Himachal Pradesh High Court
Kuldeep Chand vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 3 September, 2015
Author: Rajiv Sharma
Bench: Rajiv Sharma, Sureshwar Thakur
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HEMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
Cr. Appeal No. 299 of 2014
Reserved on: September 2, 2015.
.
Decided on: September 03, 2015.
Kuldeep Chand ......Appellant.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh .......Respondent.
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge.
of
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the appellant: Mr. Satyen Vaidya, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Ajay Kochhar,
Advocate.
For the respondent: rt Mr. M.A.Khan, Addl. AG.
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Justice Rajiv Sharma, J.
This appeal is instituted against the judgment dated 30.7.2014, rendered by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-I, Solan, H.P. in Sessions Trial No. 16-NL/7 of 2012, whereby the appellant-accused (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who was charged with and tried for offence punishable under Sections 302 IPC, has been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he was further ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
2. The case of the prosecution, in a nut shell, is that in the year 2012, M/S Gurmail Chaudhary Labour Contractor, Baddi, had supplied some labourers to M/S Jupiter Solar Power Ltd., Baddi. Dalip Kumar (deceased) son of Roop Lal was on roll of the said company as labourer.
He was working with M/S Jupiter Solar Power Ltd., Baddi in March, 2012. He was residing in House No. A-50, Kailash Vihar, Baddi. The ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 2 residence of the accused was situated across the security guard post of M/S Shree Cosmetics Company. He was residing in the ground floor of .
the building and had taken room on rent through Devinder Wallia (PW-
16) on monthly rent of Rs. 2500/-. Deceased Dalip Kumar was peon in M/S Jupiter Solar Power Ltd., Baddi and was working under the accused.
Sh. Manish Kumar (PW-25), was posted as security guard in Shree of Cosmetics Company, Baddi. In the intervening night of 15/16.3.2012, at about 3:00 AM, accused approached him and asked him about the supervisor. He told that supervisor had left for his house and accused rt asked him to contact the supervisor. But, Manish Kumar PW-25, could not contact him as he was not having balance in the mobile. Thereafter, accused went back. Manish Kumar PW-25 found hands of the accused smeared with blood and even on the next morning when he went out for a round of company premises and found blood drops on the ground where accused was standing. Sh. Sudershan Jamwal PW-5 was Director of M/S Jupiter Solar Power Ltd.. On 16.3.2012, at about 3:07 AM, he received a call from accused that an incident had taken place in his quarter. He informed that peon Dalip Kumar had come to his quarter in the evening and stayed there for a night. Accused also informed him that Dalip Kumar sustained injuries and there was lot of blood. PW-5 asked accused whether Dalip Kumar was alive or not. Accused replied that he did not know. Thereafter PW-5, immediately rang up Sh. Deepak Sharda (PW-9), Manager HR and Sh. Nagpal (PW-8), Administrative Officer, ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 3 informing them about the incident having taken place in the quarter of accused and asked them to reach the Company immediately. Sh.
.
Sudarshan Jamwal went to Company premises, immediately, where he met Sh. Nagpal and he called Sh. Dinesh Kumar, driver (PW-10) through security guard (PW-7). They all went to the quarter of accused. They saw accused standing outside his door with one hand on his neck and another of hand raised up. He was bleeding. They found Dalip Kumar lying on the floor bleeding in the quarter of accused and blood was found all around in the room. Accused alongwith Dalip Kumar were taken to NRI Hospital, rt Baddi, in a vehicle for treatment. Accused was immediately attended to by the doctor and given first aid. Sh. Deepak Sharda PW-9 informed ASI Rakesh Kumar PW-21 over telephone about the incident having taken place at Kailash Vihar. ASI Rakesh Kumar alongwith other police officials came to NRI Hospital, Baddi. He found dead body of Dalip Kumar lying there. Dalip Kumar was declared dead by the doctor. The accused was sent to PGI, Chandigarh for treatment. Rukka Ext. PW-3/A was prepared. FIR Ext. PW-3/B was registered. The knife Ext. P-2 was taken into possession. Doctor Atul Bhardwaj conducted autopsy on 16.3.2012.
The accused was also medically examined. On completion of the investigation, challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities.
3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, has examined as many as 25 witnesses. The accused was also examined under Section ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 4 313 Cr.P.C. He specifically denied the incriminating circumstances put to him. The learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused, as .
noticed hereinabove. Hence, this appeal.
4. Mr. Satyen Vaidya, Sr. Advocate for the accused has vehemently argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused. On the other hand, Mr. M.A.Khan, Addl. Advocate of General, appearing on behalf of the State, has supported the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 30.7.2014.
5. rt We have heard learned counsel for both the sides and gone through the judgment and records of the case carefully.
6. PW-5 Col. Sudershan Singh Jamwal (Retd.) deposed that the accused was posted as Administrative Officer in the Company. On 16.3.2012, at about 3:07 AM, he received a call from the accused that an incident has taken place in his quarter. He stated that their peon, Dalip Kumar had come to his quarter previous evening and stayed there for night. He told that Dalip Kumar sustained injuries and there was a lot of blood. He immediately rushed to the company. He rang up Mr. Deepak Sharda, HR Manager and Mr. Nagpal, Administrative Officer. He told them that some incident had taken place in the quarter of Kuldeep Chand Sharma and asked them to come to Company, immediately. He alongwith Nagpal and other security personnel went to the quarter of Kuldeep Chand Sharma. He saw Kuldeep Chand Sharma standing outside his ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 5 door with one hand on his neck and one hand raised up. He was bleeding badly. He also saw Dalip Kumar deceased lying on the floor. He .
immediately, asked his staff to put them in the vehicle with intention to take them to NRI hospital for medical treatment. He asked HR Manager Mr. Deepak Sharda about his whereabouts. He said that he was coming to the Company. He asked him to go back to the NRI hospital and ask the of doctor to be ready to attend the causalities. On checking, Mr. Dalip Kumar, the doctor declared him dead. After giving the first aid to Mr. Kuldeep Chand Sharma, he referred him immediately to PGI, Chandigarh.
rt He detailed Mr. Nagpal, one security supervisor alongwith the guard to accompany him to PGI, Chandigarh. The police searched the quarter.
One knife and blood stained sack were lying on the floor. One blood stained pair of chappal was also lying there. Knife was packed in a parcel. Blood was lifted from the spot. The case property was taken into possession. He identified knife Ext. P-2. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the accused told him on phone that Dalip Kumar had come to his room. He consumed liquor and stayed there in his room during night. He denied the suggestion that accused had told him on phone that Dalip Kumar deceased tried to cut his neck, while he was sleeping, with some sharp edged weapon. Volunteered that accused was being shifted to PGI after first aid. On asking, he intimated him that Dalip Kumar was trying to cut his throat with knife.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 67. PW-6 Mohit Walia, deposed that the accused produced nothing before the police in his presence. He was declared hostile and .
cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. In his cross-
examination, by the learned Public Prosecutor, he admitted that the accused had shown the place of incident to the police and the police obtained his signatures on memo Ext. PW-6/A. He denied the suggestion of that accused produced two broken teeth before the police which were put in a match box. It was packed and sealed and taken into possession. He also admitted his signatures on memo Ext. PW-6/B. rt
8. PW-7 Surinder Kumar deposed that he alongwith other persons went to the quarter of the accused. He noticed that accused was putting one hand on his neck and his other hand was raised. He was standing outside his room. The light of the room where Dalip Kumar was lying was on. He alongwith Nagpal and Dharam Singh accompanied accused to PGI Chandigarh in the vehicle. He was declared hostile and cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. In his cross-
examination, by the learned Public Prosecutor, he denied the suggestion that he got recorded in his statement made before the police that accused told him at PGI Chandigarh that he caused the death of Dalip Kumar by inflicting knife blow.
9. PW-8 Nagpal, deposed that Col. Jamwal went to the quarter of accused in his vehicle whereas he alongwith the security personnel went in separate vehicle with driver. The hand and neck of the accused ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 7 were bleeding. He was holding his hand which was bleeding. The doctor declared Dalip as "brought dead". The accused was taken to NRI hospital, .
first aid was given to him and he was sent to PGI, Chandigarh. He alongwith Dinesh, Dharam Pal and Surjeet Singh accompanied the accused to Chandigarh in the vehicle. On the way to Chandigarh, the accused did not tell anything to them about the incident. He was of declared hostile and cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor.
10. PW-9 Deepak Sharda, deposed that he went to hospital and also apprised the police that injured had been shifted to NRI, Hospital at rt Baddi and they should come there. When they reached NRI Hospital, Col.
Jamwal alongwith injured and others had already reached there. After some time, the Medical Officer told that Dalip was dead. They further told that the condition of other injured, namely the accused, was very critical and he was shifted to PGI, Chandigarh. He had seen Kuldeep on that day in NRI Hospital, Baddi. He did not have any talk with him on the way.
One kitchen knife was lying on the floor but he did not notice whether it was stained with blood. He was declared hostile and cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. In his cross-examination, by the learned Public Prosecutor, he admitted that all the memos and parcels bear the date. These memos were signed by him after going through the same.
11. PW-10 Dinesh deposed that he reached the spot and the accused was outside his house. He was bleedings. The accused boarded in his vehicle whereas the security officials brought Dalip from the room.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 8He was also put into his vehicle. They took both the injured to NRI Hospital at Baddi. The first aid was given to accused and he was shifted .
to PGI, Chandigarh. He brought the accused to Chandigarh in official vehicle. He was also declared hostile and cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. He denied the suggestion in his cross-examination by the learned P.P. that while being taken to PGI, Chandigarh, the accused of told them that Dalip had died because of stab wound inflicted by him.
12. PW-13 Dr. Atul Bhardwaj, has conducted the autopsy on 16.3.2012 around 2:00 PM.
rt According to him, the injuries were ante mortem in nature. Injury No. 3(a) caused the death of the person. It was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of a person.
The person would have died instantaneously because of the wound and the time gap between death and post mortem was between 6-18 hours.
13. PW-17 Manoj Kumar deposed that on 18.3.2012 at about 2:30 PM, he and Mohit went to Kailash Vihar. Police people were present there and in their presence, the police disclosed the place where the incident happened. He was declared hostile and cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. In his cross-examination, by the learned Public Prosecutor, he admitted that the accused had identified the place where the chappal and knife were lying in the room.
14. PW-18 HHC Kesar Singh deposed that the accused led the police party to Kailash Vihar, Baddi. The accused led to House No. A-50.
The room was locked. The accused opened the lock of the door. Two ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 9 teeth were also there on the floor. These were taken into possession in a match-box and put into parcel.
.
15. PW-21 ASI Rakesh Kumar deposed that on 16.3.2012 at about 3:35 PM, one Deepak Sharda telephonically informed that an altercation had taken place at Kailash Vihar and that injured had been brought to NRI Hospital, Baddi. Report Ext. PW-4/A was written. HC of Amit Kumar went to NRI Hospital Baddi. The doctor had already declared Dalip Kumar brought dead. Accused Kuldeep was bleeding. He was referred to PGI, Chandigarh.
rt The inquest papers vide memo Ext. PW-
21/D was prepared. The accused was discharged from PGI, Chandigarh on 16.3.2012. He was arrested on 17.3.2012. In his cross-examination, he admitted that in chemical examiner's report, alcohol was found in the blood of the deceased.
16. PW-23 Naseeb Singh Patial, Scientific Officer has proved report Ext. PC.
17. PW-24 Dr. Abhilash Alex, has examined the accused. He proved MLC Ext. PW-24/B. According to him, the patient had 10 x 2 cm wound in the left side of the neck, 3 cm below the angle of mandible and at the level of the thyroid cartilage. The wound was only superficial and only muscle deep. There was no major vessel injury or laryngotracheal trauma otherwise the patient was stable. He also admitted that injury was possible with knife Ext. P-2 shown to him in the Court. In his cross-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 10examination, he deposed that if the injury was slightly deeper received by the accused, it would have been fatal.
.
18. PW-25 Manish Kumar, deposed that on the intervening night of 15/16th March, 2012, at about 3:00 AM, accused approached him and asked him about his supervisor. He told him that he has left for his house. The accused asked him to contact him telephonically. He of declined to do so as he was not having balance in his mobile phone.
Thereafter, accused went back. At that time, the hands of the accused were smeared with blood. On the next morning, when he went out for rt round of the company premises, he found blood drops on the ground where the accused was standing on the previous night.
19. What emerges from the evidence discussed hereinabove, is that the deceased Dalip Kumar had gone to the house of accused. The accused informed PW-5 Col. Sudershan Singh that some incident has taken place at his residence. PW-5 Col. Sudershan Singh reached on the spot. He along with Nagpal and other security personnel went to the quarter of the accused. He saw accused standing outside his door with one hand on his neck and other raised up. The accused was bleeding badly. The accused and deceased were taken to the hospital. Dalip Kumar was declared 'brought dead' by the doctor at NRI Hospital, Baddi.
The accused was referred to PGI, Chandigarh on 16.3.2012 itself. The knife Ext. P-2 was recovered from the spot. The autopsy was conducted on the body of deceased Dalip Kumar. The cause of death was ante ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 11 mortem injuries. The death was instantaneous. The time which had elapsed between death and post mortem was between 6-18 hours. The .
accused was also examined by PW-24 Dr. Abhilash Alex.
20. The deceased was working under the accused. He was working as Peon and the accused was the Administrative Officer. PW-13 Dr. Atul Bhardwaj, has noticed the following injuries on the body of the of deceased:
"1. 8 and 9 ribs on the left side were fractured. Corresponding with external gaping wound with slitting of corresponding thoracic wall and musculature.
rt The pericardium was ruptured with massive blood collection with clotted blood lumps in left thoracic cavity. Anterior surface of heart bearing 3-4 cm curvilinear laceration exposing left ventricle chamber. The heart chambers were empty. No evidence of any congenital/valvular hurt disease.
2. The orodental hygiene was fair with no evidence of blood, vomitus or frothing from the upper aero-digestive tract. There was evidence of semi-digestive food with digestive enzymes/secretions in the stomach.
3. (a) There was nearly 4 x 1.5 cm gaping wound with clear cut inverted margins directed upwards and medially with fractured 8 and 9 ribs on left thorax nearly 5 cm below nipple. On probing the wound was tracked upto 10-12 cm piercing internal thoracic muscle and anterior surface of heart.
(b) Nearly 4 x 1 cm gaping wound with clear cut inverted margins on right side back nearly 5 cm from midline at thoracic 6-7 vertebrae level which could be probed upto nearly 5 cm directed downwards and medially."
21. Injury No. 3(a), according to him, was sufficient to cause the death of a person. Injury No. 3(a) was 4 x 1.5 cm gaping wound with clear cut inverted margins directed upwards and medially with fractured 8 and 9 ribs on left thorax, nearly 5 cm below nipple. The wound was tracked upto 10-12 cm piercing internal thoracic muscle and anterior ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 12 surface of heart. Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned Senior Advocate for the accused has vehemently argued that the accused was attacked by Dalip .
Kumar with knife. He has inflicted injury on the neck of the accused and thereafter in order to save his life, injuries were inflicted upon the deceased during scuffle by the accused. He has also referred to the statement of PW-24 Dr. Abhilash Alex, who has examined the accused on of 16.3.2012. PW-24 Dr. Abhilash Alex, has categorically deposed that the accused had 10 x 2 cm wound in the left side of the neck, 3 cm below the angle of mandible and at the level of the thyroid cartilage. In his cross-
rt examination, PW-24 Dr. Abhilash Alex, however, has admitted that if the injury was slightly deeper received by the accused, it would have been fatal. He has also admitted that the neck of a person is a vital part of the body as many vessels lead to brain through neck and if the injury on the neck part, if goes deep up to the vessels, it could prove to be fatal.
22. It has come on record that the accused was bleeding profusely when the witnesses, cited hereinabove, had approached his quarter. He was immediately taken to the NRI Hospital. He was given first aid and thereafter, he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh. The very fact that he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, pre-supposes that he had received injuries and it required immediate attention by the doctors at PGI, Chandigarh. Since the injury was on the neck, the doctor at Baddi in his own wisdom, had referred the accused to PGI, Chandigarh. Thus, there is merit in the contention of Mr. Satyen Vaidya, Sr. Advocate ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 13 appearing for the accused that the deceased firstly has inflicted injury upon the neck of the accused and thereafter accused, in order to save .
himself, has caused injuries to the deceased in a scuffle. The injury on the neck of the accused cannot be said to be self inflicted. However, the fact of the matter is that the accused has exceeded his right of private defence by inflicting several injuries on the body of the deceased. The of accused himself has informed PW-5 Sudarshan Singh about the incident.
He has not run away from the spot. He was present on the spot when the witnesses visited his house. He has not even disturbed the crime spot.
rt The deceased had visited his house for staying overnight. It has also come on record that the deceased had also consumed liquor and the quantity of ethyl alcohol was 159.82 mg%. Moreover, no motive has been attributed to the accused. The defence put forth by the accused is probablized that the deceased firstly attacked the accused and thereafter, he apprehending imminent threat to his life or grievous hurt to him inflicted injuries on the deceased. The accused has used more force what was required on the occasion.
23. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Dev and another vrs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 612, have held that under Section 100, if the person claiming the right of private defence has to face assailants who can be reasonably apprehended to cause grievous hurt to him, it would be open to him to defend himself by causing the death of the assailant. It has been held as follows:
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 14"[11] Section 100 provides inter alia, that the right of private defence of the body extends under the restrictions mentioned .
in Section 99, to the voluntary causing of death if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault. In other words, if the person claiming the right of private defence has to face assailants who can be reasonably apprehended to of cause grievous hurt to him, it would be open to him to defend himself by causing the death of the assailant."
24. rt In the case of The Munney Khan vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1970 (2) SCC 480, Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Bhargava, has held that the right of private defence in that case was very limited one. It only extended to causing hurt of any kind to Reoti Singh, but it did not provide any justification for giving a fatal blow. Such a right of private defence is governed by Section 101 IPC and it is subject to two limitations; one is that, in exercise of this right of private defence any kind of hurt can be caused, but not death; and the other is that the use of force does not exceed the minimum required to save the person in whose defence the force is used. It has been held as follows:
"[4] However, the main point that was canvassed and that arises on these facts is whether the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302, I. P. C., is justified. The findings of fact show that the knife blow was given by the appellant to Reotisingh when Reotisingh, had picked up a quarrel with the appellant's brother Zulfiquar, ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 15 had overpowered him was sitting on his chest, was giving him fist blows, and could not be prevented from doing so by the .
appellant by mere use of his fist. Clearly,in these circumstances, Reotisingh was the aggressor and was causing hurt to Zulfiquar, the brother of the appellant, so that a right of self-defence of body of his brother Zulfiquar had accrued to the appellant. That right, however, could not justify the act of appellant in stabbing Reotisingh in his back of so as to cause his death. The right of private defence was a very limited one. It only extended to causing hurt of any kind to Reotisingh, but it did not provide any justification for rt giving a fatal blow. Such a right of private defence is governed by Section 101, I. P: C., and is subject to two limitations. One is that in exercise of this right of private defence, any kind of hurt can be caused, but not death, and the other is that the use of force does not exceed the minimum required to save the person in whose defence the force is used. In these circumstances, in the present case, when Zulfiquar was being given fist blows only, there could be no justification at all for the appellant to stab Reotisingh with a knife and particularly to give him a blow which could prove fatal by aiming it on his back. The use of the knife itself was in excess of the right of private defence and it became much more excessive when the blow with the knife was given on a vital part of the body which, in the ordinary course of nature, was likely to cause the death of Reotisingh. From the fact that the blow was given in the back with a knife an inference follows that the appellant intended to cause death or at least intended to cause such injury, as would, in the ordinary course of nature, result in his death. In adopting this course, the appellant would have been clearly guilty of the offence of murder had ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 16 there been no right of private defence of Zulfiquar at all. Since such a right did exist, the case would fall under the exception .
under which culpable homicide does not amount to murder on the ground that the death was caused in exercise of right of private defence but by exceeding that right. An offence of this nature is made punishable under the first part of Sec.
304, I. P. C. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant must be under that provision and not under Section 302, I. P. of C."
25. In the same judgment, Hon'ble Mr. Justice I.D. Dua, has observed that the right of private defence is codified in Section 96 to 100 rt IPC, which have all to be read together in order to have a proper grasp of the scope and the limitations of this right. By enacting these sections in the Code, the authors wanted to except from the operation of its penal clauses, class of acts done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression. This right is available against an offence and, therefore, where an act is done in exercise of the right of private defence such act cannot give rise to any right of private defence in favour of the aggressor in return. This would seem to be so even if the person exercising the right of private defence has the better of his aggressor provided of course he does not exceed his right because the moment he exceeds it, he commits an offence. There is also no right of private defence in cases where there is time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the statute, available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It has been held as follows:
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 17"[3] The right of private defence is codified in Sections 96 to100, I. P. C., which have all to be read together in order to have a proper grasp of the scope and the limitations of this .
right. By enacting these sections the authors of the Code wanted to except from the operation of its penal clauses classes of acts done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression. This right is available against an offence and, there fore, where an act is done in exercise of the right of private defence such act cannot give rise to any right of private defence in favour of the aggressor in return. This would seem to be so even if the person exercising the right of private defence has the better of his aggressor provided of of course he does not exceed his right because the moment he exceeds it, he commits an offence. There is also no right of private defence in cases where there is time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the rt statute, available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed of as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose.
According to Section 97 this right vests even in strangers for the defence of the body and property of other persons against offences mentioned therein. The courts have, therefore, to be careful in seeing that no one on the mere pretext of the exercise of the right of private defence takes sides in a quarrel between two or more persons and inflict injuries on the one or the other. In a case when two parties are having a free fight without disclosing as to who is the initial aggressor it may be dangerous as a general rule to clothe either of them or his sympathiser with a right of private defence. If, however, one of them is shown to be committing an offence affecting human body then that would of course seem to give rise to such right. If there is no initial right of private defence then there can hardly be any question of exceeding that right. With these observations which I have considered proper to make in order to guard myself against any possible misunderstanding about the precise scope of the right of private defence I agree with my learned brother."
26. In this case, the conviction was converted from Section 302 to Section 304, Part I, IPC.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 1827. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deo Narain vrs. The State of U.P., reported in (1973) 1 SCC 347, have .
held that the right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not have been committed and such right continues so long as such apprehension of of danger to the body continues. Their lordships have further held that in such moments of excitement or disturbed mental equilibrium, it is somewhat difficult to expect parties facing grave aggression to cooly weigh rt as if in golden scales, and calmly determine with a composed mind as to what precise kind and severity of blow would be legally sufficient for effectively meeting the unlawful aggression. It has been held as follows:
"[5] In our opinion, the High Court does seem to have erred in law in convicting the appellant on the ground that he had exceeded the right of private defence. What the High court really seems to have missed is the provision of law embodied in Section 102, Indian Penal Code. According to that section the right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed, and such right continues so long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues. The threat, however, must reasonably give rise to the present and imminent, and not remote or distant, danger. This right rests on the general principle that where a crime is endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force in self-defence. To say that the appellant could only claim the right to use force after he had sustained a serious injury by an aggressive wrongful assault is a complete misunderstanding of the law embodied in the above section. The right of private defence is available for protection against apprehended unlawful aggression and not for punishing the aggressor for the offence committed by him. It is a preventive and not punitive right. The right to punish for the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 19 commission of offences vests in the State (which has a duty to maintain law and order) and not in private individuals. If after sustaining a serious injury there is no apprehension of .
further danger to the body then obviously the right of private defence would not be available. In our view, therefore, as soon as the appellant reasonably apprehended danger to his body even from a real threat on the part of the party of the complainant to assault him for the purpose of forcibly taking possession of the plots in dispute or of obstructing their cultivation, he got the right of private defence and to use adequate force against the wrongful aggressor in exercise of that right. There can be little doubt that on the conclusions of of the two courts below that the party of the complainant had deliberately come to forcibly prevent or obstruct the possession of the accused persons and that this forcible obstruction and prevention was unlawful the appellant could reasonably apprehend imminent and present danger to his rt body and to his companions. The complainants were clearly determined to use maximum force to achieve their end. He was thus fully justified in using force to defend himself and if necessary also his companions against the apprehended danger which was manifestly imminent. Again, the approach of the High Court that merely because the complainant's party had used lathis, the appellant was not justified in using his spear is no less misconceived and insupportable. During the course of a marpeet, like the present, the use of a lathi on the head may very well give rise to a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would result from an injury caused thereby. It cannot be laid down as a general rule that the use of a lathi as distinguished from the use of a spear must always be held to result only in milder injury. Much depends on the nature of the lathi, the part of the body aimed at and the force used in giving the blow. Indeed, even a spear is capable of being so used as to cause a very minor injury. The High Court seems in this connection to have overlooked the provision contained in Section 100, I.P.C. We do not have any of the lathi. The blow, it is known, was aimed at a vulnerable part like the head. A blow by a lathi on the head may prove instantaneously fatal and cases are not unknown in which such a blow by a lathi has actually proved instantaneously fatal. If, therefore, a blow with a lathi is aimed at a vulnerable part like the head we do not think it can be laid down as a sound proposition of law that in such cases the victim is not justified in using his spear in defending himself. In such moments of excitement or disturbed mental equilibrium it is somewhat difficult to ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 20 expect parties facing grave aggression to coolly weigh, as if in golden scales, and calmly determine with a composed mind as to what precise kind and severity of blow would be legally .
sufficient for effectively meeting the unlawful aggression. No doubt, the High Court does seem to be aware of this aspect because the other accused persons were given the benefit of this rule. But while dealing with the appellant's case curiously enough the High Court has denied him the right of private defence on the sole ground that he had given a dangerous blow with considerable force with a spear on the chest of the deceased though he himself had only received a superficial lathi blow on his head. This view of the High Court of is not only unrealistic and unpractical but also contrary to law and indeed even in conflict with its own observation that in such cases the matter cannot be weighed in scales of gold."
27. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of rt Yogendra Morarji vrs. The State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1980 SC 660, have laid down general principles embodied in the Penal Code, governing the exercise of right of private defence as follows:
"[13] The Code excepts from the operation of its penal clauses large classes of acts done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression but this right has been regulated and circumscribed by several principles and limitations. The most salient of them concerned the defence of body are as under: Firstly, there is no right of private defence against an act which is not in itself an offence under the code; Secondly, the right commences as soon as - and not before- a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit some offence although the offence may not have been committed and it is conterminous with the duration of such apprehension (Section 102). That is to say, right avails only against a danger imminent, present and real; Thirdly, it is a defensive and not a punitive or retributive right. Consequently, in no case the right extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of the defence. (Sec. 99). In other words, the injury which is inflicted by the person exercising the right should be commensurate with the injury with which he is threatened. At the same time, it is difficult to expect from a person exercising this right in good faith, to weigh "with golden scales" what maximum amount of force is ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 21 necessary to keep within the right. Every reasonable allowance should be made for the bona fide defender "if he with the instinct of self-preservation strong upon him, .
pursues his defence a little further than may be strictly necessary in the circumstances to avert the attack." It would be wholly unrealistic to expect of a person under assault, to modulate his defence step by step according to the attack; Fourthly, the right extends to the killing of the actual or potential assailant when there is a reasonable and imminent apprehension of the atrocious crimes enumerated in the six clauses of Section 100. For our purpose, only the first two clauses of Section 100 are relevant. This combined effect of of these two clauses is that taking the life of the assailant would be justified on the plea of private defence; if the assault causes reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the person exercising the right. In other words, a person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb rt may in the exercise of right of self-defence inflict any harm, even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened. This principle is also subject to the proceeding rule that the harm or death inflicted to avert the danger is not substantially disproportionate to and incommensurate with the quality and character of the perilous act or threat intended to be repelled; Fifthly, there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat, for the person confronted with an impending peril to life or of grave bodily harm, except by inflicting death on the assailant; Sixthly; the right being, in essence, a defensive right, does not accrue and avail where there is "time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities." (Sec.
99)."
28. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Scaria alias Thankan vrs. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2342, have held that the accused by inflicting four injuries on the deceased and also a serious injury on another victim, he certainly exceeded the right of private defence. Thus, he was convicted under Section 304, Part I IPC instead of Section 302 IPC. Their lordships have held as follows:
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 22"[6] The High Court while upsetting that finding held that the accused had no right of private defence and he was armed with a knife and deliberately inflicted injuries on these .
persons. It may be mentioned that PW-1 who gave the report did not say anything about the accused having received any injury. No doubt, at a later stage, the prosecution has made an effort to explain away the injuries on the accused but when a specific plea has been put forward by the accused and the presence of injuries of him is corroborated by medical evidence, the Court has to see whether the plea set up by him is plausible. It is needless to say that the accused need not affirmatively establish that he had a right of private defence of and he exercised the same in that manner. The General Exception which deals with the right of private defence lays emphasis on the reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused while exercising the right of private defence. However, for the purpose of this case, we need not go into the rt various aspects that have to be kept in mind in giving benefit of the General Exception to the accused. Suffice it to say that where an injury is found on the accused and if the accused comes forward with a specific plea, the same has to be considered in the facts and the surrounding circumstances obtaining in the case. Every kind of explanation put forward particularly at the belated stage by the prosecution will not be sufficient and cannot be held to be an appropriate explanation to reject the version put forward by the accused particularly when it does not appear to be false but, on the other hand, appears to be plausible. The injury was inflicted on the forehead of the accused which is on a vital part. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the accused had no reasonable apprehension that some hurt, at least, would be caused to him. Further, as pleaded by him, there were three persons who were about to attack. The presence of the three persons at the scene of occurrence is not in dispute. In such a case, naturally, a reasonable apprehension would have been there in the mind of the accused. It is in this back- ground we have to consider the plea set up by the accused and examine whether the accused was justified in exercise of right of private defence. At least, a reasonable doubt arises in this case when we consider the prosecution version as well as the version put forward by the accused in the light of the facts and surrounding circumstances and the situation in which the occurrence had taken place.
[7] As already mentioned, they are all closely related to each other. Though the trial court has not satisfactorily dealt with the aspect of right of self defence but we, having given our ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 23 earnest consideration, are of the view that the plea set up by the accused cannot simply be brushed aside. Under these circumstances, it is quite reasonable to hold that the accused .
had the right of self-defence. However, having regard to the fact that he inflicted four injuries on the deceased and also a serious injury on PW-2, he certainly exceeded the same. Therefore, Exception (2) to Section 300 I.P.C. is attracted and not the General Exception, as held by the trial court.
[8] Accordingly, in the result, we set aside the conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentence of life imprisonment awarded thereunder and convict him under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. and sentence him to undergo 7 years, R. I. The of other sentences and convictions are, however, confirmed. The sentences are directed to run concurrently."
29. In the case of Wassan Singh vrs. State of Punjab, reported in rt (1996) 1 SCC 458, their lordships have held that reasonable apprehension of the accused that grievous hurt will be caused to him must be judged from the subjective point of view of the accused and cannot be subjected to microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. It has been held as follows:
[10] While judging the nature of apprehension which an accused can reasonably entertain in such circumstances requiring him to act on the spur of the moment when he finds himself assaulted, by number of persons, it is difficult to judge the action of the accused from the cool atmosphere of the courtroom. Such situations have to be judged in the light of what happens on the spur of the moment on spot and keeping in view the normal course of human conduct as to how a person would react under such circumstances in a sudden manner with an instinct of self-preservation. Such situations have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the accused concerned who is confronted with such a situation on spot and cannot be subjected to any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In this connection it is profitable to refer to two decisions of this court. In the case of Mohd. Ramzani v. State of Delhi, a division bench of this court speaking through Sarkaria, J. made the following pertinent observations:::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 24
".. The onus which rests on an accused person under Section 105, Evidence Act, to establish his plea of private defence is not as onerous as the unshifting .
burden which lies on the prosecution to establish every ingredient of the offence with which the accused is charged, beyond reasonable doubt. It is further well established that a person faced with imminent peril of life and limb of himself or another, is not expected to weigh in 'golden scales' the precise force needed to repel the danger. Even if he in the heat of the moment carries his defence a little further than what would be necessary when calculated with precision and of exactitude by a calm and unruffled mind, the law makes due allowance for it. . "
In the case of Deo Narain v. State of U. P. , this court was concerned with a situation where the accused had received a blow on his head by a 467 lathi' and in self-defence he had rt used his spear in retaliation. While holding :hat the accused was entitled to the right of private defence extending to iven causing death, in such a case, he was acquitted of the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. In this connection Dua, J. , speaking for this court in paragraph 5 of the Report has made these pertinent observations:
"In our opinion, the High court does seem to have erred in law in convicting the appellant on the ground that he had exceeded the right of private defence. What the High court really seems to have missed is the provision of law embodied in Section 102, Indian Penal Code. According to that section the right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not have been committed, and such right continues so long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues. The threat, however, must reasonably give rise to the present and imminent, and not remote or distant danger. This right rests on the general principle that where a crime is endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force in self-defence. To say that the appellant could only claim the right to use force after he had sustained a serious injury by an aggressive wrongful assault is a complete misunderstanding of the law embodied in the above section. The right of private defence is available for protection against apprehended unlawful aggression and not for punishing the aggressor for the offence ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 25 committed by him. It is a preventive and not punitive right. The right to punish for the commission of offences vests in the State (which has a duty to .
maintain law and order) and not in private individuals.
. the approach of the High court that merely because the complainant's party had used lathis, the appellant was not justified in using his spear is no less misconceived and insupportable. During the course of a marpeet, like the present, the use of a lathi on the head may very well give rise to a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would result from an injury caused thereby. It cannot be laid down as a general of rule that the use of a lathi as distinguished from the use of a spear must always be held to result only in milder injury. Much depends on the nature of the lathi, the part of the body aimed at and the force used in giving the blow. Indeed, even a spear is capable of being rt so used as to cause a very minor injury. The High court seems in this connection to have overlooked the provision contained in Section 100, Indian Penal Code.
We do not have any evidence about the size or the nature of the lathi. The blow, it is known, was aimed at a vulnerable part like the head. A blow by a lathi on the head may prove instantaneously fatal and cases are not unknown in which such a blow by a lathi has actually proved instantaneously fatal. If, therefore, a blow with a lathi is aimed at a vulnerable part like the head we do not think it can be laid down as a sound proposition of law that in such cases the victim is not justified in using his spear in defending himself. In such moments of excitement or disturbed mental equilibrium it is somewhat difficult to expect parties facing grave aggression to coolly weigh, as if in golden scales, and 468 calmly determine with a composed mind as to what precise kind and severity of blow would be legally sufficient for effectively meeting the unlawful aggression. No doubt, the High court does seem to be aware of this aspect because the other accused persons were given the benefit of this rule. But while dealing with the appellant's case curiously enough the High court has denied him the right of private defence on the sole ground that he had given a dangerous blow with considerable force with a spear on the chest of the deceased though he himself had only received a superficial lathi blow on his head. This view of the High court is not only unrealistic and impractical but also ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 26 contrary to law and indeed even in conflict with its own observation that in such cases the matter cannot be weighed in scales of gold. "
.
30. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rizan and another vrs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 661, have held that in order to find whether the right of private defence is available or not, the injuries caused by the accused and the of circumstances whether the accused had time to have recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered. It has been held as follows: rt [13] Then comes plea relating to alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it. If the same is available to be considered from the material on record. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets of the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 27 reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution .
evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the of basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and others v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702; State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima, AIR 1975 SC 1478; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan, AIR 1977 SC 2226 and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 577). Sections 100 to 101 rt define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 391). runs as follows :
'It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross- examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing defence evidence.' The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea.
[14] The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for determining who the aggressor was. It cannot be stated as a universal rule that whenever the injuries are on the body of the accused persons, a presumption must necessarily be raised that the accused persons had caused injuries in exercise of the right of private defence. The defence has to further establish that the injuries so caused on the accused ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 28 probabilises the version of the right of private defence. Non- explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very .
important circumstances. But mere non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle applies to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. [See Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 SC 2263)]. In this case, as the of Courts below found there was not even a single injury on the accused persons, while PW-2 sustained large number of injuries and was hospitalized for more than a month. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private rt defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject-matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. Sections 100 and 101, IPC define the limit and extent of right of private defence.
[16] In order to find whether right of private defence is available or not, the injuries received by the accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the accused and the circumstances whether the accused had time to have recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered. Thus, running to house, fetching a ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 29 tabli and assaulting the deceased are by no means a matter of course. These acts bear stamp of a design to kill and take the case out of the purview of private defence. Similar view .
was expressed by this Court in Biran Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 SC 87 and recently in Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu (2002 (7) Supreme 124).
31. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Singh vrs. Poonam Singh and others, reported in 2003 Cri.
of L.J. 4478, have held that non-explanation of the injury sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is rt a very important circumstance.
32. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Subramani and another vrs. State of T.N., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 358, have held that whether the injuries were commensurate with the danger apprehended, should be considered pragmatically and not with mathematical precision and hyper technical approach. It has been held as follows:
[11] Only question which needs to be considered is the alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in self- defence. If the circumstances show that the right of private ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 30 defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available .
to be considered from the material on record. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act'), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-
defence. The Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses of examined for the prosecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of rt assessing the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable artd probable version satisfying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors v. Delhi Administration, state of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima, State Of U. P V. Mohd.
Musheer Khan and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab. Sections 100 to 101 define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U. P. , runs as follows:
"it is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross- examination of the prosecution witnesses or by ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:51:46 :::HCHP 31 adducing defence evidence. " the accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show .
as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea.
33. In view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, the appeal is partly allowed. The accused is convicted under Section 304 (Part I) IPC, instead of Section 302 IPC. The accused be heard on the of quantum of sentence for offence under Section 304 (Part I) IPC on 9.9.2015. The Registry is directed to prepare the production warrant and send the same to the concerned Superintendent of Jail for production of rt the accused on 9.9.2015.
( Rajiv Sharma ), Judge.
September 03, 2015, ( Sureshwar Thakur ),
(karan) Judge.
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