Allahabad High Court
Draupadi Devi vs District Basic Education Officer And 3 ... on 27 May, 2022
Author: Manju Rani Chauhan
Bench: Manju Rani Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 33 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 8196 of 2022 Petitioner :- Draupadi Devi Respondent :- District Basic Education Officer And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Indra Raj Singh,Adarsh Singh,Manoj Kumar Yadava Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Syed Nadeem Ahmad Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.
Heard Mr. Adarsh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Syed Nadeem Ahmad, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 3 and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.
The writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer to quash the impugned order dated 15.03.2022 passed by respondent no.1, i.e. District Basic Education Officer, Mau and a further prayer for restraining the respondents from interfering in the functioning of the petitioner on the post of Headmistress under the impugned order dated 15.03.2022 and to pay her salary.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic School, managed by respondent no.3 and subsequently, she was promoted on the post of Headmistress. On 07.02.2019, by order of respondent no.2, the petitioner was attached on the post of Headmistress in Junior Basic School, Kashimpur Urban Area, Mau. Thereafter, vide orders dated 26.07.2021 and 06.10.2021, the petitioner was directed to join at her original place of posting, i.e. Headmistress, Junior Basic School Bhujauti, Colony Urban Area, Mau. Subsequently, on 25.10.2021, also the respondent no.2 directed the petitioner to join at her original place of posting, but when she did not join, the respondent no.1 vide order dated 28.10.2021 again directed the petitioner to join at her original place of posting. Pursuant to which, on 03.11.2021, the petitioner placed an application/representation mentioning the facts regarding strength of the institution where she was originally posted. However, the respondent no.1, without considering the application of the petitioner, passed the impugned order dated 15.03.2022 and placed the petitioner under suspension mentioning vague and baseless allegations. The charge sheet has also been served to the petitioner on 29.03.2022 on the basis of those vague charges.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that surprisingly, without given any notice or without any inquiry, the impugned suspension order dated 15.03.2022 has been passed mentioning vague allegations, hence, the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the charges on the basis of which a suspension has resorted to should be specific. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Transport Commissioner vs. Radha K.Moorthy reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332, wherein the Apex Court has held as under:-
"A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which he was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with either other official indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part account did he falsify or help falsify, which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one. It is significant to notice that respondent has been objecting to the charges on the ground of vagueness from the earliest stage and yet he was not furnished the particulars....."
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal reported in (2013) 16 SCC 147, wherein the Apex Court has held as under:-
"22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee's continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank etc."
He has also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Mohd. Shoeb Khan vs. State of U.P. decided on 03.09.2019 passed in Service Single No.23830 of 2019, wherein the Court has observed as under:-
"7. Keeping in view the aforesaid proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Radha K.Moorthy as well as Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) it comes out that the charges levelled against the petitioner being vague and not having spelt out the specific role of the petitioner in the episode are more of a general nature and thus the impugned suspension order is clearly not sustainable in the eyes of law."
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner has already joined at the transferred place and is still working on the said post.
Learned Standing Counsel as well as learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 3 submits that there is no illegality in the order impugned and the charges so levelled against the petitioner cannot be examined at this stage, inasmuch as the explanation and documents relied upon by the petitioner can be a defence in the departmental inquiry, as during departmental inquiry, the petitioner will have ample opportunity to prove his innocence. Therefore, no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and scanned the records, the Court finds that the aforesaid order impugned does not contain any ground whatsoever which may warrant major penalty and also does not contain any ground which may require the suspension of service of the petitioner, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law and hence, the same is liable to be set aside.
In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the order impugned dated 15.03.2022, passed by respondent no.1 cannot be legally sustained in the eyes of law and the same is, hereby, quashed.
However, it is provided that the departmental inquiry be initiated against the petitioner and brought to its logical end, strictly in accordance with law, at the earliest possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the disciplinary authority. The petitioner is directed to co-operate in the enquiry. In case, the petitioner does not co-operate in the enquiry proceedings, the disciplinary authority shall be free to proceed in accordance with law.
With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :- 27.5.2022 Jitendra/-