Punjab-Haryana High Court
Amolak Singh vs Madanlal on 27 January, 1978
Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 211
ORDER
1. This revision petition under S. 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is brought from the decision of the Appellate Authority, Hissar, under that Act, confirming in appeal the decision of the Rent Controller of the district, and dismissing the application of the landlord, Amolak Singh, who sought for the eviction of Madan Lal, his tenant, from one of the shops situate at Hissar. Amolak Singh filed a petition for eviction of his tenant and the allegations were, that the tenant had not paid the rent and had materially impaired the value and utility of the shop, that the landlord required the premises for personal needs and that the tenant proved to be a nuisance to the occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood. In the present revision we are confined to the last ground which is covered by S. 13(2)(iv) of the Act. The learned Rent Controller considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the landlord and was of the opinion that the said ground was not made out and accordingly, the petition for eviction was dismissed. The landlord came in appeal before the Appellate Authority, but did not succeed. The finding of the Rent Controller on the ground covered by S. 13(2)(iv) of the Act was upheld and the entire evidence on the record was duly considered. Now the landlord has filed the present revision against the decision of the Appellant Authority.
2. It is to be understood at the very outset that the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 15(5) of the Act is some--what restricted. It is true that the High Court is not prohibited to go into the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties. Nevertheless, a finding of fact given by the Courts below need only be set aside if there are legitimate grounds for doing so. In Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 499, their Lordships observed that the power of the High Court under S. 15(5) of the Act does not include the power to revise the concurrent findings without showing how those findings are erroneous. A similar observation was made by a Division Bench of this Court in F. S. Hugh v. Sukha Singh (1966) 68 Punj LR 899. It was held that the powers of the High Court under Section 15(5) of the Act are much larger than those enjoyed under S. 115 of the Civil P. C. But this does not mean that the nature and jurisdiction of the High Court which essentially is revisional jurisdiction, would justify interference with the concurrent finding of fact, where that finding has been properly arrived at. With this state of law, it was incumbent on the part of the petitioner to point out in what manner the finding arrived at by the two authorities below could be stated not to have been properly arrived at. The very language used in Section 15(5) of the Act indicates that the legality or the propriety of that finding has got to be considered. If the evidence was duly assessed and a reasonable view could be taken in favour of or against either of the parties, perhaps the revising court would not be justified to record a different finding under its revisional powers.
3. In the instant case, the witnesses produced by the landlord give out a general statement that the tenant was having some jhagra with the sons of the landlord. A. W. 2 meant to state that this jhagra was due to the reason that the landlord wanted the tenant to vacate the shop in order to accommodate one of his sons. This fact is further corroborated by Exhibit R. 1, a joint statement recorded before the police in a proceeding under S. 107, Cr. P. C. where in it was specifically pointed out on behalf of the landlord that he would not ask the tenant to vacate the shop. Exhibits R. 8 and R. 9 also indicated that as a result of the effort on the part of the landlord to get the shop vacated, the proceedings under S. 107, Cr. P. C. started between the parties and that these proceedings ended in favour of the tenant. A. W. 1 and A. W. 3, who were stated to be the neighbours merely gave out a general statement that the landlord and the tenant were picking up quarrels. As I have stated before, A. W. 2 gave out the reasons for this quarrel, namely, the effort on the part of the landlord to get the shop vacated by the tenant for the need of his son. A. W. 4 and A. W. 5 are respectively the son of the landlord and the landlord himself. They were of course interested witnesses and hence the two authorities below have not placed much reliance on their statements. There was a denial of such a quarrel on the side of the respondent tenant. The two authorities below considered this evidence and held that whatever quarrel arose between the landlord and the tenant, that is due to the reason that the landlord wanted the tenant to vacate the shop unjustifiably. In fact the language used in S. 13(2)(iv) of the Act does not contemplate a single incident of a quarrel or exchange of abuses between a landlord and a tenant. There has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant and the landlord or occupiers of the buildings in the neighbour--hood so that nuisance can be inferred against the tenant. The mere existence of ill feelings between the landlord and his tenant could not have justified the ejectment in this provision of the Act. A sort of continuous or frequent nuisance committed by the tenant is contemplated and such a nuisance has obviously to interfere with the convenience or comfort of other persons living in the neighbouring buildings. In the instant case, as the evidence indicated, it could not be established that there were any series of acts or conduct on the part of the tenant which could amount to nuisance as contemplated under the provision. It appears to be a case where the landlord wanted the tenant to vacate the shop to serve his own needs. The tenant may have retaliated and in that connection some quarrel may have arisen between him and the landlord.
4. It is also manifest that no details of the quarrel were mentioned in the eviction petition, nor any such details were given in the notice served upon the tenant. In those documents again, a sort of general statement was made that the tenant was a quarrelsome person and in my opinion that was not enough to cover the case under S. 13(2)(iv) of the Act.
5. It was stated on behalf of the respondent shop, two other shops existed, which were in occupation of the sons of the landlord. The argument was that these shops were not let out to the sons and as such the shops could not be construed as "buildings" according to the definition provided for under S. 2(a) of the Act. It was also pointed out that the two sons of the landlord occupying the shops could not be considered to be the occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood. It would be difficult to say that the two persons merely because they happened to be the sons of the landlord, could not be considered to be the occupiers of the buildings in the neighborhood. However, the other controversy was more germane to the issue. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that the expression "buildings" as defined in the Act, includes a building or a part of the building let out to a tenant and because the two sons of the landlord were not the tenants in those shops, they could not be stated to be occupying the buildings in the neighbourhood. In that connection, the learned counsel relied upon the observations made by a Full Bench of this court in Messrs Sant Ram Des Rai v. Karam Chand, (1962) 64 Pun LR 758 : (AIR 1963 Punj 1)(FB). Indeed the learned Judges, who decided that case, held that in view of the definition of the "buildings" as provided for in the Act, only such buildings were covered which were let out to tenant and the necessary inference should be that those buildings which are occupied by landlords and not let out to tenants would not be covered. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, pointed out that this question was not specifically raised before the Full Bench as to whether the context under which the expression "buildings" is used under S. 13(2)(iv) of the Act would justify that interpretation of the expression "buildings". No doubt, the question was not raised before the learned Judges in that perspective and, therefore, nothing definite could be stated in that regard. To me, it appears that the controversy need not be gone into in this case inasmuch as my finding is that the two authorities below have rightly held that upon the evidence on the record, the tenant could not be considered to have committed any act or conduct which may amount to nuisance to the occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood. At any rate, it cannot be held that the finding of the two authorities below is illegal or improper and as such no interference can be made at this stage.
6. In the result, the revision petition appears to be without any force and the same is dismissed. No costs.
7. Petition dismissed.