which 16 is held to be the highest multiplier which may be adopted. The multiplier of 14 and 15, taken in the two cases cannot, therefore, be held to be low. That is also in conformity with the amendment introduced, providing for multiplier, depending upon the age, to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The contention advanced for taking a higher multiplier, therefore, also does not appeal to us and is rejected.
22. Lastly, it is urged that the deceased on whose deaths the claims have been lodged were salaried employees in a company and in the course of their service career, they would have got further benefits of promotion and rise in salary. It is also contended that separate award should have been made on the head of consortium and loss to estate.
23. The counsel for the claimants are right in submitting that learned Tribunal should have also given due consideration to the fact that the deceased as salaried employees would have prospects in their service-career with rise in salary and promotion. We, however, find that the claimants have not at all led any evidence to claim a higher amount on the above score. They have only examined one witness employed with the company to prove the salary that the two employees were drawing in the company. The claimants have failed to prove what were the prospects in service-career of the two employees who met the premature death. In the absence of any evidence, it is not possible for this Court in appeal to enhance the amount of compensation on that ground.
24. The contention advanced on behalf of the claimants, however, deserves to be accepted that the separate amount should have been awarded on the loss of consortium and loss to the estate. The Supreme Court, in the case of Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), has awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- each on the above two heads. The amount of compensation is, therefore, liable to be enhanced by a sum of Rs. 30,000/- in each of the two cases. No other point arise for consideration.
25. As a result of discussion aforesaid, the two appeals are partly allowed by granting the following relief:
(i) The quantum of compensation in each of the two cases is increased by a sum of Rs. 30,000/-, and
(ii) The total amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal and enhanced amount of compensation, awarded by us is held jointly and severally payable by the respondent No. 2, the United India Insurance Co. Ltd., being the insurer of mini bus MPW 6541 and respondent Nos. 4 and 5, being the driver and owner respectively of the said vehicle. The amount of compensation shall be paid in accordance with the directions made by the Tribunal to the different claimants and the enhanced amount of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation shall be paid only to the widow in each case, of the deceased. The amount of compensation and the enhanced amount of compensation shall carry the same rate of interest of 12 per cent and 15 per cent per annum, as mentioned in Sub-clause (c) of para 31 of the award of the Tribunal.
In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.