Karnataka High Court
The United India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Smt. Rekha And Ors on 26 September, 2025
Author: H.P.Sandesh
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB
MFA No. 204029 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 26th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
MISCL. FIRST APPEAL NO.204029 OF 2024 (MV-D)
BETWEEN
1. THE UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.,
DIVISIONAL OFFICE,
1718000,
STNA COMPLES,
SALEM ROAD,
TIRUCHENGODE-637 211,
STATE TAMIL NADU,
Digitally signed by THROUGH ITS DIVISIONAL MANAGER,
BASALINGAPPA 2ND FLOOR CENTURY COMPLEX,
SHIVARAJ OPP. SANGAM TALKIES,
DHUTTARGAON
Location: HIGH KALABURAGI.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. S.S. ASPALLI, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. SMT. REKHA S/O LATE AMARESH KUMAR HANCHINAL,
AGE: 32 YEARS,
OCC: NIL,
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB
MFA No. 204029 of 2024
HC-KAR
2. MILINDKUMAR
S/O LATE AMARESH KUMAR HANCHINAL,
AGE: 13 YEARS,
MINOR,
OCC: STUDENT,
3. SWETHA D/O LATE AMARESH KUMAR HANCHINAL,
AGE: 12 YEARS,
MINOR,
OCC: STUDENT,
4. SOUJANYA D/O LATE AMARESH KUMAR HANCHINAL,
AGE: 9 YEARS,
MINOR,
OCC: STUDENT,
5. MALLAMMA D/O DODDAPPA HANCHINAL,
AGE: 28 YEARS,
OCC: STUDENT,
6. BHOOMIKA D/O DODDAPPA HANCHINAL,
AGE: 26 YEARS,
OCC: STUDENT,
7. NEELAMMA W/O DODDAPPA HANCHINAL,
AGE: 70 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE,
THE RESPONDENT No.2 TO 4 ARE MINORS,
U/G OF THEIR NATURAL MOTHER RESPONDENT No.1,
ALL ARE R/O. HANCHINAL VILLAGE,
TALUKA YADRAMI, DISTRICT KALABURAGI,
NOW RESIDING AT NALWAR VILLAGE,
TQ. CHITTAPUR,
DIST. KALABURAGI-585 211.
8. P. SURESH S/O K. PREIYASAMY,
AGE: MAJOR,
OCC: OWNER OF BORE-WELL,
LORRY BEARING No.KA-01/ML-8567,
R/O. No.10,
SSS BUILDING,
A.V. ROAD,
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB
MFA No. 204029 of 2024
HC-KAR
CHAMRAJPET,
BENGALURU-560 018.
RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. TABBASUM SULTANA, ADV. FOR R1 TO R7;
R2 TO R4 ARE MINORS REPRESENTED BY R1;)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S. 173(1) OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES
ACT, PRAYING TO A) CALL FOR THE RECORDS IN MVC
No.608/2020 DATED 20.07.2024 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AND MACT, CHITTAPUR. B) SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 20.07.2024 IN MVC
No.608/2020 PASSED BY THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND MACT,
CHITTAPUR.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 16.09.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
'PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT', THIS DAY, THE COURT
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF) This appeal is by the appellant - Insurance Company calling in question the judgment and award dated 20.07.2024 in MVC No.608/2020 passed by the Motor Vehicles Claims -4- NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR Tribunal and Senior Civil Judge, Chittapura, on the ground of liability to pay the compensation or in the alternative to fasten contributory negligence on the deceased, as well as quantum of compensation.
2. Since the matter was heard on merits and found that the liability fixed on the Insurance Company is just and proper, the notice on respondent No.8 - owner of the vehicle dispensed with, as per the request of learned counsel for the appellant.
3. Though the matter is listed for orders on applications for release of amount and for furnishing of PF against respondent No.8-owner of the vehicle, since the matter was taken up for final hearing considering that there is no infirmity in holding the liability on the Insurance Company by the Tribunal after hearing the parties on merits. The notice of this appeal on respondent No.8 is dispensed with, though he has filed statement of objection, but not contested the matter and it is felt that the liability fastened on the Insurance Company, after hearing parties on merits, sound and reasoned. -5-
NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR
4. Heard Sri S. S. Aspalli, learned counsel appearing for the appellant - Insurance Company and Sri Tabassum Sultan, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 7.
5. Sri S. S. Aspalli taking us through the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal with all vehemence submitted that, the appeal is second round of litigation. Earlier the Tribunal has passed an award, fastening the liability on the owner of the Insurance Company and awarded compensation at Rs.26,66,000, wherein, both the owner as well as claimants were before this Court in MFA No.202890/2022 by the owner of the vehicle and the claimants in MFA No.200133/2023, calling in question the liability and the quantum of compensation. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court connected both the mattes and disposed of the appeals on 06.02.2024, holding that the liability fastened on the owner of the vehicle requires re-consideration on the ground that owner was not afforded with appropriate opportunity to take stand on policy and lead evidence to substantiate the risk that is covered under the policy and given liberty to lead evidence in the light of the defence, by filing an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC sought to produce a miscellaneous and special type of vehicle package policy dated -6- NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR 25.12.2019. This Court especially at Paragraph No.5 has stated that the Tribunal which did not have the benefit of the policy, has fixed the liability on the owner because the accident is not in a public place and with the material now on record, this Court having considered the said view and found considerable force in the submission of Sri S. S. Aspalli and the question of liability and negligence must be re-examined in the light of evidence that could be brought on record by the claimants as well as the insurer/owner on the risk that is covered under the policy and so also the negligence on the part of the deceased, if any. However, held that the award is just and proper and does not require any re-consideration.
6. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal only to examine whether the insurer can be made liable in the light of the terms of the policy and whether any contributory negligence can be attributed to the deceased, partly allowed both the appeals, set aside the finding on the liability and remanded the matter to the Tribunal as stated supra, calling upon the Tribunal to decide the question of liability in terms of the policy that was produced under application for additional evidence and give finding on the liability as well as contributory -7- NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR negligence on the deceased and directed the Tribunal to re- consider the appeal only on the said question. Subsequent to remand, the Tribunal, fastened the liability on the Insurance Company, however, modified the award despite there is a finding that the compensation awarded at the earlier point of time was just and proper i.e., to the extent of Rs.26,66,000/-. In the case on hand, the Tribunal now awarded compensation of Rs.30,82,000/-, which is against the order passed by this Court. In these circumstances, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal should not have been more than the compensation awarded under the earlier judgment stated supra.
7. In so far as liability is concerned, the learned counsel with all vehemence submitted that the Tribunal has failed to consider the fact that the accident has not occurred in any public place. In terms of Section 2(34) of the MV Act, which defines 'public place' and any accident which has occurred other than the public place, where a motor vehicle is involved, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation. This aspect of the matter has been missed by the Tribunal.
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8. To buttress his argument, he has placed reliance on the materials collected on Google search. According to him, which says that the application under Section 287 of IPC is generally not applicable to a motor vehicle accident, which typically governed by the Motor Vehicles Act other relevant sections of the IPC like Section 279 or Section 338 i.e., rash driving on a public way causing serious hurt by an act endangering the life or personal safety of others. Section 287 of IPC specifically deals with rash or negligent conduct with respect of machinery, not vehicles. A motor vehicle, though a machinery, is not considered as a machinery in the context of Section 287 of IPC, if it is operated on road, as the Motor Vehicles Act provides a specific framework for such incidents. He further stressed on the wordings 'machinery' Vs. 'motor vehicle', which he has got in the said Google search says that Section 287 of IPC focuses on machinery in general such as in a factory or workshop. Further he submits as per Google search that Section 279 of IPC says 'Public use'. Section 287 is relevant when an act endangers human life due to negligent way of handling of machinery, however, if a motor vehicle is involved in a road accident, other sections of IPC (like Sections -9- NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR 279 or 338) or the MV Act itself are more appropriate because they address the specific context of a public way and motor vehicle. In summary, according to the Google search on which he relies, while a motor vehicle is a machine, Section 287 of the IPC is reserved for accidents involving general machinery and not for motor vehicle accidents, which fall under the purview of the Motor Vehicles Act under other provisions of the IPC. As such, Section 287 of the IPC is not applicable in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act, because this provision deals with negligent conduct involving machinery, not vehicles. The Motor Vehicles Act, by contrast, contains both civil and criminal provisions that address rash or negligent driving. While both frameworks involve negligence, they apply to different subject matter. IPC Section 279 is for rash and negligent driving of a vehicle on a public way, whereas IPC Section 287 specifically covers dangerous machinery. Further he stressed on the material availed through Google search under the heading 'why Section 287 is not typically applicable to MV Act cases'. Section 287 of IPC pertains to machinery in general such as dangerous machine while operating carelessly. The MV Act, however, deals with motor vehicle and on the said search, he submits
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR that, since the accident occurred in a private agricultural land and not on a public way, the claim petition itself is not maintainable under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act and accordingly sought to dismiss the claim petition against the Insurance Company.
9. To buttress his argument, he has relied on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No.6969/2015 and connected with MFA No.6055/2015 dated 26.08.2021, wherein the Coordinate Bench, considering the Section 2(34), which describes public place meaning a road, street, way or other place whether thoroughfare or not, to which the public have an access and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage, along with Sections 146 and 147 of MV Act, wherein the Co-ordinate Bench has held that a conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the intention of the Legislature is to provide insurance cover to third parties in respect of accidents caused and arising out of use of vehicles in public places, any insurance policy that meets with the requirement of Section 147 of the Act, but does not cover any other risk is known as an 'Act Only' policy and provides
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR coverage only to the extent envisaged in Section 147 of the Act. It always open to the parties to obtain an insurance policy which gives a wider coverage than that provided under the statute. However, insofar as provisions of Section 147 of the Act are concerned and insurance policy to meet with the requirements thereof, has to be issued in relation to the use of the vehicle in a public place and further considering Section 2(34) and Section 147 of the MV Act held that, the definition 'public place' is an inclusive one and the same makes it clear that, it means any road, street, way or other way, other place whether a thoroughfare or not, is a public place for the purpose of the access and only condition being that the public should have a right of access to it. The expression used in the definition is a right of access. The definition of public place under the Act is therefore wide enough to include any place, which members of public use and to which they have right of access. The right of access may be permissible, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission by tickets, passes or badges or payment of fee. The use may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or purposes. What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the members
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR of public that can be available for their use, enjoyment, occasion or other purposes and held that the incident has occurred while the offending vehicle was carrying out Bore well drilling activity was being carried out at the field of the defendant at 01.00 a.m. in the midnight. It is pertinent to note that at the time of the drilling, as per the evidence of the evidence of PW2 in that case, only the deceased and defendant were present on the spot for supervision. The field of the deceased cannot be by any stretch of imagination be considered to be a place for which the public would have access. No evidence has been brought on record to show that the field of the deceased was thrown open to the public access for any purpose. Therefore, held that the vehicle was not being used in a public place and that apart, Ex.R1- insurance policy in the said case, being an Act only policy, which covers the risk of liability to third parties as restricted by Section 147 of the Act. Therefore, in that context held that, the Tribunal erred in fastening the liability to pay the compensation on the Insurance Company, when in the teeth of coverage of the policy, only in respect of any liability arising from the use of the offending vehicle in a public place. Accordingly, set aside the finding of
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR the Tribunal and exonerated the insurance company from the liability and fastened the liability on the owner of the offending vehicle.
10. Placing reliance on the judgment, Sri S. S. Aspalli submits that the facts of the case are identical to that of the facts on hand. The incident in the case on hand, had occurred on 25.08.2022 at 3.30 p.m., when the vehicle was used drilling the land belonging to one Hanumanth Devagurga. The deceased Amresh Kumar along with other villagers had been to the land of the Hanumantha Devadurga to watch digging of borewell and while operating the borewell pipes, the operator fixing casting pipes in borewell without taking any precautions, while installing the iron pipes, due to his negligence, the iron pipe which was fitted to rigged machine, opened and suddenly fallen on the deceased Amresh Kumar causing severe injuries and he succumbed to the injuries on 24.06.2020, while under treatment. The police of Yadrami P.S., registered a case in Crime No.76/2020 against driver and owner of the borewell vehicle. In these circumstances, the facts on hand are identical to the facts stated in the judgment referred supra. Accordingly, sought to set aside the liability fastened on the insurance
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR company, so also the compensation awarded by the Tribunal as against the issue already been decided by this Court in the appeal filed at the earlier point of time. In the alternative, sought to fasten the contributory negligence on the deceased who without taking any proper precautions, had gone near the machine in the land to which he has no access and without their being any permission by the land owner and when the deceased neither was the servant under the land owner nor supervising the borewell operation. In these circumstances, he is the person who is negligent and invited the untoward incident and accordingly, he is responsible for the unfortunate incident happened. Accordingly sought to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment fastening the liability in its entirety on the appellant - Insurance Company or in the alternative fasten the contributory negligence on the deceased and reduce the compensation or reduce to that of compensation awarded at the earlier point of time which has been merged in the judgment of this court in the appeal filed on the earlier point of time.
11. Refuting the submissions of learned counsel appearing for appellant - Insurance Company, Miss. Tabassum
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR Sultana learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 7 with all vehemence submitted that the police have registered the case under the provisions of Section 287 and 304A of IPC against the driver as well as owner of the borewell vehicle. As per Section 287 of IPC, 'Whoever does, with any machinery, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any machinery in his possession or under his care as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from such machinery, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.' In these circumstances, the accident has occurred by the rash and negligent handling of borewell which is the machinery i.e., a rig mounted with compressor, mobile cranes and drilling rigs permanently to the lorry amounts to a machinery and not a goods vehicle, may be because it is loaded and permanently fixed to a goods vehicle. The vehicle was standing idle. It was not moving. It is only the machinery which was being operated. Accordingly, the policy issued is the miscellaneous and special
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR type of vehicle package policy covering all the risks. In these circumstances, the Tribunal after considering the entire material on record, fastened the liability on the owner of the machinery attached to vehicle, rejecting the contention, taking into consideration the special type of policy issued by the insurance company. The Tribunal held at paragraph 21 that, the lorry was being parked adjacent to the land of the deceased, the deceased who Came to his land and gone to watch the drilling operations. At that point of time, due to dropping of iron pipe he got injured and ultimately succumbed to the injuries in the hospital while under treatment. The PW2, who is an eyewitness to the incident deposed and narrated the incident which has occurred on the date of incident. The Tribunal having considered the fact that though it was not happened in a public place to attract Section 279, the police have invoked Section 287 and 304A against the driver as well as owner of the borewell vehicle. The Tribunal has further observed in paragraph 22 that, the respondent No. 2 - Insurance Company has failed to substantiate as to which Act is applicable other than the IMV Act to the vehicle. It is a machinery attached to the lorry when the incident took place,
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR since the policy issued is a miscillenous and special type of vehicle package policy covering rig mounted fitted with compressor, mobile cranes and drilling rigs. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 jointly and severally made liable to pay and respondent no. 2 being the insurance company is under law indemnify respondent No.1 and liable to pay the compensation. In these circumstances, the argument advanced by the appellant insurance company does not hold any water.
12. So far as the research as per learned counsel for respondent no. 2 from the Google search, have no legal force as such cannot be considered. It is just answers to the queries by the Google search which has no legal force to be applicable and be considered in a case of law. It is highly surprising that the insurance company is arguing on the Google search, instead of arguing on law. The Google search cannot be considered as a material having force of law to be applied.
13. So far as the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court stated supra, though this Hon'ble Court considered Section 2(34) of MV Act and Section 146 and 147 of the M.V. Act, this Court considered the definition of public place in
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR Section 2(34) so also in terms of the policy in the said case held that the owner is liable to pay the compensation to the third party. Section 287 was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Co-ordinates Bench in the said case and if been brought to the notice of this Court, the finding may be otherwise. Section 287 clearly states regarding rash and negligence while handling the machinery, whether it be in a private place or a public place. The contention of the counsel appearing for the appellant on the basis of his Google search that the use of machinery is only confined to the factory, does not come to his aid. In Section 287 there is no word used 'public place' or restricting its limits only to a factory shed or premises. It clearly says without any ambiguity that, about rashly and negligently operating the machinery i.e., any act so rashly or negligently to endanger the human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person while operating the machinery and knowingly or negligently without taking such order with any machinery in his possession or under his care as sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human from such machinery. The object of the legislation is very much clear that it is only regarding rash and negligent act in
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR operating the machinery without taking any proper or precautionary guard, in order to avoid any danger to human life or the act while operating the machinery, does any act, so rash and negligent, endangering the human life or likely to cause hurt or injury to other persons. In these circumstances, the judgment relied would not come to the aid of the insurance company.
14. So far as the compensations is concerned, the learned counsel fairly submitted that there is a deviation to the finding which has attained finality in the appeal filed at the earlier point of time. The compensation may be restricted to the compensation which was earlier awarded and confirmed by this Hon'ble Court and sought to dismiss the appeal, on the ground of liability and be allowed on the quantum reducing it to the compensation earlier awarded which has attained finality in the appeal filed on the earlier point of time.
15. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused entire appeal papers as well as Trial Court Record, the points that would arise for our consideration are:
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR
i) Whether the Tribunal is justified in fastening the liability on the insurance company to pay the compensation?
ii) Whether the appellant - Insurance Company has made out any case to fasten contributory negligence on the deceased?
iii) Whether the Tribunal is justified in enhancing the compensation than the one awarded on 25.08.2022, which was confirmed in appeal being MFA No.202890/2022, connected with MFA No.200012/2023 and attained finality on the principle of doctrine of merger?
16. Our answers to above points for consideration are Point No.1 - in affirmative Point No.2 - in negative Point No.3 - in negative, for the following:
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR REASONS
17. Before adverting to point no. 1, we thought it apt to dwell upon point Nos.2 and 3, which would make the entire case easier and discuss point No.1 thereafter. Point Nos.2 and 3 are taken together in order to avoid the repetition of facts. It is not in dispute that at the earlier point of time, the claimants were in appeal before this court in MFA No.200133/2023, calling in question the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the extent of 26,66,000 under all heads. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while considering the appeal filed by the owner as well as the claimants on the point of liability and quantum of compensation, remanded the matter only on the point of liability. However, confirming the award as just and proper and the same does not require any re-consideration and the said aspects are affirmed. This clearly gives finality to the compensation awarded by the Tribunal at the earlier point of time to the extent stated supra. The earlier judgment and award passed by the Tribunal on the quantum attained finality. There is nothing left for the Tribunal to re-open the case on compensation. The judicial proprietary demands that the
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR Tribunal ought to have considered the case on remand only on the liability and without touching the issue on compensation, which has already attained the finality and merged in the order passed by the Higher court. It cannot be said that the Tribunal is not aware of the order, as in the opening sentence itself, in note at page No.2 of the judgment, the Tribunal has clearly stated that it is a remanded case and also mentioned the number of the MFA and the order passed by this Court. In these circumstances, We feel that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal ought to have avoided on deciding the matter on compensation aspect. The compensation awarded once confirmed by the Superior Court, judicial proprietary demands that the same ought not to have been re-opened. The Tribunal has committed serious error in re-opening the same and awarding compensation more than the one which has already been confirmed by this Court. In these circumstances, the same requires the re-consideration. Since the compensation awarded has been to be affirmed, there is no question of reducing the same also as argued by the appellant counsel for the Insurance Company. In the circumstances, we deem it proper to answer Issue No. 3 in negative and retain the
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR compensation as per the earlier order of the Tribunal dated 25.08.2022, which has been confirmed by this Court to the extent of Rs.26,66,000/- in all, as per judgment passed in the Appeals stated supra dated 06.02.2024.
18. So far as point No.2 is concerned, the claimants have examined eye witness, who has stated the incident which has taken place on the eventful day. This witness has been cross examined by the Insurance Company. He has clearly stated in the examination in chief that, it is due to the rash and negligent handling of the machine by its operator while leaving the said iron pipes into the digging area and joining the same with the rig, the said pipe suddenly opened and fell on the deceased resulting in severe injuries and subsequently in death. There are no precautionary measures taken by the operator as well as the driver of the lorry, knowing fully that non-taking of any precautionary measures in all probability may endanger the life and cause any injury or damage to person or property. Nothing has been elicited worthwhile in the cross examination to discredit the evidence of PW2. The insurance company except examining its officer, who was not present at the spot on the date of incident, cannot be a better
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR person to say, as to who is negligent, particularly that the deceased was negligent and contributed to the accident going nearby the borewell operating area, inviting the danger on him. In these circumstances, the police records are clear that it is the rash and negligent handling of the machinery as per Section 287, while operating it, which is squarely covered under Section 287, invoked by the Police towards rash and negligent handling of the missionary and Section 304A for causing death due to negligence. In these circumstances, we find no force in the argument advanced by the appellant - Insurance Company and find force in the argument advanced by learned counsel appearing for the claimant. Accordingly, the point for consideration answered in negative against the appellant - insurance company and in favour of the claimant.
19. Point No.1: We are very shocked and astonished that appellant - Insurance Company is referring to the Google search which are just answers to some random questions, having no force of law to consider while deciding a case. They are just some answers to certain random questions which were posed in the said site, without there being any factual background or the
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR circumstances. No doubt that the facts and circumstances stated in the case on hand is not in defer than the one stated in the judgment relied on by the appellant - Insurance Company. However, the fact remains that the policy that was placed in the case relied on by the appellant - Insurance Company stated supra was an 'Act Only' policy and in the case on hand, it is a 'miscellaneous and special type of vehicle package policy' and in the Body of the policy, it is clearly stated, 'the Ashok Leyland HLV rig' and so far as the type of body is concerned, rig mounted/fitted with the compressor, mobile cranes and drilling rigs. Though the lorry is a vehicle which is transporting the said rig i.e., borewell is a machinery permanently embedded to the body of the lorry. Since the machinery cannot move on its own without being transported, fitted either permanently or otherwise to a transport vehicle. It is not the case of the insurance company that the incident has taken place which involved the motor vehicle, when it was in operation i.e., while it is moving, the accident has taken place in the private land. However, the lorry was standing idle and the machinery i.e., the borewell which is fitted with the body of the vehicle, being operated, which comes within the purview of Section 287 of
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR IPC. It is not the case of the appellant - insurance company that transport-motor vehicle was moving in the private land, come in contact with the deceased resulting in injuries and ultimately to death. Section 2(34) of MV Act clearly says about public way. It is true that the definition is clear and unambiguous. This would come into operation if Section 279 has been invoked by the police. In Section 287, there is no word called 'public place' or 'way' or it is not restricted as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant - Insurance Company to a factory shed or premises. It is plain and unambiguous. It says only towards the act in operating the said machinery rashly and negligently so as to endanger the human life and likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person and second aspect is knowingly or negligently without taking appropriate precautions or guard with regard to operating of machinery in his possession or under his care, which may result in probable danger to human life from such machinery, when it is being operated. Except these two parts, there is nothing in the said Section 287 which suggest either public way or place or to a particular place. The police in the case on hand, have invoked Section 287 and Section 304 of
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR IPC, both relates to rash and negligence in handling the machine without taking proper precautions as contemplated under the said provision and resulting death. In these circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant only on certain questions and answers which he has got through Google search be taken into consideration; becomes very hard for this court to countenance. It is not possible to take the said materials on record, while considering the case, the reason being they are not supported with any legal background or on the basis of scientific research, it is just answers to some random questions or queries, which has been recorded in the website and displayed in the search engine. The courts are bound and called upon to judge a case on the basis of facts and circumstances and materials which comes within the purview of legal sense. The random answers to certain questionaries or queries cannot find place as a material to be relied on, to decide any case on a particular fact. Even the materials placed by the appellant obtained in a Google search, says regarding operation of Section 287 and Section
279. It is no doubt clear Section 287 is not applicable to a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle is different from a machine
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR because though it is a machine, it is not a machinery. However, in the case on hand, the vehicle is transporting the machinery which is embedded permanently with its body, which is used in digging bore well with the help of rig, comes within the purview of the definition of machinery. In these circumstances, even the vehicle cannot be considered as a mere goods vehicle, when a machinery is fitted with it. Admittedly, the incident had taken place when the vehicle was idle and the machinery was being operated. The place whether private or public, have no relevance for the consideration of Section 287, as the Section 287 is silent regarding the place of incident. It just contains two parts. One is the act of handling the machinery rashly and negligently and another is knowingly or negligently omit to take appropriate precautions while handling such machineries, which may result in danger to human life and cause injury from such machinery while handling the same. So far as the case relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, though the facts are stated to be identical, but the same is distinguishable on facts, when compared to the facts of this case. In the said case, the discussion was only with respect to Section 2(34) as well as
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR Sections 146 and 147 of MV Act and the policy was 'Act-Only' policy. In the case on hand, it is a, 'special miscellaneous and special type vehicle package policy', covering all the risks and the insurance policy is very much clear. It is not in dispute and even admitted by the learned counsel for the appellant on the query of the Court, that Section - 279 has not been invoked by the police. In Section 287 there is no word called 'public place' or 'way', or it is not restricted as contented by the counsel appearing for the appellant - Insurance Company to a factory shed or premises.
20. The learned counsel is unable to answer to the query of the Court and he is not in a position to differentiate that the borewell rig which is attached to the body of the transport vehicle is not a machinery. The borewell rig attached to the body of the lorry is a machinery which is used to drill deep into the earth. The borewell rig used to drill earth to access ground water. It consists of several components including a drill bit or hammer, a drill string which pulls the pipes, a powerful compressor for air pressure which is required for drilling the hard earth and a hoisting system, to lower the drill bed, which is necessary for the purpose of drilling. All its
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR components are supported by a sturdy rig structure and being powered by diesel engines or hydraulics with automatic robot. Given the circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant only on certain question and answer which he has got through Google search that section 287 cannot be made applicable to Motor Vehicles Act becomes very hard for this Court to countenance. In these circumstances, the borewell being a machinery with all the components stated supra comes within the purview of Section 287. Section 287 has neither been quoted nor has been brought to the notice of the co-ordinate bench of this court in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant - Insurance Company. What was argued before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, only on Sections 146 and 147 and Section 2(34) of M.V.Act, that apart the insurance policy being 'Act Only' policy in the said case. These are the circumstances for the Co- ordinate bench of this Court to hold that the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation and fastened the liability on the owner of the said borewell lorry. In these circumstances, the said decision is distinguishable and will not come to the aid of the appellant - Insurance Company. Except
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and the materials which the learned counsel obtained on Google search, the learned counsel for the appellant has not placed any other record to show that Section 287 is not applicable to the case on hand and the borewell is not a machinery, within the word used in Section 287. In these circumstances, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant are liable to be rejected and accordingly, rejected, holding that it is due to rash and negligent act on the part of the operator as well as the driver of the borewell lorry in operating the borewell machine fitted to the lorry, as well as taking appropriate precautions while putting the machinery into operation i.e. digging the borewell in the land belonging to one Hanumantha stated supra the accident has occured. The appellant has not placed on record that the operator as well as driver have taken appropriate caution and precautions under the second part of Section 287 to state that they have taken all appropriate measures and put on Notice to all the passersby as well as the persons who have visited or bystanders to keep safe distance from the operational area. So also, there is no material brought in evidence that there is no rash and negligent act on
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR the part of the operator while handling the machine as contemplated in Part I of Section 287. In these circumstances, the ground taken by the appellant - insurance company to avoid liability does not survive for consideration and requires to be rejected and accordingly, rejected.
21 For the above reasons, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
i) The appeal is allowed in part.
ii) The appeal on the ground of liability and in the alternative contributory negligence, is dismissed.
However, the appeal is allowed only to the extent of reducing the compensation from Rs.30,82,000/- to Rs.26,66,000/- awarded by the Tribunal on the earlier point of time dated 25.08.2022, which has been confirmed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No.202890/2022 connected with MFA
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR No.200133/2023 dated 06.02.2024, by modifying the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal dated 20.07.2024 in MVC No.608/2024.
iii) The amount in deposit shall be transmitted to the concerned Tribunal forthwith, for disbursement. The same shall carry interest at the rate of 6% p.a.
iv) The balance reduced compensation along with accrued interest supra shall be deposited by the appellant - Insurance Company before the concerned Tribunal within 6 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
v) The apportionment as well disbursement shall be as per the order passed by the Tribunal.
vi) The Registry is directed to transmit the TCR within 2 weeks from today to the concerned Tribunal, enabling the appellant - company to deposit the amount, so also for the claimants to seek release of the permissible amount.
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:5870-DB MFA No. 204029 of 2024 HC-KAR
vii) The Registry is also directed to send copy of this judgment to the concerned Precedent Officer for information and avoiding these kinds of order in future.
viii) No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(H.P.SANDESH) JUDGE Sd/-
(T.M.NADAF) JUDGE THM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 6 CT: AK