Patna High Court
State Bank Of India And Anr. vs Smt. Sushila Devi Kejriwal on 7 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(2)BLJR1037
Author: S.N. Pathak
Bench: S.N. Pathak
JUDGMENT S.N. Pathak, J.
1. This revision is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Sub-Judge VIII, Bhagalpur, in Title Eviction Suit No. 2/93/2/97.
2. The relevant facts are that the plaintiff-opposite party No. 1 of this revision filed the aforesaid Title Suit seeking eviction of the State Bank of India (Revisionist No. 1) from the suit premises on the ground of termination of the fixed period of lease. The plaintiff had also sought rent at the rate of Rs. 8,950/- per month. More relevant facts are that the revisionists were tenant of the suit premises on a monthly rental of Rs. 4,000/-. However, the plaintiff was pressing the defendants (Revisionists) to enhance the rent and towards this end, a Fair Rent Case was also filed before the House Controller. However, there was a clause in the original lease for renewal of the lease deed after negotiation between the landlady and tenant. However, in spite of negotiation, there could not be any further execution of lease and since the revisionists did not agree to raise the rate of rent at Rs. 12,950/-, the suit was filed seeking eviction and claiming arrears of rent over and above Rs. 4,000/- which was being accepted per month by the landlady after 1.7.92, when the term of the original lease expired, the claim of personal necessity was not substantiated by the evidence on record and the lower Court did not grant any decree regarding the arrears of rent and hence, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif was erroneous and, therefore, it should be set aside.
3. During course of hearing, it was pointed out that the suit was filed by the husband of the lady holding a power of attorney and, therefore, the eviction of suit was not maintainable, it having not been filed by the land lady herself. No agent or anybody acting on behalf of the landlady is entitled to maintain the suit for eviction. Moreover, the ground of personal necessity was not proved.
4. On perusal of the impugned Judgment dated 1.5.99, I find that the learned Munsif referred to the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties and he has held that the relationship of the landlord and tenant between Smt. Sushila Devi Kejriwal and the defendant State Bank of India was not in dispute. The fact that the original deed expired on 1.7.92 was also not in dispute. The question simply was whether the plaintiff of the suit was entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of termination of the lease and the failure of the parties to come to terms regarding renewal of the lease.
5. On perusal of the impugned Judgment and the pleading of the parties I found that, of course, there was a registered deed of lease creating fixed term of tenancy which admittedly expired on 1.7.92. There was a clause in the aforesaid registered deed of lease that after termination of the period of lease, there shall follow negotiation between the parties for renewal of the lease. Admittedly, the original lease could not be renewed for a further period. It has been alleged by the revisionist, defendant that the land lady was demanding exorbitant rent per square, feet of the suit premises. Hence, there was disagreement which led to the non-renewal of the lease. Therefore, it was apparent that the original lease could not be extended by any fresh execution of deed of lease. Of course, the landlady continued to accept the fixed rate of rent at Rs. 4,000/- and she had claimed arrears of rent on the basis of the proposed rate of rent at Rs. 12,000 and odd. The lower Court did not grant any decree regarding this arrear of rent over and above the Rs. 4,000/- which was already being accepted. However, the lower Court granted a decree for eviction of defendant-revisionists on the ground that the landlady had proved the ground of personal necessity required for the suit-premises for running her own transport business. During course of hearing of the suit, it also transpires that the landlady was running automobile business which was wound up. The learned Sub-Judge held that landlady had other building in the town, but it was her privilege to choose a particular house for running her transport-agency business. The suit could not also be disposed of in any eviction of the tenant from the part of the suit-premises.
6. So far the question of requirement of the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity, I find that the plaintiffs husband was examined mid perhaps one of his ancestors, in the cross-examination, he admitted that the landlady was still making up her mind regarding opening up of a transport business in the suit premises. This statement of the plaintiffs' husband was regarded as a retrograde statement regarding the claim of the personal necessity. The lower Court failed to interpret this statement of the plaintiffs' husband as a negative statement disclaiming the requirement of the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity. I think, the aforesaid statement cannot be taken by its face value and interpretated after tearing it from the over-all evidence given by him on behalf of the landlady. The suit premises was required for running a transport agency business and this was the ground regarding personal necessity and unless this transport agency was itself not set up, it was quite natural for the concerned witness to state that the landlady was still making up her mind to open up a transport agency business. Preparation for setting up any business and any statement in this regard, does not amount to any kind of no intention or no requirement to run such business. So this statement of the plaintiffs husband was not going to demolish the case of the O.P. with respect to the personal necessity, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Munsif did not commit any error in coming to the finding that the plaintiff-opposite party had proved the case of the issue of the personal necessity.
7. Now, the question remains whether the suit was maintainable, it having been filed by the landlady's husband. I am of the opinion that a personal holding power of attorney can very well maintain suit of eviction behalf of the landlady or land-holder. Power of attorney enables attorney to file a suit on behalf of a person executing the power of attorney. So if the suit was filed by the landlady's husband, there was nothing illegal in the maintainability of the suit. As far as the question whether revisionists continued to be a statutory tenant after holding over on termination of the original period of lease and whether he was entitled to continue as month to month tenant and liable to eviction unless there was default in payment of rent, I am of the opinion that mere acceptance of rent by land lady was not sufficient to constitute renewal of the tenancy nor it constituted a conversion of fixed period of lease into a month to month tenancy, when the fixed period of lease expired and the negotiation to renew the same failed, there was no option left for the tenant except to vacate the suit premises. Acceptance of the rent fixed by the terms of the registered deed of lease by the landlady did not amount to creation of a fresh lease. In this view of the matter, once the landlady proved her case of personal necessity, the tenant was liable to be evicted. So, I do not see any illegality in the impugned Judgment and its decree. Hence, I think this revision has no merit.
This revision application is accordingly dismissed.