Punjab-Haryana High Court
Christian Medical College And Brown ... vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court And ... on 1 June, 1995
Equivalent citations: [1996(74)FLR2604], (1997)IIILLJ681P&H
Author: R.P. Sethi
Bench: R.P. Sethi
JUDGMENT R.P. Sethi, J.
1. .Vide their order dated October 24, 1978, the Government of Punjab referred the dispute raised, by the Respondent-workman to the Labour Court under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the 'Act'). The Respondent-workman in his demand notice dated February 27, 1978 had objected to his illegal termination on November 13, 1974. It was submitted by him that before his termination, he was employed by the Management as Plumber on a monthly salary of Rs. 360/-. The claim of the workman was resisted on various grounds including the ground that as the management was not an 'industry' within the meaning of the Act, the reference was mis-conceived. It was further submitted that the demand notice of the claimant had earlier been rejected by the Labour Court in Reference No. 706 of 1975. On merits it was alleged that the workman was guilty of serious misconduct which he had confessed with the result that his services were terminated.
2. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the Labour Court :
"1. Whether the Respondent is not an industry under Industrial Disputes Act ?.
2. Whether this reference is incompetent as alleged in Para No. 2 of preliminary objections of written Statement ?.
3. Whether claimant was not a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act ?
4. Whether reference is belated ? If so, its effect ?
5. Whether termination is justified and in order ?
6. Whether workman resigned from service and he was guilty of misconduct ?.
7. Relief ?."
3. After referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960-I-LLJ-251) and Safdarjang Hospital's case, (1970-II-LLJ-266) and after relying upon the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978-I-LLJ-349), the Labour Court held that as the Management failed to produce the evidence to the effect that it was a charitable institution which was being run purely on donations, it was deemed to be an 'industry'. While deciding Issue No. 2, the Labour Court held that :
"... The factual position has not been brought on the file to show for as to what reasons the previous/reference was rejected. The onus was upon the respondent to establish that the reference was decided on merits. There is no force in the objection raised".
Similarly, Issue No. 3 was also decided against the Management. Issue No. 4 was also decided against the Management on the ground that even on the basis of the pleadings of the Management, the workman was shown to have raised the industrial dispute at the earliest in the year 1975. While deciding Isuue No. 5, the Labour Court referred to the evidence led in the case and concluded that the termination of the workman was not justified. Alleged letter of resignation of the workman was also held to be not proved. The Labour Court, however, directed the reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and backwages only to the extent of 35 per cent.
4. Against the order of the Labour Court, the Management filed C.W.P. No. 5469 of 1981 which was decided by the Learned Single Judge who held that the Labour Court on appraisal of the evidence led by the parties gave a finding of fact that the termination of the services of the workman was not justified. It was further observed that the entire evidence produced before the Labour Court was duly considered while passing the award. There was no illegality or error of jurisdiction in the award requiring interference.
5. In this appeal, the main ground of attack is that the termination of the services of Respondent-workman was justified and in order. It is further contended that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge has wrongly held that the onus lay upon the Management to prove that the earlier reference decided was a bar of adjudication of the 2nd reference made by the Government under the provisions of the Act.
6. Section 2(j) of the Act defines 'industry' to mean any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and his workmen for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature.
7. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (supra) it was held that the hospital run by the State for giving medical relief to citizens and imparting medical education was an 'industry' within the meaning of Setion 2(j) of the Act. The manner in which the activities are organised or arranged, the condition of cooperation between employer and employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the essential considerations for determining as to whether a particular venture is an 'industry' or not. In deciding the question as to whether the activity in question is an undertaking under Section 2(j), the doctrine of quid pro quo can have no application. It was further held at P.257 :
" The conventional meaning attributed to the words "trade and business" has lost some of its validity for the purpose of industrial adjudication. Industrial adjudication has necessarily to be aware of the current of socio-economic thought around ; it must recognise that in the modern welfare State healthy industrial relations are a matter of paramount importance and its essential function is to.assist the State by helping a solution of industrial disputes which constitute a distinct and persistent phenomenon of modern industrialised State. In attempting to solve industrial disputes industrial adjudication does not and should not adopt a doctrinaire approach. It must evolve some working principles and should generally avoid formulating or adopting abstract generalisations. Nevertheless it cannot harp back to old-age notions about the relations between employer and employee or to the doctrine of laissez faire which then governed the regulation of the said relations. That is why in construing the wide words used in Section 2(j) it would be erroneous to attach undue importance to attributes associated with business or trade in the popular mind in days gone by."
8. In Bangalore Water Supply's case (supra) it was held at P 404 :
" "Industry" as defined in Section 2(j) has a wide import.
where there is (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical), (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale, prasad or food), prima facie, there is an "industry" in that enterprise.
Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector.
The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations.
If the organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the undertaking.
Although Section 2(j) uses words of the widest amplitude in its two libs, their meaning cannot be magnified to overreach itself."
Regarding the dominant nature test to be applied, the Supreme Court held :
"Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exertion, others not, involves employees on the total undertaking. Some of whom are not "workmen" or some departments are not productive of goods and services if isolated, even then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments will be true test. The whole undertaking will be "Industry" although those who are not "workmen" by definition may not benefit by the status."
9. On the bais of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, the Labour Court was, therefore, justified in holding the petitioner-management to be an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act.
10. Mere making of reference or its dismissal could not be made a ground for rejecting subsequent reference made in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The 'Management' who had sought rejection of the subsequent reference was under a legal obligation to show that the earlier reference was with respect to the same dispute and the dispute had finally been adjudicated on merits between the parties. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Labour Court had no option but to reject the plea raised by the 'Management'.
11. Issue No. 5 has been decided by the Labour Court on proper and critical examination of the evidence led in the case. After going through the record, we are satisfied that on the basis of the evidence produced no other conclusion was possible except the one arrived at by the Labour Court holding that the termination of the workman was not justified. Otherwise also in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India we are not supposed to appreciate the evidence led in the case or substitute our opinion for the opinion of the Labour Court.
12. For the lapses in getting his earlier reference adjudicated and seeking 2nd reference from the Government, the Labour Court has already directed the payment of only 35 per cent of backwages to the workman. The workman has rightly been directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and only 35 per cent of backwages. The learned Single Judge considered all the matters while passing the judgment impugned in this apppeal and arrived at the correct conclusion of law and facts.
There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.