Uttarakhand High Court
Unknown vs Syndicate Bank Through Its Branch ... on 27 November, 2020
Author: Lok Pal Singh
Bench: Lok Pal Singh
RESERVED JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Civil Revision No.107 of 2019
Swami Rupendra Prakash
....Revisionist
Vs.
Syndicate Bank through its Branch Manager
...Respondent
Mr. Nikhil Singhal, Advocate for the revisionist
Mr. M.K. Goyal, Advocate for the respondent
Hon'ble Lok Pal Singh, J.
Instant civil revision, preferred under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is directed against the judgment and order dated 07.08.2019 passed by Judge, SCC/1st Additional District Judge, Haridwar in S.C.C. suit no.09 of 2014 Swami Rupendra Prakash vs. Syndicate Bank, whereby the plaintiff's suit for rent, eviction and mesne profit has been dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that revisionist/plaintiff instituted a suit being SCC suit no.09 of 2014 for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits against the respondent/defendant in the court of Judge, S.C.C. Haridwar, stating therein that Guru of the revisionist namely Swami Hans Prakash was the Mahant/Manager-landlord of the property in question along with other properties, which was let out to respondent/defendant on the rent of ` 11,500/- per month and in addition to that an amount of ` 1,500/- were to be paid as water and sewerage charges. The said property was let out to the respondent/defendant on 2 01.04.2006 for a period of five years and in this regard a lease deed was executed on 13.04.2007 between Swami Hans Prakash, landlord/Mahant of Prachin Avdhoot Mandal Ashram Jwalapur and defendant bank. Swami Hans Prakash left for heavenly abode on 05.01.2013. The revisionist/plaintiff, being the disciple, and on the basis of Will dated 17.12.2012, being executed by Swami Hans Prakash, became the successor and was enthroned as Mahant of Pracheen Avdhoot Mandal Ashram and he became the landlord of the property in question. It is stated that the defendant/respondent is in arrears of rent since 01.06.2013 and thus a notice dated 20.12.2013 was issued to the defendant/respondent, terminating its tenancy. Inspite of notice dated 20.12.2013, when the defendant bank did not vacate the premises, present suit was filed.
3. The defendant/respondent contested the suit and filed his written statement, thereby denying the plaint averments. It was stated that a lease deed was executed on 13.04.2007 between Swami Hans Prakash, the landlord and Mahant of Prachin Avdhoot Mandal Ashram Jwalapur and defendant bank which was signed by Swami Hansprakash Chela Swami Govind Prakash being the President and Mahant of said Ashram. It was further stated that the bank defendant is not using the property in question since 23.06.2013. In paragraphs 11 and 13, the defendant stated as follows:-
Þ11- ;g fd bl ifjlj dslEcU/k es aoknh cS d ,oaHkou Lokeh iz a kphu vo/kw r e.My vkJe Tokykiq j dse/; fu;ekuq lkj yhtMhM fnuka fdr 13- 04-2007 fu'ikfnr gks d j jft0 djkbZxbZFkh ftldh jft0 cgh ua 01 ftYn 36 is t 251 ls272 es auEcj 6043 ij fnuka fdr 13-04-2007 bZ 0 dks mifucU/kd dk;kZ y; gfj}kj ij gq bZgS A 3 14-;g fd cS a d }kjkfu;ekuq lkj bl Hkou@ ifjlj dkscS a d dsfoLrkjiVy ds:i es aiz ;ks x fd;k x;k vkS j ckn es acS a d fufr;ks adsvuq lkj mijks Dr foLrkjiVy dks"kk[kk ds:i es aifjofrZ r dj ns usdsdkj.k oknh cS a d dks vfrfjDr {ks =Qy dh vko";drk gks usdh otg lscS a d }kjk "ka d j vkJe Tokykiq j dsmÙkj dh fn"kk es anw ljk Hkou fdjk;sij ys d j fnuka d 26-06- 2013 bZ 0 dksviuk dkjks ckj iz kphu vo/kw r e.My vkJe Tokykiq j ds LokfeRo okyh lEifÙkj@ ifjlj lsLFkkuka fjr djdsu;sifjlj es a"kq : dj fn;kAÞ
4. Meanwhile, an application under Order I Rule 10 of CPC was filed on behalf of Shri Avdhoot Mandal Ashram Pracheen Brahma Das Trust through General Secretary Sushil Kumar Malik on 27.05.2014. Thereafter, on 19.06.2014, another application under Order I Rule 10 of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC was filed at the behest of Shri Avdhoot Mandal Ashram Pracheen Brahmadas Trust through Mahant Swami Shyam Prakash, Manager and Deputy Manager Swami Balram Das, and Swami Balram Das and Mahant Swami Shyam Prakash disciple of Swami Mahant Swami Hansprakash. The plaintiff resisted both the applications and filed separate objections on 01.09.2014. Despite several opportunities, as none appeared to press the applications, said impleadment applications were dismissed in default.
5. On pleadings of parties, Judge, S.C.C. formulated following issues:-
(i) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed property and the defendant is the tenant at the rent of ` 11,500/- per month and ` 1500/- per month water tax?
(ii) Whether, being a religious property, the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are not applicable to the disputed property ?4
(iii) Whether the plaintiff has terminated the tenancy of the defendant vide notice dated 20.12.2013 ?
(iv) Whether the defendant is not in possession over the disputed property since 26.06.2013 and has vacated the said property and has shifted to some other place, due to which no cause of action arises against them ?
(v) The plaintiff is entitled to get what relief?
6. Meanwhile, one more application was filed at the behest of Shri Vijay Kumar Malik, claiming General Secretary, Shri Avdhoot Mandal Ashram Pracheen Brahamdas Trust Hariwar, being paper no.41C, under Order I Rule 10 r/w 151 CPC, on 16.10.2015, on the ground that he is the necessary and proper party in the suit. Plaintiff filed his objections to the said application. After hearing the parties, Judge SCC, Haridwar, allowed the impleadment application vide order dated 03.12.2016. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred a writ petition before this Court being WPMS No.1081 of 2017. A coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 16.05.2017, stayed the order dated 03.12.2016.
7. Thereafter, the parties led their oral and documentary evidence. Revisionist/plaintiff Swami Rupendra Prakash got examined himself as PW1 and filed the original notice dated 20.12.2013, acknowledgment receipt, certified copy of plaint of misc. case no.22/2006, certified copy of affidavit of Swami Hansa Prakash filed in case no.22/2006, Xerox copy of list of members dated 20.11.2012, etc. On the other hand, the defendant got examined DW1 Bhagwat Prasad Bhatt, Branch Manager, Syndicate Bank.
58. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of evidence, learned Judge, S.C.C. decided issued no.(i) against the plaintiff. While doing so, the learned Judge recorded a finding that a lease deed was executed between the original landlord Swami Hans Prakash and the respondent/defendant bank on 13.04.2007 for a period of five years. After the death of Late Swami Hans Prakash, many other persons are claiming their title over the property in dispute and in this regard a number of cases are pending in the respective courts. Further finding was recorded that the plaintiff has failed to prove that after the death of Swami Hans Prakash and prior to issuance of notice dated 20.12.2013, terminating the tenancy of the defendant, any information whatsoever was given to the defendant at any point of time that after the death of Swami Hans Prakash, plaintiff Rupendra Praksh became the landlord of the disputed property and that the defendant has to pay the rent to him. It was, accordingly, held that there does not exist any landlord-tenant relationship between the revisionist/plaintiff and respondent/defendant.
9. On issue no.2, learned Judge, S.C.C. recorded a finding that the disputed property is a religious property and as its rent is ` 11,500/- per month therefore the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are not applicable to the disputed property. On issue no.3, Judge, SCC recorded a finding that as the landlord-tenant relationship is not established between the revisionist/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, therefore, the notice dated 20.12.2013 is null and void. Accordingly, issue no.3 was decided against the plaintiff. On issue no.4, Judge SCC recorded finding that it is an admitted fact that the defendant/respondent is tenant in the disputed property.
6DW1 Bhagwat Prasad Bhatt, Branch Manager, has given statement that the bank has shifted its branch to some other building since 26.03.2013 and that the rent till 30.06.2013 has been deposited in the bank account of Prachin Avdhot Mandal Ashram. But as different parties are claiming their ownership over the said Ashram, hence, the defendant bank has instituted a suit no.69/2014 in the court of Additional Civil Judge (S.D.), for a decree of declaration, which is pending consideration, and the keys of the disputed property has been deposited before the said court. It was further recorded that DW1 has admitted that inspite of vacating the property, the defendant bank has put their locks in the disputed property, hence, it was held that the defendant is still in physical possession over the suit property. On issue no.5, the trial court recorded finding that the as the landlord-tenant relationship is not proved between the plaintiff and defendant, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the relief sought and the suit is liable to be dismissed. On the basis of findings recording on all the issues, Judge, SCC, by judgment and decree dated 07.08.2019, dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the entire material available on record.
11. Learned counsel for the revisionist would submit that the trial court has recorded a perverse finding that landlord-tenant relationship does not exist between the revisionist/plaintiff and respondent/defendant. He would submit that the trial court has failed to appreciate that by virtue of will dated 17.12.2012 the plaintiff is the Mahant and landlord of the suit property, being the disciple of late Swami Hans Praksh Ji Maharaj. He would further submit that the tenant cannot avoid the eviction 7 proceedings merely by denying the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the landlord. To buttress his submission, he would place reliance on the decision of Shamim Akhtar v. Iqbal Ahmad (2000) 8 SCC 123, which will be discussed in latter part of the judgment.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/defendant would submit that there are no landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. He would further submit that the findings recorded by the Judge, Small Cause Court are based on appreciation of evidence. Thus, being essentially a finding of fact, the same may not be disturbed in exercise of powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. To buttress his submissions, learned counsel would place reliance on the following judgments, which this Court would discuss in subsequent paragraphs:-
(i) Civil Appeal Nos. 2528-29 of 2020 Addissery Raghavan vs. Cheruvalath Krishnadasn
(ii) Budhu Mal vs. Mahabir Prasad and others (1988) 4 SCC 194
13. Having heard the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of entire record, this Court will now proceed to record its independent findings on the issues so recorded by the trial court.
14. First question that arises for consideration is whether in a suit for eviction, the suit can be dismissed on the ground that the same involves title dispute. Law on this point is no more res integra having been settled in a 8 catena of decisions, which say that the question of title to the suit property could be gone into incidentally while deciding the case of the plaintiff seeking a decree of eviction.
15. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Ranbir Singh vs. Asharfi Lal, (1995) 6 SCC 580 has held as under:-
"9. it may be pointed out that it is well-settled law that the question of title of the property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit. In a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the privity of contract of tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such relationship the Court has only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title if disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the relationship between the litigating parties. In LIC v. India Automobiles & C.o (SCC pp. 300-02, para 21) this Court had an occasion to deal with similar controversy. In the said decision this Court observed that in a suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parites it will have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It has been further observed that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bonafide the Court may have to got into tenant's contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has 9 to see whether the tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case."
16. The decision of Shamim Akhtar v. Iqbal Ahmad (2000) 8 SCC 123, referred by the learned counsel for the revisionist, is also fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment are relevant, which are extracted hereunder:-
"11. From the resume of the facts of the case stated in the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the proceedings initiated by the landlady for eviction of the tenant has been pending in the courts over a period of nearly two decades. On perusal of the orders passed by the lower courts and the judgment of the High Court we find that time has been devoted to consideration of the objection against maintainability of the suit in the Small Causes Court. The basic fact which appears to have been lost sight of in the smokescreen created over the jurisdictional issue is that the petition was filed under section 20 of the Act by the plaintiff claiming to be landlady of the house in question against the respondent who undisputedly was a tenant in occupation of the said premises. As noted earlier respondent No.1 has all through denied that the plaintiff- appellant had any title to or interest in the suit property and also denied that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between them. He had also pleaded the case that one Mohd. Ibrahim was his landlord and he had been paying rent for the suit house to him. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the question to be determined was whether the case of the plaintiff that she was the landlady of the respondent and she was entitled to a decree of eviction in her favour on the grounds of denial of her title by the latter and non payment of rent by him. The learned single Judge has observed in the judgment under challenge and in our view rightly, the question of title to the suit property could be gone into incidentally while deciding the case of the plaintiff 10 seeking a decree of eviction. The question of title to the property was not to be finally determined in the proceeding instituted under the Act. If this position is kept in mind it becomes clear that the issue of maintainability of the suit in the Small Causes Court loses its relevance and consequentially, the objections raised on the basis of the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and the Enemy Property Act, 1968 which were introduced subsequently by the respondent lose their significance for the purpose of disposal of the proceeding. Our attention has not been drawn to any material on record to show that in any duly constituted proceeding under any of the aforementioned Acts the competent authority has declared the suit property to be either evacuee property or enemy property. From the discussions in the orders passed by the lower courts it also appears that an attempt was made by the tenant to initiate a proceeding before the District Magistrate, Varanasi-cum-Custodian of Enemy Property which ultimately did not succeed. It appears to us that these questions were belatedly introduced in the proceeding by the tenant with a view to prolong the proceedings so that he could continue in possession of the premises for as long a period as possible. To an extent his attempt appear to have succeeded resulting in repeated remands of the proceeding to the Trial Court for disposal of the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue or for determining merits of the case. It is unfortunate that the learned single Judge of the High Court could not analyse the case properly to reach at the core question which, as stated earlier, was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of eviction against the tenant.
12. The Trial Court in the facts and circumstances of the case clearly erred in returning the plaint to the plaintiff-appellant under Section 23 of the Small Causes Court Act. Section 23(1) provides that when the right of a plaintiff and the relief claimed by him in a court of small cause depends upon the proof or disproof of a title to immovable property or other title which such a Court cannot finally determine, the Court may at 11 any stage of the proceedings return the plaint to be presented to a Court having jurisdiction to determine the title. The power vested under sub- section (1) in the Court is discretionary. It is to be exercised only when the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the proceeding before the Small Causes Court depends upon the proof or disproof of a title to the immovable property and the relief sought cannot be granted without determination of the question. In the present case, as noted earlier, the plaintiff filed a petition for eviction under Section 20(2)(f) alleging that she was the landlady of the house and she had inducted respondent no.1 as tenant of the premises. The question was whether that case was to be accepted or not. Indeed the Trial Court, at the first instance, had accepted the plaintiff's case holding, inter alia, that she had got the property by a registered deed of gift from Smt. Khairunnisa Bibi who in turn had been gifted the property by her mother Fakia Bibi who, undisputedly was the original owner of the property. The question of title of the plaintiff to the suit house could be considered by the Small Causes Court in the proceedings as an incidental question and final determination of the title could be left for decision of the competent Court. In such circumstances, it could not be said that for the purpose of granting the relief claimed by the plaintiff it was absolutely necessary for the Small Causes Court to determine finally the title to the property. The tenant-respondent by merely denying the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the plaintiff could not avoid the eviction proceeding under the Rent Control Act. That is neither the language nor the purpose of the provisions in Section 23(1) of the Small Causes Court Act."
17. Having ascertained the aforesaid legal position, this Court will now deal with the findings recorded by the Judge, SCC, on issue no.1. A perusal of the pleadings would depict that the defendant has not claimed its own title over the suit property nor it has disclaimed tenancy.
12The defendant has only disputed the fact that the plaintiff is the landlord of the suit property. However, the defendant has admitted that the tenancy of the suit property was given to the defendant bank by the then Mahant of the Ashram/Guru of the plaintiff Swami Hans Prakash at the rate of ` 11,500/- per month vide lease deed dated 01.04.2006 for a period of five years. The plaintiff has taken a specific plea that after the death of Swami Hans Prakash, the plaintiff was enthroned as Mahant of said Ashram and, by virtue of the same he has become the landlord of the suit property. Said averment made in the plaint has not been specifically denied by the defendant in the written statement. Rather, evasive and uncertain pleading has been taken in the written statement. On the one hand, the defendant has pleaded that a lease deed dated 13.04.2007 was executed between the original landlord, the then Mahant of the Ashram Swami Hans Prakash and the bank in respect of the suit property, whereas on the other the defendant has contended that the said Ashram is the owner of the suit premises. It was also stated that due to conflicting claims raised by several parties with regard to ownership of the suit property, the defendant has deposited the rent in the bank account of the said Ashram upto 26.06.2013 and since 26.06.2013 the defendant bank is running in some other premises. A further contradictory pleading has been made that due to conflicting claims of the parties, the defendant has put their locks in the suit property.
18. Indisputably, defendant bank is tenant of the suit property and cannot go beyond the claim of tenant, The defendant, being the tenant, has no right to probe the ownership of the landlord. After the death of Swami Hans Prakash, the plaintiff is Mahant of said Ashram. As such, 13 the plaintiff is the landlord of the suit property. Thus, relationship of landlord and tenant is established. The plaintiff has successfully proved that he is the landlord of the suit property, and being the landlord, he has rightly maintained the suit for eviction against the tenant. The trial court has erred in law in entering into the question of title in a suit for eviction and thereafter in recording the finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove landlord- tenant relationship with the defendant. The trial court in a very cursory manner, without recording the finding that the defendant has not come with a specific denial of plaintiff's case, has illegally decided issue no.1 against the plaintiff. Having considered the pleadings and upon perusal of evidence adduced by the parties, this Court is of the firm view that the plaintiff has successfully proved the relationship of landlord and tenant with the defendant. Thus, the findings recorded by the Judge, S.C.C. on issue no.1, being perverse and illegal, are hereby set aside.
19. Now, this Court would discuss the judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondents. In Civil Appeal Nos. 2528-29 of 2020 Addissery Raghavan vs. Cheruvalath Krishnadasn, the eviction petitions filed by a landlord were decreed under Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act by the Rent Control Board. The Appellate Authority had reversed the Order of the Rent Control Court. When the matter reached the High Court, in revision the High Court reversed the order of the Appellate Authority and restored the Eviction Order passed by the Rent Control Board. Placing reliance of the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78, the Three judge Bench of the Apex Court held that none of the Rent Control Acts entitles the 14 High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court or first appellate authority. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Thus, interfering with this finding of fact, again, without any perversity or mis- appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts.
20. In Budhu Mal vs. Mahabir Prasad and others (1988) 4 SCC 194, it was held as under:-
"9. With regard to the applicability of Section 23 aforesaid the High Court has taken the view that the said section gave a discretion to a court to return or not to return the plaint where a question of title is raised and did not debar it from deciding the suit. If in a particular case the Judge, Small Causes did not exercise his discretion to return the plaint the said discretion could not be interfered with in a civil revision.
10. It is true that Section 23 does not make it obligatory on the court of small causes to invariably return the plaint once a question of title is raised by the tenant. It is also true that in a suit instituted by the landlord against his tenant on the basis of contract of tenancy, a question of title could also incidentally be gone into and that any finding recorded by a Judge, Small Causes in this behalf could not be res judicata in a suit based on title. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that in enacting Section 23 the Legislature must have had in contemplation some cases in which the discretion to return the plaint ought to be exercised in order to do complete justice between the parties. On the facts of the instant cases we feel that these are such cases in which in order to do complete justice between the parties the plaints ought to have been returned for presentation to a court having jurisdiction to determine the title. In case 15 the plea set up by the appellants that by the deed dated 8th December, 1966 the benefit arising out of immovable property which itself constituted immovable property was transferred and in pursuance of the information conveyed in this behalf by Mahabir Prasad to them the appellants started paying rent to Smt. Sulochna Devi and that the said deed could not be unilaterally cancelled, is accepted, it is likely not only to affect the title of Mahabir Prasad to realise rent from the appellants but will also have the effect of snapping even the relationship of landlord and tenant. between Mahabir Prasad 'and the appellants which could not he revived by the subsequent unilateral cancellation by Mahabir Prasad of the said deed dated 8th December, 1966. In that event it may not he possible to treat the suits filed by Mahabir Prasad against the appellants to be suits between landlord and tenant simpliciter based on contract of tenancy in which an issue of title was incidentally raised. If the suits cannot be construed to be one between landlord and tenant they would not be cognizable by a court of small causes and it is for these reasons that we are of the opinion that these are such cases where the plaints ought to have been returned for presentation to appropriate court so that none of the parties was prejudiced."
21. Insofar as the decision of Buddhu Mal's case is concerned, there are subsequent judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, other way also, in which it has been held that in an eviction suit the court needs to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question, which may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally in the eviction proceeding. One such judgment has been adverted to by this Court in the preceding paragraphs. That being the position, the ratio of law laid down in Buddhu Mal's case is of no help to the petitioner. It is apt to note that the defendant did not claim its own title over the suit property, rather simply stated that some other 16 persons are claiming their rights over the suit property, but nothing has been brought on record by the defendants to prove such fact. It is noteworthy that except the plaintiff no one has demanded rent from the defendant-bank. In making default in paying the rent, tenancy of the defendant bank was terminated by the plaintiff, by issuing a demand notice. It is not the case of the defendant that, except the plaintiff, anyone has ever issued notice to the defendant, demanding rent of the suit property. Demand notice was issued by the plaintiff to the defendant but the defendant neither complied with the notice nor handed over the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. By putting their locks over the suit property would not come to the rescue of the defendant that the defendant has vacated the suit property. Since except the plaintiff, no other person, demanded the possession and rent of the suit property from the bank, the defendant in such contingency, was not right in not giving the rent to the plaintiff or to deny the landlordship of the plaintiff over the suit property. The plaintiff has proved by adducing oral and documentary evidence that he is the landlord and Mahant of Prachin, being the disciple of Swami Hans Prakash. This fact has not been specifically denied. Evasive denial has been made by the defendant in the written statement. It is settled position in law that a defendant is required to deny the averments made in the plaint categorically, as evasive denial amounts to admission of the plaint averments.
22. In the light of aforesaid, findings recorded by Judge, S.C.C. on issue nos.1 and 3 are hereby set aside. It is accordingly held that the plaintiff is the landlord of the suit property and has right terminated the tenancy of the defendant, vide notice dated 20.12.2013.
1723. As this Court has already held that there exists landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the second question which arises for consideration is whether plaintiff is entitled to get the relief sought for? In this regard, the plaintiff by way of oral and documentary evidence has pleaded that a registered notice dated 20.12.2013 was sent to the defendant terminating tenancy on the ground of default in payment of rent and taxes. It was stated that the defendant has not paid the rent and taxes since 01.06.2013. In the written statement, the defendant has not specifically denied the said averment but has stated that the defendant bank has vacated the suit property on 26.06.2013 and since 26.06.2013 the defendant bank is running its business in some other premises. Though it is stated by the defendant that the defendant bank has vacated the suit premises and is not using the same, but it has also been admitted by the defendant that the defendant has put their locks in the suit premises and has not handed over its keys to the plaintiff. The defendant may or may not be using the suit premises but the fact remains that physical possession of the suit property was not handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant, rather the defendant has put their locks in the suit property. Further, as it is the own case of the defendant that the bank has paid the rent upto 26.06.2013 and has not delivered the actual physical possession to the plaintiff, the defendant bank has committed default in payment of rent and other taxes. In such circumstances, the defendant is liable to pay the rent and damages to the plaintiff.
24. Insofar as the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts 18 Act, 1887 is concerned, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani (2007) 8 SCC 609, has observed that the jurisdiction under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than Section 115 of CPC. It is further held that pure finding of the fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered but there are several circumstances in which the Revisional Court can interfere with the finding of fact. In paras 22 and 23 following has been stated:-
"22. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact that a revision is provided for by the statute, and not an appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises.
23. We, however, do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered therewith. A pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered with but if such finding has been arrived at upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors or therefor relevant fact has been ignored, the Revisional Court will have the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact. Applicability of the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact."
25. In Shyam Lal vs. Rasool Ahmed (2002) 9 SCC 499, it was held as under:-
"4. Lastly, it was submitted that the District Court exercising revisional jurisdiction did not have jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. This submission is also liable to be rejected. Firstly, it was a revision preferred under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the jurisdiction whereunder I not so limited as it may be under Section 19 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, as we have already pointed out the learned District Judge had assigned convincing reasons for arriving at a finding different from the one arrived at by the trial court and on material available on record, the District Judge though exercising revisional jurisdiction was fully justified in interfering with findings of fact arrived at by the trial court which overlooked the weighty relevant material available on record and clinching the issue."
26. In view of the reasons recorded above, instant civil revision is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 07.08.2019 passed by Judge, SCC/Ist Additional District Judge, Haridwar is hereby set aside. Revisionist/plaintiff's suit for eviction and recovery of rent and damages is decreed. One month's time is granted to the defendant bank to deliver the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. The respondent-defendant is also directed to pay the damages at the rate of admitted rent from the date of institution of suit till the date of its realization, within one month. Let a decree be prepared accordingly.
27. Lower court record be sent back.
(Lok Pal Singh, J.) 27.11.2020 Rajni