Chattisgarh High Court
M/S Ganesh Traders vs Specturm Infonet Pvt. Ltd on 7 April, 2026
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2026:CGHC:15752
SOURABH
BHILWAR
NAFR
Digitally signed by
SOURABH
BHILWAR
Date: 2026.04.09
10:43:02 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 644 of 2024
1 - M/s Ganesh Traders Through Its Proprietor Lalit Kumar Bondia, Son
Of Late Rajaram Bondia, Presently Aged Around 67 Years, (Aadhar No.-
4079 4047 4851), R/o, House No. 191/3, Ward No. 18, Chhaju Gali,
Behind Gandhi Ganj, Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh
(Chhattisgarh)
2 - M/s Neelam Stores Through Its Proprietor Natthulal Tayal, S/o Late
Sagarmal Tayal, Presently Aged Around 74 Years, (Aadhar No.- 6243
0707 5243), R/o, House No. 209, Ward No. 12, Arya Bhawan, Bidpara,
Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh (Chhattisgarh)
3 - M/s Kosa Silk Emporium Through Its Present Proprietor- Ashish
Agrawal, Son Of Sanjay Agrawal, Presently Aged Around 29 Years,
(Aadhar No.- 6925 5543 5849), R/o, Pooja Handloom, Kotra Road,
Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh (Chhattisgarh)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - Specturm Infonet Pvt. Ltd. Through Its Director- Bharat Agrawal, Son
Of Vijay Agrawal, Aged Around 38 Years, R/o Chakradhar Nagar,
Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh (Chhattisgarh)
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2 - Smt. Sarita Devi Jagatramka W/o Suresh Kumar Jagatramka Aged
About 55 Years R/o Gandhi Chowk, Station Road, Raigarh (C.G.)
3 - Suresh Kumar Jagatramka S/o Late Banwarilal Jagatramka, Aged
Around 55 Years, R/o Gandhi Chowk, Station Road, Raigarh
(Chhattisgarh)
4 - Smt. Pushpa Saraf W/o Premkumar Saraf Aged About 68 Years
Resident Of 3/1, Siddeshwari Road, Kolkata (West Bengal)
5 - Raghvendra Pratap Singh S/o R.K. Singh Aged About 35 Years R/o
Maharana Pratap Nagar, Tifra, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur
(Chhattisgarh)
6 - Sub-Divisional Officer Cum Rent Controlling Authority Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh
.... Respondent(s)
(Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hari Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruw, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 07/04/2026
1. The present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.08.2024 passed by the learned 3rd District & Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh (C.G.) in Regular Civil Appeal No. 05/2020 (M/s Ganesh Traders & Ors. vs. Spectrum Infonet Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.), whereby the learned Appellate Court affirmed the impugned order dated 3 19.12.2019 passed by the learned Second Civil Judge, Junior Division, Raigarh (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 273-A/2019 (M/s Ganesh Traders & Ors. vs. Spectrum Infonet Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.), whereby the learned trial Court allowed the application filed by the defendant No.1 under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and dismissed the suit on the ground that the same is prohibited under Order 35 Rule 5 of CPC and Section 6 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 (for short 'the Act, 2011'). For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.
2. (i) The case of the plaintiffs as averred in the plaint is that the plaintiffs are tenants in peaceful possession of three shops situated at Station Road, Gandhi Chowk, as described in Schedule 'A'. The tenancy commenced in the year 1973 under the original owner, late Prakashwati Jagatramka, and thereafter rent was paid to her husband Banwarilal Jagatramka and subsequently to their daughter, Defendant No. 4 Smt. Pushpa Devi Saraf, who last received rent from the plaintiffs. It is averred that the plaintiffs have neither paid rent to any other person nor entered into any tenancy agreement with any of the other defendants. However, Defendant No. 1, claiming himself to be the owner of the suit property, has instituted eviction proceedings against the plaintiffs before the Rent Controller.
(ii) Similarly, Defendant No. 2 Smt. Sarita Devi Jagatramka, 4 daughter-in-law of the original owner, has also initiated separate eviction proceedings against the plaintiffs and has issued notice claiming herself to be the owner/landlord. In the said proceedings, Defendant No. 3, being the son of the original owner, has got himself impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC asserting his own ownership rights over the suit property. Further, Defendant No. 5 Raghvendra Pratap Singh has also issued notice to the plaintiffs claiming himself to be the owner of the suit property and demanding payment of rent. At the same time, Defendant No. 4 Smt. Pushpa Devi Saraf, who had been receiving rent from the plaintiffs, has also issued a notice directing the plaintiffs to pay rent exclusively to her and not to any other person.
(iii) Thus, Defendants No. 1 to 5, all claiming through the original owners, have set up rival and conflicting claims of ownership/landlordship over the same suit property and have also initiated multiple eviction proceedings, thereby creating serious confusion and hardship for the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs have been constrained to file the suit in the nature of an interpleader suit seeking determination as to who among the defendants is the lawful owner/landlord, so as to enable them to discharge their obligations and effectively participate in the pending proceedings before the Rent Controller.
3. Per contra, defendant No. 1 has filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC on 14.11.2019 in the suit before the trial 5 Court contending that the plaintiffs have instituted the suit in the nature of an interpleader, seeking declaration as to which of Defendants No. 1 to 5 is the lawful landlord along with a relief of permanent injunction, which is not maintainable in law. It was submitted that the basis of the suit arises out of proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority, and similar issues have already been considered and rejected by the Rent Controller in earlier proceedings relating to Sarita Devi. It was further contended that the sale deed in favour of Defendant No. 1 has already been upheld in prior civil litigation, wherein Civil Suit No. 116-A/2011 filed for cancellation of sale deed was dismissed by the competent Court, and the said decision was affirmed by the High Court in FA No.274 of 2017. Thus, the title of defendant No. 1 stands duly recognized. It is also submitted that defendant No. 1 has already initiated appropriate proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, and tenancy-related disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the said authority, thereby barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. On these grounds, it is urged that the suit is barred by law and is liable to be rejected.
4. In response, the plaintiffs have filed their reply to the said application contending that defendants No. 3 to 5 had issued notices to them claiming themselves to be the landlords of the suit property. It is specifically averred that the plaintiffs never entered into any tenancy with defendant No. 1, nor was any agreement, 6 oral or written, ever executed with him. Therefore, defendant No. 1 cannot be treated as the landlord of the plaintiffs under any circumstance. It is further submitted that the civil suit earlier filed before the Court of the learned First Additional District Judge, Raigarh, pertains to the same suit property, and the issue of ownership/title is yet to be conclusively determined by a competent Civil Court. The present suit is not a suit for eviction but is an interpleader suit filed under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore, the Civil Court has proper jurisdiction to entertain and decide the same. On these grounds, the plaintiffs have prayed that the application filed by defendant No. 1 be rejected.
5. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court, vide its order, allowed the application filed by the defendant No.1 under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and rejected the suit of the plaintiffs, holding the same to be barred under Section 6 of the Act, 2011 as well as under Order 35 Rule 5 of CPC. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 30.08.2024, affirmed the order of the learned Trial Court, holding that by virtue of Section 6 of the Act of 2011, the Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership and title of the disputed property particularly when there is a dispute regarding landlord - tenant. Hence, the present 7 appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court have erred in law in holding that the jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership and title vests with the Rent Controlling Authority by virtue of Section 6 of the Act, 2011, while completely overlooking the Explanation thereto, which expressly provides that disputes relating to title of property shall be adjudicated by the Civil Courts under the relevant laws. He submits that a conjoint and holistic reading of the scheme of the Act, including Sections 9 and 12 along with the relevant Schedules, makes it abundantly clear that the powers of the Rent Controller are confined to regulating the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants and do not extend to adjudication of title/ownership disputes. Hence he submits that the interpleader suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration and injunction was clearly maintainable before the Civil Court. He further submits that the finding of both the Courts that the suit is barred under Order 35 Rule 5 CPC is perverse and contrary to the settled position of law, inasmuch as the question of maintainability of an interpleader suit involves mixed questions of law and fact, which could not have been decided at the threshold under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC without trial. Thus, learned counsel submits that the impugned judgments suffer from patent illegality and perversity, giving rise to substantial questions of law for consideration by this Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed 8 reliance upon the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court in case of Packing Paper Products vs. NICAF Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2007) 5 MhLJ 34.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.
8. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court, upon due consideration of the pleadings, applications, and the oral and documentary evidence on record, have concurrently held that the interpleader suit filed by the plaintiffs was not maintainable. The Trial Court, in its order dated 19.12.2019, noted that the suit was presented as an interpleader under Section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking declaration of the landlord among Defendants No. 1 to 5 and permanent injunction against interference in the possession of the plaintiffs. The Court observed that the plaintiffs had not complied with the requirements of Order 35 Rules 1 & 5 CPC for interpleader suits and that the Rent Control proceedings under Section 6 of the Act, 2011 were already instituted to resolve disputes between landlords and tenants regarding rights, title, and obligations of the parties. Accordingly, the Trial Court allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.
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9. For the sake of convenience, order 35 Rule 1 & 5 of CPC are reproduced hereinbelow :-
"Order XXXV - INTERPLEADER Rule 1. Plaint in interpleader-suit- In every suit of interpleader the plaint shall, in addition to the other statements necessary for plaints, state-
(a) that the plaintiff claims no interest in the subject-
matter in dispute other than for charges or costs;
(b) the claims made by the defendants severally; and
(c) that there is no collusion between the plaintiff and any of the defendants xxxx xxxx xxxx Rule 5. Agents and tenants may not institute interpleader-suits.- Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to enable agents to sue their principals, or tenants to sue their landlords, for the purpose of compelling them to interplead with any persons other than persons making claim through such principals or landlords."
10. Further it is also convenient to note here the Section 6(1) of the Act, 2011, which states:
"6. Constitution of the Rent Control Tribunal - (1) 10 The State Government shall by notification constitute, within thirty days of this Act, a Tribunal in terms of Articles 323-B of the Constitution, to be called as Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, to give effect to the provisions of this Act, and for the adjudication or trial of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues including the rights, title and obligations of landlords and tenants.
Explanation- Matters relating to transfer of property and/or disputes regarding title over any property shall continue to be considered under relevant laws by the courts of law."
11. From perusal of the above provisions, it appears that the Act of 2011 specifically provides that the Rent Control Tribunal is constituted under the Act of 2011 to adjudicate the disputes regarding title and obligation of landlord. In the present case, the suit primarily concerned the determination of title and rights of landlords over the property, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal as provided under Section 6(1) of the 2011 Act. The plaintiffs had also failed to comply with the procedural requirements of interpleader suits under Order 35 Rules 1 & 5 CPC.
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12. The object of the Act, 2011 is to provide for adjudication matters relating to rent by a Tribunal and to promote leasing of accommodation by balancing the interests of landlords and tenants. Thus, the order allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC filed by the defendant No.1 by the learned trial Court is just and proper as the suit itself is not maintainable.
13. Subsequently, the First Appellate Court, after re-appreciation of the submissions and legal provisions, affirmed the findings of the Trial Court. The Appellate Court held that the interpleader suit primarily pertained to disputes between landlords and tenants over ownership and rights of property, which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal under Section 6(1) of the 2011 Act. The appeal filed by the plaintiffs was thus devoid of merit, and the Appellate Court confirmed the Trial Court's order dated 19.12.2019. In this manner, it is clear that the concurrent findings recorded by both the learned Courts are in accordance with law and facts, and no perversity, misreading of evidence, or legal infirmity is demonstrated so as to warrant interference with the findings recorded by both the Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
14. Furthermore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, rendered by the Bombay High Court in case of Packing Paper Products (supra), is distinguishable and not 12 applicable to the facts of the present case, as the same was dealt with procedural aspects of interpleader in a commercial dispute and did not involve statutory Rent Control proceedings or disputes over landlord-tenant ownership and rights under the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011.
15. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.
16. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.
17. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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18. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
19. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.
20. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 14
21. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they do not call for any interference.
22. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court as also the order passed by the Trial Court.
23. However, the appellants are at liberty to approach the appropriate forum, as may be available to him under the provisions of law, if so aggrieved, for redressal of their grievance.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge $. Bhilwar