Chattisgarh High Court
R.K. Singh And Anr. vs State Of Chhattisgarh [Alongwith Misc. ... on 6 February, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2007(2)MPHT73
Author: Sunil Kumar Sinha
Bench: Sunil Kumar Sinha
ORDER Sunil Kumar Sinha, J.
1. Arguments heard.
2. Common order passed as follows:
These are the two bail applications filed under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of anticipatory bail to the applicants, who are apprehending their arrest in connection with Crime No. 195/2006, registered at Police Station Dipka, District Korba (CG) for the offence punishable under Sections 342, 294, 323 and 506B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Special Act').
3. The brief facts are that the complainant namely- Julious Lakra was a Security Guard under a private agency known as 'Thunderbolt Security Services Camp Gevra, District Korba'. The applicants were also working in the same concern. The victim was working in the said concern since 16-6-2004. On 3-10-2006, at about 8.30 a.m., the victim was called by the applicant- Pushpendra Singh, who said to him that now his services are no more required and he should take up his salary cheque and should leave the job. On this, the victim replied that he should be given his payment in cash. The allegations are that on account of this, the applicants assaulted the deceased with hands and fists. They assaulted the victim in the Barrack and while assaulting him, they abused him. They used the following words:
NÙkhlx< dk vkfnoklh gedks fu;e crkrk gS
4. Learned Counsel for the applicants argues that all the offences under the IPC are bailable offences and in the facts and circumstances of the case, an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act would not be made out; therefore, the applicants may be admitted to anticipatory bail.
5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the State opposes the bail applications. His submission is that since an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act has been registered, bar under Section 18 of the Special Act would be attracted and these petitions filed for anticipatory bail would not be maintainable.
6. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the case diary.
7. So far as maintainability of the petitions is concerned, it has been held in many cases that if the contents of the FIR or the complainant disclose the commission of offence under the Special Act, the Courts would not be justified in entering into a further enquiry by summoning the case diary or any other material as to whether the allegations are true or false or whether there is any preponderance of probability for commission of such an offence. At this stage, the Court cannot examine and scrutinize the record of the case in order to ascertain the veracity of the FIR/complaint. The provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 put a complete bar against the entertained of an application for anticipatory bail where prima facie the contents of the FIR disclose the ingredients of the commission of the offence under the Act of 1989, which is apparent from the perusal of the Section itself and thus the Court at the most would be required to evaluate the FIR itself with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting the alleged offence, then the Court would not be justified in entering into an enquiry as to the reliability or a genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint.
8. On many occasions, it has come before this Court that in the matter of commission of offences punishable under Section 294 etc., of the Indian Penal Code, in a place within public view, if the victim, by chance, happens to be the member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, and the accused) is not the member of the said castes or tribes, the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act are being utilized by the State, irrespective of the nature of accusation.
9. If we read the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, it would be clear that the said offence would be made out, where the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view, therefore, for application of the Special Act, the necessity is that the offence must have been committed against the victim on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular caste or category, that is to say, that if the offence is not committed on the ground or for the reason that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) would not be attracted and if the evidence of this nature is lacking in any case and the victim, by chance, happens to be the member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, which may not be in the knowledge of the accused persons, merely on this ground the aforesaid provisions would not be attracted in addition to the provisions of the IPC.
10. If we examine the contents of FIR, it does not appear that it was in the personal knowledge of the persons that the victim belongs to a particular caste or a category and that an offence under the IPC was committed for the reason or on the ground that the victim belongs to a particular caste or a community. Therefore, in absence of any evidence to this effect prima facie, facie, the provisions of Section 18 of the Special Act would not be attracted and these petitions would be maintainable.
11. In view of the above discussion, I allow these petitions and direct that in the event of arrest of these applicants, they shall be released on bail on each of them furnishing a personal bond in sum of Rs. 10,000/- with one surety each in like amount to the satisfaction of the officer arresting them.
12. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the matter of Salauddin Abdul Samad Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 667, I hereby direct that this order shall remain in force for a period of 60 days from today, during which, the applicants may apply for regular bail before the concerned Court.
13. In the result, both the petitions are allowed.