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Gujarat High Court

Kasubhai Bhalabhai Hathila vs State Of Gujarat on 8 May, 2018

Author: S.G. Shah

Bench: S.G. Shah

       R/SCR.A/3755/2018                                        ORDER




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

        R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3755 of 2018

==========================================================
                      KASUBHAI BHALABHAI HATHILA
                                Versus
                          STATE OF GUJARAT
==========================================================
Appearance:
THROUGH JAIL(50) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1
for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 2,3
MR LR PUJARI, APP (2) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 1
==========================================================
 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.G. SHAH
                    Date : 08/05/2018
                      ORAL ORDER

1. Rule.   Learned APP   waives  service   of  notice  of  rule   for  the  respondent - State.

2. Heard learned APP for the respondent - State. Perused the  record.

3. The   petitioner   is   convicted   under   Section   460  etc.   of   the  Indian Penal Code for life imprisonment and he is in jail since  for more than 18 years. It is contended by the petitioner that  since   he   has   preferred   application   for   remission   and   since  such application is pending for adjudication and not decided  till date, he be released on long parole leave in connection  with the judgment and order dated 05.05.2006 in Sessions  Case   No.18   of   2006,   Criminal   Appeal   No.1037   of   2006   is  dismissed   on   27.09.2012   It  is   further   contended   that  petitioner is aged about 53 years and therefore, he should be  Page 1 of 4 R/SCR.A/3755/2018 ORDER released on long parole.

4. It   is   undisputed   fact   that   such   parole  application   is   filed  under the provisions of The Prisons (Bombay Furlough and  Parole) Rules, 1959. It is also undisputed fact that such rules  specifically   provides   for   rules   regulating   grant   of   parole.  Rules 18 to 28 under above rules are regarding the grant of  parole, which provides that which authority/ies is competent  to   sanction   parole,   when   a   prisoner   may   be   released   on  parole, parole is not to be counted as remission of sentence,  conditions subject to which prisoners may be granted parole,  extension   of   period   of   parole   and   procedural   provision   for  filing an application for parole. Therefore, parole cannot be  granted   on   any   other   grounds   than   the   ground   for   which  parole is permissible under such rules. Rule 19 provides for  reasons   of   parole,   confirming   that   there   are   two   types   of  parole   i.e.   emergency   parole   and   regular   parole.   In  emergency   parole,   certain   reasons   are   assigned   for   which  prisoners   may   be   released   on   parole   considering   such  emergency on the ground of death, illness and marriage of  particular relative/s as prescribed under such rules. But, such  parole cannot be granted for more than seven days at a time  and  cannot   be   extended.   Whereas,  regular     parole   may  be  granted   on   completion   of  certain   period   of   imprisonment,  wherein Rule 19(2)(C) provides for parole when prisoner is  sentenced   to   life   and   whose   average   sentence   exceeds   14  years. However, under such rule also, there is no provision  for allowing parole as prayed for by the petitioner, but sub­ Page 2 of 4 R/SCR.A/3755/2018 ORDER clause   (iii)   of   above   provision   makes   it   clear   that   prisoner  shall be eligible for maximum of 45 days of parole in a year,  which can be extended upto 60 days once in three years, only  under exceptional circumstances. 

5. In view of above clarity, when there is no provision to release  any convict on parole, which is preferred as long parole by  the   petitioners   only   because   of   pendency   of   their   other  litigation   regarding   remission,   there   is   no   substance   in   the  petition.

6. However,   petitioner   is   relying   upon   an   order   dated  20.11.2012 in Special Criminal Application No.3305 of 2012,  wherein at the relevant time, single Judge of this court has  granted long parole only because of pendency of substantive  petition   for   remission   under   Section   433­A   of   Criminal  Procedure   Code.   However,   if   we   peruse   such   order,   it  becomes clear that such order is conditional and based upon  some understanding that learned advocate appearing in the  substantive   petition   against   remission   shall   extend   full   co­ operation and shall not seek adjournment  in the matter and  in absence of such co­operation, learned APP may request for  cancellation of parole.

7. With due respect, there is no reason to rely upon such order,  since   it   not   based   upon   the   statutory   provision   and   by   all  means when substantive petition  with reference to remission  of   the   petitioners   is   pending,   it   cannot   be   said   that   till  Page 3 of 4 R/SCR.A/3755/2018 ORDER pendency   of   such   petition,   petitioners   are   entitled   to   long  parole   because   Rule   19(2)(C)(iii)   makes   it   clear   that  prisoners are eligible for maximum of 45 days of parole in a  year and it can be extended only upto 60 days once in three  years, only under exceptional circumstances.

8. Therefore, only because of one order dated 20.11.2012 relied  upon   by   the   petitioner,   petitioner   is   not   entitled   to   long  parole when it is not permissible under law.

9. Moreover,   it   cannot   be   ignored  that   issue   of  remission   has  been recently considered at length by co­ordinate Bench in  Special   Criminal   Application   No.9089   of   2017   wherein   by  detailed judgment dated 8.3.2018, the court has in paragraph  78 enumerated all details on the issue under reference, but it  is   made   clear   that   "The   imprisonment   for   life   in   terms   of  Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal Code means the  imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict. To put it  in other words, till the convict breathes his last."

10. In view of above facts and circumstances, I do not see any  reason   to   extend   long   parole   beyond   the   provisions   of   the  rules and hence, the present petition stands dismissed. Rule is  discharged.

(S.G. SHAH, J) VATSAL S. KOTECHA Page 4 of 4