Karnataka High Court
State Of Karnataka And Ors. vs Bpl Group Of Companies Karmikara Sangha ... on 26 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: [2002(95)FLR886], ILR2002KAR4330, 2002(6)KARLJ11, (2003)ILLJ131KANT
Author: A.V. Srinivasa Reddy
Bench: A.V. Srinivasa Reddy
JUDGMENT
1. The State Government has preferred these intra-Court appeals against the order passed by the learned Single Judge (BPL Group of Companies Karmikara Sangha, Bangalore v. State of Karnataka and Ors., 2000(1) Kar. L.J. 355 : ILR 1999 Kar. 3520) directing the State Government to pass orders granting interim reliefs to the members of the respondent-Workers Union under Section 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 tin short the "Act"), in terms of the recommendations made by the Labour Commissioner and initially approved by the Minister in charge of Labour Department, by ignoring the order of the Chief Minister, who, on review of the entire facts and consulting all concerned, opined that in the facts of the case, instead of granting interim relief by the Government, this point as well be referred to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act.
2. The basic facts to be taken note of are quite short. The members of the respondent-workers union are employed in 12 corporate bodies, which for the sake of convenience are called "BPL Group of Companies". These workmen went on strike on 19-11-1998 in order to press their charter of demands. But since the management did not concede to their demands after failure of conciliation proceedings, the disputes reached State Government for referring to the Industrial Tribunal.
3. The Government by its order dated 25-2-1999 (Annexure-B) passed under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore. The disputes so referred were registered by the Tribunal on 9-3-1999 being IDs 17 to 28 of 1999. Both the parties appeared before the Tribunal in July 1999. The adjudicatory process is still pending.
4. The respondent-workers union while requesting the State Government for referring the dispute to the Tribunal also wanted from the Government to grant interim relief in terms of Section 10-B of the Act. But the Government instead of granting any interim relief referred this issue as well to the Tribunal by formulating one of the points of dispute being "Whether the workmen are entitled for interim relief?"
5. The respondent-workers union being aggrieved by the order of the Government, approached this Court by filing writ petitions seeking directions against the Government to grant interim relief under Section 10-B of the Act. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge quashed a part of the order of reference (Annexure-B) to the extent it related to entitlement of interim relief with a direction to the Government to pass orders granting interim relief as already noticed above.
6. Keeping in view the findings and directions given by the learned Single Judge, four material questions fall for our consideration, namely,--
(i) Whether, at the time of or after making a reference of an industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, it is incumbent on the part of the Government to pass orders in terms of Section 10-B of the Act?
(ii) Whether the powers conferred under Section 10-B of the Act can be exercised by the State Government even during the pendency of adjudication of a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal?
(iii) Whether the order to be passed under Section 10-B of the Act is to be based on its objective or subjective satisfaction and as to whether it should be preceded by an opportunity of hearing to be granted to the workmen as well the management?
(iv) Whether, under the Karnataka Government (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1977 (in short the 'Business Rules'), framed under Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the decision, with regard to grant of interim relief in terms of Section 10-B of the Act, of the Minister for Labour is final and the Chief Minister has no power to interfere with it?
7. Re: Question Nos. (i), (ii) and (iii).--For answering the first three questions, it is necessary first to refer Section 10-B of the Act, as inserted by Karnataka Act 5 of 1988, which reads as under.--
"10-B. Power to issue order regarding terms and conditions of service pending settlement of dispute.--(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to a Labour Court or a Tribunal under Sub-section (1) of Section 10 and if in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the establishment concerning which such reference has been made, it may, by general or special order, make provision.--
(a.) for requiring the employer or workman or both to observe such terms and conditions of employment as may be specified in the order or as may be determined in accordance with the order, including payment of money by the employer to any person who is or has been a workman;
(b) for requiring any public utility service not to close or remain closed and to work or continue to work on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the order; and
(c) for any incidental or supplementary matter which appears to it to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of the order:
Provided that no order made under this sub-section shall require any employer to observe terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workman than those which were applicable to them at any time within three months immediately preceding the date of the order.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section, "public utility service" means--
(i) any section of an industrial establishment on the working of which the safety of the establishment or the workman employed therein depends;
(ii) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public ;
(iii) any industry which has been declared by the State Government to be a public utility service for the purpose of this Act.
(2) An order made under Sub-section (1) shall cease to operate on the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the order or on the date of the award of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, whichever is earlier.
(3) Any money paid by an employer to any person in pursuance of an order under Sub-section (1), may be deducted by that employer from out of any monetary benefit to which such person becomes entitled under the provisions of any award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the case may be".
8. For appropriate understanding the scope and ambit of the power of the State Government under Section 10-B of the Act, it is necessary to refer Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act wherein as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Ors. v. Hotel Workers' Union, the Tribunal has been held to have the power to grant interim relief during pendency of the adjudication process. This provision reads as under.--
"Section 10. Reference of dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.--
(1) to (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto.
(5) to (8) xxx xxx xxx xxx"
9. In Management of Hotel Imperial's case, supra, the Supreme Court has held that:
"Where an order referring an industrial dispute has been made specifying the points of dispute for adjudication, the Tribunal has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto; (Section 10(4)). It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunal in these cases had to confine itself to adjudicating on the points referred and that as the question of interim relief was not referred to it, it could not adjudicate upon that. We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument, in view of the words "incidental thereto" appearing in Section 10(4). There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the Tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under Section 10(4) and need not be specifically referred in terms of the Tribunal. Thus interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the Tribunal without being itself referred in express terms".
10. From the above discussions and enunciation, it is clear that where certain points are referred for adjudication by the Government to the Tribunal, the latter has competence to grant interim relief as a matter incidental to the main question referred to it even though such point is not specifically referred. A reading of the Supreme Court judgment further makes it clear that it is permissible for the Government to specify the claim of the workman to seek interim relief as one of the points of reference in express terms. It is simple to understand that what cannot be referred expressly cannot be inferred implicitly. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Government in formulating the point of dispute with regard to grant of interim relief as well has in any way acted beyond its statutory functions.
11. The next question which is of wider implications concern avoidance of overlapping powers and conflict of orders to be passed by the State Government under Section 10-B and the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(4) of the Act pending adjudication of industrial disputes.
These need to be done very cautiously by harmonising two provisions keeping in view the object with which these provisions are incorporated in the Act. Since the legislature has not clearly spelt out as to till what point of time from the date of making reference by the State Government under Section 10(1)(c)/(d) of the Act during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal the Government can exercise powers under Section 10-B, it has now to be done by the judicial wing of the State.
12. Section 10-B(1) of the Act inter alia provides that where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to the Tribunal under Sub-section (1) of Section 10-B of the Act, it may by general or special orders, make provision for requiring the employer or workmen or both to observe such terms and conditions of employment as may be specified in the order or as may be determined in accordance with the order including payment of money by the employer to any person who is or has been a workman. Sub-section (2) of Section 10-B further provides that an order so made shall cease to operate on expiry of the period of six months from the date of order or on the date of the award of the Tribunal as the case may be, whichever is earlier.
12-A. From the language used in Section 10-B of the Act, it is possible to infer that an order under this provision intending to grant interim relief/direction has to be passed after the Government makes reference. Further, the interim relief so granted will remain valid only for a period of six months from the date of order or the date of the award, whichever is earlier. But, under Section 20(3), proceedings before the Tribunal commences from the date of reference of the dispute to the Tribunal. Reading of these two provisions together, one thing seems to be clear that despite commencement of proceedings before the Tribunal, the State Government can still pass order of interim relief under Section 10-B of the Act. But, immediately on commencement of the proceedings before it, the Tribunal acquires the power to pass orders on all matters incidental to the point of dispute referred to it, which includes the power to pass orders granting or refusing interim relief. Suppose in a given case, while the matter is pending adjudication before the Tribunal, on an application made the Tribunal passes an order relating to the interim relief claimed by the workman either granting or refusing the same and subsequently workman moves the State Government for granting interim relief under Section 10-B and the Government by not agreeing with the order passed by the Tribunal takes a contrary view thus giving rise to conflicting orders. It may create chaotic situation disturbing industrial peace and tranquillity. In order to avoid friction in the system, we need to devise a construction which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the two provisions under the Act and which may not lead to absurdity and cause practical inconvenience or any unhealthy competition between the executive Government and judicial machinery set up under the Act for adjudication. For achieving the above objective what is obvious is that both the State Government as well as the Tribunal cannot be held to have concurrent or simultaneous power of granting interim relief nor can they be said to have power to sit in appeal over each other's order or to annul the same.
12-B. In order to resolve the problem at hand, let us first examine the purpose, manner and the conditions subject to which the Tribunal can grant interim relief. This aspect has been specifically dealt with by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Management of Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna v. The Workman of the Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors., 1971-I-LLJ-389 (Pat.): 1971 Lab. I.C. 383 (Pat.) which has been followed with approval by the Raj as than High Court in the case of National Textile Corporation v. State of Rajasthan, 1989-I-LLN-778(Raj.) . In the case of Management of Bihar State Electricity Board, supra, it has been held that:
"On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Hotel Imperial, supra, I have to hold that the Tribunal has the power to grant such an interim relief under Section 10(4) of the Act. But, it follows that whether such a relief is granted at the time of final adjudication as the final award or is granted by way of a temporary or provisional arrangement during the pendency of the reference case, the order has got to take the form and effect of an interim award under Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act. There is no provision in the Act empowering the Tribunal to make an order granting relief to a discharged workman except by way of making an interim award which can be made according to the decision of the Supreme Court under Section 10(4) of the Act, or I should think, even apart from that, by the force of the definition of the term "award". In either case it has got to take the form of an interim award and in that event the Tribunal must determine that there is a good prima facie case in favour of the workman for final adjudication and, therefore, on the facts of a particular case, granting of interim relief by the interim award is necessary. In absence of such an adjudication of the kind just indicated by me, the Tribunal is not competent to grant interim relief to the discharged workman".
From the above, it is clear that for granting even interim relief, the Tribunal has to apply itself judiciously, and come to a conclusion that there exist a good prima facie case in favour of the workman. This is part of the adjudicatory process though interim in nature without attaching any conclusiveness to it.
13. Now, coming to the functions of the Government under Section 10 of the Act, we can straightaway refer to judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors., wherein it has been held that.--
"It is now well-settled that, while exercising power under Section 10(1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by Section 10 of the Act. See Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, ; Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur, ".
14. The above declaration of law by the Supreme Court put it beyond spell of any controversy that power of the Government under Section 10(1) of the Act in relation to referring of disputes to a Tribunal is purely an administrative function and has to be based on its opinion that an industrial dispute exist or is apprehended. Hence, the forming of opinion for reference of dispute without giving notice to the parties concerned cannot be said to be violative of principles of natural justice. (See Goodyear (India) Limited, Jaipur v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and Ors., 1968-II-LLJ-682(Raj).
Khadi Gramodyog Bhawan v. Delhi Administration, 1968 LDJ 79 (Del.) .)
15. Now the question arises whether the same view can be taken with regard to exercise of power of the State Government under Section 10-B of the Act as well. In our opinion, as rightly pointed out by Sri Kasturi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporate bodies, this question has been expressly answered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam and Anr. v. Bharat Kala Bhandar Limited and Ors., while considering a provision almost pari materia, with Section 10-B of the Act.
16. In Bharat Kala Bhandar limited's case, supra, Sub-rule (4) of Rule 126-AA of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 had fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court. This rule read as under.--
"Rule 126-AA(4).--The Central Government or the State Government may by order regulate the wages and other conditions of service of persons or of any class of persons engaged in any employment or class of employment to which this rule applies".
17. The above provision was made to meet emergent situations and the measures were temporary in nature. While tracing the purpose of the above sub-rule, the Supreme Court has held that this sub-rule has been enacted to see that there is contended labour force during an emergency so that essential services in declared employments can be maintained. The Supreme Court found that the power conferred in the above provision was of far-reaching nature in the field of industrial relations and may have the effect of disturbing all such relations for the duration of a real emergency. The Supreme Court after posing the question to itself that whether in the absence of express words in Sub-rule (4) to indicate that the power is to be exercised purely on subjective satisfaction of the Government, it should be held that the order under sub-rule can be passed purely on subjective satisfaction. The question so framed was answered thus.--
"When the effect of orders passed under Sub-rule (4) can be so far-reaching and so wide in its impact we would be loath to hold that such wide and far-reaching powers were conferred on Government to be exercised purely on its subjective satisfaction without even consulting the interests concerned specially when the language is not plain and unambiguous and there is no indication in the sub-rule itself that the power can be exercised purely on the subjective satisfaction of Government. We are not unmindful of the fact that the power under Sub-rule (4) has to be exercised in a real emergency. But the ambit of the power therein is analogous to the power of Industrial Courts. The power under Sub-rule (4) may be exercised instead of referring industrial disputes relating to wages and other conditions of service to Industrial Tribunals. We are also not unmindful of the fact that in a real emergency, decisions may have to be taken quickly and delay inevitable in the elaborate procedure provided for resolution of industrial disputes by Industrial Tribunals may not be desirable. Even so in the absence of express words in Sub-rule (4) to show that the power thereunder depends for its exercise entirely on the subjective satisfaction of Government we would not be prepared to hold that that is what Sub-rule (4) indicates. We have already said that the effect of Sub-rule (4) is to disturb settled industrial relations whether based on contracts or on industrial awards, and it seems to us that before Government exercises the power under Sub-rule (4) it should even in a real emergency consult the interests concerned before taking action thereunder".
17-A. It has further been held that.--
"It is not for us to indicate in detail what should be the procedure adopted by Government in a real emergency to consult the interests concerned, as that is a matter for Government to evolve for itself. But we may indicate that some kind of public notice to the particular interests should be given indicating what the Government intends to do and inviting representations from those interests and if necessary calling for data from them and also giving an oral hearing to the representatives of the interests concerned. This does not mean that notice should be given to individual employers or employees. Nor do we mean to say that this consultation should be of the same amplitude as adjudication by a quasi-judicial Tribunal. It is not necessary that oral evidence should be taken and witnesses should be called, examined and cross-examined and documents produced or called for and arguments heard as if the matter was being tried by a quasi-judicial Tribunal. But some kind of collection of data with the help of the interests concerned and some kind of hearing or conference with the interests concerned seems to us to be the barest minimum necessary to enable Government to exercise the power conferred under Sub-rule (4) for we have no doubt that this sub-rule does not intend that Government should have power of the far- reaching nature conferred thereunder purely on its subjective satisfaction. Further, if such consultation is necessary under Sub-rule (4) and it seems to us that it is necessary before an order can be passed thereunder, it would in our opinion be more convenient to hold consultation employment by employment, for it may be that needs of every employment may not be the same. After such consultation and consideration of data collected by Government itself as well as supplied by the interests concerned, it would be open to Government to pass an order under Sub-rule (4) indicating that it has considered the data and consulted the interests concerned. We have indicated this procedure merely to illustrate what we say, but it is for Government to evolve such procedure as it considers will meet the needs of Sub-rule (4). Once it is clear, as we have no doubt that it is so, that the order under Sub-rule (4) is not to be passed merely on the subjective satisfaction of Government, it seems to us that even in a real emergency this consultative procedure should not take long and should be over within a few weeks".
18. Now again reverting to Section 10-B of the Act, it is clear from its provisions that the power to issue orders regarding terms and conditions of service pending settlement of dispute can be exercised by the Government subject to fulfilment of certain conditions precedent. Firstly, the Government can resort to this provision only after it has formed its opinion that an industrial dispute exists or apprehended and thereupon refer the same for adjudication to the Tribunal. Secondly, it is further to form an opinion that passing of an order under Section 10-B is necessary or expedient to meet the emergent situations mentioned therein. The second condition requires the Government to form an opinion regarding existence of circumstances envisaged therein and such opinion can be formed only on the basis of data available with the Government. Further, any order passed under Section 10-B will necessarily have some civil consequences affecting interest of either of the disputing parties. Keeping in view these aspects, as even held by the Supreme Court though in the context of another provision as noticed above, it is appropriate and expedient to hold that the power of the Government under Section 10-B of the Act cannot be said to be purely administrative or that it can be based on just subjective satisfaction of the Government.
19. In the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors., it has been observed that wherever an action entails civil consequences, observance of principles of natural justice is imperative. Accordingly, we hold that before passing an order under Section 10-B, it is incumbent upon the Government to at least afford workman and the management a reasonable opportunity of filing effective representations in the manner as indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam, supra. Contrary view expressed by the learned Single judge in the case of Kanoria Industries Limited, Bagalkot v. State of Karnataka and Ors., 1996(7) Kar. L.J. 638 : 1997-II-LLJ-95 (Kar.) is accordingly held to be per incuriam and is therefore overruled.
20. The next question is at what stage the Government can exercise its powers under Section 10-B of the Act. For dealing with this question, one thing has again to be borne in mind that the conditions precedent for exercise of jurisdiction to grant interim relief by the Government and that conferred on the Tribunal for the said purpose are materially distinct. The Government can pass interim order under Section 10-B of the Act only on forming opinion as to the existence of exigencies of maintaining public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the establishment. The Government for invoking powers under Section 10-B is not required to enter into merits of the dispute and form any opinion in this regard. Whereas, the Tribunal can grant relief only on having judiciously determined that there exists strong prima facie case.
21. Keeping in view the above aspects, it appears to be quite reasonable to hold that if the Government while making reference is of the opinion that the conditions precedent as envisaged under Section 10-B of the Act exists then only while making reference it can simultaneously or immediately pass order in terms of the said provision subject to observance of the principles of natural justice as indicated above. If it is not so done, then the power to grant interim relief will rest only with the Tribunal in terms of Section 10(4) of the Act. This view of ours find support in the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of EID Parry (India) Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu.
22. In the present case, the Government on consideration of the materials placed before it had formed an opinion not to pass any order under Section 10-B of the Act granting any interim relief by itself and it found advisable to refer the point of dispute in this regard as well to the Tribunal itself. No exception can be found to the correctness of such an order which was well-within the competence of the Government to pass.
23. Re: Question No. (iv).--For answering this question, we need to have a little factual background. From the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge it transpires that in order to have access to the facts, he had called for the Government records. These records revealed that the Labour Commissioner and the Conciliation Officer in their failure reports made under Section 12(4) of the Act made to the Government had suggested for grant of some interim monetary relief to the workmen. On the basis of that report, the Deputy Chief Minister, who was in charge of the Labour portfolio, opined to grant interim relief as recommended under his note dated 1-2-1999. But, before any order could be issued, the file was called for by the Chief Minister, who held discussions with the Labour Commissioner, Secretaries of the concerned department and also the Labour Minister. As a result of this consultation, the Labour Minister suggested to prohibit the strike and to refer the issues relating to grant of interim relief to the Tribunal. This suggestion was duly approved by the Chief Minister. Accordingly, the decision so taken was implemented by issuing appropriate orders. One of such orders was challenged before the learned Single Judge being Annexure-B. The learned Single Judge held the view that in the process of taking decision, the Chief Minister had held consultation with the Secretaries of other department like that of Commerce and Industries which was impermissible under Karnataka Government (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1977. He has also taken the view that since in the Transaction of Business Rules, the matter relating to the service conditions of labour has been left to be transacted by the Labour Department it was impermissible for the Chief Minister to meddle with such issues. Ultimately, the learned Single Judge concluded that.--
"Consequently, the order passed by the Chief Minister not to grant interim relief and to refer the issue for adjudication was wholly unwarranted and is without the authority of law. The action amounts to legal mala fides and there is a colourable exercise of power for extraneous considerations".
24. At the outset, we may notice that no material has been placed before us to show that the Chief Minister while discharging his official and constitutional functions has acted mala fide to hold him guilty of mala fides or colourable exercise of power for extraneous reasons. Anyhow, so far as the power of Chief Minister to call for the file of any department in the Government and to take decision on behalf of the Government is concerned, the matter is finally concluded by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulabrao Keshavrao Patil and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., wherein it has been held that.--
"The responsibility of Council of Ministers under Article 164(2) of the Constitution embodies the political responsibility of the Ministry headed by the Chief Minister. Collective responsibility makes each Minister responsible to the Legislature for the acts of himself and other members of the Council of Ministers. Since the Council of Ministers would stay in office as long as it commands the majority of the Legislative Assembly, the Council of Ministers is politically responsible as one entity. In case it loses its confidence the Ministry as a whole is required to resign. The responsibility to the Governor and accountability to the people collectively by the Council of Ministers is through and by the Chief Minister. It would, therefore, be clear that the decision of a Minister under the Business Rules is not final or conclusive until the requirements in terms of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are complied with. Be-
fore the action or the decision is expressed in the name of the Governor in the manner prescribed under the Business Rules and communicated to the party concerned it would always be open by necessary implication, to the Chief Minister to send for the file and have it examined by himself and to take a decision, though the subject was allotted to a particular Minister for convenient transaction of the business of the Government. The subject, though exclusively allotted to the Minister, by reason of the responsibility of the Chief Minister to the Governor and accountability to the people, has implied power to call for the file relating to a decision taken by a Minister. The object of allotment of the subject to a Minister is for the convenient transaction of the business at various levels through designated officers. The ultimate object is to secure an impartial, pure and efficient administration as propounded by Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly vide Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, p. 546".
25. In the succeeding paragraph, the Apex Court has further held that--
"Even if the rule does not contemplate that the Chief Minister would be entitled to pass an order but when the rule envisages that he is entitled to call for the file for issue of order, it clearly implies that he has the right to interfere and make such order as he may deem appropriate. The Chief Minister may call any file and deal with it himself. The order passed by the Chief Minister even though it is a matter pertaining to the portfolio of the Revenue Minister will be deemed to be an order of Council of Ministers. So deemed, its contents would be the Chief Minister's advice to the Governor for which the Council of Ministers would be collectively responsible".
26. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court as noticed above, we do not propose to examine the Rules of Executive Business in any greater detail because whether it is expressly provided or not in the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Minister has implicit powers to call for file of any department and have it examined by himself and to take decision. That being the constitutional mandate, in our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge ought to have refrained from making uncharitable observations against the Chief Minister and from holding the Government Order to be constitutionally bad.
27. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned order of the learned Single Judge to the extent he has directed the Government to grant interim relief in terms of the recommendations made by the Labour Commissioner and the purported order passed by the Deputy Chief Minister who was in charge of Labour Department at the material time.
28. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent. No order as to costs.