Madras High Court
R. Nagarajan vs The Divisional Security Commissioner, ... on 24 August, 2006
Author: A. Kulasekaran
Bench: A. Kulasekaran
ORDER A. Kulasekaran, J.
1. The prayer in this Writ Petition is for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records of the respondents 1 to 3 herein in relation to the order of dismissal passed by the first respondent, which was confirmed by the 2nd respondent by his order No. X/P/227/2002/RN/MAS dated 18.11.2002 as confirmed by the third respondent by his order No. M/XP.227/JTJ/1/99 dated 20.06.2003 and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into services with all back wages, continuity in service and all attendant benefits.
2. Mr. Selvaraj, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was employed as head constable in the respondents/Force; that the wife of the petitioner Mrs. Santhakumari had started a business in the year 1994 in the name and style of Shanthi Electronics nearby her residence at No. 31/1, Neelakandan Street, Choolaimedu, Chennai - 600 094 and intimated the same to the respondents by her letter dated 13.01.1994 and 11.12.1997. The learned Senior counsel further submits that the petitioner himself communicated about the business carried on by his wife by letters dated 13.01.1994 and 11.12.1997; that during the period of illness of his wife, the petitioner had issued the blank cheques to the Agasthiya TV and Home Appliances, who had supplied materials; that the payee, taking advantage of the blank cheques, with an intention to enrich himself has made use of the same; that based on the complaint of the payee, the respondents have initiated departmental enquiry; that the enquiry was not at all conducted as per the provisions of Section 153 of Railway Protection Rules, hereinafter referred to as Rules; that the enquiry officer has not given appropriate opportunity to the petitioner as contemplated under Section 153 of the Rules; that the first respondent herein passed the order of dismissal on 17.05.2001, which was not communicated to the petitioner nor even served on the petitioner at any point of time; that the appellate authority, without properly looking into the evidence confirmed the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority on 18.11.2002; that the revisionary authority also, without proper appreciation of the facts involved erroneously confirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority on 19.06.2003; that the authorities failed to note that the alleged act not at all amounts to misconduct and the punishment of dismissal from service for mere issuance of cheques, as requested by his wife, without any ulterior motive, to a third party is too harsh punishment and it is totally disproportionate to the said alleged act; that the authorities also failed to note that the amount payable to the said person was already settled and in any event the alleged act not amounts to misconduct and prayed for allowing the writ petition.
3. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision reported in Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Anr. 2003 AIR SCW 4222 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court held in Para Nos. 6, 7 and 8 thus:
6. A perusal of the above judgments clearly shows that a court sitting in appeal against a punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty, however, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court, then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the abovenoted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case.
7. ...The disciplinary authority while considering the quantum of punishment came to the conclusion that the misconduct of the nature alleged against the appellant should be viewed very seriously to prevent such actions in future, whereby important and sensitive records could be lost or removed or destroyed by the employee under whose custody the records are kept. Therefore, he was of the opinion that a deterrent punishment was called for, forgetting for a moment that no such allegation of misplacing of important or sensitive record was made in the instant case against the appellant and what he was charged of was misplacement of a file, importance or sensitiveness of which was not mentioned in the charge-sheet. Therefore, in our opinion, the disciplinary authority was guided by certain facts which were not on record, even otherwise, we are of the opinion that when the Service Bye-laws applicable to the Corporation under Service Bye-law 17 provide various minor punishments, we fail to appreciate why only maximum punishment available under the said Bye-laws should be awarded on the facts of the present case. We think the punishment of dismissal for mere misplacement of a file without any ulterior motive is too harsh a punishment which is totally disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and the same certainly shocks our judicial conscience. Hence, having considered the basis on which the punishment of dismissal was imposed on the appellant and the facts and circumstances of this case, we think to avoid further prolonged litigation it would be appropriate if we modify the punishment ourselves. On the said basis, while upholding the finding of misconduct against the appellant, we think it appropriate that the appellant be imposed a punishment of withholding of one increment including stoppage at the efficiency bar in substitution of the punishment of dismissal awarded by the disciplinary authority. We further direct that the appellant will not be entitled to any back wages for the period of suspension. However, he will be entitled to the subsistence allowance payable up to the date of the dismissal order.
8. With the above modifications, this appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the disciplinary authority insofar as it directs the dismissal of the appellant, stands substituted as ordered by us hereinabove.
4. The learned Counsel for the respondents Mr. Sekar submitted that the petitioner was issued with charge memo under Rule 153 of Rules, by the Security Commissioner, Jollarpet on 24.08.1989 based on a private complaint lodged by M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances Pvt Ltd., at No. 1, Rajaji 2nd Street, Nungambakkam, Chennai - 34; that the said complaint was enquired by an Inspector of the Crime Intelligence Branch of the Force and found that the complaint made against the petitioner was true; that the said Inspector of Police also considered the documents sent by Karur Vysya Bank, Anna Nagar and Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram; that the petitioner has not informed the fact that his wife carried on business in the year 1994; that the alleged intimation by the petitioner is not supported by any evidence; that the petitioner has only produced xerox copy of the receipt of acknowledgment and certificate of posting of the year 1994 and 1997, but not enclosed the copy of the said intimation; that the petitioner admittedly issued three cheques drawn on Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai and one cheque drawn on Bank of Baroda, Chennai in favour of the said Agasthiyas TV and Home Appliances Pvt Ltd to the tune of Rs. 2,72,736/- on various dates from 09.06.1997 to 12.10.1997, which were dishonoured for insufficient funds and the accounts were closed; that the said transactions related to the petitioner only and it is evident that the petitioner has signed all the cheques as Proprietor of M/s. Shanthi Electronics and Electricals; that while answering question No. 90, the witness No. 3, Sundararajan stated that the petitioner was the proprietor of Shanthi Electronics and Electricals; that the current account with Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram Branch was opened on 03.06.1996 vide Account No. 1133 with a photograph of the petitioner as proprietor of M/s. Shanthi Electronics and Electricals and the said account was closed on 06.11.1996; that the signature of the petitioner contained in the certified copy of the account opening form with Indian Bank was marked as Ex.46; that the certificate issued by the Manager of the said Bank was marked as Ex.9 which clearly shows that the petitioner was the proprietor of the said Firm; that similarly, the petitioner has opened current account in Karur Vysya Bank, Anna Nagar Branch in the name of Shanthi Electronics and Electricals as its Proprietor; that the certificate issued by the Manager, Karur Vysya Bank Ltd, Anna Nagar dated 28.06.1999 was marked as Ex.8; that Bhavani Shankar, Dy. Manager, Karur Vysya Bank was examined as witness No. 5, who has deposed that the petitioner opened the current account vide Account No. 1539 in favour of the said firm; that the said witness had also produced certified copy of the specimen signature form with photo, account opening form with petitioner's signature and photo, sole proprietorship declaration form with his signature and the form of liability letters (bills) which are self-explanatory to show that the petitioner operated the current account as Sole Proprietor; that the petitioner has issued cheque for Rs. 5,450/- dated 09.06.1997 drawn on Karur Vysya Bank by signing as Proprietor (P2); that the petitioner issued another cheque (P3) on 06.07.1997 for Rs. 60,000/- drawn on Indian Bank; that he has issued another cheque of the same branch on 08.07.1997 for Rs. 21,780/- (P4); that on 18.08.1997, the petitioner issued another cheque on the same bank for Rs. 15,000/-; that on 08.10.1997, the petitioner has issued a cheque for Rs. 27,000/- drawn on Karur Vysya Bank; that on 12.10.1997, he issued cheque for Rs. 1,50,000/- to M/s. Lal Finance and Investment drawn on Bank of Baroda and all the above cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds; that the averment of the petitioner that he only assisted his wife in the business is incorrect; that the enquiry officer held 38 sittings from 06.09.1999 to 26.02.2001 and submitted his report holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved; that the copy of the report of the enquiry officer was sent to the petitioner through Assistant Sub-inspector of Police, Sulurpet Outpost calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation within 15 days; that the petitioner also submitted his representation dated 25.04.2001; that not satisfied with the representation, the disciplinary authority viz., the Assistant Security Commissioner forwarded the case to the first respondent, who passed the order of dismissal on 17.05.2001 which was pasted on the last known address of the petitioner at No. 31/1, Neelakandan Street, Choolaimedu, Chennai since the petitioner was not available and his wife Shanthi refused to receive the same; that the copy of the order was also sent to the petitioner at the above address by registered post with acknowledgment due on 22.05.2001 and the same was returned as not found; that the petitioner has filed time barred appeal after lapse of one year and three months on 19.09.2002 to the second respondent and the same was rejected on 18.11.2002; that the said order was sent to the last known address of the petitioner by registered post with acknowledgment due on 20.11.2002, which was acknowledged by the petitioner on 13.12.2002; that the petitioner submitted his revision to the third respondent, who has passed an order dated 19.06.2003 rejecting the revision and the same was also communicated to the petitioner by registered post with acknowledment due to his last known address on 20.06.2003 and it was returned; that the petitioner was punished on six occasions previously for various lapses; that all reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by the enquiry officer; that in reply to question No. 186 of the enquiry officer, the petitioner has stated that he is satisfied with the enquiry; that the prosecution closes his case on 30.11.2000 and the petitioner was given ample and sufficient opportunity to produce witness upto 26.06.2001, hence, the averment that enquiry officer has not given fair opportunity to the petitioner is false and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
5. Now, let us look into the charges levelled against the petitioner, which runs as follows:
Charge : 1 While working as Head Constable at RPF/Post at AJJ, he managed the business on behalf of his wife in the name of 'Shanthi Electronics' No. 31/1, Neelakandan Street, Choolaimedu, Chennai - 600 094 and operated the current accounts of the said firm as Proprietor. It is obvious that he involved in private trade directly and failed to intimate about the business of his wife. Thus, he contravened Rule 3 (1) (i) (iii), 15 (1) & (3) and 16 (4) (i) of Railway Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966.
Charge : 2 He had current account No. 1359 in Karur Vysya Bank Ltd., Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 and current account No. 1133 in Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai - 24 in the name of 'Shanthi Electronics' as its Sole Proprietor. When closing of current account at Indian Bank on 06.11.1996 he has not surrendered the cheque book. The current account at Karur Vysya Bank is still in operation with a balance of Rs. 1/-. Thus, he violated Rule 146.4 and 147(VII) of RPF Rules, 1987.
Charge : 3 He had transaction with M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd., No. 1, Rajaji II Street, Nungambakkam, Chennai - 34 on behalf of 'Shanthi Electronics' for the supply of electrical items on credit basis for about Rs. 7 lakhs. For repayment, he issued three cheques of Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai - 24, two cheques of Karur Vysya Bank, Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 and one Cheque of Bank of Baroda, Choolaimedu, Chennai - 94 in favour of Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances to the tune of Rs. 2,72,730/- on various dates from 09.06.1997 to 12.10.1997. But all the above cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds and closed accounts which resulted a complaint against him by M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances for the due of Rs. 5,20,333/- to the higher ups in Railways. Thus, he acted in a manner to defame the reputation of the Force and violated Rule 146.4 of RPF Rules, 1987.
6. Charge No. 1 against the petitioner was that he managed the business on behalf of his wife in the name of 'Shanthi Electronics' at No. 31/1, Neelakandan Street, Choolaimedu, Chennai - 600 094 and operated the current accounts of the said firm as Proprietor which is contrary to Rule 3 (1) (i) (iii), 15 (1) & (3) and 16 (4) (i) of Railway Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966. Charge No. 2 is he opened current account No. 1359 in Karur Vysya Bank Ltd., Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 and current account No. 1133 in Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai - 24 in the name of 'Shanthi Electronics' as its Sole Proprietor, but when closing of current account at Indian Bank on 06.11.1996 he has not surrendered the cheque book and made use of the same after closing the account and that the current account with Karur Vysya Bank was in force at the time of issuing charges, which are violative of Rule 146.4 and 147(VII) of RPF Rules, 1987. Charge No. 3 is that the petitioner had transaction with M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd., at No. 1, Rajaji II Street, Nungambakkam, Chennai - 34 on behalf of 'Shanthi Electronics' for supply of electrical items on credit basis for about Rs. 7 lakhs and for repayment, he issued three cheques of Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai - 24, two cheques of Karur Vysya Bank, Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 and one Cheque of Bank of Baroda, Choolaimedu, Chennai - 94 in favour of the said Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances to the tune of Rs. 2,72,730/- on various dates from 09.06.1997 to 12.10.1997, but all the above cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds and closed accounts which resulted a complaint against him by M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances for the due of Rs. 5,20,333/- which amounts to defaming the reputation of the Force and violative of Rule 146.4 of RPF Rules, 1987.
7. It is stated by the respondents that one Anandraj, Inspector of Police, Royapuram was nominated as enquiry officer, who held 38 sittings from 06.09.1999 to 26.02.2001. The first charge against the petitioner was that he has not informed the business of his wife started in the name and style of Shanthi Electricals to the respondents/department. The petitioner has produced xerox copy of the receipt of acknowledgment and certificate of posting to say that an intimation was sent to the respondents, which was rejected by the enquiry officer on the ground that the said documents are not valid to show that intimation was sent by the petitioner, besides that the copy of the intimation letter was not produced. Moreover, on verification of the documents the Enquiry Officer found that no prior permission was obtained by the petitioner or his wife to do the business, hence, the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion that charge No. 1 against the petitioner is proved.
8. In so far as charge No. 2 is concerned that the petitioner has maintained two accounts namely current account No. 1359 in Karur Vysya Bank Ltd., Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 and current account No. 1133 in Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai - 24 is concerned that the current account with Indian Bank was opened on 03.06.1997 and it was closed on 06.11.1997. The certified copy of the account opening form of current account in Indian Bank in the name of Shanthi Electricals with a photograph of the petitioner as proprietor, his signature were marked as Ex.46. Ex.9, certificate was issued by the Manager, Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram which disclose that the petitioner was maintaining the said Account as proprietor of the firm. Ex.8 is the certificate issued by the Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, Anna Nagar, Chennai dated 28.06.1999 which was accepted as valid evidence that the petitioner was the proprietor of the firm beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Bhavani Shankar, Dy. Manager, Karur Vysya Bank was examined as witness No. 5, who has deposed that the petitioner opened the current account vide No. 1539 in favour of the said firm. He also deposed that he had produced certified copy of the specimen signature form with photo, account opening form with petitioner's signature and photo to show that the petitioner operated the current account as Sole Proprietor. Based on the documents and oral evidence referred to above, the enquiry officer found that the charge No. 2 against the petitioner is proved.
9. Charge No. 3 is that the petitioner had transaction with M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd., on behalf of 'Shanthi Electronics' for supply of electrical items on credit basis for about Rs. 7 lakhs. In the course of the said transaction, the petitioner had issued three cheques of Indian Bank, Rangarajapuram, Chennai - 24, two cheques of Karur Vysya Bank, Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 and one Cheque of Bank of Baroda, Choolaimedu, Chennai - 94 in favour of Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances on various dates from 09.06.1997 to 12.10.1997, but all the above cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds and closed accounts which resulted a complaint against him by M/s. Agasthiyas TV & Home Appliances for the due of Rs. 5,20,333/-. Thus, the enquiry officer found that the petitioner acted in a manner to defame the reputation of the Force which amounts to violation of Rule 146.4 of RPF Rules, 1987.
10. The prosecution witness No. 3 Sundarajan stated that he is the Managing Director of the said Agasthiyas TV and Home Appliances, which supplied goods to the petitioner on credit basis from June 1997 to August 1997 to the tune of Rs. 7 lakhs but the petitioner did not clear the bills. It is also stated that the petitioner has issued cheque for Rs. 5,450/- dated 09.06.1997 drawn on Karur Vysya Bank by signing as Proprietor (P2); that the petitioner issued another cheque (P3) on 06.07.1997 for Rs. 60,000/- drawn on Indian Bank; that he has issued another cheque of the same branch on 08.07.1997 for Rs. 21,780/- (P4); that on 18.08.1997, the petitioner issued another cheque on the same bank for Rs. 15,000/-; that on 08.10.1997, the petitioner has issued a cheque for Rs. 27,000/- drawn on Karur Vysya Bank; that on 12.10.1997, he issued cheque for Rs. 1,50,000/- to M/s. Lal Finance and Investment drawn on Bank of Baroda and all the above cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds; PW4, T.N. Gopalakrishnan, Branch Manager of Indian Bank has deposed that the current account was opened on 03.06.1997 and closed on 16.11.1997. Similarly, witness No. 5, Bhavanishankar, Deputy Manager, Karur Vysya Bank deposed that the petitioner operated current account No. 1359 from 28.08.1996 in the name of Shanthi Electronics as Proprietor and account remained operative from 11.10.1996. Even after closing of the account with Indian Bank, the Petitioner had admittedly not surrendered the cheque books but chosen to issue cheques, hence, the enquiry officer considering all the facts has rightly found that charge No. 3 against the petitioner is proved. Considering the said evidence, the enquiry officer found all the three charges were proved.
11. The report of the enquiry officer was sent to the petitioner calling upon him to submit his representation, if any, within 15 days. Indeed, the petitioner has submitted a representation dated 25.04.2001 and on receipt of the same, the first respondent carefully considered it and passed the order of dismissal dated 17.05.2001. When the first respondent attempted to serve the order of dismissal, the petitioner was not available in the place of residence and his wife, who was available refused to receive the same, hence, the copy of the order was sent to the petitioner by registered post on 22.05.2001 to the last known address, which was returned by him. Thereafter, the first respondent ordered to affix the same in the residence of the petitioner through Chenchiah, Sub-inspector of Police, Gummudipoondi and G. Ramesh, Constable 1536 and they have done it accordingly. The petitioner, having gained time by not receiving the order of dismissal, at last has filed belated appeal dated 19.09.2002 after lapse of one year and three months before the second respondent, who rejected it on 18.11.2002. The appellate authority mentioned in its order that though the petitioner has alleged that he had undergone medical treatment and he came to know the order of dismissal only when he went for joining duty at Gummudipoondi, but, he enclosed only private Doctor's Certificate stating that he suffered from Jaundice and Vertigo from 19.05.2001 to 26.06.2002 and that the said certificate did not disclose that the petitioner was an in-patient. Even when the officers went to serve the order of dismissal passed by the first respondent, they were not informed by his wife about his illness, if any. Considering the above aspects, the appellate authority has rejected the belated appeal on the ground that the petitioner has not assigned any valid ground.
12. The petitioner has filed revision before the third respondent alleging that he was not afforded opportunity, besides, the report of the enquiry officer was not furnished. It is to be remembered that in reply to question No. 186 of the enquiry officer, the petitioner has stated that he is satisfied with the enquiry. The other averment of non-furnishing of enquiry report is concerned, it was rightly rejected by the revisionary authority stating that the same was received by the petitioner on 09.04.2001. The revisionary authority, after careful consideration of the oral and documentary evidence found that the order passed by the original authority as well as the appellate authority are perfectly valid.
13. An argument was advanced by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that misconduct alleged in the charges are not even defined either in the Railway Service Conduct Rules, 1956 or in the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and Rules 1987.
14. Misconduct is a wide expression, which is not defined in any enactment, but it can be inferred whether there are gross intentional violation of law and acts which are prohibited by Law. What amounts to misconduct is a matter which depends on the facts and circumstances of each and every case. In a number of decisions, various Courts of India have expressed the term misconduct in different aspects of the facts and circumstances of the case. Misconduct emphasis something more than negligence. The test of misconduct is to judge acts of the employee inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his obligations undertaken by him impliedly or expressly. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in Union of India v. J. Ahmed , wherein in Para Nos. 11 and 12, it was held thus:
11. ...It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness of malevolence....
12. The High Court was of the opinion that misconduct in the context of disciplinary proceeding means misbehaviour involving some form of guilty mind or mens rea. We find it difficult to subscribe to this view because gross or habitual negligence in performance of duty may not involve mens rea but may still constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings.
15. It is evident from the above judgment that the Honourable Supreme Court has summarised the expression 'misconduct' as under:
i) Blameworthy conduct
ii) Lack of efficiency, lack of intelligence, farsightedness and indecisiveness
iii) Lack of devotion to duty
iv) Gross or habitual negligence in performance of duty are the ingredients which constitutes misconduct.
16. The said judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The relevant provisions namely the Railway Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966; Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and Railway Protection Rules, 1987 relied on by the respondents also disclose what are the acts construed as misconduct.
17. The charges levelled against the petitioner discloses that the petitioner failed to inform his wife's business to the respondents and he himself directly involved in the said business, while doing so, he opened current account in his name mentioning that he is the sole proprietor of the firm and also issued cheques in respect of the business transaction by signing it as Proprietor. The above said act of the petitioner definitely comes within the ambit of the term misconduct, hence, the argument of the learned Senior counsel is rejected.
18. The original authority, appellate authority as well as the revisionary authority have concurrently found that the charges against the petitioner are proved, while so, judicial interference of this Court is not warranted. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. wherein in Para Nos. 12 and 13, it was held thus:
12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, this Court held at p.728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.
19. Applying the above judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in this case, this Court is of the view that the respondents have accepted the evidence and the conclusion received support therefrom, hence no judicial review is warranted. Moreover, this Court also finds that the punishment imposed by the respondents on the petitioner is proportionate to the charges.
20. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.