Calcutta High Court
Ellenbarrie Industrial Gases Limited vs Hdfc Bank Limited & Anr on 18 February, 2025
OCD- 1
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
ORIGINAL SIDE
COMMERCIAL DIVISION
G.A. (Com) No. 1 of 2025
In
C.S. (COM) No. 9 of 2025
ELLENBARRIE INDUSTRIAL GASES LIMITED
-VS-
HDFC BANK LIMITED & ANR.
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE KRISHNA RAO
Hearing Concluded On : 10.02.2025
Order On : 18.02.2025
Appearance:
Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rishav Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. Ritoban Sarkar, Adv.
Ms. Prerna Saha, Adv.
Mr. Aishwarya Kumar Awasthi, Adv.
... for the plaintiff.
Mr. Rudraman Bhattacharyya, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, Adv.
Mr. Aasish Choudhury, Adv.
Ms. Uma Bagree, Adv.
...For the defendant no. 2.
2
ORDER
1. The plaintiff has filed the present application for grant of interim order restraining the defendant no. 2 from invoking the bank guarantees dated 26th December, 2022 and 13th June, 2023 furnished by the defendant no.1 to the defendant no.2 at the request of the plaintiff.
2. Initially, the plaintiff has filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 being A.P. (Com) No. 695 of 2024. In the said application by an order dated 19th July, 2024, the Coordinate Bench of this Court restrained the defendants from invoking the bank guarantees. On 7th November, 2024, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has disposed of the said application by extending the period of interim order for three months by giving liberty to the plaintiff to approach the Learned Arbitrator by filing an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with interim prayer.
3. Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, Learned Senior Advocate representing the plaintiff submits that on 24th December, 2024, it was decided that the application of the plaintiff under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be treated as an application under Section 17 of the said Act. He submits that the defendant no.1 was the party to the proceeding initiated by the plaintiff before this Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 but the defendant no.1 was not a party before the Learned Arbitrator. He submits that the bank guarantees being the tripartite contract, it would not be 3 permissible to the Learned Arbitrator to pass any order of injunction in the absence of the defendant no.1. He submits that to avoid the jurisdictional issue, the plaintiff has filed the present suit and appropriate submissions were made before the Learned Arbitrator and the Learned Arbitrator has granted liberty to the plaintiff to apply for interim order before such forum as may be advised.
4. Mr. Chowdhury submits that for the purpose of invoking the bank guarantees, the defendant no.2 would be required to issue 30 days' notice to the plaintiff during the guaranteed validity period to make good the deficiency. He submits that invocation can be made by a demand indicating the amount to be received by the defendant no.2 mentioning therein that the petitioner has failed to perform its obligation before the expiry date of the guarantee under the contract and the contract is valid and binding along with the copy of the defendant no.2's letter giving 30 days' notice and a certificate that within the said period of 30 days, the plaintiff failed to make good the deficiencies.
5. Mr. Chowdhury submits that the defendant no.2 by a letter dated 20th June, 2024 for the first time given the plaintiff 30 days' notice for making good, alleged deficiencies. He submits that the period of 30 days would lapse on 19th July, 2024, only thereafter the defendant no. 2 would be entitled to issue a notice for invocation of bank guarantees, which notice would have to be issued within the guarantee validity period. He submits that since the guarantee validity period is 26th 4 June, 2024, till when the guarantee would remain in force, the defendant no.2 is not in a position to invoke the bank guarantees and the bank guarantees have lapsed and the defendant no.2 is required to return the bank guarantees to the plaintiff.
6. Mr. Chowdhury submits that the bank guarantees also records that notwithstanding the clauses contained that the defendant no.1 would be liable to pay the guaranteed amount or any part thereof, only and only if a written claim or demand was received before 26th June, 2025.
7. Mr. Chowdhury submits that the plaintiff has performed the contract and the plant which has been supplied and set up by the plaintiff is commissioned and functioning but the defendant no.2 is interested to wrongfully and fraudulently invoke the bank guarantees.
8. Mr. Rudraman Bhattacharyya, Learned Senior Advocate representing the defendant no. 2 submits that as per 246th Report of the Law Commission, Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been amended. He submits that as per the Law Commission Report, Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 has been added. As per the Law commission Report, once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall, ordinarily, not entertain an application under this provision unless circumstances exists owing to which the remedy under Section 17 is not efficacious. He submits that the Law Commission has brought the said amendment to reduce the 5 role of the Court in connection with grant of interim measures once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted.
9. Mr. Bhattacharyya submits that the Law Commission also considered to amend Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to provide the Arbitral Tribunal the same powers as a Civil Court in relation to grant of interim measures. He submits that when this provision is read in conjunction with Section 9(2), the parties will by default be forced to approach the Arbitral Tribunal for interim relief once the Tribunal has been constituted.
10. Mr. Bhattacharyya submits that the meaning of guarantee is defined in Section 126 of the Contract Act, 1872 and thus the dispute regarding invoking of bank guarantee is referable to arbitration. He submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. He submits that the plaintiff before taking leave from the Learned Arbitral Tribunal, has filed the suit.
11. Mr. Bhattacharyya submits that the plaintiff has obtained an order of injunction from the Coordinate Bench of this Court and while disposing of the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the Hon'ble Court given liberty to the plaintiff to approach the Learned Arbitrator by filing the application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with interim prayers. The Learned Arbitrator has treated the application filed under Section 9 of 6 the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as application under Section 17 of the said Act but the plaintiff, pending the said application has filed the present suit and subsequently has withdrawn the said application thus the liberty granted by the Learned Arbitrator cannot be termed as leave to file suit.
12. Mr. Bhattacharyya submits that the defendant no.2 has issued 30 days' notice to the plaintiff on 20th June, 2024 i.e. before expiry of the guarantee. He submits that the as per the clauses of bank guarantee, the bank is liable to pay the guaranteed amount or any part thereof, on receipt of a written claim or demand on or before 26th June, 2025 and accordingly, the defendant no. 2 has made demand before 26th June, 2025 after service of 30 days' notice to the plaintiff.
13. The plaintiff has filed the suit praying for the following reliefs:
a. Declaration that the bank guarantees dated December 26, 2022 and July 13, 2023 being Annexures B hereof furnished by the Defendant no. 1 on the request of the Plaintiff to the Defendant no. 2 are required to be returned to the Plaintiff;
b. Alternatively, the said bank guarantees dated December 26, 2022 and July 13, 2023 being Annexure B hereof be adjudged null and void and be delivered up and cancelled;
c. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant no. 2 from invoking the bank guarantees dated December 26, 2022 and July 13, 2023 furnished by the Defendant no. 1 on behalf of the Plaintiff to the Defendant no. 2 being Annexure B hereof or from the Defendant no. 1 making any payment thereunder to the 7 Defendant no. 2 or permitting such invocation, in any manner whatsoever."
14. The first issue raised by the defendant no.2 in the present application, whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The plaintiff has previously initiated a proceeding under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 being AP (Com) No. 695 of 2024. In the said proceeding, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has granted interim order restraining the defendants from invoking the bank guarantee. By an order dated 7th November, 2024, the Coordinate Bench of this Court disposed of the said proceeding by extending the interim order for a period of three months by giving liberty to the plaintiff to approach the Learned Arbitrator by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act with interim prayers and the Learned Arbitrator was requested to decide the scope of the interim prayer made and dispose of the application within three months independently without being influenced by the observation made in the order dated 19th July, 2024 passed in AP (Com) No. 695 of 2024. On the same day, the Hon'ble Court has appointed an Arbitrator.
15. On 20th January, 2025, the Learned Senior Advocate representing the plaintiff submitted before the Learned Arbitrator that the plaintiff has already filed a suit restricted to the relief of a preventive injunction against the defendant no.2 and has not pressed the application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. On the prayer 8 of the Learned Advocate for the plaintiff, the Learned Arbitrator has dismissed the said application as not pressed with the liberty to the plaintiff to apply for preventive injunction before such forum as he may be advised.
16. Order XXIII, Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads as follows:
"ORDER XXIII Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits
1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.-- (3) Where the Court is satisfied,--
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of a suit or part of a claim, It may, on such terms as it thinks fit grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim."
17. In the case of Sukumar Banerjee Vs. Dilip Kumar Sarkar and Others reported in AIR 1982 Cal 17, the Coordinate Bench of this Court held that since the plaintiff of that suit was permitted to withdraw from it with liberty to sue afresh, in the eye of law there was no existence of any such suit. Consequently, the findings arrived at in the earlier suit have no effect on the present suit. It is, therefore, held that there is no question of res judicata.
9
18. In the case of Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P. Gwalior and Others reported in (1987) 1 SCC 5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file fresh suit. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by initiating suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII.
19. In the case of HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. Vs. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the main purpose of permitting the withdrawal of a suit and its re-filing is to ensure that justice is not thwarted due to technicalities. Where permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 is granted, the principle of estoppel does not operate and the principle of res judicata would also not apply. However, Order XXIII Rule 1 is not intended to enable the plaintiff to get a chance to commence litigation 10 afresh in order to avoid the results of his previous suit, or to engage in multiple proceedings with the motive of bench hunting.
20. Section 126 of the Contract Act, 1872, defines "Contract of guarantee", "Surety", "Principal Debtor" and "Creditor". The issue in the suit filed by the plaintiff is that the defendant no.2 intending to invoke the bank guarantee fraudulently instead of returning the bank guarantees to the plaintiff. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not limit the jurisdiction of the Court to pass interim measures only against a party to an arbitration agreement.
21. In the case of Andhra Civil Construction Co. Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in 1992 (2) Bom CR 132, the Bombay High Court held that if the petitioner makes the money claim against the respondent for refund of amount collected by the respondent by encashing the bank guarantee and for other consequential claims like damages after the bank guarantee is encashed, such a claim can be referred to arbitration as the bank would not be then concerned with the dispute of this kind arising between the petitioner and the respondent only. If the petitioner seeks an order of injunction restraining enforcement/ encashment of the bank guarantee, it would have to file a civil suit after impleading the bank as a party defendant in the suit.
22. In the present case when the application filed by plaintiff before the Learned Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation 11 Act, 1996, the plaintiff has realized that the plaintiff is praying for an interim order against the bank for revocation of bank guarantees and the bank is the third party and not a party to the agreement, accordingly, the plaintiff has filed the present suit and informed the Learned Arbitrator and the Learned Arbitral Tribunal has also granted liberty to the plaintiff to apply for preventive injunction before such forum, thus the objection raised by the defendant no. 2 does not sustain.
23. The second issue raised by the defendants is that as per the amended Act of 1996, the Arbitral Tribunal has the same power to grant interim relief as the Court and remedy under Section 17 is as efficacious as the remedy under Section 9(1) of the Act. Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as follows:
"17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal.-- (1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings, apply to the arbitral tribunal--
(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:--
(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;
(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing 12 which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;
(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;
(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient, and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for making orders, as the court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.
(2) Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under section 37, any order issued by the arbitral tribunal under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court."
24. Mr. Bhattacharyya relied upon the judgment in the case of Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited Vs. Essar Bulk Terminal Limited reported in (2022) 1 SCC 712 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"60. A civil court of competent jurisdiction thus has the jurisdiction to admit, entertain and decide an application under Section 9(1) of the Arbitration Act, any time before the final arbitral 13 award is enforced in accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act.
61. However, sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, on which much emphasis has been placed both by Mr Khambata and Mr Kapil Sibal provides that once an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render, the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.
62. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 has two limbs. The first limb prohibits an application under sub- section (1) from being entertained once an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted. The second limb carves out an exception to that prohibition, if the Court finds that circumstances exist, which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.
63. To discourage the filing of applications for interim measures in courts under Section 9(1) of the Arbitration Act, Section 17 has also been amended to clothe the Arbitral Tribunal with the same powers to grant interim measures, as the Court under Section 9(1). The 2015 Amendment also introduces a deeming fiction, whereby an order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 is deemed to be an order of court for all purposes and is enforceable as an order of court.
64. With the law as it stands today, the Arbitral Tribunal has the same power to grant interim relief as the Court and the remedy under Section 17 is as efficacious as the remedy under Section 9(1). There is, therefore, no reason why the Court should continue to take up applications for interim relief, once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted and is in seisin of the dispute between the parties, unless there is some impediment in approaching the Arbitral Tribunal, or the interim relief sought cannot expeditiously be obtained from the Arbitral Tribunal."14
25. As per 246th Law Commission Report appropriate amendment has been made in Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the present case, the plaintiff has filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in which the plaintiff has prayed for interim order against the bank for revocation of the Bank Guarantees. The plaintiff has made the bank as party to the said proceeding before the Coordinate Bench of this Court. When an Arbitrator was appointed, the Hon'ble Court by giving liberty to the plaintiff to file an application under Section 17 of the said Act before the Arbitral Tribunal and extended the interim order for three months with the direction to the Arbitral Tribunal to dispose of the application within a period of three months without being influenced by the observation made in the order dated 19th July, 2024.
26. Before the Arbitral Tribunal, the application under Section 9 was treated as application under Section 17 of the said Act. When the plaintiff realized that the plaintiff is praying for an interim order against the bank and the bank is not the party to the arbitration proceeding and the Arbitral Tribunal cannot pass an interim order against the third party, the plaintiff has filed the present suit.
27. On a combined reading of Section 9 with Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, the Court would not entertain and/or in other words take up for consideration and apply its mind to an application for interim measures, unless the remedy under Section 17 is inefficacious, even 15 though the application may have filed before the constitution of Arbitral Tribunal. In the present case, the plaintiff has filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before constitution of Arbitral Tribunal by impleading the bank as party to the said proceeding. In the said proceeding, the plaintiff has obtained an interim order against the bank with respect to the Bank Guarantees. On appointment of an Arbitrator, the plaintiff is given liberty to file an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Arbitral Tribunal and interim order was extended for three months. The Bank Guarantee is a separate contract and distinct from the main contract which contained arbitration clause. The bank is third party to the contract and has no connection to the performance of the obligations under the main contract which contained an arbitration clause.
28. The bank is not a party to the arbitration. The injunction will be to restrain the defendant no.2 from invoking the Bank Guarantee. This injunction does not in any manner fall foul of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Injunction against invocation of the Bank Guarantee is permissible relief under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even if the defendant no.2 has invoked the Bank Guarantee, the entire amount can be attached or secured in an appropriate manner by the Arbitral Tribunal in exercise of power conferred under Section 17 of the said Act of 1996.
16
29. The Power under Section 17 is much broader than the powers granted to a Court under Section 9 of the said Act. Further, the order passed under Section 17 is appealable under Section 37 only on limited grounds which relates to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to pass such an order. The Law Commission of India in its 246th Report categorically mentioned that Section 17 as an important provision for the smooth and efficient working of the arbitration proceeding since it provides valuable right to the parties to approach Arbitral Tribunal for interim relief. The newly worded Section 17(1) exactly similar to Section 9(1) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal are now allowed to pass interim measures during the ongoing arbitral proceeding. The other major change in the Act is about the scope of relief. In the form of Section 17(1)(ii)(e), the Arbitral Tribunal has now power similar to Court. The provision is further followed by the wording "the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the same power of making orders, as the Court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it".
30. In the case in hand the plaintiff has initially filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the defendants wherein, the plaintiff has described the defendant no. 2 in the said application as "Respondent no.1" and the defendant no.2 as "Respondent no.2/ Proforma Respondent". In the said application, the plaintiff has prayed for following reliefs:
"a) Direction and/or order upon the Respondent No. 1 company to forthwith make over the original Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02231640002 dated 13th June, 2023 17 amounting to Rs.3,25,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores Twenty-Five Lakhs only) and Performance Guarantee Bank No. 014GT02223600002 dated 26th December, 2022 amounting to Rs.
1,60,00,000/- petitioner, to enable the petitioner to forthwith have the same cancelled by the Respondent No.2 /Proforma Respondent Bank.
b) An order and/or direction upon the Respondent to forthwith return the said Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02231640002 dated 13th June, 2023 amounting to Rs.3,25,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores Twenty-Five Lakhs only) and Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02223600002 dated 26th December, 2022 amounting to Rs. 1,60,00,000/- being Annexures - B hereof;
c) An order of injunction be passed restraining the Respondent No. 1 company from invoking the Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02231640002 dated 13th June, 2023 amounting to Rs. 3,25,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores Twenty-Five Lakhs only) and Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02223600002 dated 26th December, 2022 amounting to Rs.
1,60,00,000/- being Annexure B hereof in any manner whatsoever or from receiving any payment thereunder.
d) An order of injunction upon the Respondent No. 2/ Proforma Respondent Bank upon any order being passed in terms of prayers (a) and (b) above, from releasing any payment under the Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02231640002 dated 13th June, 2023 amounting to Rs.3,25,00,000/-
(Rupees Three Crores Twenty-Five Lakhs only) and Performance Bank Guarantee No. 014GT02223600002 dated 26th December, 2022 amounting to Rs.1,60,00,000/- being Annexure B hereof or from recording invocation thereof in any manner whatsoever;
e) Injunction;
f) Attachment;
g) Costs;
18
h) Ad interim orders in terms of prayer above;
i) Such further and/or other order or orders be passed, direction or directions be given as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper."
31. By an order dated 19th July, 2024, the Coordinate Bench of this Court passed the following order:
"However, in view of the petitioner having made out a very strong prima facie case for getting an injunction, in view of the respondents beneficiaries having not been able to invoke the bank guarantee in terms of its clauses, the respondents are restrained by an order of injunction from invoking the bank guarantees in question, respectively dated December 26, 2022 and June 13, 2023, as annexed at pages 88 and 83 of the present application, till August 31, 2024 or until further order, whichever is earlier."
32. The prayer (c) of the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the plaintiff has prayed for specific injunction order against the defendant no.2 (Respondent no.1 in the said application) for invoking the Performance Guarantees. The application filed by the plaintiff under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was treated as an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, thus the prayer before the Arbitral Tribunal was the same as that of the prayer made in application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
33. In the present application also the plaintiff has prayed for an order of injunction against the defendant no.2 from invoking the Bank Guarantees dated 26th December, 2022 and 13th June, 2023. 19
It is the specific case made out by the plaintiff in the present application that the defendant no. 2 by issuing notices dated 18th June, 2024 and 20th June, 2024 interested to invoke Bank Guarantee. In paragraph 58 of the present application, the plaintiff contended that the plaintiff is entitled to an order of injunction restraining the defendant no. 2 from invoking Bank Guarantees. If, the main relief for grant of injunction against the defendant no.2, the plaintiff ought to have prayed for the said relief before the Arbitral Tribunal.
34. Considering the above, this Court did not find any justification to pass interim order during the pendency of proceeding before the Learned Arbitral Tribunal.
35. As the defendant no.2 has already entered appearance but none appeared on behalf of the defendant no. 1, the plaintiff is directed to serve notice upon the defendant no.1 immediately. The defendants are directed to file their affidavit-in-opposition within two weeks, reply, if any, thereto be filed within a week thereafter.
36. List the matter on 17th March, 2025.
(Krishna Rao, J.) Later :
After the order passed by this Court, Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has prayed for stay of the order. Counsel for the defendant no.
2 has raised objection.20
Considering the submission made by the Counsel for the respective parties, this Court finds that the matter involves point of law.
Accordingly, operation of the order is stayed for a period of one week.
(Krishna Rao, J.) p.d/-