Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Banshi Lal vs State on 6 September, 2017
Author: Chief Justice
Bench: Chief Justice
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Criminal Revision No. 360 / 1998 Banshi Lal S/o Shri Choga Lal, by caste Teli, resident of Amal Ka Kanta, Udaipur.
----Petitioner Versus The State of Rajasthan.
----Respondent _____________________________________________________ For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Vineet Jain For Respondent(s) : Mr.J.P.Bhardwaj, Public Prosecutor. _____________________________________________________ HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE Order 06/09/2017
1. Sample of mustard oil purchased from the petitioner cleared all the parameters prescribed save and except the temperature at which it showed turbidity wherefrom rancidity could be determined. As per the prescribed norms the temperature had to be between 23 degree to 27.5 degree. At the FSL the temperature was opined to be 29.5 degree and at the Central Laboratory it was opined to be 28.5 degree.
2. In the decision reported as 1995 SCC (Cr) 780 Nortan Mal V/s State of Rajasthan , ash content in chilly powder opined by the Public Analyst to be 8.38 % as against 8% prescribed under the Rules was held to be a variation where benefit of doubt to the accused had to be granted for the reason there could be possibility of error of judgment in analysis by a Public Analyst.
3. In the decision reported as 2001 Cr.L.J. 2073 Gyan Chandra (2 of 2) V/s Nagar Swasthya Adhikari, Kanpur, a similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court pertaining to a sample of mustard oil, wherein the saponification value was found to be 180.3 as against the maximum limit of 177 prescribed by the standard.
4. The view taken in both judgments is that there is no exactness with 100% accuracy in analysis by a Chemist and thus the benefit of doubt needs to be given to the accused where variation is marginal.
5. The judgments which have been cited before me today had not been pronounced when the impugned judgment was rendered holding petitioner guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 7/16 of the PF Act, 1954.
6. In view of the facts and the law noted hereinabove, I am of the opinion that the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of doubt. The petition is allowed. The petitioner is acquitted of the charge of having committed an offence punishable under Section 7/16 of the PF Act, 1954. Needless to say the sentence imposed is quashed.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)CJ.
Parmar